Judgment 1. The six petitioners have been bound down in a proceeding under S.107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a bond of Rs. 1000/- each with two sureties of the like amount to keep peace for a period of one year and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for the same period. 2. It was on the basis of a Police report dated 12-2-1960 that this proceeding was started against the present petitioners and five others and another proceeding against Thakur Prasad Mishra, opposite party No. 2 and five others. The two proceedings proceeded separately, but side by side, and judgments in both of them were delivered by the trial court on the same date, being 2-2-1961. The proceeding against opposite party no. 2 and others was dropped, but the present petitioners along with five others were bound down. On appeal, the order of the trial Court against the six petitioners has been confirmed and it has been set aside against the other five. The petitioners have since filed this application in revision. 3. The facts of the case may be stated in brief. The proceeding was started as mentioned above on the basis of a police report. The police had been in the locality of the parties to investigate a case between them. This case related to an incident of 9-2-1960 under sections 143 and 379 of the Penal Code. The Police reported that the relations between the parties were strained and that they had been fighting litigations among them. The report referred to a previous proceeding under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which terminated before the trial Court on 8-1-1960, and in that proceeding the petitioners had been bound down, but it later transpired that they had been acquitted by the Court of appeal. The police report referred to a proceeding under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was pending between the parties. It further referred to another incident of 7-2-1960 regarding theft of certain crops and threat of assault at the hands of some of the petitioners. The police recommended action under section 107 of the Code against both the parties, and accordingly proceedings were started against both. I am no longer concerned with the proceeding against the opposite party. 4. It further referred to another incident of 7-2-1960 regarding theft of certain crops and threat of assault at the hands of some of the petitioners. The police recommended action under section 107 of the Code against both the parties, and accordingly proceedings were started against both. I am no longer concerned with the proceeding against the opposite party. 4. In the present proceeding, six witnesses were examined on behalf of the opposite party and one on behalf of the petitioners. The witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioners, apart from speaking to the strained feelings between the parties leading to a previous proceeding under section 107 and another under section 133, which was still pending, spoke of two specific overt acts; one referred to the incident of 7-2-1960 and the other of 9-2-1960. It was said that on 7-2-1960 the petitioners had uprooted Bhaoli crop from a field of opposite party No. 2 who deposed as witness No. 6 and that they had assaulted him also. The further evidence of some of the witnesses was that on 9-2-1960, the petitioners along with others, had forcibly uprooted Sarso crop from the land of opposite party No. 2 and on protest petitioner Shiblal ran after him to assault him. P. Ws. 1 and 2 spoke about the incident of 9-2-1960, and P. W. 6 alone spoke about the incident of 7-2-1960. There were regular cases filed against the petitioners with regard to those incidents, and both the cases were pending at the time this proceeding was decided. The Courts below did not, therefore, refer to the merits of the case in deciding the present proceeding. 5. It was, however, complained on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 that it was during the pendency of the present proceeding that two further incidents happened. It was alleged that on 31-3-1960, while opposite party No. 2 (P. W. 6) was going from the Court of Mr. K. Narain that petitioners Jagdamb, Jogi, Tribenj and another person named Surat Surrounded him on a part (sic) piece of land north of the Court and were ready to assault him, but he was saved on the intervention of some persons, including Ramchandra (P. W. 4). This incident was spoken by P. Ws. 4 and 6. K. Narain that petitioners Jagdamb, Jogi, Tribenj and another person named Surat Surrounded him on a part (sic) piece of land north of the Court and were ready to assault him, but he was saved on the intervention of some persons, including Ramchandra (P. W. 4). This incident was spoken by P. Ws. 4 and 6. A petition regarding this incident had also been filed in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, and the petition in the proceeding in this case, has been marked as Ext. 1, and it is on the record. 6. The other incident complained of was of 4-4-1960. It was spoken to by P. Ws. 5 and 6. The allegation was that P. W. 6 was on his way back home on a cycle from Laheriasarai, when near Ghoghranala, petitioners Shiblal, Ruplal and Mohan surrounded him and caught hold of his cycle. They were ready to assault him but again he was saved at the intervention of Julum Paswan (P. W. 5) a chaukidar of the place. 7. The Court of appeal below restrained from dealing with the merits of the incidents relating to 7-2-1960 and 9-2-1960, because the cases were sub judice at the time. It has, therefore, relied mainly on the subsequent events, which took place during the pendency of the proceeding. It has on weighing the evidence believed in the happening of these two events. Besides, these two events, it has also taken into consideration the extremely strained relationship between the parties, prevailing from before the initiation of the proceeding. 8. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that having ignored the overt acts of 7-2-1960 and 9-2-1960, the Court of appeal below was not quite correct in binding down the petitioners on the happening of the subsequent events after the initiation of the proceeding. It is said that any evidence in connection with the subsequent events, not being a part of the information on which the proceeding was drawn up, is inadmissible. In support of the contention, reliance has been placed upon the decision of Knox, J., in Juggan v. Emperor, AIR 1914 All 382. In that case, there was a proceeding under section 110 of the code of Criminal procedure. In support of the contention, reliance has been placed upon the decision of Knox, J., in Juggan v. Emperor, AIR 1914 All 382. In that case, there was a proceeding under section 110 of the code of Criminal procedure. A petition for the transfer of the case from the Court of the particular magistrate holding the enquiry had been moved on one of the grounds that the Magistrate had allowed to be given at the trial some further evidence, which was not in the information on which the proceeding had been started. Knox, J., in his interpretation of the words such further evidence as may appear necessary" in section 117, observed that they referred to evidence ejusdem generis with the evidence described to the words which immediately precede it. His Lordship said that the Magistrate, while dealing with a proceeding under section 110, should confine himself to the truth of the information, upon which action has been taken. 9. Section 117 of the Code lays down the procedure of enquiry in a proceeding under section 107 amongst others. Section 112 sets out how a Magistrate should initiate the enquiry. One of the requirements is that he should set forth the substance of the information received, on which the proceeding is based Section 117 requires that "the magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary." 10. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions and on the observation of Knox, J., it has been contended that the Magistrate conducting the enquiry cannot, in recording the evidence, travel beyond the information upon which action has been taken. Any further evidence, required to be taken must be confined to such information. I do not quite agree with this contention. 11. A proceeding under section 107 is required to be taken when the Magistrate is informed that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity." The proceeding can be taken even on the apprehension of a breach of the peace, but such an apprehension has to be supported by some overt acts before the initiation of the proceeding. It is not necessary that the proceeding should be based on the commission of any overt act itself but if such overt act leads to any inference of future apprehension of a breach of the peace, the proceeding will be justified. Now, if after the initiation of the proceeding any further overt act has been committed, indicative of the continuance of the apprehension of the breach of the peace, the Magistrate making the enquiry could allow the evidence of such subsequent act to be given, provided, however, the accused had an opportunity to meet the same. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a decision of a single Judge in In re A. V. Srinivasalu Reddiar, AIR 1942 Mad 242 (1) in support of his contention that before evidence of any subsequent event is given, there should be a supplementary charge framed in the proceeding. This decision, however, does not lay down that without a formal charge of the subsequent events, the proceeding will be bad. On the other hand, there is an observation in the judgment that "it would be unfortunate if a Court could not take judicial notice of what had taken place after the institution of proceedings of this nature." What happened in this case was that after a preliminary order under section 112 of the Code of Criminal procedure had been issued by the Magistrate on a certain information, there were further information brought on the record, and these subsequent informations were also incorporated in the proceeding. It was contended that this could not have been done, but the contention was overruled. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has further relied on the decision of Das, J., in pir Ali Kasab v. Emperor, AIR 1920 Pat 550 in support of his contention that evidence of subsequent events is inadmissible. But, in my opinion, this decision goes against the contention of the learned counsel. In that case, the accused had enticed away a dedicated bull to the house of one of them and slaughtered it secretly. The case was started under sections 295 and 429 of the Penal Code. The accused were, however, discharged. Meanwhile, the police recommended initiation of proceedings under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that case, the accused had enticed away a dedicated bull to the house of one of them and slaughtered it secretly. The case was started under sections 295 and 429 of the Penal Code. The accused were, however, discharged. Meanwhile, the police recommended initiation of proceedings under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The report was that the action of the Muhammedan butchers had created a sensation among the Hindus of the locality and wounded their feelings, and it was expected that the accused being butchers would not give up their habit but would commit such mischief at any moment which might disturb public tranquillity. These facts were found insufficient to have given a jurisdiction to the Magistrate to initiate a proceeding, but during the enquiry some evidence of tangible nature had been allowed to be given. It was with reference to such evidence of the subsequent stage that Das, J., observed : I have grave doubts whether this evidence was admissible, inasmuch as the Magistrate clearly did not act on any information of this definite contemplated act on the part of the petitioners. It was argued, however, that this evidence of conduct was in support of the allegation on which proceedings were initiated. In my opinion, if there was nothing in the allegations themselves on which proceedings could be initiated, evidence of Subsequent conduct would be admissible in support of those allegations, but if on those allegations the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to act, evidence of subsequent conduct is not admissible nor would confer jurisdiction when there was none originally. I have come to the conclusion that in this case the learned Magistrate had no tangible evidence that some definite wrongful act was contemplated, which act if committed, caused a breach of the peace. That being so, he had no jurisdiction to act under section 107 of the Code at all. 12 It would appear that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate will depend on the initial allegations. If on the initial allegations the Magistrate could start an enquiry under section 107, evidence of subsequent conduct would in that case, be admissible. But, if the very proceeding from its inception was bad for want of jurisdiction, evidence of subsequent conduct would be inadmissible. 13. The question is whether, on the allegations as made out in the police report, the proceeding could have been validly initiated. But, if the very proceeding from its inception was bad for want of jurisdiction, evidence of subsequent conduct would be inadmissible. 13. The question is whether, on the allegations as made out in the police report, the proceeding could have been validly initiated. The police report mentioned strained relationship between the parties. It referred to the termination of a prior proceeding under section 107 and another proceeding under section 133 which was pending. It further referred to the incidents of 7-2-1960 and 9-2-1960, regarding which specific cases had been started. From these incidents, the police was apprehensive of a future breach of the peace at the hands of both the parties. On considering these reports the Magistrate initiated the proceeding. These allegations were specific and not of general nature. Thus, the initiations of the proceeding was quite competent. That being so, evidence of subsequent events was admissible. 14. I may, however, observe that if any evidence, of subsequent conduct or event is given it should either be incorporated in a supplementary order under section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or when no such order is made and evidence has been allowed to be given the accused must have an opportunity to meet the same. The question to be considered in the present case is whether the accused had an opportunity to defend themselves against the accusations of subsequent events. The witnesses who spoke to the subsequent events had been cross examined on behalf of the petitioners. They had also examined their own witness. They were defended by a lawyer. Thus, they had full opportunity to meet the accusations of the two subsequent events which the two Courts below, after a consideration of the evidence, have found to be correct. There has been no prejudice to them. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the accused persons in both the cases relating to the incidents of 7-2-1960 and 9-2-1960 have since been acquitted, and he has also showed me the judgments of these cases. But, their acquittal in those cases has no relevancy to the validity of the present proceeding. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the accused persons in both the cases relating to the incidents of 7-2-1960 and 9-2-1960 have since been acquitted, and he has also showed me the judgments of these cases. But, their acquittal in those cases has no relevancy to the validity of the present proceeding. It is not the result of any specific case which is started in connection with any overt act that gives jurisdiction to a Magistrate to initiate a proceeding under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but it is the apprehension of a breach of the peace indicated by any one or series of overt acts and circumstances that give the jurisdiction. Now, after the proceeding, if any case on any particular overt act fails, the proceeding under section 107 is not rendered bad for that reason alone. An acquittal on the specific charge may be for so many reasons, not necessarily due to the falsity of the case. In both the cases, as the judgments will show, the acquittal was not due to the falsity of either of the two cases. In one, the learned Magistrate did not consider it safe to rely on the prosecution witnesses as they were interested, and in the other, the accused were given only benefit of doubt. By no means they show that the incidents of 7-2-1960 and 9-2-1960 were false. Besides, the present proceeding was started for other reasons as well, like strained feelings and previous enmity. Those incidents of 7-2-1960 and 9-2-1960 were only cited as materials in support of future apprehension of a breach of the peace. The order binding down the petitioners does not appear to be bad. 16. In the result, the application is dismissed..