BHARGAVA, J.—The only question which calls for determination in this revision application is whether the order of the learned Magistrate in dropping proceedings against opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in the complaint filed by the petitioner against them and ten other persons out of whom Nos. 3 to 10 are municipal employees and Nos. 11 and 12 are police constables is legally justified. Opposite party No. 2 Shri T.N. Chaturvedi is the Administrator, Municipal Council, Ajmer and opposite party No. 3 Shri Prayagraj Mathur is the Commissioner, Municipal Council, Ajmer. The learned Magistrate has dropped proceedings against them on the ground that prior sanction of the State Government as required by sec. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was necessary for their prosecution. 2. In the complaint which was filed on 2nd June, 1961, it was alleged that the complainant was the owner of a shop known as Kashmir Confectionery Mart AMC No. X/412, outside Madar Gate, Ajmer. Outside the shop there was a chabutri measuring 3 x 10. Besides there was a land measuring 10x 6 which the complainant had taken on rent from the Municipal Council. It was alleged that the complainant had erected a wooden cabin on the chabutri and the land taken on rent and the cabin along with its fittings had cost him Rs. 5000/-. It was stated that on 18th March, 1961, opposite party No. 2 came to his shop and asked him to push it back by 3 which the complainant did. On 18th April, 1961, it is said that opposite party No. 2 sent members of his staff who trespassed into the shop of the complainant which was then closed, went on its roof and, after cutting the corrugated iron sheets took them away. When the complainant came to know of it he came his shop and enquired from the gangmen about their authority to remove the corrugated iron sheets, upon which they told him that they had been sent under the order of the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, though no such orders were shown to him. Again on 3rd May, 1961, at about 11 A.M. opposite parties Nos. 4 to 12 along with 15 other gangmen came to the complainants shop with a municipal truck, trespassed into the shop, refused to quit it when the complainant asked them to do so and completely dismantled it. 2 and 3, though no such orders were shown to him. Again on 3rd May, 1961, at about 11 A.M. opposite parties Nos. 4 to 12 along with 15 other gangmen came to the complainants shop with a municipal truck, trespassed into the shop, refused to quit it when the complainant asked them to do so and completely dismantled it. On being asked they told the complainant that they had been sent to demolish the shop by the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. Opposite parties Nos. 4 to 12 after dismantling the shop committed theft and took away all the goods, account and cash; in all worth about Rs. 20,000/-. A list of the stolen property was annexed with the complaint. It is said that all the stolen goods of the shop of the complainant were handed over to opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in the Municipal Office which have since then been retained by them knowing and having reason to believe that it was stolen property. It was alleged that opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 assisted and abetted the commission of the offences by the other accused persons. In the end it was stated that as a result of the above illegal acts of the accused persons the complainant had been defamed and had lost his prestige in the eyes of the traders and general community. According to the complainant the aforesaid acts of the opposite parties amounted to offences punishable under sec. 147,427,451,380, 411 and 50 of the Indian Penal Code read with sec. 34/109 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. Before taking any proceedings on the complaint, the learned Magistrate himself raised an objection regarding the prosecution of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 without the previous sanction of the State Government and called upon the complainants counsel to satisfy him on that question. Arguments were heard on 10th June, 1961 and on 14th June, 1961 he passed the order which is the subject matter of this revision. The learned Magistrate says in this order: "I have carefully considered the arguments of the counsel for the complainant. The persons complained against Shri Triloktnath Chaturvedi Administrator Municipal Council, Ajmer and Shri Prayag Raj Mathur, Commissioner, Municipal Council Ajmer are public officers appointed by the State Government for which a prior sanction from the State Government for prosecution is required as provided under sec. 197 Cr. The persons complained against Shri Triloktnath Chaturvedi Administrator Municipal Council, Ajmer and Shri Prayag Raj Mathur, Commissioner, Municipal Council Ajmer are public officers appointed by the State Government for which a prior sanction from the State Government for prosecution is required as provided under sec. 197 Cr. P. C. I have very carefully examined the record of the case wherein such sanction is wanted. I, therefore, feel disinclined to take any proceedings against the officers noted above in the absence of the sanction under sec. 197 Cr. P. C." The matter was taken in revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer but he refused to interfere. The complainant has now come to this Court and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is against law and procedure because he could not decide the question unless opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 had appeared before him and showed that the acts complained of were done by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. It is contended that the order of the learned Magistrate does not show that he was satisfied that the acts complained of were such as fell under sec. 197 Cr.P.C. It was next contended that the acts complained of which constitute the offences of theft and of receiving stolen property punishable under sec. 380 and 411 I.P.C. cannot have any reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty and as such no question of previous sanction arises as far as these offences are concerned. 4. On the other hand learned Deputy Government Advocate and counsel for the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 maintain that the question of applicability of sec. 197 should be decided by reference to the statements in the complaint before proceedings are initiated. It is urged that though the learned Magistrate has not said in his order in clear terms that the acts complained of were committed in the discharge of official duty yet the allegations contained in the complaint show that the acts were committed while opposite parties were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. It is urged that the protection given under sec. 197 Cr.P.C. will also extend to the offences under sec. It is urged that the protection given under sec. 197 Cr.P.C. will also extend to the offences under sec. 380 and 411 I.P.C. because the acts constituting these offences bear a reasonable relation with official duty. 5. Now on the terms of sec. 197 Cr.P.C. it is abundantly clear that a Magistrate should decide the question whether sec. 197 Cr.P.C. has application in the case or not at the earliest stage on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint and need not defer the decision till the public servants appear and raise the objection before him. However, the requisite condition is that there should be proper materials from which the Magistrate may come to the finding that the acts complained of had any reasonable relation with the official duty of the public servant. In case the facts stated in the complaint do not disclose the relation of the acts complained of with the official duty and the Magistrate has no other material before him to decide the question he will not be precluded from deciding it at any further stage of the case when such materials become available on the record. Criminal proceedings against public servants can not be dropped for this reason alone that they are public servants and are not removable from their office save by or with the sanction of the State Government. Some reasonable nexus between the acts complained of and the official duty must be shown to attract the ban imposed by sec. 197 Cr.P.C. Provisions of sec. 197 Cr.P.C. are undoubtedly meant to protect the public servants from vexatious complaints with regard to acts committed by them in the discharge of their official duties but by no means can be extended to afford immunity to them in respect of acts which have no relation whatsoever with the discharge of their official duty. It is a question of fact to be determined on the facts of each case whether the acts complained of have or have not any reasonable relation with the discharge of the official duty of the public servant. Cases decided on the application of sec. 197 are not uniform. Learned counsel for the parties referred to a large number of cases to show the circumstances in which the courts have applied the provisions of sec. Cases decided on the application of sec. 197 are not uniform. Learned counsel for the parties referred to a large number of cases to show the circumstances in which the courts have applied the provisions of sec. 197 Cr P.C. But in view of the decision of the Supreme Court on this point it is not necessary to discuss those cases. Reference may here be made to the following observations made in Motajog Dobey Vs. H.C. Bhari (1) with regard to the stage at which the question for the need for sanction is to be considered and the circumstances in which the provisions of sec. 197 Cr.P.C. are to be applied. "The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial enquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation with duty that the accused could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." Therefore, neither contention that the question of the necessity of the sanction can only be decided when the public servant appears before the magistrate and satisfies him that the acts complained of related to the discharge of his official duty nor that it can only be decided at the initial stage when the complaint is filed can be accepted. The question is to be decided when materials are available on the record to determine that question, whatever the stage of the case may be. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following observations made in the case of H.H.B. Gill Vs. The question is to be decided when materials are available on the record to determine that question, whatever the stage of the case may be. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following observations made in the case of H.H.B. Gill Vs. The King (2); "The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does he does in virtue of his office." Learned counsel emphasised the word challenged and urged that the stage would only arise when the public servant appears before the court and claims protection afforded to him under sec. 197 Cr. P. C. In my opinion these observations cannot be interpreted in the manner learned counsel wants them to interpret. 6. With regard to the other question whether the arts which according to the complainant constitutes offences punishable under secs. 380 and 411 I.P.C. sec. 197 would apply or not, it may be stated that it is also a question of fact to be determined on the facts of the case. If for the performance of the official duty the acts were necessary to be done or at any rate they had reasonable connection with the performance of the duty the provisions of sec. 197 would equally apply to those acts. But if the acts are foreign to the discharge of their official duty and bear no reasonable relation with it then for those acts if they constitute any offence previous sanction would not be necessary. Learned Deputy Govt. Advocate at one stage urged that even for such acts which had no reasonable relation with the discharge of official duty previous sanction would be necessary, if occasion for the commission of such acts was the discharge of official duty. In support of this view he relied upon Matajog Dobeys case(1). But in my view this case does not support that wide proposition urged by the learned Deputy Govt. Advocate. In support of this view he relied upon Matajog Dobeys case(1). But in my view this case does not support that wide proposition urged by the learned Deputy Govt. Advocate. It was observed in that case: "Where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power of the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution." The Supreme Court further referred to the following quotation from Brooms Legal Maxims 10th Ed; Page 312. "It is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command." These observations only show that provisions of sec. 197 Cr. P. C. would apply to those acts only which are reasonably necessary for the execution of the official duty and not to acts which may have no relation with the discharge of official duty. Their Lordships in the case before them were satisfied that the act complained of were not entirely divorced from or unconnected with the discharge of official duty. In this connection reference may be made to the observations in H.H.B. Gills case (2). "A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. Thus a Judge neither acts nor purports to act as a Judge in receiving a bribe, though the judgment which he delivers may such an act; nor does a Government medical officer act or purport to act as a public servant in picking the pocket of a patient whom he is examining though the examination itself may be such an act. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that what he does, he does in virtue of his office." Reference may also be made to the observations made by Varadachariar J. in Dr. Hori Ram Singh Vs. Emperor (3); "While I do not wish to ignore the significance of the time factor, it does not seem to me right to make it the test. Hori Ram Singh Vs. Emperor (3); "While I do not wish to ignore the significance of the time factor, it does not seem to me right to make it the test. To take an illustration suggested in the course of the argument if a medical officer, while on duty in the hospital, is alleged to have committed rape on one of the patients or to have stolen jewel from the patients person, it is difficult to believe that it was the intention of the Legislature that he could not be prosecuted for such offences except with the previous sanction of the Local Government." These observations also support the above mentioned conclusion. In the present case the allegations against the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are that they abetted the offences punishable under sec. 147, 427, 451 & 380 I.P.C. It is also alleged that they have retained property knowing or having reason to believe that it was stolen property. It is not in dispute that opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are public servants and are not removable from their office save by or with the sanction of the State Government. The only question which has to be decided is whether the acts complained of were committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. The learned Magistrate does not seem to have applied his mind to this aspect of the question. He does not say in his order that the alleged acts were committed by the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in the discharge of their official duty. The Additional Sessions Judge in his judgment has referred to the provisions of sec. 203 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act which empowers the Board to remove the obstruction and encroachment from public streets and open spaces. Learned counsel for the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3also placed reliance upon the same provision of law to show that the acts complained of were committed in the discharge of official duty. Provisions of sec. 203 are attracted in cases where there h unauthorised obstruction or encroachment upon any public street and open space. On behalf of the petitioner it is contended that the shop was in existence for the last five years and that be had been paying rent to the municipality for the land occupied by him. Provisions of sec. 203 are attracted in cases where there h unauthorised obstruction or encroachment upon any public street and open space. On behalf of the petitioner it is contended that the shop was in existence for the last five years and that be had been paying rent to the municipality for the land occupied by him. During all this period the municipality without any objection continued charging rent from him. It cannot therefore, be said that he had made any encroachment on the public street. On the other hand learned counsel for the opposite parties relied on the marked A to show that Vasdeo Brothers who are alleged by the complainant to be his servants had a Tah bazari ticket from Ajmer Municipality which entitled them to occupy the land only upto 28th February; 1961 and thereafter, the complainants possession over this land became unauthorised. There is thus a controversy between the parties about the rights of the petitioner over the land in dispute. There is nothing to show on the record so far that the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 had issued orders for the dismantling of the petitioners shop in exercise of the powers conferred on the Board under sec. 203 of the Act. There is no finding of the learned Magistrate on this question of fact. Nor is there any finding that the taking away of the petitioners cash and goods of merchandise was reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty. Without deciding these points he could not have dismissed the complaint against them. Provisions of sec. 197 would not apply merely because the opposite parties happened to be public servants and the acts complained of were committed at the time they were discharging or purporting to discharge their official duty but some reasonable connection between the acts and official duty will have to be shown although it may be in excess of it. Learned counsel for the opposite parties ask me to decide these questions on the basis of the statements contained in the complaint which have been briefly set out above. Learned counsel for the opposite parties ask me to decide these questions on the basis of the statements contained in the complaint which have been briefly set out above. On the bare statements contained in the complaint I find it difficult to come to the finding that the acts complained of were committed by the opposite parties while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty and were reasonably necessary for the execution of the official duty. It will therefore be open to the Magistrate to decide about the necessity of sanction when proper materials are placed before him. I should not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the question whether the acts complained of constitute offences which have been levelled against the opposite parties in the complaint or are not reasonably connected with their official duty. These questions are primarily to be decided by the learned Magistrate who is seized of the case. The order of the learned Magistrate only suggests that sanction was necessary because the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 happened to be public servants. This by itself is not sufficient to bring the case within the inhibition of sec.197 Cr.P.C. The order of the learned Magistrate therefore, cannot be sustained. 7. I, therefore, accept the revision, set aside the order dated 14th June, 1961 passed by the learned Magistrate in the case. It will be open to him to decide the question of previous sanction of the State Government or prosecution of the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 at any further stage of the case when facts on record show that the acts complained of were committed by the opposite parties while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties or had a reasonable relation with such duties. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave is refused.