Judgment Mahapatra, J. 1. The case of the appellant, who was plaintiff, was that he joined the service of the District Board of Patna as a medical officer on the 14th of April, 1931, and was posted at Harnaut when he was transferred on the 20th of April, 1951 to Poonpoon. He handed over charge of the Harnaut dispensary to his successor Dr. Gopinath, and when he was on transit leave for joining at Poonpoon he had an attack of insomnia and palpitation of heart for which he applied for privilege leave of 15 days on the 25th of April, 1951. That was, however, refused. Thereafter the plaintiff applied for privilege leave for 21/2 months which was granted not as privilege but leave without pay, to take effect from the 22nd of April, 1951, for the reason that the plaintiff was trying to avoid the transfer to Poonpoon. He wanted to extend that leave for another four months by his application dated the 30th of June, 1951. That was allowed as without pay. Two months extension was again applied for and was allowed on the same condition. When the plaintiff again applied for further leave for four months on the 4th of January, 1952, that was refused on the ground that the plaintiff was indulging in his private professional practice. But the plaintiff continued making applications for further extension from time to time, in spite of that refusal, till the Chairman, by his orders dated the 16th/22nd of October, 1954, directed him to join the District Board office by the 30th of October, 1954, failing which the plain-tiffs services would be treated as terminated (Ext.4 ). After receipt of this letter, the plaintiff approached the Chairman in company of one member of the Parliament and a member of the Legislative Council to reconsider his case and, it was asserted the Chairman gave him assurance that his leave would be extended and the question of full or half average pay for the period under leave would also be considered in his favour. Relying upon this assurance the plaintiff did not join as he was directed on the 30th of October, 1954. Relying upon this assurance the plaintiff did not join as he was directed on the 30th of October, 1954. But when he did not receive any communication from the Chairman in accordance with his assurance, the plaintiff wrote again to him on the 31st of October, 1954, praying for further extension of leave as he had asked for in his previous application of the 9th of July, 1954. To this ha received no reply. After several unsuccessful approaches to the Chairman thereafter, the plaintiff again met him in company of Shri Sheel Bhadra Yajee, M. P. , in April, 1955; but the Chairman told him that his services had already been terminated, and there was no question of any reconsideration. Thereafter the suit was filed on the 23rd of December, 1957, for a declaration that the termination of the plaintiffs services was illegal, void and inoperative, and for a direction to the District Board, the defendant, to reinstate the plaintiff in his service with effect from the 30th of October, 1954. At a later stage the second relief wag omitted to avoid payment of further court-fee, and the suit was confined to the first declaration. 2. The District Board as a defendant contested the suit disputing the story of assurance as alleged to have been given by the Chairman for reinstatement and payment of salary during the period of leave asked for and applied by the plaintiff. In the written statement it was specifically asserted that the termination of the plaintiffs services was not at all of a penal nature, and that the plaintiff had been communicated as early as the 10th of July, 1952, the refusal of leave and was definitely asked to join his duty or submit resignation. 3. The trial court framed three issues on the pleadings : "1. Is the suit maintainable and has the plaintiff any cause of action against the defendant? 2. Is the plaintiff entitled to the declaration sought for in the plaint? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?" On the side of the plaintiff, himself and another Shri Sheel Bhadra Yajee were examined. For the defendant only the Chairman gave evidence. 2. Is the plaintiff entitled to the declaration sought for in the plaint? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?" On the side of the plaintiff, himself and another Shri Sheel Bhadra Yajee were examined. For the defendant only the Chairman gave evidence. The trial court found that the order of termination of plaintiffs services was inoperative) and it directed that he should be reinstated on his post on the same pay he was drawing at the time he was discharged and would be granted leave without pay for the period he was not on duty till the date of his reinstatement provided that he makes an application to the Chairman of the District Board, as the case may be, for his reinstatement and grant of leave without pay. Both sides felt aggrieved by this judgment. The plaintiff preferred the present appeal and the defendant filed a cross-objection. The plaintiff submits that the direction for reinstatement and grant of leave without pay as contained in the judgment was uncalled for. The defendant challenges the finding about the termination of the plaintiffs services; in other words, the declaration granted to the plaintiff. 4. The main question that falls for consideration is whether the termination of the plaintiffs services as contained in the Chairmans letter of the 16th/22nd October, 1954 (Ext.4) was justified. According to the appellant, that order was penal in nature inasmuch as it was due to the Chairmans impression, which was not justified on facts, that the plaintiff was carrying on his private medical practice at Harnaut and to have the benefit of the same he did not want to go on transfer to Poonpoon. If the termination was by way of a punishment for the plaintiff it was contended, he was entitled to be given clear notice of the same and an opportunity to be heard in answer, or at least to show cause against the proposed punishment. Though Article 311 of the Constitution of India was not applicable in terms as the plaintiff was not a civil servant under the State yet the principles of natural justice were applicable, and there having been a clear violation of the same, the appellant urged, the order of termination cannot be upheld, and the court below was justified in declaring that order to be inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiff. The appellant has reached superannuation and, as such, there cannot be any question of his reinstatement. The direction in the order of the lower court for his reinstatement was due to the willingness expressed by the Chairman of the District Board as defendants witness No.1 to take him into service if the plaintiff wanted so; but the other direction about the period of his absence to be treated as leave without pay has seriously affected the plaintiff and that is his main grievance in the present appeal. There is no doubt that the scope of the suit as it was framed, particularly after the deletion of the prayer for reinstatement, did not allow a direction for reinstatement, or for expression of any opinion about the character of the leave that would cover the plaintiffs absence from duties from April, 1951 to the date of the decree in the suit. There was no material before the court to judge that question inasmuch as the total period of leave either privilege or with average pay or half pay or no pay that was due to the plaintiff was not known, at least no evidence was adduced on that point. Nor was it stated by any side to what extent an employee of the District Board can go on leave without pay. It cannot be imagined that it is open to an employee to be on leave, though without pay, for any indefinite period, keeping lien on his service all the time and thus blocking the way for other new entrants or promotion. That portion of the judgment in which the plaintiff was asked to be reinstated and to be on leave without pay for the entire period of his absence cannot be upheld. 5. That would have been the result of this appeal but for the cross-objection filed by the defendant District Board. The declaration that the termination of the plaintiffs services by the Chairman was invalid and inoperative was seriously challenged on the ground that in the present case, neither there was any question of application of the principles of natural justice, nor was there any violation of the same, on the admitted facts. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge was that the plaintiff was asking for leave from time to time to avoid his transfer, and that he was indulging in private medical practice during this period. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge was that the plaintiff was asking for leave from time to time to avoid his transfer, and that he was indulging in private medical practice during this period. The evidence of the Chairman, which there is no reason to disbelieve, supports this. Even the deposition of the plaintiff himself does not go against that. His illness which, according to him, was the cause of his repeated asking for leave has not been substantiated by the evidence of any doctor under whose treatment he was, or production of prescriptions or any other evidence. The conduct of a medical officer, who is placed in charge of a dispensary and has the responsibility of attending to the public in rural areas under the District Board, is expected to be much more candid and straightforward. The plaintiffs evidence leaves much room for a fair inference that he was avoiding his transfer from a place where he had picked up some private practice, and the court below was justified in its conclusion about the same. 6. The history of the case as revealed by the several orders passed by the Chairman on the applications for leave by the plaintiff-appellant leaves no doubt that he was clearly refused any further leave by the orders of the Chairman passed on the 9th/16th February, 1952, vide Ext.8 (5 ). Before that, he had been allowed leave for 81/2 months already. That order reads as follows : "his application dated 4-1-52 for extension of leave for four months. He is hereby informed that as he is doing private practice, extension of leave for four months cannot be allowed. " On the 23rd of that month, the plaintiff made a representation as it were (Ext. C (1) ) in which he stated that he could not shut the doors of his medical advice against patients who in spite of his ailments which they knew he was suffering from, persisted upon seeking his advice, as he considered it an act of inhumanity not to show such people the ordinary courtesies. C (1) ) in which he stated that he could not shut the doors of his medical advice against patients who in spite of his ailments which they knew he was suffering from, persisted upon seeking his advice, as he considered it an act of inhumanity not to show such people the ordinary courtesies. In that letter he repeated his request for extension of his leave by another four months by saying : "may I once more request you to kindly look into the matter of my extension for four months with effect From 7-1-52 and grant me that privilege not only in my interest but in the interest of the patients and the Board as well. " The reply to this representation came on the 7th/10th July, 1952 (Ext. B. (6)) under the signature of the Chairman in which it was stated that further extension of leave could not be allowed and the plaintiff was asked to join his duties of submit his resignation. There was no further communication from the plaintiff except his other six applications for leave, all of which were for four months each time, except the last two, which were for six months each. The dates of these applications as stated by the plaintiff, but not admitted by the defendant, were 4th September 1952, 7th January, 1953, 2nd April, 1953, 4th September 1953, 25th February 1954 and 9th July 1954. To none of these applications there was any reply from the District Board. The defendants case was that there was no necessity for any reply since the refusal of any further extension had already been communicated to the plaintiff by the orders dated the 16th of February 1952 (Ext. B. (5) ), and he was finally told either to join his duties immediately or to resign from his office under the orders communicated to him on the 10th July 1952 (Ext. B (6) ). If an employee, in spite of such communication, still keeps out of his duties, it was at his own risk. Assuming that the plaintiff was really ill which, however, has not been proved in this case. the District Board could not have been left in a helpless condition and forced to grant leave for an indefinite term; that would be against public policy and public interest. Assuming that the plaintiff was really ill which, however, has not been proved in this case. the District Board could not have been left in a helpless condition and forced to grant leave for an indefinite term; that would be against public policy and public interest. The plaintiff has not shown either with reference to any rules followed in the District Board or by examining any witness that he was entitled to such leave as he applied from time to time. In his evidence he admitted that he had not seen the District Board laws or leave rules. He did not get it calculated as to how much leave was due to him. He only saw in his service book in 1945 or 1946 that it was mentioned there that two years and odd was due to him as privilege leave. This evidence is of no help to him because his absence began in April 1951, and we do not know if by that time there was any leave due to him either privilege or otherwise. Besides, he could have called for his service book to show if there was any leave due to him and had been wrongly refused by the District Board. Even if we assume that the ground on which leave was refused in February 1952, namely, that he was carrying on private practice was not justified, that would not alter the position in any way in favour of the plaintiff. He made a representation thereafter and on consideration of the same the Chairman stuck to his orders of refusal. It is open to an authority to make his own decision provided it is done in a bona fide manner and according to the accepted rules. The plaintiff admitted in his deposition that after the order was passed by the Chairman, he did not appeal to the District Board. When his representation was not accepted in July 1952 (Ext. B (6) ) and the previous refusal of leave was adhered to, he could have adopted some other course, such as, appealing to the District Board or seeking his remedy in Court, if that was open. No mala fide was levelled against the Chairman either in the plaint or in the evidence. In the present suit we are not to canvass the justifiability or otherwise of the refusal of leave in February or July 1952. No mala fide was levelled against the Chairman either in the plaint or in the evidence. In the present suit we are not to canvass the justifiability or otherwise of the refusal of leave in February or July 1952. The plaintiff had an opportunity of showing cause against such refusal and he did avail himself of the same, and that was also considered by the competent authority. That chapter was thus closed. The present grievance is against the orders passed in October 1954 (Ext.4 ). 7. The impugned order is colourless stating no reason whatsoever for the ultimate direction to the plaintiff to join the District Board office by the 30th October, 1954, or to treat his services as terminated. Whatever the past conduct of the plaintiff might have been in not joining his duties after his leave was refused, that appears to have been condoned in a way by this last letter from the Chairman, as otherwise he could not have been given the chance of joining his service once more. The time allowed under this letter was, in the circumstances of the case, quite reasonable and, it must be conceded, was clearly a matter of grace. There is no indication in this letter that it was on account of any impression or conclusion about the plaintiff continuing his private practice at a place from which he had been ordered to be transferred. If that reason would have prevailed with the Chairman as did in February 1952 (Ext. B (5)) or in July 1952 (Ext. B (6) ), the plaintiff would not have been given any further opportunity to join his duties again. Learned Counsel for the appellant very strenuously urged that the reason of final termination of the plaintiffs service was nothing but a preconceived misconduct or accusasion against the plaintiff. I am unable to agree with this as neither the facts nor the conduct of both the parties, as revealed by the different communications marked as exhibits in the case, justify such an inference. This termination not being by way of any punishment did not call for any application of principles of natural justice. Yet, the letter itself (Ext.4) gave him more than a weeks time to join the duties, and that period was available to him to make any representation, if he so liked, against the proposed termination. This termination not being by way of any punishment did not call for any application of principles of natural justice. Yet, the letter itself (Ext.4) gave him more than a weeks time to join the duties, and that period was available to him to make any representation, if he so liked, against the proposed termination. He, however, according to the plaintiffs evidence, sent a letter in reply to this order on the 31st of October, 1954 and not on or before the 30th October, 1954, by which date he was required to resume his work. Thus the plaintiff completely neglected to avail himself of the chances given to him, either by reporting himself to the duties or by making timely representation. The District Board had no other alternative but to terminate his services. Natural justice is not an one-sided bargain. The party, who invokes it, must also be prepared to play his part fairly and squarely. He cannot lie on the sly and claim advantage of natural justice from the other party. In the circumstances of the present case, no complaint can be made of any violation of any principles of natural justice. The trial court was clearly in error in thinking that the termination of the service should have been effected after some regular proceeding or "under some of the ordinary rules". Having held that the plaintiffs applications for leave were inspired by his unwillingness to carry out the orders of transfer which means he abstained himself from his duties without any proper justification, the learned trial Judge should not have looked for any application of the principles of natural justice for the benefit of the plaintiff in the case. There does not appear to be any breach of any prescribed procedure for termination of an employment for continued and unjustified absence. We were shown a copy of the Rules of Business framed by the District Board of Patna under Sec.32 (a) of the Bihar and Orissa Local Self-Government Act, 1885. These rules were not made under Clause (g) of Sec.32, which alone empowers the District Board to make rules for the removal of its employees. The rules made under Clause (a) of that section were to prescribe for the meetings of the Board. These rules were not made under Clause (g) of Sec.32, which alone empowers the District Board to make rules for the removal of its employees. The rules made under Clause (a) of that section were to prescribe for the meetings of the Board. In those rules, however, we find, under Rule 68, as follows : "except as otherwise provided by the Act and the general rules, all persons employed by the board, whose servicse, may be no longer required, shall be liable to discharge after the receipt of one months notice, or one months pay in lieu of notice, and no such person shall withdraw from the duties of his office without having given previous notice for the period of one month on pain of forfeiture of a months salary. " I cannot see how this rule could be framed under Clause (a) of Sec.32. Even assuming that if could be so made, a termination simpliciter was entailed with either notice or salary for a month. An aggrieved employee can, at the most, ask for his salary for one month if he had no notice for that period. Absence of notice would not render, the termination invalid. That rule has no application to the present case to give aid to the suit. Learned Counsel for the appellant conceded that if the termination of the plaintiffs service in this case is found to be contractual and not coupled with any punishment for any misconduct or accusation, the plaintiff is bound to be non-suited. 8. In absence of any prescribed conditions of service under the District Board, both the employer and the employee would be governed by the ordinary law of contract between master and servant. Sec.39 of the Indian Contract Act lays down that when a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance. The two illustrations given under that section are also eloquent about the principle Underlying this provision. In the present case, the plaintiff either refused to perform his promise to discharge his duties as a medical officer under the District Board or he disabled himself by his alleged illness from performing his part of the promise. The two illustrations given under that section are also eloquent about the principle Underlying this provision. In the present case, the plaintiff either refused to perform his promise to discharge his duties as a medical officer under the District Board or he disabled himself by his alleged illness from performing his part of the promise. In either case, the promisee, the District Board, was within its right to put an end to the contract of employment. If the plaintiff was justifiably aggrieved by the termination of this contract, his remedy was to recover damages from the defendant. The plaintiff was absent for over three years and nine months before the termination came under Ext.4, and this period was long enough to show that the plaintiff either refused to perform or disabled himself from performing his promise in its entirety. The termination of the service was thus undoubtedly for his continued absence from duties. 9. In that context, there was no question of violation of any principles of natural justice on the part of the District Board by not giving any further notice to the plaintiff or asking him to show cause against the termination of his employment, after the 30th October, 1954. In the case of Burn and Co. V/s. Their Employees, (S) AIR 1957 SC 38 one of the employees of Burn and Company, Calcutta, Ashimanada Banerjee, was detained in jail from the 25th of January 1949 to the 5th of April, 1951, following which, the Company terminated his services on the 22nd of April, 1949. The employee claimed that he was entitled to be reinstated which prevailed with the Appellate Industrial Tribunal, before whom the case had come, on the ground that the employee had been-discharged without the Company framing a charge or holding an enquiry, and that the rules of natural justice had been violated. On appeal by the Company to the Supreme Court, their Lordships held that the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal could not be upheld. The ground of discharge was the continued absence of the employee and his inability to do work. Their Lordshipe thought that no purpose would have been served by a formal charge being delivered to the employee as there was no conceivable answer that could be given by him thereto. The order of the Appellate Tribunal was set aside. The ground of discharge was the continued absence of the employee and his inability to do work. Their Lordshipe thought that no purpose would have been served by a formal charge being delivered to the employee as there was no conceivable answer that could be given by him thereto. The order of the Appellate Tribunal was set aside. This case shows that termination of service on account of continued absence, even if such absence is due to circumstances beyond the control of the employee, cannot be taken to be a violation of any principles of natural justice. The Court of law can enforce a contract which the parties have made but it cannot make contracts for the parties. An Industrial Tribunal, however, has no such fetters. It can create new obligations or modify contracts in the interest of industrial peace and to prevent unfair practice or victimisation, although it may not ignore altogether an existing agreement or obligations : (see Rohtas Industries Ltd. V/s. Brijnandan Pandey, (S) AIR 1957 SC 1 .) Even when the Industrial Appellate Tribunal had taken the view of violation of canons of natural justice in the case of termination of service of an employee, the Supreme Court held otherwise and set that aside. 10. In the well known case of Parshotam Lal Dhngra V/s. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 the Supreme Court, while dealing with reversion from an officiating higher post to the substantive lower post on account of ineffeciency and misconduct of an employee under the Government, to whom Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution are obviously applicable, observed : "any and every termination of service is not a dismissal removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal. . . . . . . . . . . . Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement. . . . . . . . . . . . is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311 (2),. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement. . . . . . . . . . . . is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311 (2),. . . . . . . . . It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency of other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service, the motive operating on the mind of the Government. . . . . . . . . . . . is, as Chagla, C. J. , has said in Shrinivas Ganesh V/s. Union of India, (S) AIR 1956 Bom 455 , wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. " 11. In the case of Nagendra Nath V/s. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, AIR 1958 SC 398 , the decision of revenue authorities in regard to the license for a country liquor shop came under consideration. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in that context: ". . . . . . this Court has laid down that the rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened, should be decided not under any preconceived notions, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions. In the instant case, no such rules have been brought to our notice, which could be said to have been contravened by the Appellate Authority. Simply because it viewed a case in a particular light which) may not be acceptable to another independent tribunal, is no ground for interference either under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. In the instant case, no such rules have been brought to our notice, which could be said to have been contravened by the Appellate Authority. Simply because it viewed a case in a particular light which) may not be acceptable to another independent tribunal, is no ground for interference either under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. " I have quoted the above to show that no abstract principles of natural justice can be invoked in each and every case irrespective of the circumstances and the contractual relationship between, the parties leading to the alleged grievance of an employee. In our case also, as in the above neither any rule nor any precedent violated by the District Board has been shown. 12. In another case, Indian Iron and Steel Co. , Ltd. V/s. Their Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130 some workmen were not in a position to come to work as they had been arrested by the police on account of their questionable activities in connection with a labour dispute. They applied for leave-when in police custody but leave was refused. Their employment was terminated by the Company, following one of the standing orders of the Company which provided that "workers absent-Without leave will be subject to disciplinary action, and over-staying leave will be considered as absence without leave and that any worker who is absent for 14 consecutive days without permission will be automatically discharged. " It was argued before the Supreme Court that the same standing order was not applicable when there had been an application for leave from the Workmen, and in view of the circumstance that the men were in custody, the Company was not justified in refusing leave and thereafter terminating their service. This argument was repelled and their Lordships, applying the principles laid down in the case of (S) AIR 1957 SC 38 , observed : "the same principle should apply in the present case. It is true that the arrested men were not in a position to come to their work, because, they had been arrested by the police. This may be unfortunate for Them; but it would be unjust to hold that in such circumstances the Company must always give leave when an application for leave is made. . . . . . . . . . . . This may be unfortunate for Them; but it would be unjust to hold that in such circumstances the Company must always give leave when an application for leave is made. . . . . . . . . . . . It is immaterial whether the charges on which the workmen are arrested by the police are ultimately proved or not in a Court of law. The Company must carry on its work and may find it impossible to do so if a large number of workmen are absent. Whether in such circumstances leave should be granted or not must be left to the discretion of the employer. " The termination of service by the Company was held valid as it was on the ground of continued absence of the workmen. In the light of the case, cited above and in view of the circumstances of the present case, there cannot be any doubt that the termination of the plaintiffs service as notified by Ext.4, dated the 22nd October, 1954. was on account of his continued absence and did not involve any punishment for any of his misconduct. As such, that order cannot be assailed. The plaintiff had no right for any further notice of such termination, nor was he entitled to an opportunity to show cause in answer to the principles of natural justice. Even if such basic principles of natural justice were applicable, the plaintiff had sufficient notice both before and subsequent to Ext.4. 13. Learned Counsel for the appellant, however, urged, on the basis of the case of Rangnath Misra V/s. Chairman District Board Saharsa, AIR 1957 Pat 333 , that in absence of any prescribed rules of service in the District- Board, the principles of natural justice are to govern their employees, particularly in matters that are detrimental to them. In that case, the petitioner was a clerk in the District Board, Saharsa and was given three days time to explain some charges pending against him. His explanation was found unsatisfactory, and on a consideration of the same, the District Board, at its meeting, resolved to ask the petitioner to submit his resignation by a certain date, and on his failure to do so, it authorised its Chairman to dispense with his service and to pass an order to that effect. Ultimately the Chairman gave his orders for the petitioners discharge from service. Ultimately the Chairman gave his orders for the petitioners discharge from service. That order was challenged on the ground, inter alia, that the procedure envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution as well as the principles of natural justice had been violated by the District Board in terminating the service of the petitioner. That objection was ruled oat by the Court on the ground that a clerk in the service of the District Board is not a Government servant, and, as such, Article 311 does not govern him. On the question whether a fair opportunity had been given to the petitioner in that case to Article 311 was not applicable, their Lordships observed that no test could be formulated which would be applicable to all conditions. The question would depend on the particular facts of each case. In the circumstances of that case they held that the petitioner was given ample and reasonable opportunity to show cause against the charges which were served upon him, and in that view the principles of natural justice were not violated. Learned Counsel is right in his contention that the principles of natural justice cannot be completely ruled out in the case of employees of the District Board to whom Article 311 has no application and for whose service conditions no prescribed rules have been framed; but that is not the same as saying that in all cases of termination of service, irrespective of any reason for the same, there must necessarily be an elaborate procedure of giving notice of the proposed termination, after the employee is communicated that his services would be terminated if he does not join his duties by a particular date. As it has been held from time to time, the background, the conduct of the parties, the circumstances in each case would determine how far and in what manner the principles of natural justice would be applied. The case on which learned Counsel relied does not support him in his contention that on the facts of the present case when termination of service was due to continued absence, the plaintiff could invoke to his advantage the principles of natural justice and claim any further opportunity to show cause against such termination. 14. The case on which learned Counsel relied does not support him in his contention that on the facts of the present case when termination of service was due to continued absence, the plaintiff could invoke to his advantage the principles of natural justice and claim any further opportunity to show cause against such termination. 14. The other two cases, Bhawani Sahai V/s. Syed Naqui Imam, AIR 1956 Pat 257 and Ramnath Prasad V/s. Collector of Darbhanga, AIR 1955 Pat 345 , also do not help the appellant. In the former, a copyist was discharged under the orders of the District Judge on account of his wilful disobedience of an order of transfer, without calling for an explanation or giving him notice of the proposed punishment. The relevant rules framed by the High Court in regard to the copyists did not provide for any notice to be given to the discharged copyist or for any hearing, before dispensing with his service. It was held in that case that though such provision was not there, as a matter of law the necessary implication in the rule (Rule 8) was that some kind of enquiry was to be made by the District Judge before he satisfied himself that the work and conduct of the copyist was unsatisfactory, and in that view, the order of the District Judge was set aside as no notice of the discharge had been given to the aggrieved party. The termination of service in that case was undoubtedly for an alleged misconduct which necessarily called for the accepted principles of natural justice, in absence of any prescribed procedure for enquiry and hearing. Similarly, in the case reported in AIR 1955 Pat 345 , an excise license was cancelled on account of a breach of the conditions of the license, and in that context, it was held that though the statute did not prescribe the procedure that the Collector had to adopt before passing final orders, in a case of that description there was an obvious implication that some form of enquiry must be made before the Collector satisfied himself pf a breach of any condition of the license. 15. 15. The compulsory retirement of an employee of the Government, who had completed 25 years qualifying service, came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Shyamlal V/s. State of U. P. , AIR 1954 SC 369 . Learned Counsel relied upon the observations of the Court where it said : "there can be no doubt that removal. . . . . . . . . generally implies that the officer is regarded as in some manner blameworthy or deficient, that is to say, that he has been guilty of some misconduct or is lacking in ability or capacity or the will to discharge his duties as he should do. The action of removal taken against him in such circumstances is thus founded and justified on some ground personal to the officer. Such grounds, therefore, involve the levelling of some imputation or charge against the officer which may conceivably be controverted or explained by the officer. " After this, the Court observed that there is no such element of charge or imputation in the case of compulsory retirement. A compulsory retirement had no stigma or implication of misbehaviour or incapacity. In that case, the employee had been called upon to explain some imputations. But, thereafter, the Government informed him that they were not holding any formal enquiry as prescribed under the rules about those imputations, and order of compulsory retirement was passed. The Supreme Court held that the enquiry was to help the Government to make up its mind as to whether it was in the public interest to dispense with his services, and as no enquiry was made, that was not a case of termination of service amounting to dismissal or removal, but it was only a case of compulsory retirement as envisaged by the rules. The Governments order was ultimately upheld. None of these cases is of any help to the appellant here. 16 Another case cited, Lee V/s. Showmens Guild of Great Britain, (1952) 2 QB 329 is equally unhelpful. The plaintiff in that case was charged by a rival claimant with unfair competition between members of the Showmens Guild, in relation to sites at fair grounds. The Committee of the Guild heard the dispute and decided against the plaintiff, imposing a fine on him. The plaintiff in that case was charged by a rival claimant with unfair competition between members of the Showmens Guild, in relation to sites at fair grounds. The Committee of the Guild heard the dispute and decided against the plaintiff, imposing a fine on him. According to the rule, a member who failed to pay such a fine was deemed to have ceased to be a member. The plaintiff did not pay the fine, and was accordingly expelled, with the result that he was deprived of the right to earn his living as a showman on fair grounds in the United Kingdom; controlled by the trade union. The Committees action was challenged by the plaintiff, who sought injunctions to restrain the union from expelling him. It was held that on the true construction of the rule under which, the plaintiff was charged, his conduct could not be unfair competition and that the find and expulsion were ultra vires and void. In that case the principles on which the courts should intervene in decisions of domestic tribunals were considered elaborately. As is evident, the expulsion of the plaintiff was on account of his misconduct. I cannot see how the appellant can apply that case to his own. The powers of the court to examine the impugned order in the instant case before us is not in question. 17. One more case referred to by learned Counsel was Cochin Devaswom Board V/s. Akhileswara Ayyar, 1961-2 Lab LJ 562 : (AIR 1961 Kerala 282 ). In that case, the Cochin Devaswom Board sent a communication to the principal of a college charging him with misconduct and informing him that his services would be terminated. He was called upon to submit explanations by a particular date. On account of some irregularities and faults in regard to the library, the principal was suspended and directed to hand over charge to a professor of the college. He filed a writ application against the order of suspension and succeeded. After that, he applied for his reinstatement in the service and for arrears of his salary with increments. The Board insisted on the principals explanation about the charges framed against him and ultimately dismissed him. Against that, another writ application was filed by the principal. An appeal against the order quashing the suspension was also preferred by the Board. After that, he applied for his reinstatement in the service and for arrears of his salary with increments. The Board insisted on the principals explanation about the charges framed against him and ultimately dismissed him. Against that, another writ application was filed by the principal. An appeal against the order quashing the suspension was also preferred by the Board. These two matters came for consideration before a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. While disposing of that matter, their Lordships observed that the contractual domestic tribunals (Like the Cochin Devaswom Board) are also under obligation to enquire with minds that are not biassed, and that the rule is well settled that no man shall be a judge in his own cause and interest disqualifies. The proceedings by tribunals under duty to act judicially are governed by principles of natural justice, and one such principle excludes persons with biassed minds from being judges in the cases when their minds be not open or impartial. Learned Counsels point was that in the instant case the Chairman, who passed the final orders of termination of plaintiffs service had a biassed mind against him inasmuch as he had thought that the plaintiff was carrying on private medical practice and was avoiding to go on transfer from that place. In such a case, the Chairman, according to learned Counsel, should not have decided about the termination, as in doing that act his biassed mind came into play. If such a contention is accepted, it would disqualify all executive personnel to take any final decision in regard to any of their employees. In the reported case, to which learned Counsel referred, the Board itself, on the facts there, had shown bias in an interview with the principal in regard to the matters, which later on, became the subject of suspension and dismissal. In our case the termination of plaintiffs service, as I have held, was due to his continued absence and not for any misconduct. Secondly, no duty of any quasi-judicial character was cast on the Chairman of the District Board when he decided about the termination for continued absence from duty. 18. Thus none of the cases relied upon by learned Counsel would support him. 19. There appears to be another hurdle in the way of the plaintiff-appellant. Secondly, no duty of any quasi-judicial character was cast on the Chairman of the District Board when he decided about the termination for continued absence from duty. 18. Thus none of the cases relied upon by learned Counsel would support him. 19. There appears to be another hurdle in the way of the plaintiff-appellant. Originally he filed the plaint with two prayers, one being for the consequential relief of reinstatement in service after a declaration about the invalidity of the order of termination of his employment. That prayer was deleted to avoid larger court-fee. The suit is thus left as one for a declaration. Learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent pleaded that Sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act would bar the present suit because, in the proviso given in that section, it is laid down that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. In the present case there cannot be any doubt that the plaintiff was able to ask for further relief than a mere declaration of title to his post. 20. For the respondent reliance was placed on the case of Mothey Krishna Rao V/s. Grandhi Anjaneyulu, AIR 1954 Mad 113 . The plaintiff of that case was the Secretary of a company and was suspended by a resolution of the Board of Directors. He brought a suit for a declaration that he still continued to be the Secretary and Treasurer on the ground that the Board had no power to remove him under the articles of association. He did not sue for damages for wrongful removal or dismissal but only for a declaration without any consequential relief. The High Court of Madras held that there had been a prima facie violation of the proviso to Sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act as the plaintiff had not asked for relief consequential to the declaration sought for. The case of Ramdas Hajra V/s. Secretary of State, 17 Cal LJ 75 is also to the same effect. 21. For the other side (Appellant) reliance was placed, on the case of Mohammad Manjural Haque V/s. Bissesswar Banerjee, AIR 1943 Cal 361, to counteract the bar of Sec.42. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable. The Board of Revenue had set aside a revenue sale. 21. For the other side (Appellant) reliance was placed, on the case of Mohammad Manjural Haque V/s. Bissesswar Banerjee, AIR 1943 Cal 361, to counteract the bar of Sec.42. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable. The Board of Revenue had set aside a revenue sale. That was challenged in a suit for a declaration about the invalidity of the order setting aside the sale, no recovery of possession having been asked for. There had already been a writ of delivery of possession in favour of the plaintiff by the Collector who had held the revenue sale in favour of the plaintiff. If the Board of Revenues order setting aside the sale could be declared invalid as, it was asked for in the suit itself, the result would have been that the plaintiff would be in possession in consequence of the writ of delivery of possession already issued in his favour. In that view it was held in that case by the High Court that there was no more than the declaration necessary. The facts of the present case are otherwise. Even if the plaintiff gets the declaration that the order of termination of his service was invalid, he would be left with no actual relief inasmuch as he cannot execute this decree to enforce his reinstatement; nor can he recover his salary for the relevant period without taking recourse to another legal action. To avoid such multiplicity of suits, the proviso to Sec.42 was enacted. 22. Support was also sought from the case of the High Commissioner for India V/s. I. M. Lall, AIR 1948 PC 121. True it is that the plaintiff, I. M. Lall, was granted ultimately a mere declaration by the Privy Council to the effect that the order dismissing Mr. Lall from the Indian Civil Service was void and inoperative, and that he continued to be a member of the Indian Civil Service; no consequential relief was given to him on the ground that a member of that service had no statutory right to institute a suit for recovery of arrears of salary and emoluments. Lall from the Indian Civil Service was void and inoperative, and that he continued to be a member of the Indian Civil Service; no consequential relief was given to him on the ground that a member of that service had no statutory right to institute a suit for recovery of arrears of salary and emoluments. I may mention here that the High Court of Lahore, where the suit was tried, had given him similar relief but on appeal to the Federal Court, while that declaration was confirmed, the plaintiff was permitted to amend his plaint to include a consequential relief for damages which necessitated the remand of the case for further trial. Against that judgment of the Federal Court, an appeal was taken to the Privy Council. On the special facts and circumstances of that case, the final Court thought that no consequential relief could have been asked for by the plaintiff, and as such the bar provided under Sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act did not come for consideration. That case cannot provide a model for all declaratory suits. 23. Another contention for the appellant was that the plea of bar of Sec.42 was not taken in the trial court and the case of Chamu V/s. Umma, ILR 14 Mad 46 was cited to show that such pleas should not be entertained at the appellate stage. That was a suit in which the plaintiff, as an heir to her husband, claimed a declaration of title to a quarter share of the compensation money due under the Land Acquisition Act. In a very short judgment delivered in the case, it was mentioned that having regard to the circumstances of that case, the relief sought for by way of declaration was considered to be sufficient, and it was thought unnecessary for the plaintiff to ask for any other relief in the suit. In that background, their Lordships observed that even assuming that the plaintiff was able and called upon in that case to ask for further relief, the suit should not at that late stage be dismissed on that ground, the objection not having been raised in either of the two lower courts. But there is abundant authority for permission to the plaintiff at the appellate stage to amend his plaint in a proper case. There is no application before us to that effect. But there is abundant authority for permission to the plaintiff at the appellate stage to amend his plaint in a proper case. There is no application before us to that effect. As a matter of fact the consequential relief which had been included in the suit was later omitted after the filing of the written statement by the defendant. In such a case there was no opportunity for the defendant to raise the plea of a bar under Sec.42 in defence. It is a legal objection and can be entertained. 24. Thus, on a consideration of the case from all aspects, the irresistible conclusion is that the plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration that he asked for in the suit. 25. The result is that the cross-objection succeeds, the appeal by the plaintiff fails and the judgment and decree of the trial court are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own-costs throughout.