Judgment S. K. Das, J. (for himself, J.L. Kapur A.K. Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.) : These are four appeals on a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Mysore under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The appeals have been heard together and this judgment will govern them all. The appellant is the Mysore Electricity Board, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Board) in all the four appeals. The respondents are four textile mills, each mill being respondent in one of the appeals. These four textile Mills are: (1) the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd., Bangalore, (2) the Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore, (3) Sri Krishna Rajendra Mills Ltd., Mysore and (4) the Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bangalore. 2. The appeals raise a common question of law, viz., whether, under S. 76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (LIV of 1948) the respondents are entitled to call for an arbitration in respect of an alleged dispute between them and the Board relating to the revision of rates payable by them for electric energy supplied by the appellant or its predecessor. The provisions of two Acts, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (IX of 19l0) and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (LIV of 1948) have to be considered in these appeals, and it will be convenient to cite the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 as the 1910 Act and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, as the 1948 Act. 3. We proceed first to state the facts which have led to these four appeals. The 1910 Act and the 1948 Act were extended to the State of Mysore on April 1, 1951 by the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (III of 1951). But the Sections of the two Acts did not come into force in the State of Mysore all at once. Some Sections of the 1948 Act came into force at once, and some came into force on later dates. It is sufficient for our purpose to know that S. 76 of the 1948 Act came into force in Mysore on December 30, 1956; and S. 5 thereof came into force on September 30, 1957. The Board was constituted under S. 5 by a Government notification dated September 27, 1957 to come into effect from September 30, 1957. It is sufficient for our purpose to know that S. 76 of the 1948 Act came into force in Mysore on December 30, 1956; and S. 5 thereof came into force on September 30, 1957. The Board was constituted under S. 5 by a Government notification dated September 27, 1957 to come into effect from September 30, 1957. Prior to the constitution of the Board, the Government of Mysore was generating electric energy and supplying it to consumers of both high tension and low tension power. On different dates in the year 1945, written agreements were entered into between the Government of Mysore and the four textile mills for the supply of electric energy to these textile mills at the rate of 0.55 of an anna per unit of day power and 0.35 of an anna per unit of night power, subject to the payment of certain monthly minimum charges. These agreements were for a period of five years and expired on different dates in 1949-50. By an order dated March 23, 1953, the Government of Mysore revised the rates for the supply of electric energy and increased the same to 0.65 of an anna per unit of day power and 0.45 of an anna per unit of night power. Subsequently, an expert committee under the Chairmanship of Prof. M. S. Thacker, the then Director of the Institute of Science, Bangalore, was appointed to go into the question of rationalisation of the rates for power supply in the State of Mysore. On the recommendation of the Committee, the rates for the supply of electric energy were again revised with effect from April 1, 1956. This was done by means of an order dated March 1, 1956. On April 26, 1956 the four textile mills filed four writ petitions in the High court of Mysore in which they prayed that the State Government and the Board (which Board, after its constitution in 1957, was added as the second respondent to the pending writ petitions) be restrained from levying or collecting the increased rates as per the order of March 1, 1956 and that they be directed to continue to levy the same rates for the supply of electric energy as were agreed to between the parties in the agreements of 1945. Two points were urged in support of these writ petitions. Two points were urged in support of these writ petitions. One was that the State Government was not legally competent to increase the rates for the supply of electric energy. The second point urged was that there was a dispute between the textile mills and Government and later the Board, with regard to the rates for the supply of electric energy and such a dispute must be decided by arbitration as provided under S. 76 of the 1948 Act. We shall read S. 76 of the 1948 Act at a later stage. We may here observe that of the two points urged in support of the writ petitions, the High Court dealt only with the first point and held that the Government of Mysore was legally competent to revise the rates for the supply of electric energy. The second point arising out of S. 76 of the 1948 Act the High Court did not decide. It said that it expressed no opinion as to "whether or not the contention of the textile mills that the dispute was covered by S. 76 of the 1948 Act and should be determined by arbitration" was sound. The High Court expressed the view that that question would have to be determined if and when the textile mills wanted to enforce their rights under the procedure laid down under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940). On the finding that the Government of Mysore was legally competent to revise the rates, the four writ petitions were dismissed on January 29, 1958. By March 31, 1958 the four textile mills were in heavy arrears with regard to the payment of the increased rates for the supply of electric energy to them, though they had paid in full according to the old rates. After the constitution of the Board in September, 1957, the Board made repeated demands on the basis of the increased rates and asked the textile mills to clear all arrears due to them according to the revised rates. The textile mills having failed to do so, they were informed that the Board would cut off the supply in exercise of its power under S. 24 of the 1910 Act. The textile mills having failed to do so, they were informed that the Board would cut off the supply in exercise of its power under S. 24 of the 1910 Act. The textile mills thereupon contended that a dispute had arisen between them on one side and the Board on the other and the dispute had to be submitted to arbitration under the provisions of S. 76 of the 1948 Act. The four textile mills then nominated their arbitrator. On November 13, 1958 the Board filed four applications before the District Judge, Bangalore, under S. 33 of the Arbitration Act, in which it asked for declaration that the dispute between the four textile mills and the Board was not liable to be referred to arbitration under S. 76 of the 1948 Act and also for a direction to restrain the four textile mills from seeking arbitration in respect of the alleged dispute. These few applications gave rise to four miscellaneous cases which were dealt with by the learned Additional District Judge, Bangalore, by a common order. The learned Additional District Judge allowed the petitions and held that the four textile mills were not entitled to the benefit of S. 76 of the 1948 Act, because the dispute between the Board and the four textile mill as to the rates for the supply of electric energy was not liable to be referred to arbitration under that Section. The order of the learned Additional District Judge by which he disposed of the four petitions was dated April 17, 1959. From that order the textile mills preferred petitions in revision to the High Court of Mysore. Four such petitions were filed in respect of the four miscellaneous cases. By a common order dated August 19, 1960 the High Court allowed the petitions in revision holding that S. 76 of the 1948 Act applied, and the respondent textile mills were entitled to call for an arbitration in respect of the dispute between them and the Board in the matter of the revised rates. The Board then asked for and obtained a certificate of fitness from the High Court and on that certificate of fitness, these four appeals have come to this court from the aforesaid order of the High Court dated August 19, 1960. The Board then asked for and obtained a certificate of fitness from the High Court and on that certificate of fitness, these four appeals have come to this court from the aforesaid order of the High Court dated August 19, 1960. It may perhaps be stated here that after the constitution of the Board in 1957, another expert committee was appointed to rationalise the various tariffs prevailing in the State of Mysore with regard to the supply of electric energy and on the recommendations of this Committee the rates were revised a third time. But these last revised rates came into effect from July 1, 1959 when presumably the revision petitions in the High Court were pending. 4. Before we embark on a discussion of the principal question involved in these appeals, it is perhaps necessary to say a few words about the inter-relation of the two Acts, the 1910 Act and the 1948 Act. Section 70 of the 1948 Act indicates that relation. It states inter alia that no provision of the 1910 Act or any rules made thereunder shall have any effect so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of 1948 Act, where, however, the provisions of the two Acts are not inconsistent, the provision of the 1948 Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the 1910 Act. It would, therefore, be necessary for us to refer to the relevant provisions of the two Acts on two points which bear upon the principal question mooted before us. These two points are- (a) what are the powers of the Board or its predecessor Government to revise rates for the supply of electric energy and can a dispute be raised by the textile mills with regard to such revision; and (b) what are the provisions in the two Acts for the settlement of disputes by arbitration and who are the persons who can be parties to such a dispute ? In considering the aforesaid two points, a distinction has to be kept in mind. We are concerned in this case with two periods. The first period is from 1953 to September 30, 1957, when the Board was constituted. The second period is the period of the Board commencing from September 30, 1957 till November 13, 1958, when the applications under S. 33 of the Arbitration Act were made. We are concerned in this case with two periods. The first period is from 1953 to September 30, 1957, when the Board was constituted. The second period is the period of the Board commencing from September 30, 1957 till November 13, 1958, when the applications under S. 33 of the Arbitration Act were made. As we have stated earlier, the revision which is in depute in these cases took place in the first period, that is, before the constitution of the Board. We have pointed out earlier that the third revision of rates took effect from July 1, 1959, when the revision petitions in the High Court were pending. 5. We think it advisable and convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the two Acts at a later stage and in their relation to the points which we have stated above. We do not think that quoting the Sections at this stage and out of relation to the two points which fail for consideration will serve any useful purpose. We, therefore, desist from quoting the relevant Sections at this stage, but are content to refer here to the difference in the scheme of the two Acts, namely, the 1910 Act and the 1948 Act. 6. Very briefly put, the scheme of the 1910 Act was to empower the State Government, on an application made in the prescribed form and on payment of the prescribed fee, if any, to grant a license to any person to supply electric energy in any specified area. A person holding such a license was called a licensee. The State Government had certain powers to give directions to the licensee in regard to the supply of electric energy, and to control the distribution and consumption of electric energy etc. Section 28 of the 1910 Act laid down that no person other than a licensee shall engage in the business of supplying energy to the public except with the previous sanction of the State Government and in accordance with such conditions as the State Government may fix in that behalf. Therefore, under the 1910 Act there were two classes of persons who could supply electric energy, a licensee and a sanction holder. The 1948 Act made some radical changes in the scheme. Therefore, under the 1910 Act there were two classes of persons who could supply electric energy, a licensee and a sanction holder. The 1948 Act made some radical changes in the scheme. One such change was that the expression licensee was given an extended meaning to take in not merely a licensee licensed under Part II of the 1910 Act but also a person who had obtained sanction under S 28 of the 1910 Act. The expression did not, however, include the State Electricity Board which was constituted for the first time under the 1948 Act. Next, the 1948 Act brought into existence two important authorities, one called the Central Electricity Authority under S. 3 of the Act and the other the State Electricity Board constituted under S. 5 of the Act. Section 26 of the 1948 Act, to which a detailed reference will be made later, lays down that subject to the provisions of the 1948 Act, the Board shall, in respect of the whole State, have all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the 1910 Act, and the 1948 Act shall be deemed to be the license of the Board for the purposes of the 1910 Act. There is a proviso which excepts the Board from the obligation of certain provisions of the 1910 Act. Chapter V of the 1948 Act contains provisions indicating the nature of the works which the State Electricity Board may undertake and its trading procedure; it includes provisions giving the Board power to establish its own generating stations to supply electric energy to licensee and to other persons requiring such supply. Under the 1948 Act, every licensee has to comply with such reasonable directions as the Board from time to time may give for the purpose of achieving the maximum economy and efficiency in the operation of the undertaking. Chapter VI deals with the Board s finance, accounts audit and in it occurs S. 60 which says inter alia that all debts and obligations incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done by, with or for the State Government for any of the purposes of the 1948 Act before the first constitution of the Board shall be deemed to have been incurred, entered into or engaged to be done by, with or for the Board etc. Chapter VII deals with miscellaneous provisions one of which is arbitration under S. 76, a Section which we shall quote so far as it is relevant for our purpose. "76: Arbitration: (1) All questions arising between the State Government or the Board and a licensee or other person shall be determined by arbitration. (2) Where any question or matter is, by this Act, required to be referred to arbitration, it shall be so referred - (a) in cases where the Act so provides, to the Authority and on such reference the Authority shall be deemed to have been duly appointed as Arbitrators, and the award of the authority shall be final and conclusive; or (b) in other cases, to two arbitrators one to be appointed by each party to the dispute. (3) Subject to the provisions of this Section, the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) shall apply to the arbitrations under this Act. x x x x 7. The arguments presented before us on behalf of the appellant may be put in two categories: (1) the first line of argument is that the question of the power to revise the rates for the supply of electric energy to the four textile mills during the first period (1953 to 1956) by the Government of Mysore having been decided against the respondents by the High Court on the writ petitions, that decision is binding on them and the respondents cannot raise a dispute as to it by reason of the application of the principle of res judicata; (2) the second line of argument is that on a proper construction of Sub-s. (1) of S. 76, it should be held that the words "other person" occurring therein must be read ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis with licensee and so read, a consumer of electric energy will not be entitled to the benefit of that sub-section; furthermore, sub-s. (2) of S. 76 will not help the respondents, because no provision of the 1948 Act read with the 1910 Act requires to be referred to arbitration a dispute of the nature which is alleged to have arisen in the present case between the Government or the Board on one side and the textile mills on the other. 8. We shall now deal with these two arguments in the order in which we have stated them. 8. We shall now deal with these two arguments in the order in which we have stated them. First as to the argument based on the principle of res judicata. We may first refer to the pleadings in the writ petitions. In paras 7 and 8 of the affidavits which the textile mills filed in support of the writ petitions, they raised two main contentions: (a) firstly, that the Government of Mysore had "no right to increase the rates for supply of electrical energy in the manner they have done", it was stated that there were prior agreements (referring to the agreements of 1945) and the supply had to be made at the same old rates since all the terms and conditions of the agreements were observed by both the parties; (b) secondly, it was stated that the increase of rates was arbitrary and unfair by reason of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the 1948 Act. A reference was made to S. 26 of the 1948 Act and the Sixth Schedule thereof. That Schedule inter alia provides that the licensee shall so adjust his rates for the sale of electricity by periodical revision that his clear profit in any year shall not, as far as possible, exceed the amount of "reasonable return" determined in accordance with certain rules laid down in the Schedule. It was pleaded on behalf of the textile mills that it was possible to find out from the rules the maximum rate which a licensee could charge under the rules, and in view of those rules, the revised rates fixed by the Government of Mysore were unfair and excessive. 8a. The prayer which was made to the writ petitions was in these terms : "The High Court may be pleased to issue a writ of prohibition or a writ of mandamus or such other appropriate writ, direction or order retaining the respondent (meaning the Government of Mysore and later the Board) from levying or collecting the increased rates as per the Govermnent order dated March 1, 1956 and that the respondent be directed to continue to levy at the rates agreed to between the parties in the agreements of 1945". 9. 9. The decision of the High Court on the writ petitions makes it clear that the only point which was urged before the High Court on behalf of the textile mills was that under S. 26 of the 1948 Act the Board had all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the 1910 Act and as the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the Seventh Schedule of the 1948 Act were, under S. 57 of that Act, deemed to be incorporated in the license of every licensee, the Board which had the same obligations as a licensee could not demand charges for the supply of electricity which were not in consonance with the principles laid down in those Schedules. This argument was repelled by the High Court, and the High Court pointed out that the Board was not a licensee within the meaning of the 1948 Act and was not subject to the rules of the Sixth Schedule thereof. Section 26 of the 1948 Act is in these terms: "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board shall, in respect of the whole State, have all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and this Act shall be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act". The High Court expressed the view that having regard to the definition clause in S. 2 (6) which in clear terms stated that the Board was not a licensee within the meaning of the 1948 Act, S. 26 was of no assistance to the textile mills. The High Court decided that the plea of the textile mills based on the provisions of S. 26 read with the Sixth Schedule of the 1948 Act was unsound and could not be accepted. 10. Now, the question is, does this decision operate as res judicata in the matter of a reference to arbitration under S. 76 of the 1948 Act when the High Court, in express terms left that question open? " The learned Attorney General appearing for the appellant has put his argument in the following way. 10. Now, the question is, does this decision operate as res judicata in the matter of a reference to arbitration under S. 76 of the 1948 Act when the High Court, in express terms left that question open? " The learned Attorney General appearing for the appellant has put his argument in the following way. He has submitted that S. 26 of the 1948 Act came into force in Mysore on September 30, 1957, and the disputed revision of rates was made by the Government of Mysore in 1956 when S. 26 of the 1948 Act was not in force there, but under S. 60 of the 1948 Act all matters and things engaged to be done by, with or for the State Government for any of the purposes of the 1948 Act before the first constitution of the Board, shall be deemed to have been done by, with or with or for the Board etc. therefore, the Board was entitled to ask for payment of all arrears of electric charges at the rates revised by the State Government, provided the State Government had the right to revise the rates in 1956. That right having been found for the State Government and against the textile mills, the latter could not re-agitate the question and ask for a reference to arbitration under S. 76 of the 1948 Act. 11. As against this line of argument, it has been submitted on behalf of the textile mills that having regard to the pleadings in the writ petitions and the decision of the High Court thereon, all that the High Court decided was that the Sixth Schedule of the 1948 Act did not apply to the Board and the revised rates could not be challenged on the ground that there was no compliance with the principles laid down in that Schedule. The question whether the dispute shall be determined by arbitration under S. 76 of the 1948 Act was specifically left open by the High Court and, therefore, that question cannot be shut out by the operation of the principle of res judicata. 12. We do not think that these appeals can be decided on the narrow ground of res judicata. The question whether the dispute shall be determined by arbitration under S. 76 of the 1948 Act was specifically left open by the High Court and, therefore, that question cannot be shut out by the operation of the principle of res judicata. 12. We do not think that these appeals can be decided on the narrow ground of res judicata. There was some argument before us as to whether a decision on a question of law operates as res judicata and the learned Attorney General relying on the Full Bench decision in the Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, AIR 1954 Bom I has contended that a decision given by a court on a question of law may not bind the same parties when they are litigating with regard to a matter different from the one on which the decision was given; but a decision of law would be binding between the same parties as res judicata if the right that a party claimed was the same in the former litigation as in the later. We do not think that it is necessary for us to consider in the abstract to what extent a decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the same parties. It is well settled that in order to decide whether a decision in an earlier litigation operates as res judicata, the court must look at the nature of the litigation, what were the issues raised therein and what was actually decided in it. In the cases before us the High Court decided on the writ petitions that the Board was not a licensee within the meaning of S. 26 of the 1948 Act and was not bound by the principles laid down in the Sixth Schedule thereof. This was the actual decision, of the High Court. It is indeed true that what becomes res judicata is the matter" which is actually decided and not the reason which leads the court to decide the "matter". We find it difficult, however, to agree with the learned Attorney General that the matter which was actually decided on the writ petitions necessarily embraced or included the question of the right of the textile mills to call for an arbitration under S.76 of the 1948 Act. We find it difficult, however, to agree with the learned Attorney General that the matter which was actually decided on the writ petitions necessarily embraced or included the question of the right of the textile mills to call for an arbitration under S.76 of the 1948 Act. The right of the State Government or of the Board to revise the rates, and the right, if any, of the textile mills to raise a dispute as to the revised rates are two different matters and the decision on one cannot operate as res judicata with regard to the other. As to the right of the textile mills to call for an arbitration, the High Court, in express terms, left that matter open. 13. While we do not agree with the learned Attorney General that these cases can be decided on the narrow ground of res judicata, we do think that a much larger question arises, and this question has two facets, namely, whether the alleged dispute about the revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956 is a question which, at all comes under the 1948 Act and if it does, do the textile mills come within the category of "other person" occuring in S. 76 (1) of that Act? 14. Let us first consider whether the dispute at all comes under the 1948 Act. What were the powers of the State Government to revise the rates in 1953-1956? No provision of the 1910 act as it stood at the relevant time has been brought to our notice which imposed any restriction on the State Government in the matter of charging for the electric energy which it supplied, through S. 23 of the 1910 Act and some of the clauses in the Schedule of that Act imposed restriction on a licensee in the matter of charging for electricity which the licensee supplied. The State Government was not, however, a licensee, either under the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act, and was not bound by those restrictions. Speaking generally, the Board takes the place of the State Government under the 1948 Act. The State Government was not, however, a licensee, either under the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act, and was not bound by those restrictions. Speaking generally, the Board takes the place of the State Government under the 1948 Act. Section 49 of the 1948 act states : "Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any regulations made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board may from time to time fix having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and the purpose for which it is required : Provided that in fixing any such terms and conditions the Board shall not show undue preference to any persons. It is worthy of note that this Section came into force in Mysore on September 30, 1957 and the revision of rates made in l953-56 by the State Government was not in exercise of the powers given to the Board under S. 49. The position in 1953-56 was that the State Government of Mysore was free to contract with the consumers of electric energy to supply at such rates as it thought fit. The agreements which the State Government had entered into with the four textile mills in 1945 had come to an end in 1949-50 and the State Government was not bound to continue to supply electric energy to those mills at the old rates. The matter rested in the region of contract, express or implied, and it could not be said to raise a question under the 1948 act. If it was not a question which arose under the 1948 Act, S. 76 thereof would not be attracted thereto. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent had sought to meet this difficulty in the following way. He has first referred to S. 60 of the 1948 Act. It is perhaps necessary to quote sub-s. (1) of that Section here. "60(1). If it was not a question which arose under the 1948 Act, S. 76 thereof would not be attracted thereto. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent had sought to meet this difficulty in the following way. He has first referred to S. 60 of the 1948 Act. It is perhaps necessary to quote sub-s. (1) of that Section here. "60(1). All debts and obligations incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done by, with or for the State Government for any of the purposes of this Act before the first constitution of the Board shall be deemed to have been incurred, entered into or engaged to be done by, with or for the Board; and all suits or other legal proceedings instituted or which might but for the issue of the notification under sub-section (4) of S. 1 have been instituted by or against the State Government may be continued or instituted by or against the Board". The argument is that the revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956, looked at either as a matter of contract between the parties or as something done by the State Government in exercise of its power to fix such rates as it thought fit, shall be deemed under sub-s. (1) of S. 60 to have been done by the Board, and if at the time when the revision was made there was a dispute between the parties which dispute has continued with the Board by reason of the Board demanding the arrears at the revised rates, it must be held that the dispute arises under the 1948 Act and may be determined by arbitration under S. 76 (1) thereof. Learned counsel for the respondents has further argued that even if the Board had revised the rates in exercise of its powers under S. 49, a Section which we had earlier quoted, such power would be subject to the provisions of the 1948 Act and would attract S. 76. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for the respondents is that the effect of S. 60 and 49 is that the dispute is one which arises under the 1948 Act and must be determined by arbitration as required by S. 76-1). 16. We doubt the correctness of this line of argument. First, as to S. 60 of the 1948 Act. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for the respondents is that the effect of S. 60 and 49 is that the dispute is one which arises under the 1948 Act and must be determined by arbitration as required by S. 76-1). 16. We doubt the correctness of this line of argument. First, as to S. 60 of the 1948 Act. The revision of rates which was made by the State Government in 1953-56 rested, as we have said earlier, either on contract or on the unilateral action of State Government. In either case, it was outside the 1948 Act and was not referable to any provision thereof. A pre-requisite condition for the application of S. 60 is that the contract made by the State Government or the thing done by it must be "for any of the purposes of the 1948 Act". If it was for the purposes of that Act and was entered into or done by the State Government before the first constitution of the Board, then the contract or the thing done shall be deemed to have been made or done by the Board and all suits or other legal proceedings which might have been instituted against the State Government could be instituted against the Board. We have earlier pointed out that there was no provision in the 1910 act as it stood at the relevant time which applied to the State Government in the matter of the rates which it charged for supplying electricity to consumers. In the 1948 Act also, there is no Section which regulates the State Government, in the matter of what it will charge for electric energy supplied by it. That being the position, how can it be said that the revision of the rates by the State Government gives rise to a question under the 1948 Act ? 17. We now turn to S. 49. That Section came into force in Mysore, we have said earlier, on September 30, 1957. That Section applied to the Board after it was constituted. It had no application in 1956, and we are unable to see how it can be said that any dispute as to the revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956 was a question which arose under the 1948 Act. The learned Attorney Gene For Citation : AIR 1963 SC 1128