MEHROTRA, C. J.: This rule arises out of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The facts necessary for the appreciation of the arguments advanced by the parties are that on the 2nd August 1961 a notification was issued by the Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Assam and Collector, Lakhimpur District under S. 4 of the -Land Acquisition Act by which it was notified that 23IB. 3K. of land in village Dilli Grant No. 343 NLR., Mouza Jaipur, Subdivision Dibrugarh, District Lakhimpu .was likely to be needed for the company. Another; notification was issued on the same date in respect, of 212 B. 4 K. 16 L. of land in the same village: by which it was notified that this land was needed for a company. In these two notices it was further, observed that in the exercise of powers conferred; by S. 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act the State Government decided that in view of the urgency of the project the provisions of S. 5A of the Act shall not apply to waste or arable land. Thereafter on the 16th August 1961 another] notification was issued in respect of 314 B. 3 K 18 L. of land within the boundaries given in the notification situate in village Dilli T. E., Mouaj Jaipur of Dibrugarh Subdivision, District Lakhirnj pur. It was specified that the land was needed far a company viz., Fertiliser Factory. In this notificif tion however the petitioner was allowed an opportunity to file objection under S. 5A of the Lati Acquisition Act (hereinafter called 'the Act'). Oil the same date another notification was issued with respect to 41 B. 1 K. within the boundaries specified in that notice, in this notification also the peti­tioner was given an opportunity to the objection .under S. 5A. Another notification was issued on 'the 28th August 1961 in respect of 343 B. 3 K. V) lechas, boundaries being given in the notifica­tion itself, in this notification also the petitioner was given an opportunity to file objections under S. 5A of the Act. Another notification was issued under S. 4 of the Act on 25th September 1961 in respect of 29 B. 2 K. 8 Lechas of land within boundaries specified in the notification itself. It is not disputed that in respect of this acquisition the petitioner was given an opportunity to file objections under S. 5A of the Act. Another notification was issued under S. 4 of the Act on 25th September 1961 in respect of 29 B. 2 K. 8 Lechas of land within boundaries specified in the notification itself. It is not disputed that in respect of this acquisition the petitioner was given an opportunity to file objections under S. 5A of the Act. Thereafter it is contended by the petitioner that In respect of notices issued on the 16th August, 28th August and 29th September 1961 some objections were filed by the petitioner. In respect of the notices issued on 2nd August 1961 no objection could be filed by the petitioner as the provisions of S. 17 (4) were applied to these notices. (2) The petitioner has mainly alleged three grounds in his petition. He has firstly contended that no advance possession could be taken of the [and unless the proceedings under S. 5A were com­pleted or that a proper notice under S. 17(4) was given. In the present case the contention of the petitioner is that the Fertiliser Corporation of India Ltd. took possession of the land, cut certain jungles and were constructing certain buildings on this land which act was illegal and this court Should issue a direction restraining them from tak­ing possession of the land. (3) A counter-affidavit has been filed on be­half of the Land Acquisition Officer, Lakhimpur District in which it is stated that the State never took possession over this disputed land. The Fertiliser Corporation has entered into possession of the land and cut the jungles and made certain constructions. That was done in pursuance of a certain agreement reached between the Fertiliser Corporation and the petitioner. There was thus no irregularity committed by the State and the Land Acquisition Officer. The petitioner is thus Sot entitled to any relief as against the opposite parties under Article 226 of the Constitution. (4) In our opinion there is a considerable force in the argument of the opposite party. It is not denied now that the State has not entered into possession of this land and thus there has been ho violation of the provisions of the Act by the State or the Land Acquisition Officer. (4) In our opinion there is a considerable force in the argument of the opposite party. It is not denied now that the State has not entered into possession of this land and thus there has been ho violation of the provisions of the Act by the State or the Land Acquisition Officer. If the Cor­poration for which the land is being sought to be acquired, enters under certain agreement over the land, whether it has violated the terms of the agreement or not is not a matter which can be decided by this Court. If the Corporation has entered into possession as a trespasser, then the remedy of the petitioner will be by means of a suit, or if the Corporation has entered into posses­sion in pursuance of the agreement between the petitioner and the Corporation and the question is whether it has violated the terms of the agreement, the proper forum to decide that question will be a civil court and not this court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. (5) Mr. Goswami for the petitioner has very .strenuously contended that the facts are admitted in this case. The terms of the agreement are be­fore this court. Under the circumstances the in­terest of the petitioner will be safeguarded if this court declares that under the agreement the Cor­poration was not entitled to make constructions over the land and take possession." The right which was given under the agreement to the Cor­poration is a limited one. We do not think that the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked for the purpose of granting infructuous declarations. The whole question is which is the proper forum to decide the question. This court cannot determine the rights between third parties and this court under Article 226 of the Constitution will grant relief to the petitioner only against the illegal acts of the State. If there is any dispute with regard to the interpretation of the agreement or the possession being taken by the other parties in a private capa­city over the land as a trespasser, this court under •Article 226 of the Constitution will not exercise its extra-ordinary power. (6) It was then contended that in the present case the Corporation was not a stranger. (6) It was then contended that in the present case the Corporation was not a stranger. In fact the land was sought to be acquired for the Cor­poration and thus their interest was linked up with that of the State and thus the Corporation was not a stranger. We do not think that merely, because the land is sought to be acquired for the! Corporation, any relief can be granted against' them for the acts which they are alleged to have done as trespasser or in violation of the terms of the agreement between the petitioner and the Cor­poration independently of the Government. There-' fore there is no force in this contention. (7) The next point raised is that the petitioner should have been allowed to raise objections as to the nature of the acquisition on the notices which were issued on the 2nd August 1961. The argu­ment of the petitioner is that S. 17(1) gives power to the State to take possession without the issue of a declaration under S. 6, if it is a case of emer­gency and the land is arable and waste land. The Government in the present case cannot be said to have formed an opinion on the materials before it, that it was waste and arable land. It was con­ceded that the formation of opinion is entirely with the Government and once the Government has formed an opinion that there is an emergency and the land is waste and arable land, the opinion of the Government cannot be interfered with by this court. But if it is found that the Government had formed an arbitrary opinion, it will be no opinion in the eye of law and this court can set aside the order of the Government under S. 17(1) or S. 17(4) on the ground that the opinion which the Govern­ment is required to form, has not been formed in the present case. It is further contended that if the notice issued by the Government has specified the materials on which the Government has come to the opinion that there was an emergency and that the land was waste and arable land, this court could have presumed that the Government had formed such an opinion but in the absence of any such specifica­tion in the notice itself, the petitioner could not file an objection as to whether the land was acquir­ed for a public purpose and the petitioner could show before this court that there are not sufficient materials before the Government to come to the conclusion that there was an emergency and that the land was waste and arable land. Another argument advanced in this connection is that the Government has not exercised its powers under section 17(4) in respect of the notices issued on the 16th and 28th August and 25th September 1961, and those lands are also required for the same purpose for which the land under notices issued on the 2nd August 1961, was required. (8) It is very difficult to accept that there is an emergency for part of the land while there is no emergency for other parts of the same land, It may be that the Government may have realised that there is an emergency in respect of both the parts but as the other parts in the opinion of the Government were not arable and waste land, it did not purport to exercise its powers under sec­tion 17(4) in respect of the land. But from that fact alone it cannot be held that the exercise of the power by the Government under section 17(4) in respect of the land covered by notices D/- 16th and 2nd August, 1961 was illegal & this court should interfere with that. Apart from it, section 17(1) gives power to the Government to take immediate possession over the land without issue of notice under section 6 if there is an emergency and if the land is waste and arable land. In the present case the Government has not taken possession over any land. Apart from it, section 17(1) gives power to the Government to take immediate possession over the land without issue of notice under section 6 if there is an emergency and if the land is waste and arable land. In the present case the Government has not taken possession over any land. Therefore there was no exercise of power under section 17(1) in the present case and it cannot be said that the entire acquisition proceedings are illegal because the Government had exercised powers under section 17(1) although the condition precedent for the exercise of this power did not exist in the present case. (9) It was then contended that the notice issued under section 4 is defective inasmuch as it does not specify that the land which is needed for the factory is a waste and arable land and that there was an emergency. In our opinion sec­tion 4 does not require that it should be specified that there is any emergency or that the land is waste and arable land. The power is exercised under section 17(4) and there can be a composite notice under section 4 and sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act and m the present case the notice is a composite notice. So far as section 17(4) is con­cerned, it is clearly specified in the notice that action has been taken in the exercise of the power conferred by section 17(4) of the Act as the State I Government has decided that in view of the urgency the provisions of section 5A of the Act shall not apply to the waste or arable land. (10) The other ground taken by the petitioner is that in this notice it is not specified as to which portion of the land is waste and arable land. This power has been exercised in respect of the land which is the subject-matter of the two notices dated 2nd August 1961, and not of the other notices. In that view of the matter^ there is no difficulty in interpreting the words in the notices themselves and to hold that the notification only applies to the land which is the subject-matter of these notices. Reliance is placed in sup­port of the contention by the petitioner on the case of Prasanna Kumar Das v. State of Orissa, '(S) AIR 1956 Orissa 114. Reliance is placed in sup­port of the contention by the petitioner on the case of Prasanna Kumar Das v. State of Orissa, '(S) AIR 1956 Orissa 114. That was a case where there was one composite notice dealing with both the waste and arable land and homestead land and if under those circumstances the area of the waste and arable land is not specified in the notice, the entire notice may fall. But in the present case this power has been exercised in res­pect of the entire land which is the subject-matter of the notices dated the 2nd August 1961. Because by a separate notice under section 4 some other land has also been sought to be acquired for the same purpose, it cannot be said that this notice should be held to be defective inasmuch as the other land is considered not to be waste and arable land. (11) As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1203 : "The purpose of the notification under Sec. 4 I (Land Acquisition Act) is to carry on a preliminary ' investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking levels, and if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether | the land was adapted for the purpose for which it I was sought to be acquired. It is only under S. 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that land with proper description and area so as to be identifiable is needed for a public pur­pose or for a company. What was a mere proposal under Sec. 4 becomes the subject-matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. Hence the defect in the notification under section 4 is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a company and the purpose has to be investigated under sec­tion 5A or section 40 necessarily after the notifica­tion under section 4." This case to our mind, is a complete answer to the contention of the petitioner that the notifications Under section 4 should be held to be illegal as the public purpose has not been specified in the notification itself. (12) It was lastly contended by the counsel for the petitioners that as the acquisition was for a company the provisions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act are attracted and unless there was an agreement no notification under S. 6 could be issued. He has contended that an oppor­tunity is to be given to a person under section 5A to show whether the land is needed for a public purpose or not and the entire object of giving such an opportunity will be defeated if the petitioner does not know the real nature of the purpose be­fore he is called upon to file an objection. It is contended thus that the purpose must be known to the petitioner before he files an objection. The proceedings under section 5A should be held to be invalid if the petitioner has not been supplied with the information as to the nature of the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired before he enters into an objection. It is further urged in this connection that the provision of section 6 makes the declaration under it conclusive evidence of the fact that the purpose is a public purpose. After the notification has been issued under sec­tion 6, it will not be open to the petitioner to Show that the purpose is not a public purpose as contemplated under Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act. It is thus essential that the peti­tioner should know the nature of the requirement of the Government before he files an objection. (13) We do not think that there is any force in this contention. Section 39 provides that "the provisions of sections 6 to 37 (both in­clusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless with the previous consent of the Provincial Government nor unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinbefore mentioned." Section 39 expressly excludes the operation of sec­tions 6 to 37 before an agreement is executed. If the intention of the legislature was to exclude the operation of section 5A and section 4 also, it would have expressly mentioned these sections in Sec. 39. The reading of section 40 also throws light -on this question. If the intention of the legislature was to exclude the operation of section 5A and section 4 also, it would have expressly mentioned these sections in Sec. 39. The reading of section 40 also throws light -on this question. Section 40 provides that the consent shall not be given unless the Provincial Govern­ment be satisfied either on the report of the Collec­tor under section 5-A, sub-section (2), or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided. The consent is to be given after the report has been submitted under section 5-A, or the enquiry has been made by Government under sec­tion 40, and the agreement can only come into (existence after the consent has been given. This also shows that the proceedings under section 5A have to precede the issue of the agreement and it is not essential that the copy of the agreement should be supplied to the petitioner before he files an objection under section 5A. The pro­ceedings under section 5A thus cannot be held to be invalid simply because the. copy of the agreement was not supplied to the petitioner. Before the Government gives its consent, the Government has to satisfy itself on the report submitted by the Collector under sec­tion 5A or on the inquiry made by itself under section 40. If the Government chooses to make inquiry under section 40, the petitioner will have ample opportunity at that stage to show that it is not a public purpose as contemplated under Chap­ter VII of the Act. It cannot therefore, be said that the petitioner was in any way prejudiced in filing his objections under section 5A of the Act. The land acquisition proceedings thus cannot be vitiated on that ground. (14) In the case of AIR 1960 SC 1203 to which I have already referred, it has been laid down that (he agreement is to be executed after either the proceedings under Sec. 5A have terminated and report has been submitted or the Government has made an inquiry under section 40. There is there­fore, no force in the contention raised by the peti­tioner that the proceedings are vitiated as the copy of the agreement was not supplied to the petitioner before he was called upon to file objection under Sec. 5A. Nor can it be held that the notice under Sec. 4 is invalid for want of such a copy. There is there­fore, no force in the contention raised by the peti­tioner that the proceedings are vitiated as the copy of the agreement was not supplied to the petitioner before he was called upon to file objection under Sec. 5A. Nor can it be held that the notice under Sec. 4 is invalid for want of such a copy. No doubt the execution of the agreement and the consent of the Government is a condition precedent for acquisition of the land for the company. But section 39 clearly excludes the operation of Sees. 6 to 37 before the consent of the Government is obtained and the agreement is executed if the land is sought to be acquired for a company. So fat no notification under section 6 has been issued by the Government and it cannot be assumed that without resorting to the proper procedure and without executing the agreement if it is found necessary the Government will issue the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. (15) The last point urged is that in any case before the agreement is executed under Sec. 39, the provisions of Sees. 6 to 37 cannot be brought 'into operation. Section 17(4) is a section, the operation of which is excluded from the acquisi­tion proceedings so long as the agreement is not executed. It is contended that as the land was required for a company, which is clear from the notification issued under section ~4, the Government could not have exercised its powers under S. 17(4) and prohibited the petitioner from filing the objec­tions under section 5A as section 17(4) by virtue of section 39 was not applicable to these proceed­ings. I have already referred to section 39. It includes section 17(4) also. In the present case in the notifications which were issued on the 2nd August 1961, it was expressly laid down that the provisions of section 5A will not apply in the present case as the land was waste and arable land and the Government was of , opinion that there was an emergency. This power was exercised under section 17(4) of the Act. As it is expressly laid down in the notices themselves that the land is required for a company, Sec. 39 will apply. (16) Two arguments were advanced on behalf of the opposite parties to meet this contention of the petitioner. This power was exercised under section 17(4) of the Act. As it is expressly laid down in the notices themselves that the land is required for a company, Sec. 39 will apply. (16) Two arguments were advanced on behalf of the opposite parties to meet this contention of the petitioner. Firstly it is contended that sec­tion 39 only lays down that the provisions of sections 6 to 37 shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any company. Section 17(4) is not meant for the purpose of acquiring the land. It is only for the purpose of taking immediate possession that section 17(4) empowers the Gov­ernment to take action. In my opinion there is no justification for such an interpretation of the provisions of sections 39 and 17(4). Section 39 makes the provisions of Sees. 6 to 37 inapplicable to the proceedings if the land is sought to be acquired for the company, unless the agreement is executed and it cannot be said that the provisions of Sec. 17(4) are not meant for the purpose of acquiring the land. In this view of the matter the Government was not right in laying down in the notifications issued on the 2nd August 1961, that the provisions of Sec. 5A will not be attracted in this case. This however, will only give an opportunity to the petitioner to file objection so far as the notifications dated the 2nd August 1961, are concerned. No notification under Sec. 6 has so far been issued and if this part is deleted from the notices issued under section 4, then the peti­tioner will have an opportunity to file objection to that. But we see no force in the contention of the petitioner that the proceedings of land acquisi­tion are vitiated on account of any error of irregularity committed by the Government or of account of any violation of any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. (17) It was also urged that there has been an earlier requisition of this land under the provisions of the Assam Requisition Act and the land was at that stage requisitioned for a different purpose. The present acquisition therefore, was invalid. Bui this point was not pressed before us and we were not called upon to give any decision on the ques­tion. The present acquisition therefore, was invalid. Bui this point was not pressed before us and we were not called upon to give any decision on the ques­tion. Moreover the land was derequisitioned and there is no bar to the issue of a fresh notification under section 4 as the land is acquired for a public purpose. In the result therefore, we allow this petition in so far as the words in the notifica­tions by which it is provided that the provisions of Sec. 5A will not apply in these proceedings are deleted and in other respects the petition is rejected. Parties will bear their own costs. (18) S. K. DUTTA, J.: I agree. Order accordingly.