Judgment Anantanarayanan, J.- This is an appeal by the State against the acquittal for Kuttayan alias Muniswami (respondent) by the learned Sessions Judge, Madurai Division, upon the charge of causing the death of one Balusami by a fatal injury inflicted with a bichuva. The only grounds upon which we have been invited to dissent from the conclusion of the learned Judge and to hold that the acquittal was improper and unjustified, lie within a restricted compass. They do not impinge upon any principle of law as such, and really relate to the merits of the evidence and the probabilities. There is a background to this occurrence, which might be very briefly indicated. On 21st May, 1959, there was an incident between a Harijan woman Karuppayi (P.W.5) and a lad of the Thevar community, which led to an assault on the woman. Mookkan (P.W.6) then interfered, and there was a scuffle between P.W.6 and that Thevar lad during the course of which Veilan (P.W.7) separated the combatants. The incident no doubt appears very trivial, but it led to bitter feeling; between Harijans and Thevars of the locality, and there was one grave outcome, namely the stabbing of one Chelliah Thevar that evening. The prosecution does not allege that there was any direct motive for this accused Kuttayan alias Muniswami to stab Baluswami (deceased). The case for prosecution is that the incident was wholly the consequence of ill-will between the Thevars and Harijans of the locality in general. The actual facts of the occurrence are very simple. Balusami (deceased) and one Velu (P.W.1) came to the bus-stand at Madurai to proceed to Kcchadai when they were accosted by two Thevars, beaten and taken to a locality known as Nagupilli Thope ( see plan Exhibit P-13). From there these Thevars insisted on taking the deceased and P.W.1 to B-3 Police Station, which was not far away, for interrogation as suspects with regard to the stabbing of Chelliah Thevar. The party was proceeding on foot west of the junction of South Veli Street and Draupathi Amman Koil Lane. It is alleged that one Koolupani, not an accused in this case, and the present respondent Kuttayan darted from the lane. Koolupani was armed with a stick and the respondent with a bichuva. The party was proceeding on foot west of the junction of South Veli Street and Draupathi Amman Koil Lane. It is alleged that one Koolupani, not an accused in this case, and the present respondent Kuttayan darted from the lane. Koolupani was armed with a stick and the respondent with a bichuva. Koolupani beat Balusami with the stick, and the respondent gave a fatal injury to Balusami in the lower part of the abdomen with the bichuva, after which the assailants ran away. P.W.1 and Balusami raised alarms. P.W.4 came there and the injured was taken in a cycle rickshaw to B-3 Police Station where his statement, Exhibit P-1 was recorded by P.W.17, the Head Constable. Later, a dying declaration Exhibit P-4, was recorded from the victim. There can be no doubt that the victim sustained a gaping incised wound on the abdomen 1 X 1 X 4, below the umbilicus to the effect of which he succumbed. The real point is whether there is credible evidence to show that it was the present accused (respondent) who stabbed Balusami and caused the fatal injury. That depends, almost exclusively, on the testimony of (1) P.W.1, (2) P.Ws.2 and 3, the alleged eye-witnesses and (3) the recorded declarations of the victim Exhibits P-1 and P-4. Normally, there would not be great difficulty in such a case, and the absence of a direct motive would not be material. For, it is clear enough that there was considerable ill-will between the Harijans and the Thevars of the locality, that Balusami and P.W.1 were actually suspected of complicity in the stabbing of Chelliah. Thevar, and that the present respondent, an young man of the Thevar community, might have been led by feelings of hatred and enmity to perpetrate the murderous assault. If the dying declaration had clearly indicated the identity of the assailant, that would place the matter beyond doubt. But, unfortunately, the victim was not previously acquainted with the identity of the accused-respondent. In Exhibit P-1 the assailant is described as a short man with a cropped head with curly hairs aged about 20 years. It is specified that this assailant had the scar of a stab injury on the left side of his chest. Exhibit P-4 follows Exhibit P-1 with regard to this description, and adds that the person who stabbed the victim was of fair complexion. It is specified that this assailant had the scar of a stab injury on the left side of his chest. Exhibit P-4 follows Exhibit P-1 with regard to this description, and adds that the person who stabbed the victim was of fair complexion. The very important aspect of this case, on the matter of the declarations themselves, is that the present respondent does have a scar mark 4½ inches long on the left side of his chest extending from left collar-bone. But there are considerable difficulties in accepting this feature as adequate to sustain the conclusion that the declarations Exhibits P-1 and P-4 indicate the present respondent as the assailant and no other person. First of all, it is not at all clear from the declarations themselves whether this feature of the scar was actually noted by the victim at the moment of assault. We have carefully scrutinised the language, and it might equally bear the interpretation that the victim became aware that the assailant had such a scar, perhaps from P.W.1 or some other person. The second point is that according to the evidence, the assailant (respondent) was wearing a banian of a particular variety. The record does not show whether this banian would necessarily have concealed the scar on the left side of the chest. But we cannot say that it was an wholly unjustified observation on the part of the learned Sessions Judge that he felt some doubt whether, under those circumstances, and within that very brief interval of time, it would have been possible for the victim to have already seen the scar and recognised it as an identifying feature. The learned Judge also points out that the description of a fair complexion, may not precisely suit the accused-respondent. In this state of the evidence, we are necessarily constrained to turn to the testimony of P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 for evidence which would furnish some safe corroboration of the inference suggested by the declarations. As far as P.W.1 is concerned, his evidence does not appear to be worthy of any reliance, for the truth was that at the subsequent parade held by the Sub-Magistrate, P.W.13, P.W.1 failed to identify the respondent as the assailant. Discrediting this evidence, we are left with the testimonials of P.Ws.2 and 3. As far as P.W.1 is concerned, his evidence does not appear to be worthy of any reliance, for the truth was that at the subsequent parade held by the Sub-Magistrate, P.W.13, P.W.1 failed to identify the respondent as the assailant. Discrediting this evidence, we are left with the testimonials of P.Ws.2 and 3. The learned Public Prosecutor has strenuously contended before us that the grounds furnished by the learned Sessions Judge for the rejection of the testimonies of P.Ws.2 and 3 will not stand critical scrutiny. For instance, it was not unnatural that P.Ws.2 and 3 should have rushed back to Chintamani to inform the old father of Balusami (deceased) about the incident, instead of proceeding forthwith to B-3 Police Station in order to make a report of the occurrence Again the fact that P.W.1 does not refer to P.Ws.2 and 3 may not be a major criticism against these witnesses for, as we have seen, P.W.1 failed to identify the respondent at the parade, and cannot be termed a reliable witness. But the real difficulty in the case is that the learned Judge does not rest his rejection of the testimonies of P.Ws.2 and 3 on these criticisms alone, or even mainly upon these criticisms. He seems to rest the rejection far more upon his impression of these two witnesses in the box on persons who were not at all speaking the truth, and who were, not to put too fine a point upon it, speaking to a tissue of falsehoods. It is not very clear why precisely the learned Sessions Judge get the impression, and we have examined the original depositions in which no note appears of the demeanour of the witnesses. Nevertheless, such an impression obtained by a Sessions Judge of experience at a murder trial, is not a factor that can be lightly discarded in considering the propriety of an appeal from an acquittal. The principles upon which this question of interference with an acquittal is governed, have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in several decisions, of which it is sufficient to refer to the following. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan1 it is emphasised, that the appellate Court has full power to review the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan1 it is emphasised, that the appellate Court has full power to review the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded. Nevertheless it is stressed that the reasons given by the Court below in support of its order must be very carefully considered before being dissented from, and, in interfering with an acquittal, the superior Court should also express its own grounds in detail. In Harbans Singh v.State of Punjab2 emphasis is laid upon the canon that the appellate Court must be able to arrive at the conclusion that the view taken by the lower Court was manifestly unreasonable. Where such an inference is justified, that would be a compelling ground for interference. Finally, we may observe that in C.A. Nos. 176 of 1959 and 40 of 1960, M.G. Agarwal and M.K. Kulkarani v.The State of Maharashtra3 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have again emphasised the same principles, in some detail. As observed by them “In dealing with such appeals, the High Court naturally bears in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and cannot lose sight of the fact that the said presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court and so, the fact that the accused person is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt will also be present in the mind of the High Court when it deals with the merits of the case. As an appellate Court, the High Court is generally slow in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly when the said finding is based on an appreciation of oral evidence, because the trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence. Thus, though the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal are as wide as those which ithas in dealing with an appeal against conviction, in dealing with the former class of appeals, its approach is governed by the overriding consideration flowing from the presumption of innocence.” Bearing these principles in mind, we think it abundantly clear that this is not a case in which interference with the acquittal would be justified, in the interests of justice. The dying declarations, unfortunately for the prosecution, do not reveal the identity of the assailant in any unmistakable terms. They merely justify asuspicion that the victim might have indicated the accused respondent as the assailant, because of the reference to the scar on the left side of the chest. But obviously, that is an unsafe basis for an inference that identity has been established beyond doubt. Proceeding to the oral evidence, we have only the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3, and those witnesses were discredited by the learned Sessions Judge, because of a powerful impression gained by him that they were speaking to falsehood and untruth. It may be that the learned Sessions Judge erred, but even that would not be an adequate ground for us to interfere with the acquittal, particularly as he had the advantage of seeing and hearing those witnesses, an advantage which is denied to us by the very circumstances. Consequently, we decline to interfere with the acquittal in this case, and dismiss the appeal. K.L.B.-----Appeal dismissed.