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1962 DIGILAW 412 (SC)

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY v. ROBERT J. SAS

1962-11-16

A.K.SARKAR, J.L.KAPUR, M.HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, S.K.DAS

body1962
JUDGMENT KAPUR, J.-These three appeals by special leave are brought against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay. The appellant in all the three appeals is the Commissioner of Income-tax but in each of the appeals the respondent is different i. e., one of the three shareholders of a private limited company A.C.E.C. Private (India) Limited which was , carrying on business in India and made profits during the calendar year 1947. The accounting year is the calendar year ending December 31, 1948, and the relevant assessment year 1949-50. Although the company had earned large profits during the year 1947 it did not declare any dividend at the shareholders meeting held on December 4, 1948. On March 29, 1954, the Income-tax Officer passed an order under s. 23A(l) of the Income-tax Act, hereinafter termed the "Act", whereby the income of the company was in accordance with that provision, deemed to have been divided amongst the shareholders. By that order the following dividends were deemed to have been distributed amongst the three shareholders, each a respondent in one of the appeals. Untitled Document Mr. Paul Roufart :              Rs. 1,09,859/- Mr. Paul Victor Hermans :              Rs. 1,00,189/- Mr. Robert J. Sas :              Rs. 1,09,859/- The Income-tax Officer issued notices under s. 34 of the Act and the notices were served on the respective respondents on April 1, 1954. Thereafter the return of the income was submitted and the assessment was completed in regard to the shareholders. Appeals were taken first to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. One of the points taken before the Tribunal was that the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to take proceedings as the notices were served on the assessee respondents beyond the period of four years allowed under s. 34(1)(b) of the Act. Appeals were taken first to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. One of the points taken before the Tribunal was that the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to take proceedings as the notices were served on the assessee respondents beyond the period of four years allowed under s. 34(1)(b) of the Act. This plea was accepted by the Tribunal and at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax a case was stated to the High Court under s. 66(1) of the Act and the following two questions were referred to it: (1) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case it was necessary for the Income-tax Officer to initiate action under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act in order to tax the deemed income distributed by virtue of the order under section 23A(l) of the Act made in the case of the A.C.E.C. Private (India) Ltd. ? (2) If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative whether having regard to the observations of their lordships in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City 1 (1955) 27 I.T.R. 245 the notice served on April 1, 1954 was out of time ? The second question was reframed by the High Court as follows: If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative whether the notice served on April 1, 1954 was out of time ? Both the questions were answered in the affirmative and against the Commissioner of Income-tax. Against that Judgment and order he has come in appeal to this court by special leave. In view of the decision of this court in Sardar Baldev Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi & Ajmer ({[1961] 1 S.C.R. 482.}) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Navinchandra Mafatlal ({[1961] 42 I.T.R. 53.}) in which it was held that an assessment cannot be made under s.23A of the Act because that section does not make provision for an assessment to be made and assessment can only be made under s. 34 of the Act, the first question no longer survives for decision and was rightly not argued before us. The only question that remains for decision is the second question i. e., whether the notice served on April 1, 1964, was out of time. The only question that remains for decision is the second question i. e., whether the notice served on April 1, 1964, was out of time. Counsel for the appellant-Commissioner of Income-tax-argued (1) that there was no limitation prescribed in regard to the order to be made under s. 23A of the Act and if the period mentioned in s. 34 (1) (b) is made applicable to orders under s. 23 A then that section (s. 23A) would become unworkable; (2) that as under s. 23A(1) there was a period of six months up to the end of which dividends could be distributed the accounting year would, in the present case, be 1949 and the assessment year 1950-51 and therefore the notice could be served within four years of the end of that year i.e.. up to March 31, 1955. Finally it was urged that proviso (1) to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 applied and as the notice was issued within four years under s. 34(1) (b) there was a period of one year from the date of service of the notice during which the assessment or reassessment could be made and the impugned order having been made within that period it was a proper and a valid order. In the present case the High Court in its advisory jurisdiction had to give its opinion on the question submitted to it and it refrained the question in order to bring out the question which arises from the order of the Tribunal. We did not allow the question of the applicability of proviso (1) to s. 34(3) to be raised as the question does not take in the point raised about the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34. The question as framed by the High Court is, whether the service of notice under s. 34(1)(b) was out of time. The proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 relates to completion of assessment within a particular period when the notice is issued before the period of limitation referred to in s. 34(l)(b). The two are different questions and one does not include the other. At the relevant date s. 23A which empowered the Income-tax Officer to assess individual members of certain companies read as under : S. 23A. Power to assess individual members of certain companies (1). The two are different questions and one does not include the other. At the relevant date s. 23A which empowered the Income-tax Officer to assess individual members of certain companies read as under : S. 23A. Power to assess individual members of certain companies (1). Where the Income tax Officer is satisfied that in respect of any previous year the profits and gains distributed as dividends by any company up to the end of the sixth month after its accounts for that previous year are laid before the company in general meeting are less than sixty per cent of the assessable income of the company of that previous year, as reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof he shall, unless, he is satisfied that having regard to losses incurred by the company in earlier years or to the smallness of the profit made, the brought to our attention in support of that sub mission. In this view of the matter the answer given by the High Court to the second question was correct and the assessment made under s. 34(l)(b) of the Act after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was out of time. This is the only question which survives for decision and in our opinion the High Court answered it correctly. These appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed. For Citation : air 1963(262)