JUDGMENT 1. THIS Rule is directed against an order of the Land Acquisition Collector, Birbhum, refusing to make a reference under section 8 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 [west Bengal Act II of 1948]. 2. THE petitioner's prayer for reference has been rejected on the ground of limitation. It is admitted that the Collector's award in the instant case was made on 15th May, 1958. The petitioner was not present before the Collector at the time of the making of the said award but a notice appears to have been received by her on 18th May, 1958, purporting to be a notice under section 12, sub-section (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioner's application for reference was filed on 2nd September, 1958. That application was rejected on the ground of limitation as, according to the Collector, the time for filing the said application had expired on 28th June, 1958, that is, with the expiry of a period of six weeks from the date of the petitioner's receipt of the aforesaid notice, under the first part of section 18 (2) (b) of the Land Acquisition Act (Central Act I of 1894) which provision, inter alia, was attracted to the instant case, that is, to proceedings under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, by the amended sub-section (2) of section 8 thereof. Before us a question was raised on behalf of the petitioner as to the scope of the Explanation, appended to the said sub-section (2) of section 8 of the above Act by the new section 5 of the amending Act XII of 1957 and. it was argued that the said Explanation, so far as it sought to widen the scope of the said sec. 8 (2) by equating the notice under sec. 7 (2) (aa) (ii) to that under sec. 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for purposes of its sec. 18 (proviso) was ultra vires and could not be recognised or given effect to. 3. 8 (2) by equating the notice under sec. 7 (2) (aa) (ii) to that under sec. 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for purposes of its sec. 18 (proviso) was ultra vires and could not be recognised or given effect to. 3. ALTHOUGH we are not in favour of accepting the above view of the aforesaid Explanation, it is not necessary for us to pronounce finally on the validity or otherwise of the same in the light of the petitioner's contention aforesaid, as, in our view, the petitioner, upon any view of the said Explanation, would be entitled to succeed in the instant Rule, as, from the materials, placed before us, it does not appear that any manner has been prescribed for the giving of notice by the Collector, as contemplated in section 7, sub-section (2), clause (aa), sub-clause (ii) of the above West Bengal Land ('requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, after its amendment by the aforesaid amending Act XII of 1957. There being thus no prescribed manner, the provision requiring service of notice in the prescribed manner for the purpose of the shorter period of limitation, as contained in the first part of proviso (b) to sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, sought to be attracted to proceedings of the present type by the above amending Act, would not be operative, the result being that the application for reference under this new Statute can be filed within the other or longer period, prescribed in the last part of the said proviso (b) to section 18, namely, six months from the data of the Collector's award, and, from that point of view, the petitioner's application for reference before the Collector would be quite within time. 4. A point was raised by the learned Additional Government Pleader that the provision about giving of notice in the prescribed manner was merely directory and not mandatory or imperative. We are unable to accept this contention. To put it at the highest, it can only be supported on the ground of great inconvenience otherwise occurring from the public point of view. We do not think, however, that to hold that this provision is mandatory or imperative and not merely directory would lead to any such great inconvenience. We are unable to accept this contention. To put it at the highest, it can only be supported on the ground of great inconvenience otherwise occurring from the public point of view. We do not think, however, that to hold that this provision is mandatory or imperative and not merely directory would lead to any such great inconvenience. The learned Additional Government Pleader further argued that, even where the statute provides for notice in a prescribed manner, the giving of a notice, substantially carrying out the Intention of the statute, would be sufficient although it may not be in the prescribed form, there being no such prescribed form, made under the statute. In our opinion, this contention also cannot succeed. 5. INDEED, as a matter of substance, this contention is practically the same as the one which we have rejected above inasmuch as if substantial compliance be held sufficient the statute would be directory, strict compliance being necessary in cases of mandatory or imperative statutes. The form of the contention, however, is different. Be that as it may, it is clear from the statute that a notice in the prescribed form was clearly contemplated and it could not be substituted by any other notice, much less by a notice under section 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition act, 1894, to which, under the deeming provision, the actual notice in the prescribed manner under this new statute was to correspond. 6. IT was next contended that the Collector in dealing with the matter of reference was not a Tribunal, amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. This argument, in our opinion, has only to be stated to be rejected. The Collector in making or refusing the reference, particularly as, in this case, in refusing it on the ground of limitation, is certainly acting judicially, or, at least, quasi-judicially and would, in our opinion, obviously come within, at any rate, the term 'tribunal' under the aforesaid Article 227 of the Constitution. (Vide in this connection the Administrator General of Bengal v. The Land Acquisition Collector, 24 Parganas (1) 12 C. W. N. 241, and Haripada Dutta v. Ananta Mandal, (2) A. I. R. 1952 Cal. 526; See also Krishna Das Roy v. L. A. Collector, Patna (3) 16 C. W. N. 327 and Radha Prosanna Das's case (4) A. I. R. 1952 Orissa 98 ). 526; See also Krishna Das Roy v. L. A. Collector, Patna (3) 16 C. W. N. 327 and Radha Prosanna Das's case (4) A. I. R. 1952 Orissa 98 ). In the above view, we would hold that the order of the learned Collector rejecting the petitioner's application for reference on the ground of limitation, was a bad order, vitiated by an error in the exercise of his jurisdiction or by reason of an improper exercise of jurisdiction, vested in him, upon a wrong view of the law. It is, therefore, open to challenge and revision under the aforesaid Article 227 of the Constitution and, accordingly, the instant Rule should succeed. 7. THIS Rule, in the circumstances, is made absolute, the order of the learned Collector, complained against herein, is set aside and he is directed to make a reference, if the petitioner's application in that behalf is otherwise in form and otherwise complies with the statute in question. The petitioner will be entitled to her costs of this Rule, hearing fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.