The plaintiffs' case is that the suit lane together with some other lands of the same patta originally belonged to defendant No. 1, who mort­gaged the sama to the father of the plaintiffs Nos . 1 and 2. As the defendant No. 1 failed to redeem the mort­gage, the entire patta land was sold and the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 purchased it at auction sale for Rs. 400/-. Sale certificates were issued by the Munsiff on the 22nd 'December, 1939. At that time, the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 were minors, aged 6 and 4 years respectively and at the execution proceedings, they were represented through their guardian appointed by the Court. On the 19th April, 1940, possession was given over this land to the guardian of the plaintiffs. The land was managed by plaintiff No. 3, the mother of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. Maisena Devi, pro forma defendant No. 2 is the step-mother of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, and is the daughter of defen­dant No. 1. Plaintiff No. 3 is the mother of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. She and defendant No. 2 were living to­gether after the death of their husband and defendant No. 1, the father of defendant No. 2, occasionally used to ' visit his daughter. Plaintiff No. 3 sold to defendant No. 1 on the 19th of February, 1942, by a registered sale deed 8 bighas 3 kathas and 5 lechas of land of the disputed patta and delivered possession thereof to him. The re­maining 7B-4K-2 lechas comprised by two dages, being the land in suit, remained in the possession of the plain­tiffs. (2) The defendant No. 1 after purchasing the major share of the patta land assured to plaintiff No. 3 that he would get the names of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 mutated in respect of their shares. Management of the land, how­ever, was done by defendant No. 1 as he was a co-sharer in the patta. After some time, defendant No. 2 went to live with defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs No, 1 and 2, after attaining majority, wanted to manage the suit land and the defendant No. 1 thereafter started interfering with the rights of the plaintiffs. There were several criminal litigations between the parties. After some time, defendant No. 2 went to live with defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs No, 1 and 2, after attaining majority, wanted to manage the suit land and the defendant No. 1 thereafter started interfering with the rights of the plaintiffs. There were several criminal litigations between the parties. Thereafter, the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs for a declaration of their right and title over the disputed land and for possession. (3) The defendants contested the suit. The allega­tion of defendant No. 1 is that after the death of her husband, defendant No. 2, as she was ill-treated by the step-sons and plaintiff No. 3, went to live with her father, defendant No. 1. Thereafter, defendant No. 1 pressed plaintiff No. 3 to give up the land in suit to him for maintenance of defendant No. 2. On the 19th of Febru­ary, 1942, plaintiff No. 3 sold the patta land (8B-3K) to defendant No, 1 for Rs. 400/-, and relinquished the suit (and, which is the remaining portion of the same patta, in favour of defendant No. 2. Dejfendant No. 2 thereafter sold the suit land to one Hareswar Sarma on the condi­tion of re-purchase within two years. The land was got back by defendant No. 1 from Hareswar Sarma within one year by an endorsement on the back of the sale deed and later on the 16th December, 1957, Hareswar Sarma execut­ed a formal deed of sale. Defendant No. 2 thus got pos­session and enjoyed the land through defendant No. 1. Thereafter, she gave the land to defendant No. 1, who mortgaged 2 bighas of land to defendant No. 3 for Rs. 4007- and met the expenses of marriage of the daughter of defendant No. 2. The plaintiffs impleaded the defen­dants Nos. 3 and 4 on the allegation that they were claim­ing right under some mortgage executed by defendant No. 1 in their favour. (4) The trial Court accepted the case of the plain­tiffs and repelled the contention of the defendant No. 1 that the suit was barred by limitation and that the land was relinquished in favour of defendant No. 2 by the plaintiff No. 3. On. appeal, the learned District Judge has re­versed the decision of the trial Court. The only point on which the District Judge has held in favour of the defendants is that the suit is barred by limitation. On. appeal, the learned District Judge has re­versed the decision of the trial Court. The only point on which the District Judge has held in favour of the defendants is that the suit is barred by limitation. Thu District Judge has held that the deed of relinquishment, which is marked Ex. "C", relied upon by the defendants, cannot be admitted in evidence, as it is not registered. Thus, the defendants cannot claim any title to the pro­perty under this deed of relinquishment. . It is also ad­mitted that the defendant No. 1 purchased in the year 1942 a major share in the patta. Thus, in. the year 1942, he admitted title to the property of plaintiffs 1 and 2 and unless the relinquishment deed is a valid deed and passed the title to the defendants, the title of the land remained with the plaintiffs. Having held that the deed of relinquishment was not registered and thus it could be ignored by the plaintiffs, it was not necessary to get this document cancelled. The learned District Judge has held that it was a voidable transaction and the plaintiffs should have brought a suit within three years of their attaining majority under Art. 44 of the Limitation Act, and as the suit was brought beyond three years of their atta­ining majority, the suit was barred by limitation. (5) Article 44 of the Limitation Act provides for a suit by a ward who has attained majority, to set aside a transfer of property by his guardian within three years from the date when the ward attains majority. Having held that the transfer was a nullity, there was nothing voidable and the case to my mind will not be governed " Art. 44 of the Limitation Act. The District Judge has held that an unauthorized alienation by a lawful guardian is only voidable. In the present case, plaintiff No. 3, «ho is the lawful guardian of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, gave up possession of the suit land in 1942. The District Judge has held that as the minors, plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, did not file the suit within three years of their attain­ing the majority, the suit is barred by limitation. In the earlier part of his judgment he has held : "But as this deed is not a registered document, it cannot be admitted in evidence. The District Judge has held that as the minors, plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, did not file the suit within three years of their attain­ing the majority, the suit is barred by limitation. In the earlier part of his judgment he has held : "But as this deed is not a registered document, it cannot be admitted in evidence. So I think the learned Subordinate Judge is correct in holding that the question of getting this document cancelled by the minors did not arise as it had no legal bearing". it is difficult to reconcile these two findings of the District Judge. When he found that the deed of relinquishment, being unregistered, was not required to be cancelled and could not be taken in evidence, there was no evi­dence of alienation and the question of the alienation being voidable or void did not arise. According to the plain­tiffs, the defendants' possession was unauthorised.. In fact, the plaintiffs have come up with the case that they were all along possessing the land and the management was en­trusted to defendant No. 1, as he was a co-sharer in the patta. The plaintiffs' case thus was that they were in constructive possession through the co-sharer defendant No. 1. The relinquishment deed was relied upon by the defendants in support of their title to the land and ,f that document cannot be taken in evidence, the question of the plaintiffs bringing a suit for voiding the transfer of property by the guardian does not arise at all. It is a simple suit for declaration of title and for possession of the land. (6) The next reasoning of the District Judge is that admittedly, the defendants had been in possession of the land from the 19th February, 1942. The suit was brought on the 5th November, 1957. The suit was thus brought more than 12 years of 1942 since when the defendants have been in possession, if it is to be treated as a "suit where Art. 142 of the Limitation Act is attracted, the plaintiffs have not given the date when they were dispossessed, and thus they are not able to show that the suit was brought within 12 years of the date of disposses­sion. If Art. 144 is attracted, then the defendants being in possession for over 12 years, acquired right to the property by adverse possession. If Art. 144 is attracted, then the defendants being in possession for over 12 years, acquired right to the property by adverse possession. The District Judge has held that in his opinion, Art. 144 applied to the case. The District Judge has categorically held that in the absence of any date in the plaint of dispossession, Art. 142 cannot be applied and the case will be governed by Art. 144 of the Limitation Act. If Article 144 is attracted, the mere possession, by the defendants will not amount to adverse possession. By taking the land from the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 defendant No. 1 has admitted the title of the plaintiffs to the land. The defendants came with a case that the land was relinquished in their favour. If the case of relinquish­ment falls, it cannot be said that the possession of the defendants was adverse to the plaintiffs. Apart from it, defendant No. 1 by purchasing major shares in the patta, became a co-sharer with the plaintiffs in the patta and unless an ouster is proved by them, the possession will not constitute an adverse possession in the eye of law as against the co-sharers. It is settled law that in the case of co-sharers, the possession cannot be adverse un­less an ouster is established. The ouster necessarily implies assertion of hostile title to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. In the case of a co-sharer, the possession by the co-sharer even over the entire land, can be refer­able to his right as a co-sharer and thus mere possession of the land will not constitute ouster and the defendants by mere possession of the land for over 12 years will not acquire adverse possession. In the present case, the defendants have set up the case that the possession of defendant No. 1 over the land was not in his own right as a co-sharer, but on behalf of defendant No. 2, and as defendant No. 2 was not a co-sharer with the plaintiffs, the principles on. which the possession of a co-sharer becomes adverse, will not be attracted. It is further contended that there was a hostile assertion of title by defendant No. 2 inasmuch .as the properties were sold to one Hareswar Sarma with the right of re-purchase. which the possession of a co-sharer becomes adverse, will not be attracted. It is further contended that there was a hostile assertion of title by defendant No. 2 inasmuch .as the properties were sold to one Hareswar Sarma with the right of re-purchase. The learned District Judge observes as follows: "If the defendant No. 1 is believed, then the suit became barred in 1954 as the defendants had been pos­sessing the suit lands since 1942. In such a case Arti­cle 144 of the Indian Limitation Act would apply and the suit would become barred twelve years after the posses­sion by the defendants become adverse." (7) The District Judge has not considered the fact that the defendant No. 1 by purchasing the land in the 3rear 1942 became a co-sharer in the patta and unless an ouster was established, his possession will not be ad­verse to that of the plaintiffs. When the defendants claimed title under the deed of relinquishment executed 'by the plaintiff No. 3, the possession, which they obtained under the said deed, cannot be said to be adverse to the -plaintiffs, the decision of the District Judge is thus er­roneous and this appeal is allowed. (8) The judgment of the District Judge is set aside and the judgment of the trial Court is restored with costs to the plaintiffs. Appeal allowed.