ORDER :- This is an application by one Laisram Tombi Singh, a dismissed constable against the Superintendent of Police, Manipur, for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of dismissal dated 1-2-1961 passed by the respondent and to re-instate him in service. 2. The petitioner had put in 7 years of permanent service as constable by 1955. On 2-6-1955, he made a report to the O/C Imphal Police Station that he was assaulted by one Laman Kabui, while he was on duty. A criminal case was started against the said Laman Kabui on the said report under Section 332, I. P. C. In the course of the trial which followed, the petitioner gave evidence that he was not assaulted by the accused, but that Laman Kabui had dashed against him in the darkness of the night accidentally. As a result of the said evidence, Laman Kabui was discharged by the Court. Thereupon, Departmental action was taken against the petitioner and he was ordered to be dismissed from service on 24-9-1955. He filed Title Suit No. 55 of 1956 against the said dismissal and the Second Subordinate Judge, Manipur, by his judgment dated 30-5-1960 held that the punishing authority did not comply with the provisions of article 311(2) of the Constitution and hence the dismissal order was illegal. Thereupon, the Superintendent of Police re-instated the petitioner, but placed him under suspension on 28-7-1960 by Annexure D and directed that a further enquiry should be held under the provisions of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957. Accordingly a fresh charge was framed against him regarding the same matter and a regular enquiry was held by Shri J. M. Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police and in the enquiry, the charge was found to be proved against the petitioner as seen from the report Annexure G. But the Enquiry Officer recommended a light punishment, namely, loss of half of his salary for the period of suspension. The reason for taking this lenient view was stated in the report to be the dogged perseverance of the petitioner during the period of 5 years to get his remedy with the help of Court which showed that he had a great liking for the Police service and the suffering which he must have undergone during the period, which might have taught him a good lesson. But the Superintendent of Police did not accept the recommended punishment and issued the show cause notice Annexure H why the petitioner should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner filed his representation. But the Superintendent of Police refused to accept his representation and stated in his final order Annexure, J. dismissing the petitioner with effect from the date of his suspension, that the petitioner had made two contradictory statements - one before the O/C Imphal Police Station and the other before the Court and for this serious misconduct, he was dismissed from service. This order was passed on 1-2-1961. Thereupon, the petitioner has come forward with the present application. 3. It was contended in the application that the petitioner having been dealt with and punished for the same charge on 24-9-1955 and the said punishment having been set aside by Court, he cannot be punished on the same charge a second time, as it will amount to double jeopardy. It was also pointed out that the petitioner should not have been suspended with retrospective effect from the date of the original dismissal, namely, 24-9-1955. It was next stated that the charge framed against him was vague and misleading and the fact that the punishment to be inflicted on the petitioner was mentioned in the charge clearly showed that the case against him had been pre-judged. The next point urged was that in the enquiry report Annexure. G, the previous service record of the petitioner was taken into consideration and this has prejudiced the disciplinary authority in determining the punishment to be imposed. Next it was contended that when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the recommended punishment by the Enquiry Officer, he should have recorded his reasons as contemplated in Rules 15(9) and (10) of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957. Lastly, it was contended that the order of dismissal Annexure, J. did not give any reasons to show how the respondent came to the conclusion that the charge against the petitioner was proved and how the petitioner deserved the punishment of dismissal and how he disagreed with the punishment recommended by the Enquiry Officer. It did not also give due consideration to the representation made by the petitioner. It was also urged that it was wrong to have ordered the dismissal with retrospective effect. 4. It did not also give due consideration to the representation made by the petitioner. It was also urged that it was wrong to have ordered the dismissal with retrospective effect. 4. Though, these are the arguments raised in the petition to challenge the order of dismissal, the petitioners counsel traversed much wider ground in the course of his arguments. In the petition, it was accepted that the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957 would apply to the enquiry against the petitioner and the complaint was that the said Rules were violated in the enquiry. The Respondent in his counter statement tried to show that there was no violation of the said Rules and that the enquiry was strictly in accordance with the provisions of those Rules. But, the petitioners learned counsel in the course of his arguments changed his whole stand and even contended that the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957, will not apply to the Government servants in Manipur and that even if they applied, they will not apply to the members of the Police Force in Manipur and that they were governed by the Police Act and Rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual and he argued that the enquiry against the petitioner should have been conducted only under the provisions of these Assam Police Manual and not under the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957. He tried to show that the enquiry was not as provided in the Assam Police Manual. 5. I cannot, however, permit the petitioner to raise those arguments in the present application, as his whole petition was based on the footing that the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957 applied to his case and the whole ground of attack was that the provisions of those Rules have not been complied with. In paragraph 13(b), (c) and (d) of his petition he has pointed out the instances where the said Rules were not complied with - meaning thereby, that the said Rules would apply to him. The learned Government Advocate pointed out that he can be expected to meet only the case set up in the petition and that the petitioner should not be allowed to traverse other grounds in the course of the arguments and raise fresh grounds which he had no opportunity of meeting. The learned Government Advocate pointed out that he can be expected to meet only the case set up in the petition and that the petitioner should not be allowed to traverse other grounds in the course of the arguments and raise fresh grounds which he had no opportunity of meeting. I agree with the Government Advocate that the petitioner cannot be allowed to traverse grounds which are totally inconsistent with the grounds set forth in his petition. In this view of the matter, I do not propose to deal with his new case that the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957 will not apply to the Government servants in Manipur or that in any case, it will not apply to the members of the Police force in Manipur. I shall proceed on the basis that the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957 which have been applied in the enquiry held against the petitioner will apply to his case and I shall only see whether the said Rules have or have not been complied with in the enquiry held against him. 6. But, before I do so, I must make it clear that it is not enough for the petitioner to show merely that the Rules have not been complied with in order to get relief in this writ application. The petitioner will have to satisfy this Court that on account of the non-observance of the Rules, prejudice has been caused to him in defending himself against the charge framed against him or in other words that reasonable opportunity as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution has not been given to him for showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, which implies that in the enquiry held against him, the principles of natural justice were not observed. After all, the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957, have been framed in accordance with the principles of natural justice in order to assure that a delinquent Government servant is given a fair opportunity to defend himself against the charges. After all, the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957, have been framed in accordance with the principles of natural justice in order to assure that a delinquent Government servant is given a fair opportunity to defend himself against the charges. As pointed out in the decision of the Kerala High Court - S. Neelakanta Iyer v. State of Kerala, AIR 1960 Ker 279 , though the rules for disciplinary action are meant to be observed and not to be ignored and the complaint of the civil servant against the punishment has also to be tested in the context of the rules, it is not every breach of it that will attract Article 311(2) and a mere breach of the rules unattended by prejudice does not spell a denial of reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311(2). Hence, we have got to see in our present case whether any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, even if there has been a non-observance of the rules. 7. The first contention of the petitioner is that after the Subordinate Judge had set aside his dismissal, vide -judgment Annexure A, on 30-5-1960, a second enquiry should not have been commenced in respect of the same occurrence as that would amount to what he calls a double jeopardy and that the proceedings started on the same set of allegations cannot be held to be proper in the circumstances. In support of this contention the petitioner relied mainly on the decision in Dwarkachand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1958 Raj 38 . This argument however did not appeal to me. Annexure A, the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, showed that the dismissal order was set aside for the reason that reasonable opportunity was not given to the petitioner before he was dismissed from service and that the punishing authority at the time of passing the order of dismissal considered the previous conduct of the delinquent without giving him an opportunity to explain it. Thus, the dismissal order was not set aside on the merits of the case, but only on the ground that the principles of natural justice were not observed and the petitioner was not given a chance in an enquiry to meet the charge against him. Thus, the dismissal order was not set aside on the merits of the case, but only on the ground that the principles of natural justice were not observed and the petitioner was not given a chance in an enquiry to meet the charge against him. In such a case, the disciplinary authority is certainly entitled to rectify the mistake and hold a fresh enquiry in respect of the same allegations as has been done in the present case. In this connection, I may also refer to Rule 12(4) of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957, which is as follows : "12(4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence by a decision of a Court of law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further enquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders." This provides for a case where a Court sets aside a dismissal and the disciplinary authority on a consideration of the circumstances of the case decides to hold a further enquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal was originally imposed. Thus the rules contemplate a second enquiry on the same allegations. 8. The decision of the Rajasthan High Court which is relied on by the petitioner does not afford any help to him. In that case, the public servant concerned was exonerated by the disciplinary authority on a Departmental enquiry and he was re-instated. But subsequently, the matter was taken up by the Anti Corruption Officer, Jaipur, and the disciplinary authority was asked to re-open the matter and to hold a fresh Departmental enquiry and thereupon charges were framed against him by the disciplinary authority. At that stage, he moved the High Court of Rajasthan. But subsequently, the matter was taken up by the Anti Corruption Officer, Jaipur, and the disciplinary authority was asked to re-open the matter and to hold a fresh Departmental enquiry and thereupon charges were framed against him by the disciplinary authority. At that stage, he moved the High Court of Rajasthan. It was under those circumstances that their Lordships held that no second Departmental enquiry on the same facts could be ordered, unless there was a specific provision for reviewing an order of exoneration in the Service Rules or under any law. But in our present case, the petitioner was not exonerated in the first Departmental enquiry, but his dismissal was set aside by a Court not for the reason that the allegations against him were found to be false, but for the reason that there was no proper enquiry. Thus, it is not a case of exoneration at all. Again, Rule 12(4) of the Central Civil Service Rules, contemplates that a second enquiry can be held in such cases, and hence the petitioners contention that the second enquiry cannot be held is without any force. 9. There is also no question of double jeopardy as stated by the petitioner. Even Article 20(2) of the Constitution which deals with a case of criminal prosecution and not a Departmental enquiry, provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. Here, the second Departmental Enquiry held against the petitioner will not amount to punishing him more than once for the same offence and hence no question of double jeopardy at all arises. 10. It was next contended for the petitioner that he should not have been kept under suspension with retrospective effect as was done by the Annexure B. We are really not concerned in this case with this question, as the order challenged in the writ proceeding is the order of dismissal subsequently passed against him after a fresh enquiry and not the order keeping him under suspension retrospectively. After all, the order of suspension is not the final order of punishment, but was one to remain in force until the enquiry against him was over and until it was decided whether he should be punished or not. After all, the order of suspension is not the final order of punishment, but was one to remain in force until the enquiry against him was over and until it was decided whether he should be punished or not. If ultimately he was found not guilty and exonerated, the order of suspension will also go and he would be deemed to have been in service even during the period of suspension. The disciplinary authority has the right to keep him under suspension even with retrospective effect as seen from Rule 12(4) of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957 given above. Under the said Rules, even without a specific order by the disciplinary authority, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. All that the respondent stated in the order Annexure B was to point out Rule 12(4) of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957 and to say that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension with effect from 24-9-1955, the date of the original order of dismissal and that he shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. It was when Rule 12(4) was brought to the notice of the petitioners counsel, that he raised the new argument that the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957, themselves will not apply to the petitioner. I have held that this particular argument which was inconsistent with the other contentions raised by the petitioner in the petition will not be allowed to be raised by him. The order of suspension by Annexure B has subsequently merged in the order of dismissal, as the respondent has dismissed him with effect from 24-9-1955. I shall deal separately with the argument of the petitioner that an order of dismissal cannot be passed against a Government servant with retrospective effect, as has been done in this case. For the present, I am concerned whether there can be an order of retrospective suspension. Such retrospective suspension is in accordance with Rule 12(4) as pointed out above and it cannot be questioned in the writ proceedings, unless the petitioner was questioning the Rule itself as ultra vires the Constitution, which point has not been raised before me. For the present, I am concerned whether there can be an order of retrospective suspension. Such retrospective suspension is in accordance with Rule 12(4) as pointed out above and it cannot be questioned in the writ proceedings, unless the petitioner was questioning the Rule itself as ultra vires the Constitution, which point has not been raised before me. Further, the question involved in this case is the dismissal of the petitioner and not his suspension prior to the dismissal. Hence, it is not necessary to deal with the various decisions cited before me dealing with the question of retrospective suspension, except to say that all such decisions were prior to the framing of Rule 12(4). 11. It was next contended before me that the charge framed against him in the enquiry was not in accordance with Rules and that in the very charge, the punishment to be meted out to him, namely, dismissal from service was indicated and that this showed that the disciplinary authority was already biassed against him and that in the face of such bras, the whole enquiry was vitiated. In support of this contention, the decision in C. S. Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 All 45 , was cited. But that decision has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, it was found that the Officer, who was appointed by the State Government to hold the enquiry against the delinquent officer was already biassed against him and had stated in a note that by personal enquiries he was satisfied that the delinquent officer was undoubtedly corrupt. The enquiry by such an officer would certainly not to be a proper enquiry. But in the present case, the enquiry was not conducted by the disciplinary authority, but by Sri J. M. Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police. The petitioner has not pointed out that Shri J. M. Singh did not conduct the enquiry properly or that he was in any way prejudiced against him. His complaint is against the disciplinary authority, namely, the respondent herein and according to the petitioner, the respondent had already prejudged the case and decided to dismiss him and hence indicated the punishment even in the charge framed against him. Of course, it was not necessary to have indicated the punishment even in the charge. His complaint is against the disciplinary authority, namely, the respondent herein and according to the petitioner, the respondent had already prejudged the case and decided to dismiss him and hence indicated the punishment even in the charge framed against him. Of course, it was not necessary to have indicated the punishment even in the charge. Perhaps, it was done because he had already been dismissed once on the same charge, and the disciplinary authority wanted to indicate what the punishment would be, in case the charge was found to be proved. This will not show that the disciplinary authority had already decided to punish him with dismissal, but only that the misconduct involved in the charge was quite serious for which he would be liable to be dismissed from service if the charge was found proved. I cannot say that this indicated any bias in the disciplinary authority. Unless therefore the petitioner is able to show that he did not have a proper opportunity to defend himself against the charge, I cannot say that the indication of the punishment in the charge itself will vitiate the entire enquiry. 12. It was next stated that Annexure G, showed that extraneous circumstances had been imported in his report by the Enquiry Officer without giving the petitioner an opportunity to explain the same and that this extraneous matter had prejudiced the disciplinary authority in determining the punishment to be imposed upon him. What was pointed out was that in Annexure G, the Enquiry Officer had stated that in the previous service record, the delinquent had two money rewards and 3 minor punishments and that his service record on the whole was a balanced one and that his service record was also enclosed for the perusal of the disciplinary authority. This certainly does not show that the service record of the petitioner has been used against him. Further, even taking into consideration the service record, the Enquiry Officer, after finding from the oral and documentary evidence that the charge of misconduct of giving false evidence in Court was made out against the delinquent, only recommended that he may be reinstated with effect from the date of suspension with loss of half of his pay for the period of suspension. Thus, the service record has not been used against the petitioner. Thus, the service record has not been used against the petitioner. The decision cited before me, namely, Prafulla Mohan Mukherjee v. Inspector-General of Police, 62 Cal WN 842 : ( AIR 1959 Cal 1 ) does not apply to the facts of the present case. In that case, one charge against the delinquent officer was that he purchased a plot of land knowing full well that there was a dispute as to its ownership and that by purchasing the land it would involve him in litigation with another person who was in physical possession of the property and was living in the house existing thereon. In support of that charge, the disciplinary authority took into consideration matters which had taken place subsequent to the purchase of the property and instead of showing the impropriety of the purchase, what was considered was the impropriety of the subsequent conduct of the delinquent officer after the purchase. But that is not the case before us. The charge against the petitioner was found proved on the evidence adduced in the course of the enquiry and not on his past record as a Police Officer which was found to be a balanced one. Thus, the Calcutta decision has no application to the facts of this case. 13. Next, it was contended that Annexure H, which was the notice served on the petitioner by the respondent accepting the finding of J. M. Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police in the report Annexure G, but not agreeing with the punishment recommended by the Enquiry Officer and directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service was not in accordance with Rule 15(9) and (10) of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957. It was pointed out from the said rule that if the disciplinary authority disagreed with the Inquiring Officer it was his duty to have given his reasons for such disagreement and to have communicated the reasons for his disagreement to the delinquent so that he could have an opportunity of meeting those reasons in the representation which he sought to make. But this argument is the result of a misreading of Rule 15. Under Rule 15(7), the Inquiring Officer has to record his finding on each of the charges together with the reasons therefor. But this argument is the result of a misreading of Rule 15. Under Rule 15(7), the Inquiring Officer has to record his finding on each of the charges together with the reasons therefor. In the present case, there was only one charge and the Inquiring Officer has given his finding on the charge that the petitioner was guilty of giving false evidence and he has given detailed reasons for coming to that conclusion. On receipt of the report, the disciplinary authority has to consider the record of the enquiry and to record its findings on the charges under Rule 15(9) and if the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Officer, a statement of the findings of the disciplinary authority with brief reasons for such disagreement has to be communicated to the delinquent officer under Rule 15(10)(a). But in the present case, the disciplinary authority did not disagree with the Inquiring Officer and so the statement mentioned in Rule 15(10) did not have to be given. It was not part of the Inquiring Officers duty under Rule 15(7) to recommend the punishment. It is for the disciplinary authority himself to decide provisionally what the punishment should be after he has recorded his findings on the charges. Thus, where the disciplinary authority disagrees with the punishment recommended by the Inquiring Officer, it is not necessary for him to give any reasons for such disagreement under Rule 15(10) as it is for the disciplinary authority himself to decide what punishment should be imposed. Thus, there has been no violation of Rule 15(9) and (10) as contended by the petitioner 14. The next contention was that the order Annexure, J. by which the petitioner was finally dismissed from service with effect from the date of suspension, namely, 24-9-1955, was illegal. It was first contended that the respondent was prejudiced against him. Thus, there has been no violation of Rule 15(9) and (10) as contended by the petitioner 14. The next contention was that the order Annexure, J. by which the petitioner was finally dismissed from service with effect from the date of suspension, namely, 24-9-1955, was illegal. It was first contended that the respondent was prejudiced against him. But nothing was pointed out to show how the respondent was, in any way, prejudiced, except to point out that the punishment of dismissal was indicated even in the charge framed against the petitioner and that this showed that the respondent had decided to punish him with dismissal even before the enquiry was held against him and that the order Annexure, J. did not show that the representations made by the petitioner had been taken into account before the order of dismissal was made, which, it was pointed out, showed that the respondent was bent on dismissing him. I am not prepared to draw any such inference against the respondent. The Inquiring Officer had found the charge of giving false statement in Court proved against the petitioner. Such false statement resulted in the acquittal of the accused in the Criminal Court. The criminal case had been started on the statement given by the very petitioner that he was assaulted by the accused. On the said finding of the Inquiring Officer, with which the respondent agreed, it was for the respondent to decide what the punishment should be. If the respondent as head of the department felt that such misconduct made the petitioner unfit to be a member of the Police force and ordered his dismissal, it cannot be inferred from it that he was prejudiced. 15. But it was pointed out that even in the final order Annexure, J. the representations made by the petitioner do not appear to have been taken into consideration, as no reasons are given for awarding the punishment of dismissal. But I find from Annexure, J. that the respondent has stated that he has gone through the explanation given by the delinquent and that he did not find anything in it to shake the proof contained in the finding that the delinquent had made contradictory statements before the Imphal Police Station and the Court. Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent did not consider the representation made by the petitioner. Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent did not consider the representation made by the petitioner. Annexure, J. further says that for this serious misconduct, the petitioner is dismissed from service. It is not for this Court to decide whether the disciplinary authority was right in awarding the punishment of dismissal or not, as it is a matter which it is for the disciplinary authority to decide and not for this Court. This Court will not, therefore, interfere with the order of dismissal. 16. Lastly, it was urged that the respondent was wrong in making the order of dismissal dated 1-2-1961 take effect from the date of suspension, namely, 24-9-1955. It was argued that an order of dismissal should not be passed with retrospective effect, but only so as to take effect from the date of the order. It was also pointed out that in the notice Annexure H, it was not indicated that the punishment proposed was dismissal with effect from the date of suspension and that the petitioner was thus not given any opportunity to make his representation against the dismissal being made to take effect from the date of suspension. My attention was also drawn to the order passed by me in Konsam Joykumar Singh v. Union Territory of Manipur, Civil Writ Appln. No. 9 of 1960 : ( AIR 1963 Manipur 25 ), in which in the case of discharge of a temporary Government servant, which had been made to take effect from the date of suspension, I set aside that portion of the order giving the discharge retrospective effect and held that the discharge will take effect only from the actual date of the order of discharge. 17. This point, though raised in the petition, was not traversed in the counter statement of the respondent. The ordinary rule is that any order including an order of dismissal can take effect only from the date of the order. If it is to have retrospective effect, there must be some provision in the statute or in the rules on which the order was based, permitting retrospective effect to be given to the order. The Central Civil Services Rules 1957 which are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution to regulate the conditions of service of Government servants provide for various penalties including dismissal. The Central Civil Services Rules 1957 which are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution to regulate the conditions of service of Government servants provide for various penalties including dismissal. There is nothing in the said rules, which would permit the disciplinary authority to dismiss a person from Government service with retrospective effect. 18. Rule 13, deals with the penalties which can be imposed on a Government servant, of which item vii is "dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future appointment". Rule 12 permits a Government servant to be placed under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending. In our present case, it was Rule 12(4) which was applied according to which a Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal, when the disciplinary authority decides to hold a further enquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal was originally imposed, which penalty was set aside by a decision of a Court of law. The Government servant is placed under suspension, when it is not considered desirable to allow him to exercise the functions of the post which he holds when a serious enquiry is pending against him. 19. Under Rule 53 of the Fundamental Rules, a Government servant under suspension will be entitled to certain payments towards subsistence allowance, into the details of which we need not for the present go. Again, under F. R. 54, when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated, the question has to be decided regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to him for the period of his absence from duty. Thus, a Government servant who is under suspension has got certain rights and he has still to be considered as a member of the service until he is dismissed or removed. 20. In our present case, the petitioners original dismissal on 24-9-1955 was set aside by Court on 30-5-1960 and he is to be treated as re-instated in service, though under Rule 12(4) of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957, he must be deemed to have been kept under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal, as the respondent by his order Annexure B decided that there should be a further enquiry against him. We have no evidence before us as to whether any subsistence allowance was paid to him as provided under F.R. 53. But we have to treat it that the provisions of F.R. 53 have been followed. Thus, during the period of suspension from 24-9-1955, the petitioner continued to be a member of the service until the order of dismissal was passed against him. It is in this situation that we have got to see whether the disciplinary authority has the right to dismiss him with effect from the date of suspension. 21. An order of dismissal with retrospective effect from the date of suspension amounts even to a decision by the disciplinary authority that the Government servant is not entitled even to the subsistence allowance to which he has a right under F.R. 53. The disciplinary authority is bound by the provisions of F.R. 53 and he cannot make any order which will be against the said provision. But it was pointed out that he was being dismissed from service for an offence which he had committed in 1955, that the proceedings against him would naturally take some time to complete, that the finding that the delinquent is guilty of the offence and the punishment of dismissal which is decided upon against him will go to show that he was unfit to be a member of the service from the date on which the offence was committed by him, and that therefore the disciplinary authority is entitled to dismiss him even from the date when the offence was committed, though the proof of the offence would naturally take some time to be established. It is for the reason that the enquiry will take some time that Rule 12 of the Central Civil Service Rules, 1957, has given the power to the disciplinary authority to suspend the delinquent from service pending the enquiry. Unless, therefore the same Rules give the disciplinary authority the power to dismiss him with retrospective effect from the date of the offence or from the date of the suspension, the disciplinary authority cannot arrogate to himself a power which he does not possess. 22. Moreover, in Annexure H, the notice to show cause, the disciplinary authority did not inform the petitioner that the punishment proposed was dismissal with effect from the date of the order of suspension, but simply mentioned that he should be dismissed from service. 22. Moreover, in Annexure H, the notice to show cause, the disciplinary authority did not inform the petitioner that the punishment proposed was dismissal with effect from the date of the order of suspension, but simply mentioned that he should be dismissed from service. Thus, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause against the dismissal with retrospective effect which would disentitle him even to the subsistence allowance he is entitled to during the period of suspension. Thus, dismissal with retrospective effect would amount to double punishment, namely, dismissal as well as denial of the subsistence allowance. This double punishment cannot be given unless the petitioner is given an opportunity to make his representation against it. 23. Thus, the result is that though the dismissal of the petitioner in this case cannot be set aside as he has been given sufficient opportunity to show cause against it, such dismissal cannot be allowed to take effect with retrospective effect, but only from the actual date of the order Annexure, J. Article 311(2) of the Constitution provides that no public servant shall be dismissed until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. It does not make any mention of a dismissal with retrospective effect. Even if Article 311 is intended to cover cases of retrospective dismissals, which itself is doubtful, it is necessary that the delinquent should be given an opportunity to show cause against giving retrospective effect to the order of dismissal. That has not been done in the present case. Thus, the portion of the order Annexure, J. punishing the petitioner retrospectively has to be accepted as not in conformity with Article 311. But this does not mean that the entire order of dismissal has to be set aside. It is sufficient that the portion giving retrospective effect to the order of dismissal is set aside, as the petitioner has already been given an opportunity to show cause against his prospective dismissal from the date of the order, though he has not been given opportunity to show cause against the retrospective dismissal. It is sufficient that the portion giving retrospective effect to the order of dismissal is set aside, as the petitioner has already been given an opportunity to show cause against his prospective dismissal from the date of the order, though he has not been given opportunity to show cause against the retrospective dismissal. Thus, while I refuse to set aside the order of dismissal Annexure, J. in toto, it has to be declared that the order of dismissal will take effect only from the date of the order, namely, 1-2-1961 and the portion of the order that it shall take effect from 24-9-1955 is set aside. Ordered accordingly. Under the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear then own costs. Order accordingly.