JUDGMENT D. P. Uniyal, J. -These four connected appeals arise out of two suits filed by the plaintiff firm Messrs. Ram Niranjan Lal and Sons, through one of its partners Mahadeo Prasad, against the defendant company, the Upper India Cold Storage, Ltd., through its Manager, P. C. Kapur, for recovery of damages on the allegation that the plaintiff firm had entrusted 6,052 maunds 36 seers and 8 chhataks of potatoes, of both seed and table variety, with the defendant company which carried on the business of keeping in safe custody and preserving potatoes of customers in their Cold Storage. It was alleged that the plaintiff firm had entrusted the above quantity of potatoes with the defendant company between the 24th March 1953 and the 27th April 1953 for safe custody and preservation in the latter's Cold Storage on condition that the goods would be returned to the plaintiff in good condition as and when needed and by the latest on or before the 22nd October 1953. The plaintiff agreed to pay to the defendant Rs. 5-6-0 per maund on account of the storage charges of the said potatoes. The plaintiff withdrew certain quantity of potatoes from the defendant's Cold Storage, the last withdrawal being on 18-9-53. The total quantity left with the defendant after these withdrawals was 4,754 maunds and 21 seers. The plaintiff came to know for the first time on 29-7-53, when Mahadeo Prasad inspected the godown of the defendant, that the defendant company had not maintained a proper temperature required for preserving and maintaining the good condition of the potatoes, with the result that the plaintiff's goods were badly damaged and sprouts came out of the potatoes rendering the same unmarketable and unserviceable, both for seed and table purposes. The plaintiff thereupon filed the above two suits against the defendant company on the 29th September 1953 with the allegation that the cause of action for the suits arose on 27-9-53 when the plaintiff came to know that the defendant company had committed a breach of the contract and had acted negligently and carelessly in preserving the plaintiff's goods in proper condition in their Cold Storage. 2. The defendant company contested the suits and denied the plaintiff's allegations. 2. The defendant company contested the suits and denied the plaintiff's allegations. They, however, admitted that they were carrying on the business of Cold Storage and had received the goods of the plaintiff firm for being stored in their Cold Storage, for which the defendant company was to be paid at the rate of Rs. 5-6-0 per maund. It was also admitted by the defendant company that the goods were agreed to be stored in their Cold Storage up to 22-10-53. The defendant company pleaded that there was no agreement for "safe preservation" of potatoes and that they had only contracted for reservation of certain space for storage of plaintiff's potatoes. They alleged that some of the potatoes stored by the plaintiff were inherently defective and rotten and that this fact was brought to the notice of the plaintiff by means of a notice dated 10-9-53 when they asked the plaintiff to withdraw their potatoes expeditiously. It was asserted that under the terms of the contract the plaintiff was bound to withdraw the goods within 48 hours of the notice, failing which the entire risk and responsibility was to be that of the plaintiff. They denied that they had committed any breach of agreement or were in any way responsible for damage to the plaintiff's potatoes. The defendant company asserted that they maintained a temperature between 35 F. and 40 F. in their Cold Storage and that there was proper space for ventilation and movement of cool air both at the bottom and the sides of the stacks of potatoes. They denied that any portion of the stored potatoes had become unmarketable on 10-9-53 or thereafter. They alleged that in spite of notice the plaintiff had failed to remove his goods from the Cold Storage and allowed them to lie in the open exposed to the sun and the weather for and that the defendant could not be liable for any loss or damage caused to the goods after 27-9-53. Lastly, it was contended that the damages were excessive. 3. The learned Civil Judge held that the defendant company had undertaken to preserve the potatoes in dispute in their Cold Storage under a contract, that they owed a duty to the plaintiff to keep the goods in their Cold Storage in proper condition and to save them from damage or deterioration. 3. The learned Civil Judge held that the defendant company had undertaken to preserve the potatoes in dispute in their Cold Storage under a contract, that they owed a duty to the plaintiff to keep the goods in their Cold Storage in proper condition and to save them from damage or deterioration. He also held that the sprouting in the plaintiff's potatoes had occurred because of some negligence or carelessness on the part of the defendant and that this was mainly due to improper stacking and inefficient refrigeration of the goods. He was further of the opinion that the defendant company were not entitled to ask the plaintiff to remove the potatoes from the Cold Storage before 22-10-53. He gave the plaintiff a decree for damages at the rate of Rs. 14 and Rs. 8 per maund respectively for seed and table potatoes which remained with the defendant company on 18-9-53, after deducting storage charges and charges for cartage, unloading, cleaning, sorting and drying, etc. 4. Against the said two decrees passed by the learned Civil Judge in favour of the plaintiff both parties have come up in appeal to this Court. 5. The terms of contract for storage and safe preservation of the goods left in the custody of the defendant company are to be found in Exs. 4, 5, 10 to 14 and 26. These are application forms issued by the defendant company to the plaintiff at the time of the storage of various quantities of potatoes by the latter. These forms are signed by Mahadeo Prasad on behalf of the plaintiff firm and by P.C. Kapur on behalf of the defendant company. On the reverse of these forms are printed the terms for storing potatoes in the cold Storage of the defendant company. The conditions, inter alia, provided that storing charges for the season (Chaitra to Kuar, inclusive) for Phulwa seed or table potatoes will be Rs. 5-6-0 per maund, that the owner of the goods must take back the same from the Storage by the end of Kuar (22nd October 1953) and that "there will be no responsibility of the company for the damage caused to the goods for not taking them back after that period". 5-6-0 per maund, that the owner of the goods must take back the same from the Storage by the end of Kuar (22nd October 1953) and that "there will be no responsibility of the company for the damage caused to the goods for not taking them back after that period". Under the contract the Company was entitled to deduct 10% from the weight of the stored potatoes for driage and 90% of the goods stored in their weight were agreed to be given back. The company was not to be liable for losses caused to the goods by act of God or any reason beyond their control. 6. It was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the terms contained in these bonds did not constitute a written agreement and that the parties were governed by an oral agreement. This argument is devoid of merit. Para 3 of the Plaintiff was lying on the terms of the written contract and that the plaintiff had never set up a case of an oral agreement in the plaint. On 19-10-53 the defendant filed an objection in reply to the plaintiff's application that the potatoes lying in the defendant's Cold Storage be sold by public auction. In their objection the defendant company asserted that the plaintiff submitted a reply to the defendant's objection the same day and did not deny the existence of the written contract. The plaintiff only contended that the defendant was not entitled to cold-storage charges as the latter was guilty of gross negligence and breach of duty in improperly storing the plaintiff's goods. It was for the first time in his statement in court that the plaintiff came forward with the plea that the contract of storage was governed by an oral agreement. We have no hesitation in holding that the parties were bound by the terms of the written agreement and the plaintiff could not be allowed to set up a new case wholly inconsistent with the pleadings. 7. The next question that falls to be determined is whether the defendant's allegation that there was inherent defect in the condition of the goods stored by the plaintiff and that the defendant company were not liable for their deterioration in cold storage, is supported by any evidence. 7. The next question that falls to be determined is whether the defendant's allegation that there was inherent defect in the condition of the goods stored by the plaintiff and that the defendant company were not liable for their deterioration in cold storage, is supported by any evidence. The goods were tendered by the plaintiff to the defendant's Cold Storage between the 24th March 1953 and 27th April 1953. The defendant did not raise any objection to the condition of the goods which were accepted for storage. In fact P. C. Kapur, (D.W. 10) admitted that there was no visible sign of sprouting in the potatoes which had been kept in cold storage, up to the 30th September, 1953. From the evidence it appears that the defendant took good care to inspect the condition of the potatoes before their storage. In their letter dated 9-4-53 to the plaintiff the defendant company stated that the consignment of potatoes received by them for storage was found to contain some bags which were "stinking badly." The rotten potatoes found in them were sorted out and were returned to the plaintiff's representative. The plaintiff brought some potatoes to be stored in the defendant's Cold Storage on 27-4-53 and 7 maunds and 20 seers of these potatoes were also returned as being unfit for storage. This clearly goes to show that the defendant company stored plaintiff's potatoes which were in good condition and did not allow the plaintiff to put in rotten or damaged potatoes in the Cold Storage. It was on 10-9-53 that the defendant company wrote to the plaintiff that there had been rapid deterioration of the potatoes stored by the plaintiff with them, and that the plaintiff should remove the same expeditiously. Thereupon the plaintiff replied to the defendant on 15-9-53 denying the defendant's allegation that they had stored raw and rotten potatoes with the defendant. The plaintiff complained that the defendant had never drawn their attention to this fact earlier and that their allegation was incorrect. The plaintiff went on to say that if any part of the goods was damaged the defendant would be liable for the same. On the following day i.e., on 16-9-53, the plaintiff withdrew 534 bags of seed potatoes, and thereafter on 18-9-53 they took delivery of another 70 bags of seed potatoes and 20 bags of table potatoes from the defendant's Cold Storage. On the following day i.e., on 16-9-53, the plaintiff withdrew 534 bags of seed potatoes, and thereafter on 18-9-53 they took delivery of another 70 bags of seed potatoes and 20 bags of table potatoes from the defendant's Cold Storage. The defendant again wrote to the plaintiff on 18-9-53 complaining that the latter was taking delivery of the bags which were found in good condition and was leaving the rotten ones behind. They called upon the plaintiff to remove his goods within three days, failing which they threatened to ask the health authorities to remove the rotten bags of plaintiff's potatoes from their Cold Storage. The plaintiff replied to the above letter on 21-9-53 informing them that under the terms agreed between the parties the defendant company were under a duty to keep the goods up to Kuar and that the defendant had been negligent in preserving the goods of the plaintiff and were attempting to destroy evidence of their negligence under the pretext of destroying the alleged damaged goods with the aid of the Health authorities. In their reply to the last letter of the plaintiff, the defendant company agreed to keep the goods on "a further risk of holding on with them (goods) for three days more, but must emphasise that it is essential that the very rotten bags must be removed without further delay." 8. As regards the final time limit for storage, the defendant company in their letter stated that the terms of storage were from Chaitra to Kuar, but this had nothing to do with the deteriorated stuff which must be forthwith removed. This letter was followed by another letter of the defendant dated 29-9-53 in which they called upon the plaintiff to remove all the stored goods expeditiously. It would thus appear that the defendant had not made any complaint to the plaintiff up till 10-9-53 about the quality of the goods stored in the defendant's Storage. It was on 27-4-53 that the last consignment of goods had been sent by the plaintiffs to the defendant's Storage. The defendants did not inform the plaintiffs about the deterioration of their goods in the Cold Storage at any time between 27-4-53 and 10-9-53, which would go to show that the potatoes sent by the plaintiffs were of good quality. It was on 27-4-53 that the last consignment of goods had been sent by the plaintiffs to the defendant's Storage. The defendants did not inform the plaintiffs about the deterioration of their goods in the Cold Storage at any time between 27-4-53 and 10-9-53, which would go to show that the potatoes sent by the plaintiffs were of good quality. We are not, therefore, prepared to accept the defendant's contention that the potatoes stored by the plaintiffs with the defendant's company were inherently defective or rotten. 9. This leads us to the consideration of the question whether the deterioration of the goods was the consequence of the negligent conduct of the defendants in not using necessary skill and care. In this connection it is necessary to examine the evidence of the experts examined by the parties. * * * 10. The plaintiffs had thus established that the injury to some of the goods was on account of the negligent act of the defendant bailee and the burden lay on the bailee to show that the injury to the goods had occurred through some cause consistent with due care and skill on his part. The defendants had failed to show that the sprouting was not the consequence of their negligent act and that they had taken proper care and used necessary skill for the preservation of the goods in their custody. 11. In Brabant and Co. The defendants had failed to show that the sprouting was not the consequence of their negligent act and that they had taken proper care and used necessary skill for the preservation of the goods in their custody. 11. In Brabant and Co. v. Thomas Mulhall King, 1895 AC 632 the Privy Council held that bailees for hire were "under a legal obligation to exercise the same degree of care towards the preservation of the goods entrusted to them from injury which might reasonably be expected from a skilled store-keeper, acquainted with the risks to be apprehended either from the character of the store-house itself or of its locality; and that obligation included not only the duty of taking of reasonable precautions to obviate these risks, but the duty of taking all proper measures for the protection of the goods when such risks were imminent or had actually occurred." Their Lordships declared that - "it would be very dangerous doctrine, for which there is not a vestige of authority, to hold that a depositor of goods for safe custody, who by himself or by his servants, has had an opportunity of observing certain defects in the store-house, must be taken to have agreed that any risk of injury to his goods which might possibly be occasioned by these defects, should be borne by him and not by his paid bailee......The duty is incumbent upon the latter in the due fulfilment of his contract, of considering whether his premises can be safely used for the storage of goods, and, if they cannot, to take immediate steps for placing the goods in a position of safety." To the same effect are the observations made in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II, 3rd Edn., para. 227 :- "When a chattel entrusted to a custodian is injured or destroyed, the onus of proof is on the custodian to show that the injury did not happen in consequence of his neglect to use such care and diligence as a prudent or careful man would exercise in relation to his own property. If he succeeds in showing this he is not bound to show when and how the loss or damage occurred." 12. If he succeeds in showing this he is not bound to show when and how the loss or damage occurred." 12. In the present case it is established by the evidence on the record that the damage to some of the potatoes entrusted to the care of the defend ant company was due to their negligence and the latter had not been able to show that the injury to the goods was due to causes consistent with due care and skill employed by them in the preservation of the goods. Under the contract between the parties the defendants had undertaken to preserve the goods of the plaintiffs in their Cold Storage till the 22nd October 1953. The damage to some of the goods was noticed by the defendants themselves on the 11th September 1953 when they wrote to the plaintiffs asking them to remove the goods. By this letter the defendants expressed their intention to repudiate the contract. This led to exchange of correspondence between the parties and eventually by their letter of 24th September 1953 the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs, saying that - "in view of your personal request and in order to keep up good relations with you, we are taking a further risk of holding on with them for three days more, but must emphasise that it is essential that the very rotten bags must be removed without further delay...There is no objection to your taking delivery of your goods in as many lots as suits your convenience, but timely intimation of removal must be given." 13. The time limit given by the defendants in this letter expired on the 27th September 1953. The plaintiffs then instituted the two suits on the 29th September 1953, thereby accepting the repudiation of the contract by the defendants. The plaintiffs followed it up by applying to the court on the 13th October, 1953 to the effect that to mitigate the extent of damage the goods may be ordered to be sold forthwith at any public auction and the parties be permitted to bid at the auction. On the 20th October 1953 the Civil Judge appointed M/s Stanwill and Co. and M/s Sohan Lal and Sons as auctioneers to dispose of the plaintiff's goods by public auction. The goods were accordingly sold by the auctioneers between 27-10-1953 and 8-1-1954. It was contended by Mr. On the 20th October 1953 the Civil Judge appointed M/s Stanwill and Co. and M/s Sohan Lal and Sons as auctioneers to dispose of the plaintiff's goods by public auction. The goods were accordingly sold by the auctioneers between 27-10-1953 and 8-1-1954. It was contended by Mr. Jagdish Swarup the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiffs could not sue for recovery of damages without first asking the defendants to deliver the goods and that the contract could not be put an end to by the unilateral act of the plaintiffs. Strong reliance was placed on the case of Sachs v. Miklos, 1948 (1) All.ER 67. That was a case of gratuitous bailment. The defendants had in 1940 allowed the plaintiffs to store his furniture in their house free of charge and subsequently lost touch with him. In 1943 the defendants requiring the space taken by the furniture wrote two letters to the plaintiffs at an address supplied by his bank. Receiving no reply to these letters the defendants sold the furniture. In 1946 the plaintiff demanded the furniture from the defendant who tendered # 15 for which it had been sold. The market value having risen greatly since the sale, the plaintiff brought an action in conversion and also in detinue claiming as damages the increased value. The court of appeal observed that : - "The value of the goods converted, at the time of their conversion is one thing but it does not follow that that sum is the measure of the plaintiff's loss. The question is, what is the plaintiff's loss, what damages he has suffered by the wrongful act of the defendants." It was held that the increased value till knowledge was to be treated as consequential damage. 14. It may be pointed out that in the case of detenue which is primarily an action claiming redelivery rather than damages the plaintiff must accept redelivery of the goods if offered by the defendant, provided the goods are still in the same condition. The same proposition appears to be established for conversion. 15. The case of Sachs, 1948 (1) AER 67 is clearly distinguishable because a gratuitous bailee is under no legal obligation to keep the goods after he had given notice to the bailor and the failure of the bailor to take delivery of the goods entitles the bailee to sell the same. 15. The case of Sachs, 1948 (1) AER 67 is clearly distinguishable because a gratuitous bailee is under no legal obligation to keep the goods after he had given notice to the bailor and the failure of the bailor to take delivery of the goods entitles the bailee to sell the same. In the second place, that was a case where the suit was based on the allegation that the goods had been wrongfully converted by the bailee without notice to the bailor. In the instant case the suit for damages was founded on contract and the rights and liabilities of the parties were governed by the written agreement, which provided that the defendants, who were bailees for remuneration, would retain the goods in their custody for preservation till 22-10-1953. The plaintiffs, therefore, could insist on the performance of the contract by the defendants until 22-10-1953. 16. Coming to the facts of the present case it is abundantly established that the defendants had finally repudiated the contract on 27-9-1953 when they expressed an unequivocal intention not to retain the goods of the plaintiffs any longer in their cold storage. The plaintiffs had in effects the repudiation of the contract by the defendants when they instituted the two suits for damages for breach of contract. Thus the contract between the parties came to an end on the 29th September 1953 when the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs. 17. In Mayne and Mc Gregor on Damages 12th Edition at page 180 the legal position is stated as follows:- "One situation where it is important to keep this obvious rule in mind is where a party repudiates the contract before the time fixed for his performance. Unless and until such a repudiation is accepted by the other party it is a mere nullity and there is no breach of contract. If, subsequently, the repudiation is accepted or if there is a failure to perform, either of which will produce a breach, the damages will fall to be assessed as from that breach." Again, in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., 1947 (1) AER 337 Viscount Simon observed that :- "Repudiation by one party standing alone does not terminate the contract. If, subsequently, the repudiation is accepted or if there is a failure to perform, either of which will produce a breach, the damages will fall to be assessed as from that breach." Again, in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., 1947 (1) AER 337 Viscount Simon observed that :- "Repudiation by one party standing alone does not terminate the contract. It takes two to end it by repudiation one on the one side and acceptance of the repudiation on the other." It was pointed out that such repudiation ends the liability of the parties to perform the contract but not the liability to pay damages for any breach of the contract. 18. It seems to us that the breach of contract occurred when the defendants evinced the intention not to perform their part of the contract and the plaintiffs accepted their repudiation and this gave the plaintiffs a cause of action to sue for damages. 19. Another contention of the learned counsel was that damages could not be recovered by the plaintiffs for breach of contract unless it was shown that they were the immediate or proximate consequence of the wrongful act of the defendants. The evidence which was adduced in the case clearly pointed to the conclusion that the injury to the plaintiff's goods was the direct result of the negligent act of the defendants, that is, on account of the defendant's negligent act of improperly stocking the goods in the Cold Storage in bags placed one upon another without allowing sufficient air to circulate around them. Where under the terms of the contract between the parties the defendants are charged with the duty of preserving the goods in safe custody, it would be reasonable to infer that the damage to the goods was the proximate result of the breach committed by the defendants. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, para. 122, it has been observed :- "Upon a breach of contract such damages are to be awarded as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, when they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, para. 122, it has been observed :- "Upon a breach of contract such damages are to be awarded as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, when they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it. Therefore, where there are special circumstances, and these circumstances are communicated at the time of the contract to the party from whom it is afterwards sought to recover damages, and accepted by him as the basis on which the contract is made, the damages reasonably contemplated are such as would ordinarily follow from breach of contract in these special circumstances." 20. It was one of the most important conditions of the contract that the goods would be stored in the Cold Storage for safe custody and preservation by the defendants and that the latter would return the same in good condition to the plaintiffs on or before 22-10-1953. Therefore, the special circumstances as to the quality and the nature of the goods and the purpose for which they had been entrusted to the custody of the defendants was within the knowledge of the defendants. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages for breach of the contract. 21. It was also urged that in a case of breach of contract it was the duty of the plaintiffs to take all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss they have sustained consequent upon the wrongful act in respect of which they brought the suit. The question as to what is reasonable for the plaintiffs to do in mitigation of their loss is not a question of law but one of fact depending on the circumstances of each particular case. (See Halsbury's Laws of England 2nd Edition Vol. X, paras 143 and 144). The defendants did not lead any evidence to show that the plaintiffs had misconducted themselves or had failed to perform their part of the duty as stipulated by the contract. As a matter of fact the plaintiffs did act, as best as they could, in mitigation of the damage by applying to the court on the 13th October, 1953 for an order directing the sale of the potatoes by public auction. In Halsbury's Laws of England 2nd Edn. Vol. X Para. As a matter of fact the plaintiffs did act, as best as they could, in mitigation of the damage by applying to the court on the 13th October, 1953 for an order directing the sale of the potatoes by public auction. In Halsbury's Laws of England 2nd Edn. Vol. X Para. 118 it has been observed that: - "When the sufferer from a breach of contract finds himself in consequence of that breach placed in a position of embarrassment, measures which he may be "driven to employ in order to extricate himself ought not to be weighed in nice scales at the instance of the parties whose breach of contract has occasioned the difficulty. The law is satisfied if the party placed in the difficult situation by reason of the breach of duty owed to him has acted promptly in the adoption of remedial measures. He will not be held disentitled to recover the cost of such measures merely because the party in breach can suggest that other measures less burden some to him might have been taken." We are, therefore, of the opinion that the argument raised by the learned counsel has no force and must be rejected. 22. This leads us to the next question as to what is the measure of damages which the plaintiff may recover for breach of the contract. The general rule is that the plaintiffs can recover only such damages as are the consequence of what the defendant did before action is brought. The cause of action for such suits was injury to the goods before the institution of the suits, Any injury which may have occurred to the goods of the plaintiffs subsequent to the breach could not be attributed to the wrongful act of the defendants, because they had been directed under the orders of the court to deliver the property to the auctioneers and if any damage ensued on account of the delay in conducting the auction sales the consequent injury to the goods could not be laid at the door of the defendants. 23. The rule is that where the subject of the bailment is injured while in the possession of the bailee, the measure of damages is the difference in the value of the property before and after the injury, or the amount recovered to place the property in the condition called for by the contract of bailment. 23. The rule is that where the subject of the bailment is injured while in the possession of the bailee, the measure of damages is the difference in the value of the property before and after the injury, or the amount recovered to place the property in the condition called for by the contract of bailment. (Vide Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. VIII, page 367). 24. Certain broad principles on the question of damages are deducible from the observations of Viscount Haldane Lord Chancellor in British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Company of London Ltd., 1912 AC 673 (688). The Lord Chancellor summed up the conclusion thus :- "The quantum of damage is a question of fact, and the only guidance the law can give is to lay down general principles which offered at times but scanty assistance in dealing with particular cases. The judges who give guidance to juries in these cases have necessarily to look at their special character, and to mould, for the purposes of different kinds of claim, the expression and the general principles which apply to them, and this is apt to give rise to an appearance of ambiguity." "Subject to these observations I think that there are certain broad principles which are quite well settled. The first is that, as far as possible, he who has proved a breach of a bargain to supply what he contracted to get is to be placed, as far as money can do it, in as good a situation as if the contract had been performed." "The fundamental basis is this compensation for pecuniary loss naturally flowing from the breach; but this principle is qualified by a second, which imposes on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent upon the breach and debars him from claiming any part of the damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps .... This second principle does not impose on the plaintiff an obligation to take any step which a reasonable and prudent man would not ordinarily take in the course of his business." The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover such damages as were the natural consequence of the breach of contract committed by the defendants. 25. 25. One of the questions which was debated in the court below and was argued before us by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs was that the Civil Judge was not entitled to make any deductions on account of shrinkage in the weight of the potatoes during the period of cold storage. It was contended that Cl. (5) of the agreement which related to deduction of ten per cent of the stored potatoes for driage had been struck off at the time of the contract. The defendants denied this allegation and produced duplicates of the agreement in their possession which admittedly bore the signatures of Mahadeo Prasad on behalf of the plaintiff's firm. It appears from the duplicate copies that Cl. (5), of the agreement had not been scored out. The court below recorded a finding that the plaintiff's allegation on this matter was wholly false. The evidence in the case disclosed that the potatoes stored in cold storage were bound to undergo physiological loss in weight. Dr. R. B. Mathur an expert examined by the plaintiffs admitted that there would be physiological loss in the weight, that is, loss due to respiration and transpiration if the potatoes be kept in cold storage with proper temperature and that there would be visible shrinkage in potatoes on account of physiological loss in weight which he estimated at ten per cent. This according to him was a natural phenomenon. In view of the expert evidence that the potatoes kept in cold storage were bound to lose weight, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention of the learned counsel is devoid of any substance. 26. The only question that now remains to be determined is the quantum of damages to which the plaintiffs may be entitled. That the plaintiffs had suffered damage on account of the wrongful act of defendants admits of no doubt. It is abundantly established that some of the plaintiff's goods suffered serious deterioration in their quality when they were in the custody of the defendants. As there was a breach of contract on the part of the defendants in not preserving the plaintiff's goods in proper condition, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover damages in respect of those goods which had either deteriorated or had been totally destroyed. 27. As there was a breach of contract on the part of the defendants in not preserving the plaintiff's goods in proper condition, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover damages in respect of those goods which had either deteriorated or had been totally destroyed. 27. The plaintiffs have, however, not led any evidence to prove the actual loss or damage suffered by them in respect of their goods. There is no evidence to the effect that a specified quantity of potatoes had suffered actual damage. The fact that the plaintiffs had incurred a loss of some of their goods is shown but the necessary evidence as to its amount is wanting. In such circumstances, it is impossible for the Court to assess damages on the basis of the difference in the value of the property before and after the injury. 28. The only evidence that is forthcoming is that the auctioneers received 4304 maunds 15 seers and two chhataks of potatoes for auction from the defendant's cold storage between the 27th October, 1953 and the 8th January, 1954. The gross sum realised at the auction sales was Rs. 17852-14-0. After deducting the auctioneer's costs the net amount deposited in court was in the sum of Rs. 16,632-11-0. From the report of the auctioneers it appears that about 1170 maunds and 6 seers of potatoes remained unaccounted for by the defendants and that 256 maunds and 19 seers of potatoes had become rotten and had to be thrown away as waste. The learned counsel for the parties accepted these figures as being correct. The plaintiffs would be entitled to claim compensation in respect of 1170 maunds and 6 seers of potatoes which had remained unaccounted for. After making an allowance of ten per cent on account of shrinkage in weight the net amount would come to 1053 maunds and 6 seers. It is also undisputed that 256 maunds and 10 seers of potatoes had become rotten. The learned Civil Judge had taken the average of the rates of potatoes given by the witnesses and on that basis fixed the price of seed potatoes and table potatoes at Rs. 14 and Rs. 8 per maund, respectively. We consider that the average rate of Rs. 14 per maund would be a fair rate for determining the price of potatoes which had suffered damage. 29. 14 and Rs. 8 per maund, respectively. We consider that the average rate of Rs. 14 per maund would be a fair rate for determining the price of potatoes which had suffered damage. 29. There is no evidence as to how much out of the 1426 maunds and 25 seers of potatoes was of seed variety and how much of table variety. The plaintiff's evidence was to the effect that a substantial quantity of potatoes of table variety had been withdrawn by them. Calculating at the rate of Rs. 14 per maund the price of potatoes which could not be accounted for by the defendants and the potatoes which had become rotten, together with the price realised at the auction sales, would, in our opinion, represent the loss suffered by the plaintiff. It would thus appear that the amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants by way of damages would be as under :- (1) Sale price deposited by the auctioneers in court ........... Rs. 16,632-11-0 (2) The value of 256 maunds and 19 seers of rotten potatoes at the rate of Rs. 14 per maund ........... Rs. 3,600-10-2 (3) The value of 1053 maunds 6 seers of potatoes for which the plaintiff did not give any account, at the rate of Rs. 14 per maund .......... Rs. 14,747-4-0. Total Rs. 34,980-9-2. 30. The learned Civil Judge, for reasons which we have not been able to comprehend, ordered that the defendant company will be entitled to the sale price of the quantity of potatoes which were auctioned during the pendency of the two suits. This order was clearly illegal. This defendants had not claimed a set off in respect of storage charges and no order could, therefore, be made for payment of the sale price of the potatoes to them, nor were they entitled to it in these suits. The auction sales took place at the instance of the plaintiffs who were entitled to the sale price of the potatoes in question which were admittedly their property. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the amount recoverable by the plaintiffs from the defendants in the two suits by way of damages would be a sum of Rs. 34,980-9-2 only. 31. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the amount recoverable by the plaintiffs from the defendants in the two suits by way of damages would be a sum of Rs. 34,980-9-2 only. 31. We, therefore, allow F. A. No. 234 of 1958 and F. A. No. 235 of 1958 in part and modify the decree passed by the Civil Judge to the extent indicated above. F. A. No. 438 of 1958 and F. A. No. 279 of 1959 are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of this case the parties shall bear their own costs.