Judgment AYYANGAR, J. : This appeal by special leave granted by us on September 7, 1962 raises for consideration the proper construction of Ss. 6 and 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (Central Act XX of 1958) hereinafter called the Act . 2. The appellants are two brothers- Ramji and Basist. It was alleged that these two assaulted one Sidhnath (P.W. 2) who as a result suffered grievous injuries. Basist, the younger brother was charged before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Arrah with the commission of an offence under S. 307, Indian Penal Code for the reason that the injury he inflicted was a bhala-blow under circumstances "that if by that act death had been caused he would have been guilty of murder", and as the injury actually sustained was grievous he was further charged with causing grievous hurt under S. 326, Indian Penal Code. The elder brother who too caused hurt to the victim was charged under S. 324, Indian Penal Code. The Assistant Sessions Judge held that prosecution case as alleged established against both the accused. It is now necessary to mention that according to the Sessions Judge Ramji was 21 years old and Basist 19. Section 6 of the Act enacts; "6. (1) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so. (2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under section 3 or section 4 with an offender referred to in sub-s. (1) the Court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender." The terms of this section excluded the application of its provisions to Basist who was found guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life (both Ss. 307 and 326, Indian Penal Code). He accordingly sentenced Basist to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six years under S. 307, Indian Penal Code and to four years under S. 326, Indian Penal Code, the sentences to run concurrently. As regards Ramji, the elder brother he considered it inappropriate to afford him the benefit of this provision and recorded his finding on this matter in these terms : "So far as accused Ramji is concerned I am not inclined to take recourse to the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 because the act of assault on the informant on the part of this accused is premeditated." He sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under S. 324, Indian Penal Code. 3. Both the accused filed an appeal to the High Court. The learned Single Judge who heard the appeal considered the evidence in the case and the circumstances in which the injury was inflicted and held that there was no intention on the part of Basist to cause grievous hurt to P.W. 2, with the result that as against him the conviction under S. 307 as well as that under S. 326, Indian Penal Code were set aside and in their place he recorded a finding of guilty in respect of an offence under S. 324, Indian Penal Code for which he imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years. As against Ramji the conviction was maintained but being informed by Counsel that accused had been suffering from tuberculosis the sentence of imprisonment was reduced from 2 years to 9 months. 4. It was urged before the High Court that the reasons assigned by the Assistant Sessions Judge for refusing to apply the provisions of S. 6 of the Act to accused Ramji were not proper. 4. It was urged before the High Court that the reasons assigned by the Assistant Sessions Judge for refusing to apply the provisions of S. 6 of the Act to accused Ramji were not proper. This submission was, however, repelled since the learned Judge considered the section inapplicable to that accused because, though he might have been "under 21 years of age" on the date of the offence (October 17, 1960), "he was not a person under 21 years of age" on May 24, 1961 when the Sessions Judge found him guilty and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment, holding that the crucial date on which the age had to be determined being not the date of the offence but the date on which as a result of a finding of guilty sentence had to be passed against the accused. 5. As regards Basist also, it was urged before the High Court that in view of the alteration in the finding recorded as regards his guilt, the beneficial provisions of S. 6 of the Act became applicable to him, the learned Judge holding that he could pass the same orders as the trial court could have done because of the provisions contained in S. 11 of the Act reading : "11. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, an order under this Act may be made by any Court empowered to try and sentence the offender to imprisonment and also by the High Court or any other Court when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, where an order under section 3 or section 4 is made by any Court trying the offender (other than a High Court), an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former Court. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, where an order under section 3 or section 4 is made by any Court trying the offender (other than a High Court), an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former Court. (3) In any case where any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence and the Court by which he is found guilty declines to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and passes against him any sentence of imprisonment with or without fine from which no appeal lies or is preferred, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former Court may, either of its own motion or on an application made to it by the convicted person or the probation officer, call for and examine the record of the case and pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. (4) When an order has been made under section 3 or section 4 in respect of an offender, the Appellate Court or the High Court in the exercise of its power of revision may set aside such order and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law: Provided that the Appellate Court or the High Court in revision shall not inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the Court by which the offender was found guilty." The learned Judge however, declined to do so observing: "No doubt, under the provisions of S. 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act this Court is competent to make an order, but it is entirely discretionary for this Court to exercise the power conferred on it under S. 11. In view of the fact that the Court below has already dealt with this matter, though not very satisfactorily, I do not consider it desirable to deal with the cases of these appellants under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act at this stage", and instead pass the sentence of imprisonment as already mentioned. It is the correctness of theses orders refusing to apply the provisions of S. 6 of the Act to the cases of the appellants that is raised for consideration in this appeal. 6. It is the correctness of theses orders refusing to apply the provisions of S. 6 of the Act to the cases of the appellants that is raised for consideration in this appeal. 6. Taking first the case of Ramji, the elder brother, we entirely agree with the High Court in their construction of S. 6. The question of the age of the person is relevant not for the purpose of determining his guilt but only for the purpose of the punishment which he could suffer for the offence of which he has been found, on the evidence, guilty. The object of the Act is to prevent the turning of youthful offenders into criminals by their association with hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of a prison. The method adopted is to attempt their possible reformation instead of inflicting on them the normal punishment for their crime. If this were borne in mind it would be clear that the age referred to by the opening words of S. 6 (1) should be that when the court is dealing with the offender, that being the point of time when the court has to choose between the two alternatives which the Act in supersession of the normal penal law vests in it, viz., sentence the offender to imprisonment or to apply to him the provisions of S. 6(1) of the Act. As the High Court has found that Ramji was not a person under the age of 21 on May 24, 1961 when the learned Sessions Judge found him guilty it is clear that S. 6(1) of the Act has no application to him. 7. The position in regard to the second appellant, Basist, stands on an entirely different footing. He was said to be of the age of l9 by the Sessions Judge which is apparently a reference to the time when the offence was committed. If so, he would have been about 20 at the time when the Sessions Judge found him guilty of offences under Ss. 307 and 326 Indian Penal Code and possibly also below 21 at the time when the High Court altered his conviction into one under S. 324, Indian Penal Code. 8. If so, he would have been about 20 at the time when the Sessions Judge found him guilty of offences under Ss. 307 and 326 Indian Penal Code and possibly also below 21 at the time when the High Court altered his conviction into one under S. 324, Indian Penal Code. 8. If by reason of his age, and the offence of which he has been found guilty the provisions of S. 6(1) are not excluded, the question that has next to be considered is whether the learned Judge had an absolute and unfettered discretion to pass or refuse an order under the Act by virtue of the terms of S. 11 of the Act. This would obviously turn on (1) whether or not S. 6(1) was applicable to the High Court, and (2) the proper construction of the terms of S. 11 which empowers appellate and revisional courts to pass orders under the Act. 9. It was urged by learned Counsel for the appellant that the High Court when it recorded a finding that Basist was guilty of an offence under S. 324, Indian Penal Code, was squarely within the words "the court by which a person is found guilty" occurring in S. 6(1) as it was only by that Court that for the first time the accused was found guilty of an offence which was not excluded by the opening words of that section. Learned Counsel relied for this position on the judgment of High Court of Madras in Narayanaswami Naidu v Emperor, ILR 29 Mad 567, following a decision of the Allahabad High Court to a similar effect in Emperor v. Birch, ILR 24 All 306. The question that arose in the first of the above cases related to the scope of the words "Court before whom he is convicted" occurring in S. 562, Criminal Procedure Code as it originally stood. The provision in S. 562, Criminal Procedure Code is somewhat in pari materia with S. 4 of the Act wherein a person found guilty of having committed offences not punishable with death or imprisonment for life may, instead of being sentenced to imprisonment, be released on entering into a bond. In the Code as originally enacted with the decision referred to, had to deal with, there was no express provision as regards the power of appellate courts to pass similar orders. In the Code as originally enacted with the decision referred to, had to deal with, there was no express provision as regards the power of appellate courts to pass similar orders. The accused in that case was tried and convicted by a magistrate under Ss. 447 and 352, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two weeks. The accused filed an appeal and the Deputy Magistrate who heard it while affirming the conviction directed his release on his executing a bond applying to him the provisions contained in S. 562, Criminal Procedure Code, the District Judge considered that the Deputy Magistrate had exceeded his jurisdiction in making this order and referred the question to the High Court. The learned Judges rejected the reference observing that the words Court before whom he is convicted" used in S. 562 were not intended to limit the power of making orders under that section to the court of first instance. 10. It might be mentioned that the Code has since been amended by the addition of sub-s. (2) which runs: "An order under this section may be made by an appellate court or by the High Court when exercising its powers of revision," so that it is no longer necessary for an appellate or revisional court to rely on any construction of the words "the court by which the person is found guilty" for invoking or exercising its jurisdiction. The position therefore comes to his the words referring to "the court by which a person is found guilty" are wide enough to include an appellate court, and particularly so where it this the appellate court along which by reason of its finding on the guilty of the accused becomes for the first time vested with the power or the duty to act under the section. Undoubtedly if S. 11 were attracted to the case, then there would be no need for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 6, and indeed in those circumstances the proper construction of S. 6 itself would be to exclude an appellate or revisional Court, since a redundancy could not have been intended by the statute. 11. The first question would therefore be to ascertain whether the jurisdiction or powers envisaged by S. 6(1) are within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by S. 11. 11. The first question would therefore be to ascertain whether the jurisdiction or powers envisaged by S. 6(1) are within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by S. 11. The power conferred on the High Court is to pass "an order under the Act." One is thrown back on the Act for determining what these are. They are: (1) Under S. 3, a court might order the release of a person found guilty of an offence of the type specified in the section after due admonition. (2) Under S. 4, an order may be passed in circumstances set out in it releasing such person on entering into a bond with or without sureties or pass a supervision order. (3) Orders which are consequential on orders under S. 3 or S. 4 like those for which provision is made by Ss. 5 and 9. So far as S. 6 is concerned it is, to say the least, doubtful whether it involves the "passing of an order," for the operative words are that the court finding a person guilty refrains from passing any sentence. An injunction enacted by this Act against passing a sentence of imprisonment which the court under the normal law is empowered or enjoined to pass can hardly be termed "passing an order under the Act. If this were correct, the result would be that on the reasoning which the High Courts of Madras and Allahabad adopted to construe the words in S. 562 of the Code, the High Court when hearing an appeal would be subject to the provisions of S. 6. 12. It is however possible that the words in S. 11 (1) "pass an order under the Act" are not to be construed so strictly and literally, but to be understood to mean "to exercise the powers or jurisdiction conferred by the Act." This wide interpretation might perhaps be justified by the scope and object of this section. Section 11 is to apply "notwithstanding anything in the Code or any other law" to all courts empowered to sentence offenders to imprisonment. To read a benef For Citation : AIR 1963 SC 1088