JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This is a defendants' Special Appeal and is directed against the decree passed by our brother Nigam in a first Appeal on the 24th of March, 1961. 2. The plaintiffs-respondents M/s. Jwala Prasad Radha Krishna, a Firm situate at Kanpur, had brought a suit giving rise to this appeal for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 6,750.00 on the allegation that that amount was due to them by way of refund in respect of the octroi duty paid for the goods which had gone outside the limits of the municipality of Balrampur. The suit, was contested, inter alia, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The trial court (the learned Civil Judge, Gonda) accepted the plea of limitation and dismissed the suit on the 23rd of December, 1953. Against that decree a first appeal was filed in this Court which was heard by our brother Nigam who allowed the same and decreed the plaintiffs-respondents' suit with costs. 3. It is not necessary to go into the details of the case because the submissions that were made before us have been confined to a pure question of law, the same being of limitation. The goods in respect of which the octroi was paid and refund claimed passed through the octroi barrier between the 26th of January, 1949 and the 7th of March, 1950. A total sum of Rs. 7,540-13-0 had been paid as octroi dues. The vouchers were presented at the Municipal Office for the refund of the octroi duty on various dates between January, 1949 and March, 1950. The Municipal Board was short of funds. It paid a sum of Rs. 2,002-13-0 on the 15th of April, 1950. The plaintiffs-respondents, therefore, filed the suit for the recovery of Rs. 5,538.00, the balance of the amount liable to be refunded plus a sum of Rs. 1182 on account of interest and a sum of Rs. 30 on account of costs of sending notices under Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Section 80, C.P.C. in all a sum of Rs. 6,750. 4. The question of limitation arises because under the provisions of Section 326 of the Act, the suit must be filed within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. 6,750. 4. The question of limitation arises because under the provisions of Section 326 of the Act, the suit must be filed within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. Admittedly, the present suit would be governed not by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act but by the special provisions contained in Section 326 of the Act. Whatever little controversy there was about the application of the provisions of the Articles of Sch. 1 to the Indian Limitation Act was set at rest by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Dargahi Lal v. Municipal Board, Cawnpore, AIR 1952 Allahabad 382 : 1952 ALJ 122, The parties have, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that the present case will be governed by Section 326 of the Act. It may be stated at the outset that no question of acknowledgement can or does arise in this case even though Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act would be applicable to a suit filed under Section 326 of the Act. All the acts of the Board which could amount to acknowledgement were performed more than six months before the date of the filing of the suit even excluding the period of notice. Consequently, learned counsel for the parties have not addressed us on Section 19 of the Limitation Act. Our brother Nigam has taken the view relying upon certain decisions that before it can be said that a cause of action has accrued, there must not only be a right to sue but also a denial or infringement of that right. We will deal with each one of the cases on which he has placed reliance but before we do so, we would like to mention that none of the cases relied upon by our learned brother are cases under Section 326 of the Act. We would like to advert to some of the provisions of the Act and the U.P. Municipalities Account Code which govern the right of the parties in the present case. 5. Chap. IV of the Act deals with municipal funds. We would like to advert to some of the provisions of the Act and the U.P. Municipalities Account Code which govern the right of the parties in the present case. 5. Chap. IV of the Act deals with municipal funds. Sec. 127 of the Act, which falls under that Chapter, reads as follows : "The following matter shall be regulated and governed by rules made by the State Government under Section 296, namely, - (a) the authority on which money may be paid from the municipal fund, (b) the conditions on which property may be acquired by the board or on which property vested in the board may be transferred by sale, mortgage lease, exchange or otherwise, and (c) any other matter relating to the municipal fund or municipal property in respect of which the Act makes no provision or insufficient provision and provision is necessary. The U.P. Municipal Account Code contains the rules which have been framed under Cl. (a) of Section 127 of the Act as also those framed under the other clauses of that section. It is a matter of admission before us that these rules have statutory foundation and, therefore, statutory force. Rr. 178 and 196 have been headed as `Refund of Octroi.' R. 178 provides that "a person who exports from a municipality any goods on which, if they were being imported, octroi would be leviable shall be entitled to receive payment of a sum equivalent to that octroi. This payment shall be of a sum equivalent to that octroi and described as a refund." R. 179 provides that no proof whatever of the previous payment of octroi shall ordinarily be demanded. R. 180 is to the effect that "claims for refunds shall be promptly dealt with, and when a claim has been admitted, the payment of the refunds shall be made on demand, even at the risk of exceeding the budget allotment." (Italicised by us). R. 182 provides that the member or the officer incharge making the refunds shall attend the municipal office daily during the office hours. R. 182 provides that the member or the officer incharge making the refunds shall attend the municipal office daily during the office hours. R. 185 provides that on receiving an application for a refund, the verifying officer appointed by the Board shall calculate the amount to be refunded and after filling up columns 11 to 15 in the refund application, he shall sign the certificate at the foot of his portion of the form, being careful to insert the exact hour and date of examination in the space provided. The rules prescribe a form in which an application is to be made, the same being form No. 59. The last column, i.e., No. 15, of the form is headed `Amount of refund.' Below it a certificate in the following words has got to be endorsed: "I have, as far as possible, examined the goods mentioned in this application and made entries in columns 11 to 15." I have this day . . at A.M./P.M satisfied myself that they agree with the details of the application." 6. We have referred to these rules in details in order to show that the scheme of the rules is that no sooner an application for a refund is made, the amount becomes payable and has got to be paid forthwith. If the amount is not paid within a reasonable time, it has got to be assumed that there is denial of payment. Under these circumstances, it appears to us that when no payment was made within a reasonable time, the Board had by its act defaulted in the payment. That being so, even if we take it for granted that the general rule for a cause of action is that there should not only be a right to sue but also an infringement of that right in the shape of either repudiating the liability or committing default in honouring that right, both these conditions are present in this case. It cannot be seriously urged that even though the amounts were not refunded, there was no default on the part of the Board or that the Board had not infringed the right of the plaintiffs-respondents. Mr. It cannot be seriously urged that even though the amounts were not refunded, there was no default on the part of the Board or that the Board had not infringed the right of the plaintiffs-respondents. Mr. Sridhar Misra, who has appeared for the plaintiffs-respondents, has strenuously submitted before us that inasmuch as the Board by its letters had shown its willingness to pay the amount of the refund claimed and that no time denied its liability to pay, it cannot be said that the second condition for the cause of action, that is the right of the plaintiffs is infringed, did not exist in the present case. Though this argument prevailed with the learned Single Judge, we have, for the reasons which we have already mentioned above, come to the conclusion that the mere fact of the non-payment of the amounts liable to be refunded constituted on the part of the defendant-appellant an act of default and invasion of the rights of the plaintiffs. There cannot be any hard and fast rule on the basis of which a Court can hold whether or not cause of action has accrued. It differs from case to case. In the present case, the plaintiffs-respondents had come to court on the express allegation that the cause of action for the suit accrued on the 26th of January, 1949. It is trite that it is allegations in the plaint that determine the date of the cause of action. The proposition is so well established that no authority is needed in support of it. However, if one was required, an easy reference can be made to Mst. Chand Kour v. Pratap Singh, 15 IA 156 at 157 and 158, Akkineri Sreeramulu v. Mullapudi Ramayya, ILR 25 Mad. 731 at 733, Mohammad Haji Hamed v. Jute and Gunny Brokers, Ltd., AIR 1932 Bombay 42 and Tarit Bhushan v. Sridhar Salagram Shila Thakur, AIR 1942 Calcutta 99 at 111. 7. During the course of arguments before us, as also before the learned Single Judge, reliance was placed upon para. 5 of the plaint it was submitted that the cause of action, even according to the plaint allegations, had accrued on the 4th of October 1952 and thus the suit would be within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 326 of the Act. Para. 5 of the plaint it was submitted that the cause of action, even according to the plaint allegations, had accrued on the 4th of October 1952 and thus the suit would be within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 326 of the Act. Para. 5 of the plaint reads as follows: "That the notices U/s. 326, Municipalities Act and Section 80, C.P.C. have been delivered to the administrator, Municipal Board, Balrampur on 4-10-52 and to D. G. on 4-10-52." It is contended that the date on which the notice was served upon the Deputy Commissioner, Gonda and the Municipal Board at Balrampur would be the date on which the cause of action accrued. We have no difficulty in rejecting the submission outright. If a notice is served long after the period of limitation has expired, it cannot furnish a fresh cause of action. It is well known that once limitation starts to run, it is not stopped or suspended except under special circumstances, as for example, by an Act of legislature by an order of the Court. None of the two conditions mentioned above exist in the present case and nothing has been shown to us to justify the conclusion that in this particular case the cause of action which, in our judgment, accrued on the date when the vouchers were presented for refund was suspended and that it accrued again on the 4th of October, 1952. 8. In view of these findings, it is really not necessary to consider the various authorities that were cited before the learned Single Judge and on which he has relied. We have already mentioned above that none of them deal with a case under Section 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Most of them are decisions under Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act. 9. In Jitendra Nath v. Manmohan Ghose, A.I.R. 1930 PC 193 the Judicial Committee was called upon to consider whether the six years rule of limitation provided by Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act would govern the case. Most of them are decisions under Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act. 9. In Jitendra Nath v. Manmohan Ghose, A.I.R. 1930 PC 193 the Judicial Committee was called upon to consider whether the six years rule of limitation provided by Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act would govern the case. Their Lordships observed as follows: "The respondents admit that this article governs the suit, but say that their "right to sue," which defines the starting point of the period, only accrued in April 1921, when the appellants first applied for the sale of the tenure, and their suit was brought in November of that year. The trial Judge (as already stated) made no pronouncement upon this issue. The learned Judges of the High Court agreed with the respondents' contention, and their Lordships have no doubt that they were right for the reasons given in their judgment." It would be noticed that the point actually decided by the Judicial Committee was that it is the date on which the right to sue arose which would be the starting point of the period of limitation. In the present case, there can be no manner of doubt that the right to sue arose in favour of the plaintiff-respondents within a day or two of the presentation of the vouchers for the refund. We find nothing in this case on the basis of which we can hold that the starting point for the period of limitation in the instant case would be any other date than in between the 22nd of January, 1949 to 7th of March, 1950. 10. Mst. Bolo v. Mst. Koklan, A.I.R. 1930 PC 270 : 1930 ALJ 1188 is again a case where the Judicial Committee had to consider whether Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act would apply. While doing so, the Board observes as follows:- "There can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted." This shows that even a threat would be good enough to give a cause of action. It is not denied in the present case and even the learned Single Judge has not held that the right to sue did not arise in favour of the plaintiff-respondents on the dates on which they presented the vouchers for refund. What have already said above that the mere failure to pay did amount to an infringement of that right and in any case it was a threat to infringe. 11. In Annamalai Chettiar v. A.M.K.C.T. Muthukaruppan, A.I.R. 1931 PC 9 the question that arose before the Judicial Committee was whether Article 62 or 120 would apply to the facts before them. Holding that Article 120 would not apply, their Lordships relying upon an earlier decision of the Board in Mst. Bolo v. Mst. Koklan, A.I.R. 1930 PC 270 : 1930 ALJ 1188 reproduced the passed to which we have already made a reference above. It is not necessary that there should be an infringement of the right and even a threat to infringe the right would be sufficient. We have already said above that inasmuch as in spite of the presentation of the vouchers, the amount was not paid to the plaintiffs-respondents, it is obvious that there was a threat and a serious threat to their right to receive the money claimed by way of refund. We find nothing in this case on the basis of which we would be justified in holding that the cause of action to the plaintiffs-respondents did not accrue on the dates when they presented he vouchers for the refund of the amount paid. 12. In Govind Narayan v. Sham Lal, 58 IA 125 their Lordships again had to consider the provisions of Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act. We do not find anything in this judgment which would militate against the view that we are taking. 12. In Govind Narayan v. Sham Lal, 58 IA 125 their Lordships again had to consider the provisions of Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act. We do not find anything in this judgment which would militate against the view that we are taking. The following passage from that judgment has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents : "Assuming that Article 120 applies, they think that the expression "right to sue" in that 'article means the right to bring the particular suit with reference to which the plea of limitation is raised, and that the present suit being in respect of Dendua only the starting point for limitation must be the date when the appellants' right in Dendua were first invaded." It would be noticed that in this judgment, their Lordships have not spoken either of the infringement of the right or a threat of infringement and have taken the right to sue as sufficient to constitute the accrual of the cause of action. We have already said above, it is not necessary that in every case, that there should be an infringement of the right or a threat of infringement to the right in addition to the existence of the right to sue. In most cases the existence of the right to sue would itself constitute the cause of action. In the first place, this decision is like the others to which we have already made a reference and is one under Art, 120 with which we are not concerned in the instant case. It is well established that authorities on a section different from the one under scrutiny cannot be safe guides in determining the question that the Court has to answer. Apart from it, as we have already said above, that we find nothing in this decision which is in conflict with the view we are taking. 13. In Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan, A.I.R. 1960 SC 335 their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope and applicability of Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act and while doing so, relying upon the case of Mst. Bolo v. Mst. 13. In Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan, A.I.R. 1960 SC 335 their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope and applicability of Article 120 of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act and while doing so, relying upon the case of Mst. Bolo v. Mst. Koklan, A.I.R. 1930 PC 270 : 1930 ALJ 1188 and Annamalai Chettiar v. A. M. K. C. T. Muthukaruppan Chettiar, A.I.R. 1931 PC 9 observed as follows: - "There can be no `right to sue' until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. 14. We have no difficulty in saying that the instant case falls completely within the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision mentioned above. It has not been contended even by the learned counsel for the appellant nor has it been found by the learned Single Judge that on the dates when the vouchers were presented for payment, the right to sue had not accrued to the plaintiffs-respondents. We have already said above that inasmuch as the amounts were not paid within a reasonable time, though the law required them to be paid forthwith, there clearly is an act which can be construed, to put it at the lowest, as a threat to infringe that right. In our judgment this case also does not support the learned counsel for respondents. It is not necessary to multiply authorities and we would like to conclude by saying that no decision has been brought to our notice on facts similar to this case where it has been held that even though the law requires payment to be made immediately a voucher is presented and the payment is not made, there would still not be a cause of action. With great respect to the learned Single Judge, we would like to point out that the fact that the Board continued to make defaults in payment on various pretences, may amount to acknowledgment but cannot be construed as anything short of a threat to the right of the respondents. With great respect to the learned Single Judge, we would like to point out that the fact that the Board continued to make defaults in payment on various pretences, may amount to acknowledgment but cannot be construed as anything short of a threat to the right of the respondents. Perhaps the respondents might have had a very good case for the extension of the period of limitation under Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act but their misfortune is that all the acknowledgments are more than six months anterior to the date of the filing of the suit and consequently cannot be availed of. An acknowledgment of liability is not mutually exclusive with the default to pay and consequently even though the liability was acknowledged, but when no payment was made, a default has been committed and, therefore, the starting point of limitation would still be the dates on which the various vouchers were presented. 15. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the decree passed by our brother Nigam must be reversed. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree passed by him and restore the one passed by the trial court and dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their costs throughout. 16. Before we part with the case, we would like to observe that the Municipal Board of Balrampur has not set a good standard of conduct in first lulling the plaintiffs-respondents into the belief that the payment would be made and then, after the period of limitation had expired, to come and contest the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. If representative bodies act in a manner in which the Municipal Board of Balrampur has acted, it is obvious that public confidence would be undermined in the authority of the Government and the results would be disastrous. However, that is a consideration on which we, as Judges, cannot give any relief to the plaintiffs-respondents. We only hope that the Municipal Board of Balrampur would still consider whether morality demands them to make the payment which they admit to be due against them but which they only want to escape on the ground of limitation.