JUDGMENT :- The appellant is a villager in the Hill village of Somgpakmon and the respondent is the Chief of that village. The appellant filed a complaint on 18-12-1959 against the respondent before Shri Y. Ibotombi Singh, S. D. C., Chunachandpur, who is a 2nd Class Magistrate complaining of criminal trespass by the respondent into his land and committing of mischief thereon by cutting trees grown in the orchard. The complainant was examined on the same day, but the record of the examination does not even show that he was sworn. Any way, the case was taken on file and summons was issued to the respondent. After the respondent appeared, the Magistrate explained the substance of the accusation to the respondent, and he pleaded not guilty, thereby showing that the Magistrate treated the case as a summons case. Subsequently, the case underwent many adjournments for various reasons. Then, the Magistrate Shri Y. Ibotombi Singh was transferred, and the case was taken up before the S. D. C., Shri Abung Longmei. The case again underwent many adjournments as the respondent absented himself from Court on the hearing date. Ultimately, it was taken up on 25-1-1961 on which date, the respondent was present. On that date, the S. D. C., Shri Abung Longmei, framed a charge against the respondent under S. 427 I. P. C. and the respondent pleaded not guilty. This would show that the Magistrate decided to adopt warrant procedure. The Magistrate appears to have proceeded to further question the respondent and the respondent stated that the complainant shifted to the respondents village and there was a compromise made between them, but the complainant did not pay him Basuri and Saliang according to the tribal customary law and that the respondent therefore cut some fruit trees from the complainants garden and further that it was quite undesirable that without the respondents consent fruit plants should be grown in his village. After this, the Magistrate recorded the evidence of the complainant on 14-3-1961 and straightaway, he delivered judgment stating that as the complainant did not belong to that village, but to another village and did not pay Hill House Tax in 1959, he cannot grow fruit trees in the said village without the consent of the chief of the village, according to certain orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur and therefore there were no sufficient grounds for proceeding with the case and hence the case was struck off. 2. The appellant got a copy of the said order and he filed a revision petition before the Sessions Judge on 23-3-1961. The Additional Sessions Judge(I), dismissed the revision petition by his order dated 6-9-1961. In dismissing the revision, the Additional Sessions Judge stated that in the certified copy of the judgment of the Magistrate, issued to the appellant herein, there was no order of acquittal, but that on perusal of the original judgment he found the additional words "the accused is acquitted" therein and that it appeared to him that the said words were added subsequently after issuing the certified copy to the appellant, but that he would not. enter into the merits of the case as he found that the remedy of the appellant was to file an appeal before the Judicial Commissioner and that the revision petition was incompetent. After the dismissal of the said revision petition, the appellant has filed the present appeal on 8-9-1961 with an application for condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal. 3. There are very good grounds for condoning the delay in this case. In the certified copy granted to the appellant the words "the accused is acquitted" were absent and so the appellant could not file an appeal against the acquittal, but only revision before the Sessions Judge. It was only when the Additional Sessions Judge (I) perused the records on 6-9-1961 that he found the words "the accused is acquitted" seen added in the original judgment and the Additional Sessions Judge (I) was himself of opinion that the said words were added after granting the certified copy to the appellant. I nave also perused the original records in this case and it is seen that the words "the accused is acquitted" have been added subsequently in a different ink in the original judgment. I nave also perused the original records in this case and it is seen that the words "the accused is acquitted" have been added subsequently in a different ink in the original judgment. The fact that in the certified copy given to the appellant, the said words are not seen also indicates that the words have been subsequently added. Hence, there is no doubt that there has not been any negligence on the part of the appellant. He has come up in appeal as soon as the additions of these words was noticed by the Additional Sessions Judge (I) on 6-9-1961. Hence, the delay has to be condoned under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. It is indeed a very serious matter that there should be an alteration in the judgment; after the certified copy was granted. The Additional District Magistrate will hold an inquiry into this matter and submit a report to this Court within one month from the date of receipt of the records. 5. I am surprised that the Additional Sessions Judge (I) should have dismissed the revision petition and failed to report this serious matter to this Court under S. 435, Cri. P. C. when he found such a serious irregularity. This will amount to shirking of his duty. If he did not consider this serious irregularity as worthy of report to this Court, it only means that he does not realise his responsibility under S. 439, Cri. P. C. 6. It was wrong on his part to have dismissed the revision petition as incompetent. He does not say on what basis he considered the revision petition to be incompetent. Perhaps, he was under the impression that the provision in S. 439 (5), Cri. P. C. made it necessary for the appellant in the case of an acquittal to file an application under S. 417, Cri. P. C. for leave to appeal against the said acquittal before this Court. But the question whether S. 439(5) would prevent any revision petition being entertained is a matter which it is not for the Additional Sessions Judge (I) to decide. It is a matter for this Court to decide. There is no provision in S. 435, Cri. P. C. corresponding to S. 439. (5), Cri. But the question whether S. 439(5) would prevent any revision petition being entertained is a matter which it is not for the Additional Sessions Judge (I) to decide. It is a matter for this Court to decide. There is no provision in S. 435, Cri. P. C. corresponding to S. 439. (5), Cri. P. C. and the power of the Sessions Court to call for and examine the record of any proceeding is not curtailed by S. 439 (5), Cri. P. C. If the Sessions Judge on an examination of the record finds that there has been any illegality or impropriety in the finding or order of the Magistrate, whether it be a case of acquittal or conviction, and he thinks it is a fit case for reporting for the orders of this Court, it is his duty under S. 438, Cri. P. C. to refer the matter to the High Court. If he makes the reference at the instance of a party in a case of acquittal, and if he considers that the provision of S. 439(5) should also be brought to the notice of the High Court, he may do so while making the reference, but he has certainly no right to dismiss the revision petition as incompetent. I have already pointed out in my order as Judicial Commissioner, Tripura in Raj Kumar Paul v. Amar Chand Das, 1962(1), Cri LJ 677 (Tri) that the provision in S. 439(5) will not stand in the way of a party filing an application in revision against an order of acquittal. In any case, it will not prevent the Sessions Judge on an application by the party from calling for and examining the record of the proceeding before an inferior Criminal Court and reporting the matter under S. 438, Cri. P. C. for the orders of this Court. The Sessions Judge should have gone into the merits of the case, particularly, when he found that there was such a serious irregularity of interpolation of the words "the accused is acquitted" in the judgment of the Magistrate. 7. When we examine the record of the proceedings before this Magistrate, we find that the entire proceedings have been irregularly conducted. He adopted warrant procedure and framed a charge against the respondent under S. 427, I. P. C. Before framing the charge, it was his duty under Section 252, Cri. 7. When we examine the record of the proceedings before this Magistrate, we find that the entire proceedings have been irregularly conducted. He adopted warrant procedure and framed a charge against the respondent under S. 427, I. P. C. Before framing the charge, it was his duty under Section 252, Cri. P. C. to record the evidence produced in support of the prosecution. Any way I take it that he framed the charge as he was satisfied perhaps from the evidence recorded by his predecessor that a prima facie case was made out against the respondent. After framing the charge, it was his duty under Section 256, Cri. P. C. to ask the accused if he wished to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses already examined and to give an opportunity to the prosecution to examine the remaining witnesses, if any. Instead, he only appeared to have further examined the complainant. I do not find that the respondent even cross-examined the complainant. The prosecution was not given any opportunity to examine further witnesses. Unless, the prosecution is permitted to examine all its witnesses, the Magistrate cannot close the trial and straightaway proceed to pronounce judgment and acquit the accused. If the Magistrate was not satisfied that there was a prima facie case, he should not have framed a charge and he could have discharged the accused under Section 253 (1), Cri. P. C. But after the framing of the charge, it is his duty to give an opportunity to the prosecution to examine all the witnesses in support of the charge. 8. I find that the Magistrate has entered into a discussion on the title of the complainant to the land. It was not within the province of the Magistrate to decide whether the complainant had title to the land. He was only concerned with the question of the possession of the complainant as far as the offence of criminal trespass was concerned. But then, this Magistrate did not frame a charge at all under Section 447, I. P. C. With regard to the charge under Section 427, I find that the respondent even admitted causing destruction to the property by cutting trees. But the Magistrate considered that the petitioner should not have raised the fruit trees in the land without the consent of the respondent. But the Magistrate considered that the petitioner should not have raised the fruit trees in the land without the consent of the respondent. That was not a matter for the Magistrate to decide in a case of mischief against the respondent. Thus, the Magistrate has gone beyond his province in refusing to proceed further with the trial and in striking off the case. The Magistrate has also not dealt with the case of criminal trespass at all. When he decided to adopt the warrant procedure for the trial of the case, it was his duty to have framed a charge regarding the plea of criminal trespass also even though the offence of criminal trespass was triable as a summons case. There has been no trial in this case of the complaint of criminal trespass against the respondent. 9. For all these reasons the acquittal of the respondent has to be set aside. 10. The appeal is allowed and the case is remanded for further trial. The Additional District Magistrate, Manipur, will send this case for trial to a Magistrate other than this S. D. C., Shri Abung Longmei. Appeal allowed.