Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. This appeal is on behalf of the plaintiffs, and is directed against the judgment and the decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Arrah, dated the 21st December, 1956, affirming those of the Munsif of the same place dated the 14th December, 1956. 2. One Banka Rai died about twenty-five years ago leaving him surviving three minor sons, Ramjee Rai (Plaintiff No. 1) Sheoji Rai (defendant No. 5), Lakshman Rai (defendant No. 6) and his widow, Musammat Sulakshana Kuer. During the minority of her sons, Musammat Sulakshana Kuer was managing the estate. On the 15th September 1932, she usufructuarily mortgaged 1.88 acres of land for a consideration of Rs 690 in favour of Rambilas Ram. On the 6th August, 1944, defendants 5 and 6 who have been described as the defendants second party transferred by a registered deed of sale, Exhibit B. 2.27 acres of land comprised in survey plot 135, 143 and 144, to the defendants first party for a consideration of Rs. 700.00 with a stipulation that out of the consideration of Rs. 700, Rs. 690/-would be paid to Rambilas Ram in redemption of the aforesaid mortgage. There is no dispute that Rs. 690.00 was paid to Rambilas Ram and the mortgage was thereby redeemed. On the 13th December, 1954- the present suit was brought by plaintiff No. 1 along with his sons and the minor sons of the defendants second party, the executants of the sale deed for a declaration that the sale deed of the 6th August, 1944, is illegal, void inoperative and not binding on the plaintiffs and also for a declaration of title and confirmation of possession or in the alternative, recovery of possession, in respect of 2.27 acres of land. 3. The defendants first party resisted the suit and supported the sale deed in their favour on the, ground that Sheoji Rai, defendant No. 5, was the karta of the joint family and that the sale deed was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the estate and was, therefore, binding on the plaintiffs also. 4. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, held that the sale deed, Exhibit B, was genuine, legal, valid and for consideration and that it was binding on plaintiff No. 1. He further observed that the plaintiffs 2 to 9 could not challenge this transaction as it took place before their birth. 4. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, held that the sale deed, Exhibit B, was genuine, legal, valid and for consideration and that it was binding on plaintiff No. 1. He further observed that the plaintiffs 2 to 9 could not challenge this transaction as it took place before their birth. He accordingly dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal; and in the appellate Court below the only point pressed on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants was whether or not the sale deed was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the estate. The respondents however, raised a question of limitation also. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, who disposed of the appeal, held that suit was not barred by limitation and that the sale was justified by legal necessity and for the benefit of the estate. Accordingly he affirmed the judgment and the decree of the learned Munsif. The plaintiffs have come up in second appeal. 5. The first point, that was urged on behalf of the appellants, was that it was not permissible to a coparcener or a Karta of a joint Hindu family to sell the joint family property for redemption of a mortgage as it would jeopardise the right of the reversioners to redeem; and in such a case there can be no question of any pressure upon the estate for effecting the transaction. The proposition of law enunciated by learned counsel in this broad form cannot be accepted. There is no inflexible rule that a Karta or a manager of the family cannot at all transfer a portion of a joint family property for redemption of a prior mortgage. Prima facie a mortgage may be regarded a more favourable transaction than a sale. Nevertheless, circumstances may arise where, sale will be of greater benefit to the estate than continuance of the mortgage. Therefore, whether or not the sale for redemption of the mortgage is justified must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In every case, it will be for the Court to determine whether the sale for the redemption of the mortgage was a prudent act on the part of the manager and the Karta of the joint family. Nobody would reasonably require continuance of a mortgage if the mortgaged property is inconveniently situated and profitable cultivation cannot be carried out. In every case, it will be for the Court to determine whether the sale for the redemption of the mortgage was a prudent act on the part of the manager and the Karta of the joint family. Nobody would reasonably require continuance of a mortgage if the mortgaged property is inconveniently situated and profitable cultivation cannot be carried out. If a portion of such a mortgage property is sold to redeem the mortgage, it cannot be considered as an unreasonable act on the part of the manager or the Karta of the family. I do not want to dilate upon this question, because we have a recent pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court on this point in the case of Jaisri Sahu V/s. Rajdewan Dubey, AIR 1962 SC 83 . In that case, a widow, holding a widows estate, executed a Zarpeshgi deed for a sum of Rs. 1100/-. Subsequently, the widow sold a portion of the properties, which were the subject-matter of the zarpeshgi deed for a consideration of Rs. 1,600/-. Out of this amount, a sum of Rs. 1,100/-was reserved with the purchaser for redemption of the zarpeshgi and the balance of Rs. 500.00 was paid in cash. It was also recited in the sale deed that the sum of Rs. 500.00 was taken for legal necessity and there was no dispute about that. The question mooted out in that case was whether in the circumstances the sale by the widow was supported by necessity and binding on the next reversioners. The High Court held that a sale by a widow of properties which are the subject-matter of a usufructuary mortgage is beyond her powers when the mortgagee cannot sue to recover the amount due on the mortgage. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court dissented from this view and observed as follows:- - "If the learned Judge intended to lay down as an inflexible proposition of law that, whenever there is a usufructuary mortgage, the widow cannot sell the property as that would deprive the reversioners of the right to redeem the same, we must dissent from it. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court dissented from this view and observed as follows:- - "If the learned Judge intended to lay down as an inflexible proposition of law that, whenever there is a usufructuary mortgage, the widow cannot sell the property as that would deprive the reversioners of the right to redeem the same, we must dissent from it. Such a proposition could be supported only if the widow is in the position of a trustee, holding the estate for the benefit of the reversioners, with a duty cast on her to preserve the properties and pass them on intact to them, That, however, is not the law. When a widow succeeds as heir to her husband, the owner-ship in the properties, both legal and beneficial, vests in her. She fully represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being only spes successions. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. It is true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of the estate as known to Hindu law ......... Where, however, there is necessity for a transfer, the restriction imposed by Hindu law on her power to alienate ceases to operate, and the widow as owner has got the fullest discretion to decide what form the alienation should assume. Her powers in this regard are, as held in a series of decisions beginning with Hunooman Pershad V/s. Mt. Babooee Mundraj Koonwaree, 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC), those of the manager of an infants estate or the manager of a joint Hindu family. In Venkaji V/s. Vishnu, ILR 18 Bom 534 at p. 536 it was observed that -- "A widow like a manager of the family must be allowed a reasonable latitude in the exercise of her powers, provided, ......... In Venkaji V/s. Vishnu, ILR 18 Bom 534 at p. 536 it was observed that -- "A widow like a manager of the family must be allowed a reasonable latitude in the exercise of her powers, provided, ......... she acts fairly to her expectant heirs." And more recently, discussing this question, it was observed in Viraraju V/s. Venkataratnam, ILR 1939 Mad 226 at p. 231 : ( AIR 1939 Mad 98 at p. 100): How exactly this obligation is to be carried out, whether by a mortgage, sale or other means, is not to be determined by strict rules or legal formula, but must be left to the reasonable discretion of the party bound. In the absence of mala fides or extravagance, and so long as it is neither unfair in character nor unreasonable in extent, the Court will not scan too nicely the manner or the quantum of the alienation." Judged by these principles when there is a mortgage subsisting on the property, the question whether the widow could sell it in discharge of it is a question which must be determined on the facts of each case, there being no absolute prohibition against her effecting a sale in a proper case. What has to be determined is whether the act is one which can be justified as that oi a prudent owner managing his or her own properties. If the income from the property has increased in value, it would be a reasonable step to take to dispose of some of the properties in discharge of the debt and redeem the rest so that the estate can have the benefit of the income." Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it appears that the lands covered by the sale deed, exhibit B, were not as fertile and as profitable as the lands given in usufructuary mortgage dated the 16th September, 1932, Exhibit C. It is in evidence that defendants 5 and 6 mortgaged out of the redeemed lands, 0.83 acre by virtue of a registered deed of mortgage dated the 15th August, 1948, Exhibit C (6), for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/-. It is significant to note that 1.88 acres had been mortgaged previously for a consideration of Rs. 690.00 only and only a portion of this mortgaged land that is, 0.83 acre fetched Rs. 1,500/-. It is significant to note that 1.88 acres had been mortgaged previously for a consideration of Rs. 690.00 only and only a portion of this mortgaged land that is, 0.83 acre fetched Rs. 1,500/-that is to say more than double the amount of the original consideration. It is, therefore, manifest that the mortgaged lands were more valuable than the lands covered by the sale deed of the 6th August, 1944, Exhibit B. On this ground, therefore, the sale of the 6th August, 1944, Exhibit B, cannot be challenged successfully. Learned counsel, however, pointed out that the sale took place in 1944 and the subsequent mortgage was made four years later in 1948; and, therefore, the consideration obtained in 1948 cannot be a criterion for determining the necessity of a sale out and out in 1944. The short answer to this argument is that the case was not approached from that point of view in the Courts below and no question was raised as to the variation in the price of land between 1944 and 1948. The argument of learned counsel is based on pure speculation. If it is at all permissible to speculate, one can say that there was not much difference in the price of land from 1944 to 1948. Hence, this argument has no factual basis and is also not supportable on principle. Therefore, the Courts below were right in holding that the sale was justified as there was clear benefit to the estate. 6. Learned counsel then urged that, at all events, the sale will not bind the share of the plaintiffs in the joint family property. He pointed out that the sale was not effected by a karta and manager of the family. Both the Courts below concurrently held that defendant No. 5 was the Karta of the joint family of the plaintiffs and the defendants second party and there is no challenge of that finding. Learned counsel, however pointed out that when the deed of sale was not executed by the Karta (defendant No. 5) as such and when the same was executed by the Karta along with the other member of the joint family, it cannot be said, in the eye of law, that it was executed by the Karta representing the joint family. Before I proceed to consider this argument I may state here the law on the point. Before I proceed to consider this argument I may state here the law on the point. It is well settled that where a member of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara law as administered in Bengal, Bihar and Utter Pradesh, sells or mortgages the joint family property or any portion thereof without the consent of his coparceners, the alienation is liable to be set aside wholly unless it was for legal necessity or for payment by a father of an antecedent debt and it does not pass the share even of the alienating coparcener. The result is that if the alienation is neither for legal necessity nor for the payment of an antecedent debt, the other coparceners are entitled to a declaration that the alienation is void in its entirety. In such a case the sale is not valid even in respect of the interest of the Karta or the manager or the alienating coparcener in -the joint property, vide Mullas Principles of Hindu Law, 12th edition, page 407. When, therefore, the sale is bad for want of legal necessity, which also includes benefit to the estate, the sale must be set aside as a whole. The sale cannot be said to be valid with respect to the interest of the alienating members and invalid with respect to the members not parties to the alienation. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel that the sale, in any event did not affect the interest of the plaintiffs is against the established principle of Mitakshara law as obtains in Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. If there was no legal necessity justifying the same or there was no benefit to the estate, the sale must be set aside in its entirety. The case on which reliance was placed in support of this contention does not, in my opinion, apply to the facts of the present case. Reference was made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jagdish Pandey V/s. Rameshwar Choubey, 1959 Pat LR 215 : ( AIR 1960 Pat 54 ). That case dealt with not a voluntary sale by a private party but a sale at an auction held by a Court in execution of a decree. Further, in that case, their Lordships were considering the applicability of Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. That case dealt with not a voluntary sale by a private party but a sale at an auction held by a Court in execution of a decree. Further, in that case, their Lordships were considering the applicability of Sec. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. We are not concerned in this case with the provisions enacted by Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decision in that case, therefore, proceeded entirely on different grounds. It cannot be said that their Lordships were laying down principles of law which were contrary to what is so firmly established in Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The principles governing execution sales are entirely different. Although a coparcener cannot alienate his undivided interest in the coparcenary property, his undivided interest can be sold at a sale in execution of a decree. The purchaser at such a sale does not acquire any right to immediate possession of the property but only a right to compel a partition which the coparcener whose interest has been purchased might have compelled, had he been so minded, before: the sale of his interest took place. This is the exception to the general rule of Mitakshara law that a sale of an undivided interest by a coparcener or by a manager or a karta without legal necessity is void ab initio. The principle of that case, therefore, cannot be extended to cover a case of a private sale. It is noteworthy, however, that that decision rested upon a prior decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sidheshwar Mukherjee V/s. Bhubneshwar Prasad, AIR 1953 SC 487 and in that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that under the Mitakshara law as it is administered in the State of Bihar, no coparcener can alienate, even for valuable consideration his undivided interest in the joint property without the consent of his coparceners. They have further pointed out that it is, however, open to the creditor who has obtained a decree against him personally to attach and put up to sale his undivided interest and after purchase, to have the interest separated by a suit for partition. It is plain, therefore, that the decision in the case of Jagdish Pandey is not an authority for the proposition that the sale by a member of the family does not affect the interest of the non-managing members. It is plain, therefore, that the decision in the case of Jagdish Pandey is not an authority for the proposition that the sale by a member of the family does not affect the interest of the non-managing members. On this principle, therefore, the plaintiffs cannot urge that the sale may be binding upon those who were parties to the sale and was not binding upon the other members of the family. The legal position seems to be clear that the sale stands or fails in its entirety and cannot be maintained in part and set aside in respect of the other part. 7. Learned counsel, however, contended that in the present case, the sale deed was not executed by the karta alone, but by the karta and another junior member of the family, and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a sale by a karta in his representative capacity. In support of his contention he referred to two decisions of this Court reported in Prahlad Das V/s. Dasarathi Satpathi, AIR 1940 Pat 117 and Deo Narain Singh V/s. Bibi Khatoon, AIR 1949 Pat 401. In those cases, no question of a sale executed by a karta and another member of a joint Hindu family was involved. There, their Lordships were considering a suit instituted by or against the karta and another member of the family and there they had observed that when the suit was instituted not by the karta, alone but by another member also, it cannot be said that the suit had been instituted in the representative capacity. The principles governing suits do not apply to transactions by a private party. When a sale or mortgage is created by a karta and another member of the coparcenary, it cannot be said that it is not a transfer on behalf of the family. There is no authority for the view that in all cases where a sale or mortgage is affected by a karta and another member of the joint family, it cannot be regarded as a sale or mortgage by the Karta as such. No decisions directly bearing on this question has been cited before us. It is likely that the purchaser wanted that the other member should also join; and, in such case a sale by a karta may not lose its representative character. No decisions directly bearing on this question has been cited before us. It is likely that the purchaser wanted that the other member should also join; and, in such case a sale by a karta may not lose its representative character. There may be various other circumstances, which may compel the karta to ask the other members also to join in the execution of the sale deed. The trouble is that no such case was made out either in the plaint or in the evidence or in the arguments before the Courts below; and we are denied the advantage of any explanation for the other member joining the karta in execution of the sale deed. This argument was advanced for the first time in this Court. This argument is, therefore, supportable neither on facts nor in principle; and must, therefore, be rejected. 8. It follows that the decisions of the courts below are right must be upheld. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Ramratna Singh, J. 9 I agree.