JUDGMENT 1. ON a short point depends the fate of this Rule. The point is short but it is of paramount importance to the rights of the parties and to the instant matter before the Court. The Rule before us was issued for reconsideration of an order of this Court, discharging a previous Rule, obtained by the petitioner against an order of the trial court under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, striking out his defence to the pending action in ejectment. 2. THE petitioner was the tenant in respect of shop room No. 10 in the ground floor of Ashutosh Building (87/2, College Street, also numbered as 43 Culootola Street) under the opposite party, namely, the University of Calcutta, at a monthly rental of Rs. 118/-, payable according to English calendar months. On June 18, 1958, the present suit for ejectment, namely, Ejectment Suit No. 971 of 1958, was filed by the opposite party University against the petitioner in the City Civil Court, Calcutta. In the plaint, two grounds were taken for denying to the petitioner the benefit under the relevant rent control legislation-the first was the ground of default and it was alleged that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent since April, 1956; the second ground was that the suit premises was required by the opposite party University reasonably for its own use and occupation. The summons of the suit appears to have been served on the petitioner on July 17, 1958, and he entered appearance on July 31, following 3. ONE of his main defenses at the time was that there were no arrears, due from him, and that as a matter of fact, there was no rent, due from him in respect of the disputed premises. It was specifically alleged further that between August 10, 1956. and June 26, 1958, all rents for the period April, 1956, to June, 1958 had been paid. On August 13, 1958, the petitioner deposited in court, presumably under section 17, clause (1) of the above Act, the rent for July, 1958, and, as stated by him, he deposited also 1 month's rents out of greater caution or ex abundante cautela. Thereafter, rents were being deposited month by month in terms of the aforesaid section within the 15th of the next succeeding month. Thereafter, rents were being deposited month by month in terms of the aforesaid section within the 15th of the next succeeding month. In December, 1958, the plaintiff applied for an order under section 17 (3) of the aforesaid Act and prayed for striking out the petitioner's defence against ejectment on the ground of his being a defaulter within the mischief of the aforesaid provision. On May 18, 1960, the trial court, on a consideration of the cases of the parties as placed before it at the time, accepted the plaintiff's above contention and directed that the defence of the petitioner against delivery of possession be struck out. 4. THE suit was, therefore, posted for exparte disposal on May 28, 1960, and eventually, this date was shifted to June 24, 1960. In the mean time, on June 20,1960, the petitioner approached this Court and obtained Civil Rule No. 2407 of 1960, complaining against the order of the trial court, striking out his defence against delivery of possession. The Rule, however, was ultimately discharged on June 8, 1960. Thereafter, an unsuccessful attempt was made before the trial court to have the above order reviewed by that court but it failed on the technical ground that, the said order having been affirmed by this Court in the aforesaid Rule it was no longer revisable or reviewable by the trial court. The petitioner then came to this Court again and applied on October 5, 1961, and obtained the present Rule under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to have a reconsideration of the order of this Court, passed on June 8, 1960, discharging the prior Rule, obtained by it, namely, Civil Rule No. 2407 of 1960. 5. THE ground, upon which this reconsideration has been prayed for, is that, at the time, when the order under section 17 (3) of the above Act, striking out the petitioner's defence was passed, all relevant materials for showing that the petitioner was not a defaulter but that the arrears of rent, alleged not to have been paid, had actually been paid by his sub-tenant, were not in his possession, and, accordingly, could not be produced before the court for getting an order in its favour in the said section 17 (3) proceeding. It was also alleged that the said materials in full were obtained only recently and, although, some of them were available at the time of the hearing of the prior Rule, namely, Civil Rule No. 2407 of 1960, they were not sufficient and could not persuade then Lordships, who discharged that Rule, to allow the petitioner to reopen the said matter. 6. EVEN, on the materials, now produced, the position is far from being clear, whether the petition or anybody on his behalf has actually deposited or paid all the arrears, complained of by the University. Even on the petitioner's case, a sum roughly amounting to Rs. 7,000/- or a little above that, would have been due prior to the separation of the original tenancy, comprising the disputed room No. 10 and the two other rooms No. 9 and 11 of the same block, and if that be taken into account, even on the payments, alleged by the petitioner, it is difficult to hold, at least, prima facie, upon the present materials, that the entire arrears had been paid off by the petitioner. The petitioner's specific case, therefore, on this point would fail, but, at the same time, it would be obvious now that, on these materials, a dispute would arise as to the amount, payable by the petitioner under section 17 of the aforesaid Act. One of the points, leading to this dispute, would be that, whereas, according to the University, a sum, roughly about Rs. 12,000/-, would have been due in respect of the present disputed room No. 10 on the separation of the tenancy as aforesaid, according to the petitioner, on a settlement made between the parties, that amount would be much less. In any event, there would be a dispute and that dispute, in view of the date of the aforesaid application under section 17 (3), namely, December, 1958, would be one, arising at a time, when sub-section (2) of the said section was in its original, or unamended form Under that subsection, as it stood, then, the court had. a duty of determining such a dispute and, if this dispute had been raised, it would have been the bounden duty of the court to decide this dispute and determine the amount, which would be payable by the petitioner under the aforesaid section 17 and fix a time for the purpose of its deposit. a duty of determining such a dispute and, if this dispute had been raised, it would have been the bounden duty of the court to decide this dispute and determine the amount, which would be payable by the petitioner under the aforesaid section 17 and fix a time for the purpose of its deposit. This, obviously, could not be done, as, due to the absence of the necessary materials, the petitioner was not in a position to raise this dispute, which, had the true and complete materials been available to it, would have certainly been a matter for the court to consider. 7. UNFORTUNATELY, this aspect was overlooked until the matter practically came up to this Court in the instant Rule, but, having regard to the importance of the matter and its far-reaching consequence on the rights of the parties, we feel that it is a fit case, where an opportunity should be given to the petitioner to raise this dispute to enable him to have an order from the court if he is otherwise entitled to it, in terms of the old Section 17 (2) of the aforesaid Act and get an opportunity of depositing the amount, as required by the said statutory provision, to avoid ejectment. We think, in the interest of justice, such an order should be made and the petitioner should have this opportunity in the circumstances of this case, though, obviously, on terms. 8. WE would, accordingly, make this Rule absolute, direct that the orders of this Court, dated June 8, 1960, discharging the petitioner's rule (Civil Rule No. 2407 of 1960) and the order of the trial court, dated May 18, 1960, striking out the petitioner's defence, be set aside and the opposite party's application under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, be reconsidered by the trial court in accordance with law, in the light of the observations, made hereinbefore, after giving due opportunities to both parties to place their respective cases on the point with the fullest materials, now available to them. This order, however, as we have said above, must be on terms, and, considering the late stage, at which the above point was taken, even though, there were circumstances which justify the entertainment of the said point even at that late stage, we would direct the petitioner to pay to the opposite party University by way of costs, until this stage of the section 17 (3) proceeding, that is, costs, which have practically been thrown away and which are assessed at the round and consolidated figure of 30 gold mohurs, namely, Rs. 510/ -. The payment of these costs would be a condition precedent to the reconsideration and further hearing, which we have directed above, of the Section 17 (3) proceeding. The above costs must be paid within six weeks from the arrival of records in the trial court and must be paid to the opposite party University or, deposited to its credit in the court below within the time in default, this Rule will stand discharged with costs, hearing fee being assessed at three gold mohurs. 9. THERE will be no other order for costs in this Rule, that, is, no such order save and except as made hereinbefore. Before concluding, it is only necessary to add that, although, the order under reconsideration here was passed by our learned brothers Banerjee and Roy, JJ., we have dealt with the present matter under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the principles, underlying 11 C. L. J. 155, 156-7, which, in our opinion sufficiently empowers us in that behalf.