MEHROTRA, C. J.: These two matters can be disposed of by one common judgment. Civil Rule No. 176/62 arise? out of an order dated the 7th March 1962 passed by the Collector of Central Excise and Land Cus­toms. The facts are that on receipt of certain information, the shop of Sri Narendra Chandra Das, Proprietor Assam Popular Watch and Cycle Co. Gar-Ali, Jorhat was searched on the 26th Septem­ber IS59. As a result of this search, 135 foreign made wrist watches of different types and sizes were found from a steel almirah and an iron safe. Thereafter a written statement was filed by the peti­tioner Sri Narendra Chandra Das on the 26th September 1959 in which he stated that he pur­chased the watches from different places in the Indian Union as he was carrying on the .business of selling watches. He promised to reproduce later on the vouchers under which the purchases were made. Thereafter notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause why action should not be taken against him under the Land Customs Act, the Sea Customs Act and S. 3(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The show cause notice was issued on the 6th October 1959 by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs. In the notice it was also specified that the petitioner should show cause as to why the goods should not be confiscated. The petitioner then filed objections. Personal hearing was given to him and in his reply dated the 27th November 1959 he denied the charges and again reiterated his case that the seized watches were procured by him in the usual and ordinary course of business against valid considerations both direct from the companies dealing In such articles and from registered representatives for trading pur­poses against valid vouchers and bills. He filed in support of his contention 27 bills and vouchers. He was a registered dealer of watches and clocks and he said that he was keeping 5 watches for re­pairs. He was given an opportunity for personal hearing and appeared along with two legal repre­sentatives. His contention was that the watches seized were purchased by him under the vouchers submitted by him along with 27 bats. He was asked to correlate these watches as recorded in the vouchers against the individual items of the search list. He was given an opportunity for personal hearing and appeared along with two legal repre­sentatives. His contention was that the watches seized were purchased by him under the vouchers submitted by him along with 27 bats. He was asked to correlate these watches as recorded in the vouchers against the individual items of the search list. According to the Collector of Customs he failed to correlate the watches specifically against the individual items of the search list as promised in the letter dated the 10th October 1960. Then an attempt was made by the Depart­ment on the basis of the documents filed by him to correlate the articles seized with the items of vouchers. On enquiry which was admittedly made behind the back of the petitioner it was found that 5 bills produced by the petitioner covering 71 seized watches did not appear to be genuine. It was found that the watches in respect of which the invoices were produced were denied to have been sold by the supplying firms and in respect of cash memos it was found that the supplying firms were not existing at the recorded address. After considering the evidence gathered by the Depart­ment behind the back of the petitioner the Col­lector came to the conclusion that out of the watches seized from his possession, 71 watches were not obtained by him in the usual and ordi­nary course of business, as claimed by him. About the rest 64 watches the finding was that the peti­tioner has succeeded in proving that they were pur­chased by him bona fide. On that finding the Collector ordered the confiscation of the watches which were found to be of illicit origin and also gave the owner an option to pay a fine o Rs. 1,0001- only in lieu of confiscation under S. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. (2) The objection was specifically taken the petitioner that the evidence of the third parties from whom inquiries were made behind the backs of the petitioner could not be used in evidence against him, unless they were produced for purposes of cross-examination. 1,0001- only in lieu of confiscation under S. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. (2) The objection was specifically taken the petitioner that the evidence of the third parties from whom inquiries were made behind the backs of the petitioner could not be used in evidence against him, unless they were produced for purposes of cross-examination. The Collector of Custom made the following observations with regard to this contention of the petitioner: "The party's request for cross-examination o the witnesses collected for evidence against him does not merit consideration in this case as no extra evidence has been derived other than those relating to the bills and vouchers produced by thi party himself in support of the genuineness of his purchase of the goods". It is difficult to accept this enunciation of law bi the Collector of Customs to be correct. The bur­den of proving the fact that the goods were brought in India without the proper permit is on the Department and that cannot be denied. In fact in respect of some of the goods where the administra­tive difficulties were felt to prove the guilt, S. 178A was enacted. But it is admitted that the watches were not covered by the items mentioned in that section. The burden therefore lies upon the Department to prove that these goods were obtained without a proper permit. This proposition can not be disputed and has not rightly been dispute by the Government Advocate before us. (3) The only question is whether in the adjudication proceedings the Collector violated an) principles of natural justice. It is clear that the evidence recorded by the Collector or the equal made by the Department behind the back of the petitioner has been relied upon by the Department in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner ha failed to prove bona fide purchase of 71 watches The petitioner thus had no opportunity to test ft material which has been relied upon against him? Merely because an inquiry was made from the per sons from whom the petitioner discloses that the petitioner purchased these watches, it does not fol­low that the statement made by those persons will be an admission of the petitioner himself or that those persons will be witnesses of the petitioner There is nothing on the record to show that the petitioner himself offered that an inquiry should be made from them and thus any statement made by them will be regarded as an admission of the petitioner himself. (4) It also cannot be doubted that the princi­ples of natural justice will depend upon the nature of the tribunal and the circumstances of each case and it will have to be seen from the circumstance) of each case whether there has been a violation -4 the principles of natural justice or not. (5) Reliance has been placed on the case o! M/s. Valimahomed Gulamhussain Sonavala asi Co. v. C. T. A. Pillai, ATR 1961 Bom 48. In fact the decision in that case does not support the con­tention of the Government Advocate and he has accepted that. But he has relied upon the observa­tions made in that case and reference to some of the unreported decisions of the Bombay High Court. At page 52 of the report the following passage from the judgment of Chagla, C. J. in an unreported decision has been quoted and it may be instructive to refer to that passage: "Now, when one talks of rules of natural jus­tice, one does not refer to procedure or to techni­calities of procedure. The rule of natural justice which has got to be observed by all judicial and quasi-judicial bodies is that a party should not be condemned unheard,, that he should know what the charge against him is, that he should be heard in his defence, that he should be given an oppor­tunity to lead evidence and he should also be given an opportunity to test the materials which are be­fore the adjudicating authority. If there is a de­parture from any of these requirements, then un­doubtedly the Court would say that a proper op­portunity was not given to the party to defend-himself or to show cause against the charge made". If there is a de­parture from any of these requirements, then un­doubtedly the Court would say that a proper op­portunity was not given to the party to defend-himself or to show cause against the charge made". Applying the test laid down above in our opinion there has been a violation of the essential require­ment that the party should be given an opportu­nity to test the materials which were before the adjudicating authority. The material before the adjudicating authority in this case was that the in­formation was secretly gathered by the Department from the sellers of these goods to the petitioner and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to test the correctness of that material, inasmuch as he was not allowed to cross-examine those witnes­ses. It appears from the various orders which have come before us from time to time that the De­partment seems to think that the obligation is dis­charged as soon as the secret inquiries are made and the Department is convinced by the secret in­quiries that the petitioner has failed to prove his bona fide purchase without giving him any op­portunity to test the materials on which the infor­mation is based. In our opinion that is not the correct approach to the case and that cannot be said to be the correct proposition of law. (6) As has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the Collector of Customs acts as a quasi-judicial body in making adjudica­tion and in imposing the penalty under S. 182 of the Sea Customs Act and one of the essential requirements of a judicial body is to act judicially. It necessarily follows that no material will be relied I upon by such a body against a person, which the | person has not been given an opportunity to test. In the present case as I have already observed, the j petitioner at no stage offered that the Department 1 should make an inquiry secretly from these persons so as to bind the petitioner by the statement iof these persons. The only thing which the peti­tioner did was to file the vouchers in support of his contention that he made purchases in the open market. The only thing which the peti­tioner did was to file the vouchers in support of his contention that he made purchases in the open market. If any inquiry was made secretly it was an essential requirement or the principle of natural justice that the witnesses examined in a secret in­quiry should have been produce9 for the purposes of cross-examination or the officer who made the inquiry should have been produced before the Collector, to that the material collected could have been tested by the petitioner. (7) It is also difficult to accept the contention that merely because the petitioner has failed to prove the particular purchase, the necessary infer­ence can be drawn that the goods were brought into India without a proper permit. The goods may have been brought into India at a time when the import restrictions were not there or it may be that the persons who sold these goods to the peti­tioner may have been responsible for committing violation of the rules or the provisions of the Im­ports and Exports (Control) Act. But it does not necessarily follow that the petitioner was guilty of the breach of the rules. As has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Amba Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 264 the position of the petitioner is like that of an ac­cused and the principles which govern a criminal trial have got to be applied to inquiries in the present case. It is true that the technicalities of the Evidence Act may not be followed, but the es­sential principles of natural justice have got to be observed and the burden is always on the depart­ment to show that the goods were brought into India without the necessary permit. (8) Reference may be' made to the case of Hiralal Sarawgi v. The Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs,' AIR 1962 Assam 39. The case oi Mahadev Ganesh v. Secretary of State, AIR 1922 Bom 30 cited by the Government Advocate does not apply to the facts of this case. The mat­ter came up before the High Court in appeal. The case oi Mahadev Ganesh v. Secretary of State, AIR 1922 Bom 30 cited by the Government Advocate does not apply to the facts of this case. The mat­ter came up before the High Court in appeal. The principle laid down in this case is that as no provi­sion has been made in the Sea Customs Act with regard to the adjudication, the Customs Office: must proceed according to the general principles, which are not necessarily legal principles, for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion. The following observations at page 31 of the report may be-quoted: "It is obvious from the record in this case that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to correct or contradict any statement prejudicial to his view which had been recorded". In our opinion therefore, the application should be allowed and a writ of certiorari should be issued quashing the order of the Collector of Customs dated the 7th March 1962. The rule is made ab­solute but in the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs. Civil Rule 182/62. (9) Civil Rule No. 182/62 arises out of the search made on the 16th March 1959 in the pre­mises of Messrs. Sky Players, Silchar. 5 bags of betelnuts were booked by them for transport to Calcutta. Out of these five bags three bags were booked under their consignment Note 11028 dated 15-3-59 the consignee being Shri Dinesh Chandra Paul of Silchar. The bags were consigned to Shri Jatindra Ch. Paul. The reasoning of the Collector is the same in this case as in the other case and admittedly the Department had relied upon some inquiries made behind the back of the petitioner. On the principles which we have already laid down, in our decision in Civil Rule No. 176/62 above, this petition should also be allowed and the order of the Collector dated the 21st October 1961 is quashed. (10) S. K. DUTTA, J. : I agree. Petition allowed.