JUDGMENT K.L. Pandey, J. This is a defendant's appeal against a modifying decree of the lower appeal Court by which the plaintiff's claim for damages for nondelivery of one of the two bales of gunny bags consigned for transport by rail was partly allowed. The facts, which are not in dispute, may be briefly stated On. 7th December 1950, Messrs. Puranmal Dalmia and Co. consigned at Shalimar two bales of gunny bags, each containing 400 pieces, to be delivered to themselves at Baradwar. The plaintiffs, who paid for the bales and obtained the railway receipt, learnt that only one bale bad arrived. They asked for open delivery which was given on 31st December 1950. The second bale was not delivered. On a claim being made by the plaintiffs, the Claims Officer offered to pay to them RS. 558.56, but they refused to accept the amount. Thereupon, after serving the usual notices u/s 77 of the Railways Act and section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they initiated this action. The Court of first instance decreed the claim amounting to Rs. 804-9-0 in full, but the lower appeal Court reduced it to RS. 767. The defendant has challenged the decree passed in appeal on several grounds. It is urged that the two statutory notices are not valid. While these notices were given by "Nathmal Prahladrai", the suit was also filed by "Shop Nathmal Prahladrai" through the proprietors, Satyanarain and Puranmal. During the pendency of the suit in the first Court, the plaintiffs were allowed to amend the plaint by deleting the name of the shop and showing themselves as the persons suing. The precise defect pointed out is that, in the two notices, the plaintiffs did not show that they intended to sue the Union of India, Having heard the counsel, I am of opinion that this contention must be accepted. The plaintiffs, who are members of a Hindu joint family, carry on business in the name of "Nathmal Prahladrai". In view of Order 30, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, they may, in certain circumstances, be sued in that name, but they have no right to sue in that name. Either the Karta or manager of a joint family may, in his own name, bring a suit on behalf of the joint family or all the members of the family, acting together, may do so. Either the Karta or manager of a joint family may, in his own name, bring a suit on behalf of the joint family or all the members of the family, acting together, may do so. Also, when a transaction is entered into in the names of two or more managers, they, acting together, are entitled to bring a suit without impleading other members of the family: Kisken Parahad v. Har Narain Singh 38 IA 45. In view of this position, the present suit could have been brought by the manager of the family in his own name or by the two plaintiffs if the contract was entered into in their names. That being so, the statutory notices had to be given either by the manager in his own name or by the two plaintiffs in their names and not in the name in which they carried on business. One of the two notices was given by "Puranmal for Nathmal Prahladrai, Merchants" and another was given on behalf of "M/S Nathmal Prahladrai". The learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon Dhian Singh Sobha Singh v. The Union of India 1968 SCR 781 : AIR 1968 SC 274, State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies AIR I960 SC 1309 and other oases for the view that such notices should be construed liberally and with common sense. In dealing with a similar contention, the Supreme Court observed in S.N. Dutt Vs. Union of India (UOI), : But where it is a question of the name of the plaintiff, there is, in our opinion, little scope for the use of common sense, for either the name of the person suing is there in the notice or it is not. No amount of common sense will put the name of the plaintiff there if it is not there. In the last mentioned case, one S. N. Dutt, who carried on his business, of which he was the sole proprietor, in the name of Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co., gave the statutory notices in the name of Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co. and then filed a suit in his personal name "as sole proprietor of the business carried on under the name and style of S. N. Dutt and Co.". S. N. Dutt and Co., gave the statutory notices in the name of Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co. and then filed a suit in his personal name "as sole proprietor of the business carried on under the name and style of S. N. Dutt and Co.". Accepting the submission that the notices were bad, the Supreme Court stated: It will he immediately obvious that the notices were in the name of Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co., while the suit was filed by S. N. Dutt claiming to be the Bole proprietor of Messrs. S. K. Dutt and Co. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the reason why the suit was filed in the name of S, N. Dutt as sole proprietor of Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co-was that no suit could have been filed in the name of MESSRS. S. N. Dutt and Co., as that was not a firm; that was merely the name and style in which an individual, namely 8. N, Dutt, was carrying on the business. The question therefore that immediately arises is whether S. N. Dutt who filed the suit was the person who gave the notices and the answer is obvious that it is not so. It may be that S. N. Dutt is the sole proprietor of Messrs. 8. N, Dutt and Co. and is carrying on business in that name and style; but that does not mean that these notices were by S3, N. Dutt. Any one reading these notice would not necessarily come to the conclusion that Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co. was merely the name end style in which an individual was carrying on business, The prima fact impression from reading the notices would be that Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co. was some kind of partnership firm and notices were being given in the name of that partnership firm. It cannot therefore be said on a comparison of the notices in this case with the plaint that there is identity of the person who issued the notices with the person who brought the suit. Besides if Meters. S. N. Putt and Co, not being a partnership firm, could not file a suit in that name and style on behalf of its members, we cannot, be how Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co. Besides if Meters. S. N. Putt and Co, not being a partnership firm, could not file a suit in that name and style on behalf of its members, we cannot, be how Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co. could give a valid and legal notice in that name and style on behalf of an individual, S. N. Dutt. As was pointed out by the Privy Council in Peatottji Ardeskir Wadia'a case 761 A 86 the case of members of a firm stood on a different footing for the members of a firm might sue in the name of the firm, but in the present case Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co., is not a firm; it is merely the name end style in which an individual (namely, 8. N. Dutt) is carrying on business and though the individual may in certain circumstances be sued in that name and style, be would have no right to sue in that name. Therefore, where an individual Carrie on business in some name and style, the notice has to be given by the individual in his own name, for the But can only be filed in the name of the individual. The present suit is analogous to the case of trustees where the suit cannot be filed in the name of the trust; it can only be filed in the name of the trustees and the notice therefore has also to be given in the name of all the trustees who have to file a suit. Therefore comparing the notices given in this suit with the plaint, and remembering that Masers. S. N. Dutt and Co. is not a partnership firm but merely a name and style in which an individual trades, the conclusion is inescapable that the person giving the notices IB not the same as the person Being. The plain tiffs' counsel sought to distinguish S.N. Dutt v. Union of India AIR 1901 SC 1449. on the ground that, in the subsequent correspondence, S. N. Dutt created the impression that he was a partner of Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co. But the ratio of the Supreme Court decision is that when individuals carry on business in some name and style other than their own, they must bring their suits in their own names and the statutory notices given by them, to be valid, must also be in their own names. S. N. Dutt and Co. But the ratio of the Supreme Court decision is that when individuals carry on business in some name and style other than their own, they must bring their suits in their own names and the statutory notices given by them, to be valid, must also be in their own names. In view of this position, the plaintiffs, who had not previously given the notices required lender the two statutes in their own names, cannot maintain this suit. In the view I have taken of the main submission, it is not necessary to take up the other points pressed in Support of the appeal. Even so, I would briery consider them. One of these is that the claim is barred by time because one of the bales was delivered on 31st December 1550 in a situation in which, admittedly, it was received earlier and this suit was filed more than a year later on the 29th February 1952. It is urged that the limitation of one year prescribed by Article 31 of the Limitation Act commenced to run from the date on which the bale delivered actually arrived at the destination. I am unable to accept this contention for the reason that the railway authorities were repeatedly asked to give delivery of the missing bale and they kept on assuring the plain-tiffs that the matter was receiving their attention. The defendant did not deny, and must be deemed to have admitted, averments made to this effect in paragraph 10 of the plaint. In such cases, time begins to run from the date when the railway authorities finally say that the goods cannot, or would not, be delivered. Another point is that the plaintiffs are disentitled to sue because there was an endorsement in blank on the railway receipt which was not expressly endorsed in their favour. Reliance is placed upon Mahadeo Ram Bhimeswar, Firm and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI), . A contrary view was taken in Governor-General in Council v. Joynarain AIR 1918 Pat. 36. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to consider the effect of a mere endorsement in blank on the railway receipt without more on the question of passing of the property in the goods consigned. The Union of India (UOI), . A contrary view was taken in Governor-General in Council v. Joynarain AIR 1918 Pat. 36. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to consider the effect of a mere endorsement in blank on the railway receipt without more on the question of passing of the property in the goods consigned. In this ease, as in the Fatna case, the price for the goods had been paid and the title to the goods had passed to the plaintiff's entitling them to sue. It was also found in this case that they had not subsequently transferred the goods. The contention that the plaintiff's failed to prove misconduct or negligence on the part of the railway administration was not pressed in the lower appeal Court and cannot be allowed to be repaginated here. The last point is that the plaintiffs did not lead any evidence to establish the market price of the goods at or about the time when the goods ought to have been delivered. This contention is not without substance because the plaintiffs merely proved the rates at which they agreed to sell like goods on two occasions. Those rates may well be different from the market rate. In each a situation, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the purchase price - RB. 556.56 per bale - could be regarded as the market price, The result is that this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decrees passed by the two lower Courts are set aside and the But is instead dismissed. The plaintiffs shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the defendant throughout. Counsel's fee according to schedule. Final Result : Allowed