ORDER :- This is an application in revision against the order of the District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1957, directing the petitioner (who was the plaintiff in C. S. No. 37 of 1956, before the Subordinate Judge and the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1957, before the District Judge) to pay ad valorem Court-fee on Rs. 10,838/-. 2. The petitioner filed the suit for declaration of his title to an ingkhol under patta No. 86/151 and the structures built thereon by right of inheritance from one R.K. Nandasana Singh as a reversioner and he prayed for the consequential relief of possession of the said property from the respondents. He also claimed that he was entitled to a sum of Rs. 838/- which was deposited in the Government in Claim Case No. 4268 of 1950-51, by the same right of inheritance. The other reliefs claimed in the plaint were that a sale-deed dated 2-1-1952 executed by the first respondent in favour of the second respondent in respect of a portion of the property was illegal and inoperative against the plaintiff and that certain Revenue Court proceedings recording the name of the 1st respondent as the owner of the property were inoperative against the plaintiff. The petitioner valued the entire relief at Rs. 2,500/-, but did not state in the plaint under what provision of the Court Fees Act the suit was valued. Still, the Court accepted the valuation and the Court-fee paid as correct and received the plaint on file. But the respondents objected to the valuation in their written statement. They also did not state on what basis the suit should be valued, but said that the approximate value of the ingkhol and the structures thereon would be Rs. 10,000/-. The Subordinate Judge framed an issue regarding the Court- fee, but he did not treat it as a preliminary issue and allowed the parties to let in evidence on all the issues and he dismissed the suit on merits. But on the question of valuation, he simply stated that the suit has not been properly valued, without deciding what the correct value should be for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction and what provision of the Court-fees Act would apply. 3. But on the question of valuation, he simply stated that the suit has not been properly valued, without deciding what the correct value should be for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction and what provision of the Court-fees Act would apply. 3. The petitioner took the matter in appeal and the District Judge remanded the suit to the lower Court stating that the lower Court should take up the issue on the question of valuation and that it should realise the deficit Court-fee if it finds that the suit was under-valued. The matter came up in revision before this Court and this Court set aside the order of remand and stated that the District Judge had all the material before him to decide the question himself and that he himself should have decided the question of Court-fee and collected the deficit Court-fee if he was of opinion that there was deficiency in the Court-fee, instead of remanding it to the lower Court. This Court also pointed out that the main relief in the case sought by the plaintiff was the declaration of title to the ingkhol and the structures thereon with the consequential relief of possession and that the lower Appellate Court had to see whether the valuation and Court-fee paid on that basis was correct. 4. When the matter came up again before the District Judge, the plaintiff was directed by the Court to give the basis of his valuation and he stated that he valued the land at Rs. 800/- and the structures at Rs. 500/- that he valued the relief to set aside the sale-deed executed by the first respondent to the second respondent at Rs. 900/- and the claim for money at Rs. 838/-. He valued the relief to declare the Revenue proceedings as void at Rs. 62/- making in all Rs. 2,500/-. The learned District Judge took into consideration only the two reliefs, namely, (i) for declaration with consequential relief and (2) the claim for Rs. 838/-. With regard to the remaining reliefs, namely, setting aside the sale deed and declaring that the Revenue Proceedings are inoperative against the plaintiff, he did not give any finding. Strictly speaking those two reliefs are quite unnecessary reliefs and need not be valued as the said two reliefs will be obtained by the plaintiff if he gets the relief of declaration with consequential relief. Strictly speaking those two reliefs are quite unnecessary reliefs and need not be valued as the said two reliefs will be obtained by the plaintiff if he gets the relief of declaration with consequential relief. Thus, in this suit we are only concerned with the two reliefs, namely, (r) for declaration with consequential relief, and (2) the claim for Rs. 838/-. With regard to the second relief, there is no difficulty and ad valorem court-fee on Rs. 838/- has been paid. In dealing with the first relief the learned District Judge treated it as coming under S. 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. He dealt with the evidence of some of the D. Ws. in the case and came to the conclusion that the disputed land together with the structures were worth more than Rs. 10,000/-, but that the first respondent cannot be allowed to go beyond her written statement and that the value must be treated as Rs. 10,000/-. In arriving at the valuation of Rs. 10,000/- he dealt with the evidence of D.W. 2 a Computer in the Executive Engineers Office, who had stated that the value of a Pucca structure would be Rs. 13/-per square feet and the value of a Katcha structure would be Rs. 6/- per square feet and that the area of the Pucca building given in the plaint schedule was 47 x 18. Thus, he was calculating the cost of erecting the structures and not trying to find out the market value of the land and structures thereon. He also failed to see that, according to the plaint, the structures had been put up by R.K. Nandasana Singh, who was alleged to have died more than 20 years before suit. Thus, no attempt was made to find out the market value of the land and structures at the time of suit. The petitioner had applied in the District Court for permission to let in evidence on the question of the value but no order was passed on the said petition by the District Judge. 5. Now in revision, the petitioner urged that as it was admitted by the District Judge that the valuation should be under Section 7(iv)(c), he was entitled to give his own valuation and the Court was bound to accept it and that the Court Fee paid by him should have been accepted as correct. 5. Now in revision, the petitioner urged that as it was admitted by the District Judge that the valuation should be under Section 7(iv)(c), he was entitled to give his own valuation and the Court was bound to accept it and that the Court Fee paid by him should have been accepted as correct. If, however, it was held that Court Fee had to be paid on the basis of market value, he pointed out that the basis on which the District Judge has valued it is not the market value, but the value for putting up new structures and he prayed that in any case he should be given an opportunity to let in evidence regarding the market value. 6. As this was a matter involving Court Fee, notice was issued to the Government Advocate and he was also heard. The learned Government Advocate pressed that the court-fee regarding the declaration with, consequential relief should be paid on the market value of the property and he also stated that this has been the practice in the Courts in Manipur ever since the Court Fee and Suits Valuation Acts were introduced in Manipur. 7. I am dealing with this case on the footing that the relief of declaration of title of the ingkhol with the structures thereon with the consequential relief of possession has to be valued under S. 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. I find that it is not the practice for parties who file plaints in the lower Courts to mention in the plaints the basis of their valuation of the reliefs for the purpose of Court Fees and jurisdiction nor the provisions of the Court Fees Act under which Court Fee is paid for each relief. This practice must be corrected immediately. The lower Courts will insist that in all plaints and memorandum of appeal, the value for the purpose of Court Fee and jurisdiction should be mentioned in the plaint and the provisions of the Court Fees Act under which each relief is valued for the purpose of Court Fee should also be mentioned. 8. In the case before us, the plaintiff was claiming the property as reversioner and by way of inheritance from one R.K. Nandasana Singh, who had died 20 years before suit. 8. In the case before us, the plaintiff was claiming the property as reversioner and by way of inheritance from one R.K. Nandasana Singh, who had died 20 years before suit. - Thus, the plaintiff has got to prove that he was the reversioner and he has to get his title declared before he can get the relief of possession. Thus, without a declaration of his title, he cannot claim possession. The relief of declaration is not, therefore, a surplusage. The relief of possession depends on the plaintiffs getting the relief of declaration and. hence it is a consequential relief. Thus, it is a clear case of a suit for a declaration with consequential relief and hence it is Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act which will apply. If it was ft a suit in which the main relief was for possession, and it could be obtained without getting the title declared, it would have to be valued under Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act. In such a case, if the plaintiff attempts to bring the suit, under Section 7(iv)(c), by including a relief for declaration of title and making the relief of possession a consequential relief, the court should not permit it and will call upon him to value it under Section 7(v). It is for the lower Courts when such suits are filed to see which provision of the Court Fees Act would really apply on the allegations made and the reliefs claimed in the plaint, before the suits are taken on file. Sometimes, the plaintiffs may in order to reduce the Court Fee or to file it in a court having limited pecuniary jurisdiction try to bring their suits under Section 7(iv)(c) when the suit should have been valued under Section 7(v) or some other provision of the Court Fees Act. The plaints should be properly checked) by the lower Courts, before they are received on file. I find that the practice of checking the plaints, to see whether they conform to Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. is not properly attended to in the lower Courts. It is the duty of the Presiding Officers when the plaints are brought before them for orders as to filing, to see whether there has been proper checking by the ministerial Officers concerned. This important duty should not be neglected. 9. It is the duty of the Presiding Officers when the plaints are brought before them for orders as to filing, to see whether there has been proper checking by the ministerial Officers concerned. This important duty should not be neglected. 9. In the case before us, it is Section 7(iv)(c) which applies. The question is about the valuation under Section 7(iv)(c). The petitioners valuation for the purpose of Court Fee and jurisdiction is mentioned as Rs. 2,500/-. Out of this Rs. 838/- is for the other relief. Thus, the valuation for the relief under Section 7(iv)(c) comes to Rs. 1,662/-. It is this amount which, according to the District Judge, should be raised to Rs. 10,000/-. In suits coming under Section 7(iv)(c), the plaintiff has to state in the plaint the amount at which he values the relief sought and the Court Fee payable is according to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the ad valorem Court Fee and it is a payable on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The Supreme Court has dealt with the valuation in the case of suits coming-under Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act in its decision Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan AIR 1958 SC 245 . In paragraph r4 of the decision, their Lordships have stated as follows : "14. The question which still remains to be considered is whether the Division Bench was justified in directing the appellant to pay court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the valuation for Rs. 15,00,000. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in contending that this order is erroneous in law. Sec. 7, Sub-Sec. 7(iv)(h) deals with suits to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property and the amount of fees payable on plaints in such suits is "according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal". Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under Section 7(iv), the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under Section 7(iv), the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several Sub-Sections of S. 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under Sub-Sec. (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the, plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court-fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision of definiteness. Take for instance the claim for partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce hit, right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property. The basis of the claim is that the property in respect of which a share is claimed is joint family property. In other words, it is property in which the plaintiff has an undivided share. What the plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Now it would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiffs alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness. That is why Legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment of court-fees. It really means that in suits falling under S. 7(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the Court in computing the court-fees payable in respect of the said relief. In the circumstances of this case, it is unnecessary to consider whether, under the provisions of this section, the plaintiff has been given an absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on his relief". Further, in paragraph 15, the decision shows that the computation of court-fees in suits falling under Section 7(iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Further, in paragraph 15, the decision shows that the computation of court-fees in suits falling under Section 7(iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Again, in paragraph 16, it is stated that if the Court comes to the conclusion that the case falls under Section 7(iv)(b) or Section 7(iv)(c), ordinarily liberty should be given to the plaintiff to amend his plaint and set out specifically the amount at which he seeks to value his claim for the payment of court-fees and that it would not be reasonable or proper in such a case to hold the plaintiff bound in such a case by the valuation made by him for the purpose of jurisdiction and to infer that the said valuation should be also taken as the valuation for the purpose of court-fees. 10. Thus, in a suit coming under S. 7(iv)(c), the plaintiff is at liberty to give his valuation and the said valuation has ordinarily to be accepted by the Courts in computing the Court fees payable in respect of the relief. The Supreme Court left open in that decision, the question whether the plaintiff under the provision of that section has been given an absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on his relief. It is pertinent, however, to state that though the plaintiff had in that case given Rs. 15 lakhs as his valuation for purposes of jurisdiction when he valued his relief under Article 17, Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, he was allowed to value the Hint at Rs. 50,000/- for purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction when he was directed to value his suit under Section 7(iv)(b). 11. The Legislature has permitted the plaintiff to state his own valuation for suits coming under Section 7(iv), because as pointed out by the Supreme Court, it is really difficult in the case of such suits to value the claim with any precision or definiteness. Thus, in a suit for mere declaration of title, the Court Fees Act provides how it should be valued and what the Court Fee will be under Schedule II Article 17. Again, if it were a suit for possession alone, the Court Fees Act provides how it should be valued under Section y(v). Thus, in a suit for mere declaration of title, the Court Fees Act provides how it should be valued and what the Court Fee will be under Schedule II Article 17. Again, if it were a suit for possession alone, the Court Fees Act provides how it should be valued under Section y(v). But in the case of a suit for declaration of title with consequential relief of possession, neither Schedule II Article 17 nor Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act would apply and so neither the fixed court-fee under schedule II Article 17 nor the ad valorem court-fee on the value of the subject-matter under Section 7(v) will apply. Nor can it be a combination of the two, because the plaintiff in such cases is sometimes forced to pray for the consequential relief, on account of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and again because the relief of declaration with the consequential relief is not the same as claiming the two reliefs independently. If that was the intention of the legislature, the plaintiff would not have been given, the liberty to state the amount at which he valued the relief sought by him. 12. It cannot therefore be said, as contended by the learned Government Advocate, that the plaintiff must in such cases be asked to value the relief on the market value of the subject-matter. If any such practice has grown in the Manipur Courts, it was not based on the provision in the Court Fees Act nor on any decision of this Court. There has been no prior decision on this question by this Court. Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that when the subject-matter of the suits coming under Section 7(iv) does not admit of being satisfactorily valued, the High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purpose of the Court-fees Act, and the Suits Valuation Act, be treated as if their subject-matter were of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in that behalf. Such direction may have been given in other States. We know that Section 7(iv) has been amended in some States fixing minimum valuation in particular classes of suits coming under that section. But no such direction has been given under Section 9, as far as the Territory of Manipur is concerned. Such direction may have been given in other States. We know that Section 7(iv) has been amended in some States fixing minimum valuation in particular classes of suits coming under that section. But no such direction has been given under Section 9, as far as the Territory of Manipur is concerned. Thus, the discretion is still with the plaintiff under Section 7(iv) to state the amount at which he values the relief sought in cases coming under that section. In this state of affairs, it is meaningless to say that the Court can insist that the plaintiff should value the relief at the market value of the subject-matter involved in the suit. 13. I am aware that such discretion given to a plaintiff is liable to be abused in favour of the payment of as little Court-fee as possible and that he will have a tendency to under value the relief. Thus in the case of a suit for declaration of title with consequential relief involving property worth thousands of rupees the plaintiff may even value the relief sought by him, say at Rs. 5/- and pay ad valorem court-fee on the said amount. It is this contingency which has made various States make special provisions to value the reliefs in such suits. Thus, the States of Bengal, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Orissa and U.P. have made certain special provisions to avoid such under-valuation. There is also divergency of rulings in various High Courts as to whether the Courts can interfere with the valuation given by the plaintiff in such suits. Some High Courts like Bombay, Lahore and Madras take the view that the Courts have no power to interfere with the plaintiffs valuation. Some other High Courts, like Allahabad, Nagpur, Patna and Calcutta take the view that the Courts can interfere. 14. As far as Manipur is concerned, we follow the Court-fees Act as it applies in Assam and in Assam we have Sections 7(A) to 7(D) which allow the Court to revise the valuation and to determine the correct valuation, if the Court is of opinion that the subject-matter of any suit has been wrongly valued and an enquiry is permitted for the said purpose. We have also got Order 7 Rule 11 Civil Procedure Code giving the power to the Court to reject a plaint where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff on being required by Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court fails to do so. Thus, it is clear that the Court can reject the valuation given by the plaintiff and prevent in-Correct valuation. But the difficulty in cases coming under Section 7(iv) is that there is no standard by which it would be possible for a Court to say that the plaintiffs valuation is incorrect. So long as rules have not been framed under Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, the difficulty is to be decided by what standard, we can say whether a plaint has been incorrectly valued. It is clear that we cannot adopt as a standard the market value of the property involved, in the absence of any rules fixing the market value in cases where the subject-matter is capable of having a market value, because the Courts will be then guilty of legislating when the. legislature has itself left it to the discretion of the plaintiff to state the value of the relief. 15. Thus, it seems to me that what the learned District Judge has done in the present case, namely, to find out the cost of erecting the structures, without paying any regard to the age of the structures and to call upon the plaintiff to pay the court-fee on the value of the structures so calculated is meaningless. Nor can the Court insist on the market value being given by the plaintiff in such cases. The correct position seems to be as pointed out in the AIR Commentaries on the Court-fees Act, Second Edition, at page 188 under note 21, to Section 7(iv)(c), which is as follows :- "Underlying the view that the Court cannot interfere under Order 7 Rule 11(b) of the Civil Procedure Code with the plaintiffs valuation under this paragraph is the idea that this paragraph deals only with suits which are not capable of valuation and Order 7 Rule 11(b) applies only to cases which can be valued definitely. This assumption is not correct. The words of Order 7 Rule 11(b) are quite general and there does not seem to be any necessity to curtail their operation. This assumption is not correct. The words of Order 7 Rule 11(b) are quite general and there does not seem to be any necessity to curtail their operation. Hence, it is submitted that even if there should be no statutory rules or other provisions fixing a legal standard of valuation for suits coming under this paragraph, the Court would be entitled to correct the plaintiffs valuation if it is obviously arbitrary and absurd." This seems to me to be the correct principle in such cases. The Court cannot insist on the market value of the property involved being given by the plaintiff. The Court can only see under Order 7 Rule 11(b) Civil Procedure Code if there has been gross under-valuation or if the valuation given was obviously arbitrary and absurd. Thus, for example where a suit should go before a higher Court having higher pecuniary jurisdiction, the plaintiff should not be allowed to be the suit in a. Court having a lower pecuniary jurisdiction and for that purpose deliberately under-value the subject-matter. That has not happened in the case before us, as the suit has been filed in the Court having higher pecuniary jurisdiction. Nor can a plaintiff be allowed to grossly under-value the subject-matter to avoid payment of reasonable Court-fee. All that the Court can see in that the valuation given by the plaintiff is fair and reasonable having regard to the value of the subject-matter, if it is capable of valuation. This is in a way indicated in Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, because the value for the purpose of jurisdiction and for computation of Court-fee shall be the same. 16. There cannot be an enquiry as has taken place in the present case to find out the cost of putting up new structures and the plaintiff cannot be directed to pay Court-fee on such value. Nor can the plaintiff be called upon to pay the Court fee on the market value. We have to remember that the structures are more than 20 years old. The details of the structures are not before us except that it is 47 x 18. The plaintiff has valued the land at Rs. 800/- and the structures have been valued at Rs. 862/- and the Court-fee has been paid thereon. We have to remember that the structures are more than 20 years old. The details of the structures are not before us except that it is 47 x 18. The plaintiff has valued the land at Rs. 800/- and the structures have been valued at Rs. 862/- and the Court-fee has been paid thereon. The suit has also been filed in the Subordinate Judges Court which is the Court having the higher pecuniary jurisdiction. Under those circumstances, it seems to me that in a case like this, we have to accept the valuation given by the plaintiff as correct, particularly, as I do not find any gross under-valuation or any arbitrary or absurd valuation. 17. For the reasons stated above, the order of the District Judge directing the plaintiff to pay Court-fee on Rs. 10,838/- is set aside and it is held that the valuation given by the plaintiff as well as the Court-fee paid are correct. The matter will now go back to the District Judge for n decision of the appeal on the merits. Parties to bear their own costs. Order accordingly.