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1962 DIGILAW 49 (RAJ)

State v. Salu

1962-02-12

RANAWAT

body1962
RANAWAT, C.J.—Although this petition was filed as an appeal from the order of the Sessions Judge, Balotra, dated the 25th of February, 1961, the learned Assistant Government Advocate prayed that as the interim order was not appealable, this petition may be treated as one for revision. 2. Mst. Sukhi filed a complaint in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Barmer, on the 21st of August 1959, against Salu and Deda, with the allegations that, on the previous day, namely, the 20th of August, 1959, both the accused went to the bank of Kareli Nadi where Mst. Sukhi had gone to fetch water, and that Deda caught hold of both her hands and Salu bit her on her face, and that when she cried, Hazari, Kesha and others reached there and they saved her. The Magistrate issued process against the accused persons after examining the complainant under sec. 200 Cr. P. C. Mst. Sukhi also filed a first information report at Police Station, Barmer, on the same day, and the police, registered a case under secs.354 and 324 I.P.C. against the accused persons. While the complaint case was still pending and no evidence had been recorded, the police presented a challan against both the accused On the 8th October, 1959. The Magistrate thereupon passed an order that as a challan had been received the Prosecuting Sub-Inspector should undertake to prosecute the case. He then framed charges against both the accused and tried them in accordance with the procedure laid down by section 251 A Cr. P. C. and finally convicted Salu under secs. 354 and 323 I.P.C. and Deda under sec. 354 read with sec. 114 I.P.C. and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. On appeal, the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra, held that the accused were prejudiced inasmuch as the trial was not held according to the provisions of secs.252 to 259 Cr. P.C. He therefore remanded the case for retrial after setting aside the convictions of the accused persons. 3. In this revision petition, it is urged on behalf of the State that the learned Sessions Judge was in error in thinking that the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the case on a police challan after he had already initiated the proceedings against the accused persons by issue of process on complaint. 3. In this revision petition, it is urged on behalf of the State that the learned Sessions Judge was in error in thinking that the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the case on a police challan after he had already initiated the proceedings against the accused persons by issue of process on complaint. It is argued that even though the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the case on a private complaint, he was not debarred from taking cognizance on a police challan subsequently and trying the case on the challan as provided by sec. 251-A Cr. P.C. allowing the complaint proceedings to remain dormant. It is further contended that the proceedings of the trial were in accordance with the law and did not suffer from any illegality. 4. Mr. Lekhraj, for the accused, has contended that once the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the case on a complaint, it was not open to him to change the procedure and try the case in accordance with the procedure provided for police challan case. He has argued that procedure for the trial under secs. 252 to 259 Cr. P. C. is more comprehensive and that the accused were prejudiced on account of the Magistrates following the procedure meant for the trial of police challan cases. He has, therefore, supported the order of the appellate court. 5. It may be noted that two distinct procedures have been provided under the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of warrant cases according as cognizance is taken on a complaint or on a police challan. In a case instituted on a complaint, the procedure provided under Sec. 252 to 259 Cr. P. C. has to be followed, while in a case of which cognizance is taken on a police challan under sec. 190(1)(b) Cr. P. C, the procedure provided under sec. 251-A Cr. P. C. has to be followed. In the instant case, cognizance was taken by the Magistrate on a complaint and, while the proceedings were still pending, a police challan was also filed and the Magistrate, from that stage onward, tried the case as laid down in sec. 251-A Cr. P. C. The language of his order dated the 8th of October, 1959, is not very clear, but virtually it amounts to allowing the complaint case to remain dormant and proceeding with the trial under sec. 251-A Cr. 251-A Cr. P. C. The language of his order dated the 8th of October, 1959, is not very clear, but virtually it amounts to allowing the complaint case to remain dormant and proceeding with the trial under sec. 251-A Cr. P. C. as a challan had been submitted by the police. 6. Mr. Gurtu has referred to a decision of this Court in Jagdish Vs. State(1), in which it was held that a Magistrate could take cognizance of a case on a police challan even though he had taken cognizance of the same offence on a the same private complaint. In that case Jagdish lodged a complaint in a court of the Magistrate First Class against 11 accused persons for offences under secs. 452 323, 504 and 147 I.P.C. and, while the case was still pending, the police submitted a challan against all the accused persons for offences under secs. 452 and 440 I.P.C, and the Magistrate thereafter tried the case as a police challan under sec. 251-A Cr. P. C. and allowed the complaint to be tagged on to the challan, He convicted the accused persons, but on appeal the Sessions Judge held that the trial was vitiated on account of the Magistrates consolidating the two cases and holding the trial in accordance with the provisions of sec. 251-A Cr. P. C. He, therefore, remanded the case. On revision, it was held by this Court that the view of the appellate court was not well founded for the reason that the two cases had not been consolidated although the accused persons had been tried according to the procedure laid down by sec. 251-A Cr. P. C. and also because there could have been no prejudice to the accused on that account. The decision in Jagdishs case(1) no doubt lays down that cognizance can be taken by a Magistrate on a police challan even after he had taken cognizance of a case on the same facts on a private complaint. In Mukania Vs. 251-A Cr. P. C. and also because there could have been no prejudice to the accused on that account. The decision in Jagdishs case(1) no doubt lays down that cognizance can be taken by a Magistrate on a police challan even after he had taken cognizance of a case on the same facts on a private complaint. In Mukania Vs. Achalia (2), it was held as follows— "Sec. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives jurisdiction to a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence under three circumstances: (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police-officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed. It is open to a Magistrate to act on any one of these three grounds but these three grounds are not, in our opinion, mutually exclusive and it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence upon two or more of such grounds e.g , both upon receiving a complaint and on a police report." Thus, according to the rule laid down in Mukanias case (2), it is competent for a Magistrate to take cognizance of a case on a police report and also on a private complaint. The decision in Bharat Kishore Lal Singh Deo Vs. Judhistir Modak (3) was approved in that case. The decision in Mukanias case (2) was given before Sec. 251-A Cr.P.C. was introduced in the Criminal Procedure Code, but this circumstance cannot affect the correctness of the rule laid down in it. We do not think there is any illegality in the Magistrate taking cognizance of the police challan after he had issued process on a private complaint. The accused has a right to be tried according to the procedure laid down by the Code, i. e., under Sec. 251-A Cr.P.C. in police challan cases and Sec. 252 to 259 Cr P.C. in complaint cases. However, where there is a complaint and also a police challan, it is competent for the Magistrate to proceed with the trial of one of the two cases according to the procedure applicable to it. In other words, if he continues to try the complaint case he may do so and follow the procedure laid down under Secs. However, where there is a complaint and also a police challan, it is competent for the Magistrate to proceed with the trial of one of the two cases according to the procedure applicable to it. In other words, if he continues to try the complaint case he may do so and follow the procedure laid down under Secs. 252 to 259 Cr.P.C. and allow the police challan to lie over and vice versa. This being the correct position in law, it cannot be said that the Magistrate in this case was in error in trying the accused according to the procedure laid down in Sec. 251-A Cr.P.C. and in taking no action on the private complaint, which ultimately became infruc-tuous on account of the decision in the challan case. The learned Sessions Judge has referred to the decision of this Court in Ghisia and other Vs. the State (4). It may be noted that for that case the only procedure applicable was the one prescribed in the Code for the trial of a complaint case, but the Magistrate, instead of following that procedure, tried the accused in accordance with the procedure provided by Sec. 251-A Cr.P.C. It was under these circumstances that this Court held that there was an illegality in the trial of the case to the prejudice of the accused which vitiated it. That was not a case where both the procedures could be followed in the alternative. The decision in Ghisias case (4) is, therefore, of no assistance for the purposes of this case. 7. The contention that the accused was prejudiced on account of the Magistrate having followed the procedure provided for police challan cases, is without any substance. A police challan having come before the Magistrate, it was competent for him to take cognizance of the same offence upon that challan and to proceed to try the accused as provided by sec. 251-A Cr. P. C. The order of the learned Sessions Judge is clearly erroneous and cannot be maintained. 8. The revision petition is allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge remanding the case for retrial is set aside and he is directed to restore the appeal to its original number and to decide it on merits according to law.