ORDER P.K. Tare, J. This revision u/s 115 of the CPC is by one of the defendants against the order, dated 22-6-1961, passed by Shri M. K. Kaul, District Judge, Jabalpur, in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 60 of 1960, affirming the order, dated 6-9-1960, passed by Shri B. B. L. Agarwal, First Civil Judge, First Class, Jabalpur, in Civil Suit No. 6-A of 1945. Mithailal (since deceased and predecessor of the first non-applicant, Raja-ram) and Mst. Ranibahu (who also died after the preliminary decree) filed a suit for partition and separate possession of their shares in the joint family property. A Commissioner was appointed to effect a partition by metes and bounds. As regards the house property the Commissioner reported that it was not possible to effect a partition of the house. Therefore, the Commissioner made two alternative proposals. The first suggestion was that Chokhelal and Sunderlal who were then occupying the house, might be allowed to retain its possession provided they were prepared to offer its value as estimated by an engineer to the other coparceners. However, this proposal was not acceptable to Chokhelal or Sunderlal. The alternative suggestion was that the entire property be sold by public auction and the proceeds be divided amongst all the sharers. This proposal was acceptable to all the parties concerned. Therefore, the Court, by order, dated 2-7-1962 directed the house property to be sold through the Court. In the meantime in execution of a decree against the petitioner Motilal, house No. 170 had been sold for Rs. 6,000 for recovery of Rs. 117-12-0 only. After the amount was paid to the decree-holder of that decree, Motilal withdrew the balance of the amount in spite of an order of the Court to the contrary. He was directed to deposit the amount in Court for distribution among different sharers. But, he failed to carry out that order on the assertion that he was entitled to an amount from the other sharers after accounting and the same amount be adjusted towards that. Ultimately, the house was sold on 21-6-1960 and was purchased by the fifth non-applicant, Kalloolal for a consideration of Rs. 21,500. In this connection, the petitioner had moved the trial Judge for permission to bid at the auction and the permission had been granted on the condition that the petitioner's reserve bid should be at Rs. 30,000 minimum. Ultimately, the house was sold on 21-6-1960 and was purchased by the fifth non-applicant, Kalloolal for a consideration of Rs. 21,500. In this connection, the petitioner had moved the trial Judge for permission to bid at the auction and the permission had been granted on the condition that the petitioner's reserve bid should be at Rs. 30,000 minimum. The petitioner, therefore, did not bid at the auction, as he was not prepared to offer the minimum bid at Rs. 30,000. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application purporting to be one under Order 21, rule 90, CPC for setting aside the auction sale. During those proceedings the Court with the consent of the other parties again made an offer to the petitioner to purchase the house for the auction price of Rs. 21,500, which he was required to deposit in cash. The petitioner, however, insisted on no payment being made by him and claimed that the entire amount of Rs. 21,500 be adjusted towards the amount that may be found due to him after accounts were taken by the Commissioner. The learned Judge of the trial Court refused to accede to this request and, therefore, confirmed the sale in favour of the fifth non-applicant. The learned appellate Judge affirmed that order by holding that the same was not appealable either u/s 96 or Order 43, rule 1 (j) of the Civil Procedure Code. Relying on the case of Jadunaih v. Permeskwar LR 67 IA 11, the learned Judge expressed the opinion that the proceedings between the preliminary and the final decree were proceedings in the suit. For this reason, the order was not appealable u/s 47 of the CPC as well. However, further relying on the case of Pedapudi Vissanna v. Pedapudi Visurtbrakmam AIR 1957 AF 25, the learned Judge held that the same could be treated as a second preliminary decree and appealable as such. However, the sale could not be set aside in the absence of any substantial injury, as laid down in Ckellama v. Rama AIR 1946 Mad. 337 : ILR 1946 Mad. 795. It was also expressed, relying on Darbhamulla Subbamma Vs. Valivetti Veerayya and Others, , that the Court could, under inherent powers, refuse to divide the property by metes and bounds and adopt such other means which may appear to be equitable for effecting a just partition. 337 : ILR 1946 Mad. 795. It was also expressed, relying on Darbhamulla Subbamma Vs. Valivetti Veerayya and Others, , that the Court could, under inherent powers, refuse to divide the property by metes and bounds and adopt such other means which may appear to be equitable for effecting a just partition. The question that arises for consideration is whether the order impugned is appealable or revisable. Such a sale is held either u/s 2 or 3 of the Partition Act read with Order 20, rule 18, Civil Procedure Code. Order 21, rule 89 or 90 of the CPC cannot in terms apply to such a sale held by the Court or the receiver or the Commissioner. The said provisions apply to an auction sale held in execution of a decree. The proceedings between the preliminary decree and the final decree cannot be said to be proceedings in the execution, as laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jadunath v. Permeshwar LR 67 IA 11. They are, undoubtedly, proceedings in the suit. Can it be said that an appeal lies u/s 96 of the CPC ? The learned District Judge, relying on the case of Pedapudi Vissanna v. Pedapudi Viswabrahmam AIR 1957 AP 25 , held that there can be a second preliminary decree. There is a controversy on the point whether there can be more than one preliminary decree in a suit. The cases answering this question in the positive are (Raja) Peary Mohan Mookerjee Vs. Manohar Mookerjee, , Sarat Chandra Rakshit v. Subashini Debi ILR 56 Cal. 550 and Pedapudi Vissanna v. Pedapudi Viswabrahmam AIR 1957 AP 25 while those answering in the negative are Ghulusum Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowtha and eleven Others ILR 42 Mad. 296, Jagmohan Das and Another v. Indar Prasad and Another AIR 1921 Oudh 224, Vamanacharya Ramacharya Vs. Govind Madhavacharya, , Rudra Pratap Singh and Others v. Sarda Mahesh Prasad Singh ILR 47 All. 543 and Kedar Nath v. Panalal and Others ILR 20 Luck. 557. Subhedar A.J.C. in Punjaji v. Jairam 26 NLR 24 preferred the Calcutta view to the Bombay view on the point whether an appeal could lie in the absence of a formal decree. The learned Judge opined that an order finally determining the rights of the parties fully would operate as a decree, though no formal decree may be drawn. 557. Subhedar A.J.C. in Punjaji v. Jairam 26 NLR 24 preferred the Calcutta view to the Bombay view on the point whether an appeal could lie in the absence of a formal decree. The learned Judge opined that an order finally determining the rights of the parties fully would operate as a decree, though no formal decree may be drawn. It is pertinent to note that the question whether there could be more than one preliminary or final decree was not for consideration before Subhedar A. J. C. In the case of Pandurang v. Gayabai 17 NLR 66 decided by Mittra A. J. C. (which was relied on by Subhedar A, J. C.) this learned Judge unequivocally expressed the opinion that the law docs not contemplate more than one preliminary or final decree. Although in the Full Bench case of AIR 1943 204 (Nagpur) : AIR 1943 Nag. 204 : ILR 1943 Nag. 241, these two cases decided by Subhedar A. J. C. and Mittra A. J. C. have been referred to, there is no disapproval of the view of Mittra A. J. C. Therefore, relying on the case of Pandurang v. Gayabai 17 NLR 66, as also the view as expressed by the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts and the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court, I am not inclined to follow the view propounded by the Calcutta and the Andhra High Courts. Consequently, I hold that there cannot be more than one preliminary or final decree in a suit. Such an order, undoubtedly, falls within the ambit of Order 20, rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code, which contemplates that the Court may give such further directions as may be necessitated by the circumstances of each case. This would include the power to auction the family property, when resort to the provisions of the partition Act can be had. Therefore, if the order be under Order 20, rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code, it will not be appealable either as a decree or as an order passed in execution proceedings, or as a second preliminary decree. By virtue of section 7 of the Partition Act. Therefore, if the order be under Order 20, rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code, it will not be appealable either as a decree or as an order passed in execution proceedings, or as a second preliminary decree. By virtue of section 7 of the Partition Act. it becomes appealable under Order 43, rule 1 (j) of the Code of Civil Procedure, In other cases not covered by the provisions of the Partition Act, it can, however, in my opinion, be revisable by the High Court u/s 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. I had an occasion to consider this point in Pannalal v. Sauurmal C.R. No. 288 of 1959, D /- 12-10-1960 (1961 M P L J 66.), when I expressed the opinion that Order 21, rule 90 of the CPC was inapplicable to private sales held by a receiver or a commissioner. In that ease I had dealt with the question of tenability of an appeal exhaustively with reference to the case-law. Upon further consideration, I am of opinion that the provisions of Order 21, rule 89 or 90 of the CPC cannot apply to such private sales, which are held at the direction of the Court and which are not in execution of a decree and which do not fall within the purview of the provisions of the Partition Act. Therefore, although such sales may be subject to the control or the general supervision of the Court holding them, they cannot be termed as execution sales. The Court will have to follow the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in the matter of upholding and setting aside such sales. Even apart from the provisions of Order 21, rule 89 or 90, the Court will always have the inherent power to refuse to hold such sales even apart from the provisions of the Partition Act, as laid down in Darbhamulla Subbamma Vs. Valivetti Veerayya and Others, . Even in respect of execution sales, the Court has always the inherent power to set aside the same if it finds the sale to be a nullity or if a fraud has been played by some party, as laid down by late Padhye J. in AIR 1948 52 (Nagpur) : AIR 1948 Nag. 52 : ILR 1947 Nag. 344. However, the question about the tenability of an appeal or a revision need not detain us. 52 : ILR 1947 Nag. 344. However, the question about the tenability of an appeal or a revision need not detain us. I feel that it is necessary to consider the merits of the petitioner's contention, as an item of the joint family property has been sold to a stranger and it is his grievance that he has been denied an opportunity to purchase that. Section 2 of the Partition Act (No. 4 of 1893) empowers the Court to order sale instead of division. That power is exercisable by the Court under Order 20, rule 18, Civil Procedure Code. Section 3 lays down the procedure when a sharer undertakes to buy the property. Section 4 relates to the transfer of a share in a dwelling house to a stranger. Section 6 provides for fixing of reserve bids to be offered by the share-holders. Section 7 provides that the procedure at such sales shall as far as practicable be such as may from time to time be prescribed by the High Court by any rules and until such rules are made the procedure prescribed in the CPC in respect of execution sales shall be applicable. Therefore, according to section 7 of the said Act, the procedure laid down in Order 21 is made applicable to such sales. For this reason, I am of opinion that the appeal before the learned District Judge was tenable under Order 43, rule 1 (j) of the Civil Procedure Code, as this High Court has not framed any specific rules in this behalf. For this reason, I am unable to accept the view of the learned District Judge that the appeal was not tenable under Order 43, rule 1 (j) of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently the present revision u/s 115 of the CPC is also tenable. Further, it has to be seen if the provisions of the Partition Act were violated by the trial Judge. In this connection it is to be noted that the petitioner was given a choice to offer bid and the reserve bid was fixed at Rs. 30?000. That may be higher than the actual price fetched at the auction-But, even after the auction was held, the petitioner was given another opportunity to purchase it for Rs. 21,500. He was required to deposit the amount in cash. It is this direction which is assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 30?000. That may be higher than the actual price fetched at the auction-But, even after the auction was held, the petitioner was given another opportunity to purchase it for Rs. 21,500. He was required to deposit the amount in cash. It is this direction which is assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is urged that the petitioner was entitled to adjustment of the amount that might be found due to him. In this connection, I may only observe that the petitioner as a sharer would, no doubt, be entitled to adjust any amount that may be found due to him. But, the petitioner's conduct has to be judged in the light of an earlier incident. Another house belonging to the joint family was sold in execution of a decree for Rs. 117-12-0 against the petitioner alone. The sale-price fetched was Rs. 6,000. After payment of the said amount of Rs. 117-12-0 with costs to the decree-holder, the petitioner withdrew the balance of the amount in spite of an order of the Court to the contrary. He was directed by the trial Court to deposit the amount withdrawn and to make it available to the other sharers. He did not comply with that order. Consequently, the trial Judge, in my opinion, was right in refusing to allow him any adjustment when he himself was guilty of a wrongful act in having withdrawn the amount, which should have been made available to the other sharers. If he is not prepared to allow adjustment to the other sharers, he himself cannot claim any adjustment in equity. After all, adjustment is an equitable right, which is indisputably reciprocal. It cannot be unilateral as is claimed by the petitioner. Therefore, in my opinion, the trial Judge was right in taking a serious view of the petitioner's conduct and in not permitting him to have an adjustment and in insisting upon the whole of the sale-price of Rs. 21,500 being deposited in cash. As a result, the order under revision cannot be assailed on any ground whatsoever. Consequently this revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 50, if certified. Final Result : Dismissed