Judgment :- 1. This appeal is against the conviction of the appellant under S.380, I.P.C., read with S.75 I.P.C. and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years passed on him by the Sessions Judge, Trichur. He was charged with having committed theft of a Lady Smith lady's wrist watch with a gold bracelet from the possession of Pw. 2 a teacher, on the night of July 19, 1960. Pw. 2 kept the watch with the bracelet on the top of an almirah when she retired for the night on that day. The next morning she found them missing and after a futile search in the house, her nephew Pw.1 who was living with her, lodged the information at the Trichur Town Police Station where a case was registered. On September 9, 1960, the Trichur police received information from Ernakulam North Police Station that a man was arrested in Ernakulam and a Lady Smith lady's wrist watch and a gold bracelet were seized from him. They were identified and after investigation the case was charged and tried. 2. In this appeal in which the accused was defended by the counsel briefed by the State, the first point raised on his behalf was that his arrest was illegal. It would appear that Pw. 5, a police constable of the Ernakulam Station who was on patrol on the night of August 15,1960, found the accused as stated in his evidence, attempting to conceal himself, when on being questioned he gave contradictory and evasive answers as to his identity and to his presence there at the time. It is the case of Pw. 5 that upon this the accused was taken into custody and certain articles seized from his person including a Lady Smith lady's wrist watch M.O.1 and a gold bracelet M.O.2. S.54 (1), Crl. P.C. authorises a police officer to arrest without warrant any person against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been concerned in any cognizable offence. The facts detailed by Pw. 5 and corroborated by his report Ext. P5, show that Pw. 5 was acting well within his power in making the arrest. It was then argued that the seizure of the articles having been made before the arrest was not warranted by the terms of S.51, Crl. P.C. and Ramain Rai v. Emperor (AIR. 1942 Allahabad 424) was pressed into service. P5, show that Pw. 5 was acting well within his power in making the arrest. It was then argued that the seizure of the articles having been made before the arrest was not warranted by the terms of S.51, Crl. P.C. and Ramain Rai v. Emperor (AIR. 1942 Allahabad 424) was pressed into service. That was a case in which there was no arrest at all at any time, but only a search for the sake of searching, in order to get at some incriminating documents which the person searched was suspected to be carrying with him and is not applicable to this case. The only basis for the argument here is the sequence in which the seizure was mentioned in Ext. P. 5, but not in the deposition of Pw. 5. I am satisfied in the present case, that even on a literal reading of Ext. P5, the arrest, and the seizure were legal. 3. On the merits, the point pressed was that the articles were not identified properly. Pws.1 and 2 who must be deemed to be quite familiar with their belongings were quite sure that M. Os.1 and 2 belonged to the latter, but it was urged that there was no mark on them to identify. It was observed as follows in Public Prosecutor v. I.C. Lingiah (AIR. 1954 Madras 433 at 436): "But in advancing this criticism it is forgotten that small and even nice points of difference distinguishing one thing from others of the same kind may merely by the frequent sight of them and without any special attention to them make an impression on the mind ... a workman has it of his tools and most people have it of their dress, jewellery and other things they are frequently seeing, handling or using. It occurs every day that by remembrance of their general appearance a carpenter, mason or other workman recognises his tools; and dress, jewellery or other property is known by its owner." The Sessions Judge was right in thinking that they were in a position to identify them. There could be no difficulty in identifying the bracelet at any rate. Pw. 4, the gold-smith also identified M.O.2 as that which he made for Pw. 2. The fact that both were seized together is also a point of some significance in establishing the identity of both. There could be no difficulty in identifying the bracelet at any rate. Pw. 4, the gold-smith also identified M.O.2 as that which he made for Pw. 2. The fact that both were seized together is also a point of some significance in establishing the identity of both. The discrepancies as to the content or carat of the gold in Ext. P. 3 report made by Pw. 5 and in the evidence of Pw. 4 are of no moment because as testified by Pw. 5 his reading of the same was only an approximation. Other discrepancies if they are really so, as to the shape of the watch or the name to which my attention was invited are inconsequential. I entertain no doubt that the identity of M.Os.1 and 2 has been satisfactorily established. 4. Lastly, it was urged that the presumption under S.114 of the Evidence Act, from recent possession of stolen property cannot be applied for sustaining the conviction under S.380 I.P.C., because M.O.1 and M.O.2 were seized only after an interval of about thirty days. I quote here the following observations from Best on Evidence, S.211: "It is clearly established that, in order to put the accused on his defence, his possession of the stolen property must be recent; although what shall be deemed recent possession must be determined by the nature of the articles stolen, i. e., whether they are of a nature likely to pass rapidly from hand to hand, or of which the accused would be likely, from his situation in life, or vocation to become possessed innocently. A poor man, for instance, might fairly be called to account for the possession of articles of plate, jewels, or rare and curious books, after a much longer time than if the property found on him had consisted of clothes, articles of food suitable to his condition, tools proper for his trade etc." 5. Judging from the circumstances and from the situation in life of the accused, I do not feel justified in concluding, that an interval of thirty days is sufficient to rule out the operation of the above presumption, let alone the alternative presumption which may be drawn in similar circumstances as to receipt of stolen property with a dishonest intent. Judging from the circumstances and from the situation in life of the accused, I do not feel justified in concluding, that an interval of thirty days is sufficient to rule out the operation of the above presumption, let alone the alternative presumption which may be drawn in similar circumstances as to receipt of stolen property with a dishonest intent. The accused set up a case that he purchased the watch from one Rayappa Chettiar in Madras, but made no attempt to call him as witness and did not intimate the court that he wanted to give any evidence. I am satisfied, that the conviction under S. 380 in these circumstances was properly made. Having regard to his previous convictions the sentence imposed does not call for any interference. This appeal is dismissed. Dismissed.