JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This is a second appeal by the plaintiff from the concurrent judgments of the lower Courts dismissing his suit for ejectment of the defendant-respondent from a house tenanted by him on the ground that the plaintiff's claim of bona fide requirement for the residence of himself and his family was unacceptable, he having other accommodation in the same town that was equally suitable. There is no controversy at this stage in regard to the rent payable by the tenant-respondent. This being a second appeal, we can only see if the facts found by the lower Courts are capable of a fairer and more plausible interpretation in favour of the plaintiff. His own argument is that the landlord is entitled to choose, in a fair and reasonable manner any of the several units of accommodation owned by him; the Courts cannot compel him to live in the unit he does not want, as long as choice is not mala fide or grossly unreasonable. The facts of the case are that the subject-matter of the suit the house numbered 104 in the Juni Kasera Bakhal has been in the occupancy of the defendant a schoolmaster on a low rent of 5 per month, which was fixed years ago and which cannot be raised and has not in fact, been so increased. The plaintiff-appellant is a businessman having his main business premises in what is called the M. T. Cloth Market at Indore, very near the Kasera Bakhal as stated in the evidence, between 2 and 3 furlongs. The business premises themselves consist of a shop or godown down-stairs with one or two rooms upstairs. In the same locality, at about the same distance from the M. T. Cloth Market, the plaintiff had a rented house numbered 47 in the Bajajkhana Chowk; before the suit was filed, the landlord of that house had taken possession of half the accommodation for use by him as the office of a company but it appears that the plaintiff was still in possession of some of the rooms in this house. His own case was that his landlord had noticed him to vacate these rooms as well but the Courts have found that the notice had not been issued at that time, though the landlord's secretary or manager had been examined to say so. His own case was that his landlord had noticed him to vacate these rooms as well but the Courts have found that the notice had not been issued at that time, though the landlord's secretary or manager had been examined to say so. However, there is no finding about the suitability for the plaintiff's residence of this part of House No. 47 in Bajajkhana Chowk still in the possession of the plaintiff at the time of the suit side by side with that landlord's company offices. About three miles away from this locality the plaintiff was then building a house in the locality called New Palasia; he completed it during the pendency of the suit. For want of other accommodation, and pending the final decision in this litigation, the plaintiff moved into the New Palasia house. However, his argument is that though it has sufficient living space for himself and his family, the New Palasia house is altogether unsuitable for him, on account of distance from his business premises in the M. T. Cloth Market and the schools for the children and his business associations and social relations which are all in the locality of the M. T. Cloth Market and the Kasera Bakhal. The trial Court did not give any finding about the suitability of this or the part of the House No. 47 in Bajajkhana Chowk still in the plaintiff's possession, or the spare rooms in the M. T. Cloth Market shop. But it generally felt that the plaintiff was not in need of the house No. 104 Juni Kasera Bakhal; so. it rejected the prayer for ejectment. In his appeal, the appellate Court found that the New Palasia house into which he had already moved, was quite suitable and there was no more necessity of another house. From this he has come up in second appeal emphasizing both the subjective element in the choice of suitable accommodation, and apart from it, the unsuitability of the other units of accommodation, in particular, the house in New Palasia. Section 4 (g) of the Accommodation Control Act reads- In the case of residential accommodation, that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for his own residence or that of any person of his family bona fide residing or to reside with him and there is no other accommodation...for such residence. Section 4 (g) of the Accommodation Control Act reads- In the case of residential accommodation, that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for his own residence or that of any person of his family bona fide residing or to reside with him and there is no other accommodation...for such residence. On the face of it, this implies three distinct elements: (i) that the landlord can choose and cannot be compelled to stay in the accommodation to which the tenant points; (ii) the accommodation to which the Court indicates as being already available to the landlord should be totally suitable, in other words, should be such as can reasonably accommodate the landlord and his family and dependents and enable him to pursue in a convenient manner his business and social activities; (iii) the words "genuine" and "bona fide" imply the element of reasonableness; in other words, that is in setting out his needs of living space, accessibility and the like, the landlord should not do anything which a reasonable man in his position is not expected to do. There is, therefore, no doubt that there is what I would call, a "subjective choice" which the Courts should respect, as long as it is exercised in a reasonable manner. This is the view held in some of the reported rulings by this Court, for example, in the short-noted Case No. 36 M. P. L. J. 1960 (p. 10): It is for the tenant to satisfy the Court by positive evidence that the house under construction when completed or the accommodation already in the occupation of the landlord, was reasonably equivalent as regards suitability in all respects to the accommodation in his occupation. In the instant case, the plaintiff-appellant had three or four units of accommodation to choose from. The room on the upstairs of the business premises in the M. T. Cloth Market is according to the plaintiff, quite unsuitable for his purpose, namely, of residence of himself, his wife and three children and also three married daughters who are staying with him. He has also stated that what is left for the moment of house No. 47 of the Bajajkhana Chowk is not suitable. While the lower Courts are not satisfied that his landlord, that is, Nandlal Bhandari and Co., have actually noticed him, they did not find that this accommodation, such as it is, is suitable for the plaintiff's purposes. He has also stated that what is left for the moment of house No. 47 of the Bajajkhana Chowk is not suitable. While the lower Courts are not satisfied that his landlord, that is, Nandlal Bhandari and Co., have actually noticed him, they did not find that this accommodation, such as it is, is suitable for the plaintiff's purposes. The plaintiff's unwillingness to stay in part of a house which is used as the office of a company is quite understandable. In view of our social conditions and the ways of life, it is not unreasonable for the plaintiff to feel that such accommodation is unsuitable for a family whereas it is quite conceivable that single unmarried individual may have no objection to stay in these rooms. This leaves the accommodation in dispute, and the New Palasia house. As far as the title living space is concerned it is obvious that the house in New Palasia is the more suitable. This is probably why the appellate Court has held that the accommodation the plaintiff had occupied during the pendency of the litigation is suitable and the defendant should not be disturbed. On the other hand, the plaintiff has averred here, that the appellate Court has failed to take into account either side the subjective element giving him the choice as long as it is exercised reasonably, of the distance of New Palasia from the M. T. Cloth Market locality, where he has his business, and social connections. His assertion that his friends and local connections are in the locality of the M. T. Cloth Market, has to be believed considering that he is an old resident of Indore and the New Palasia is a locality that has been recently built on; the lower Courts have not disbelieved it as a fact. By suitability is meant not only the sufficiency of living space, but also other conditions such as accessibility to the place of business and the like. Thus, on the findings of fact, it was not correct for the appellate Court to compel the plaintiff to stay in the New Palasia house, and not to ask for the accommodation in dispute. It is obvious that this would result in some serious inconvenience to the defendant. Thus, on the findings of fact, it was not correct for the appellate Court to compel the plaintiff to stay in the New Palasia house, and not to ask for the accommodation in dispute. It is obvious that this would result in some serious inconvenience to the defendant. He has been enjoying the accommodation with which he is satisfied for the very low rent of 5 per month; he cannot, for obvious reasons, take on rent the plaintiff's New Palasia accommodation, as rents are very high in that locality. If the defendant looks for other accommodation, it is certain that he will have to pay much more than 5 per month. But that is no reason why the plaintiff should be seriously inconvenienced. The plaintiff is the owner of the property and he is entitled to choose whether he should reside in what he finds to be the most suitable accommodation near his place of business, or should stay at a distance in a bigger or more fashionable house and put up with the inconvenience of having his business at some distance, buy a motor car for it, or pay the carriage fare day after day. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed. In view of the special circumstances of the case, the costs throughout should be borne by the respective parties. Final Result : Allowed