JUDGMENT : R.K. Das, J. - This appeal is directed against an order dated 10-8-1961 passed by Sri C.R. Dutta, Taluk Magistrate, Gunupur, in G.R. Case No. 354 of 1960, discharging the Respondents u/s 251-A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for offences under Sections 332, 147 and 149, of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be stated as follows: One Saroj Kumar Mohapatra, Assistant Operator, Electrical Department, Gunupur, detected unauthorised use of electric energy by the Respondents at Gunupur. When he questioned them and wanted to prevent them from doing so by removing the fuse, the Respondents in a body obstructed him in his duty and assaulted him and his khalasi causing injuries on their person. He lodged information before the police and after due investigation charge-sheet was submitted on 5-10-1960 against the accused-Respondents under Sections 332, 147 and 149, Indian Penal Code. The case was adjourned to several dates for consideration whether a charge has to be framed on the police report submitted u/s 173, Code of Criminal Procedure. At this stage, an objection was raised by the accused-Respondents that in the absence of a complaint by the concerned public servant u/s 195(1)(a), Code of Criminal Procedure the Court was not competent to take cognizance of the offence, and that mere filing of the charge-sheet was not enough. This objection of the Respondents was based upon the ground that the offence as disclosed in the first information report was essentially an offence u/s 186, Indian Penal Code. Section 186 runs as follows: Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both. For an offence under this section, a special complaint is necessary and is to be filed by the concerned public servant as required u/s 195(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure, Code, which runs thus: No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. It was contended before the Magistrate that the offence as disclosed in the information given by Saroj Kumar Mohapatra, being essentially one u/s 186 of the Indian Penal Code, a special complaint was necessary as contemplated u/s 15(1)(a) and in the absence of such a complaint, the Court cannot take cognizance even in respect of other offences though committed in course of one transaction. The learned Magistrate after an elaborate discussion of the subject came to the conclusion that such a complaint was necessary and since that had not been made, he discharged the Respondents u/s 251-A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The short question that arises for consideration is whether in view of the circumstances of this case, a complaint u/s 195(1)(a) was necessary and whether in the absence of such a complaint the order of discharge was valid. 3. In the first information it was alleged that the accused-Respondents were making unauthorised use of electricity. The informant on reaching the spot asked the accused-Respondents as to why they were committing theft of electric energy by tampering with the motor and caned upon them to disconnect the line and on their failure to do so, he asked one of his sub-ordinates to get upon the pillar and when the man had gone half way on the pillar he was dragged and made to fall on the ground by the accused-Respondents, and thereafter the informant's party were assaulted with fists and blows and left the place out of fear for their sub-station. Sometime after the accused persons along with several others assembled at the sub-station and out of fear the informant closed the office-door, but the accused persons through the window meddled with the telephone shouting to assault the people of the Electrical Department. This in sub-stance is the allegation in the information report lodged by the informant. Therefore the question for consideration is whether the allegations as disclosed in the information report constitute essentially an offence u/s 186, Indian Penal Code, so that cognizance cannot be taken except by the process laid down u/s 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This in sub-stance is the allegation in the information report lodged by the informant. Therefore the question for consideration is whether the allegations as disclosed in the information report constitute essentially an offence u/s 186, Indian Penal Code, so that cognizance cannot be taken except by the process laid down u/s 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The allegations no doubt disclose a number of offences, such as forming an unlawful assembly u/s 147, theft of electricity u/s 379, and causing hurt to the public servant in the discharge of his duty u/s 332, Indian Penal Code, as also obstructing the public servant in discharge of his public functions, u/s 186, Indian Penal Code. 4. The accused were charge-sheeted under Sections 332, 149 and 147, Indian Penal Code. The material question that fans to be considered is whether where in a single transaction distinct offences were committed for some of which a complaint is necessary u/s 195(1)(a), the Court is precluded from taking cognizance of offences for which no such special complaint is necessary. This question appears to have been funny answered in a number of decisions including one of the Supreme Court in the case of reported in Basir-ul-huq and Others Vs. The State of West Bengal, where their Lordships have held that Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on which the question raised is grounded provides inter alia that no Court shall take ognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, except on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The Statute thus requires at without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, no offence mentioned in that section can be taken cognizance of. According to their Lordships that section does not further provide that if in the course of commission of that offence, other distinct offences were committed, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant, and on the other they may also constitute some other distinct offences. The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant, and on the other they may also constitute some other distinct offences. The section does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence even if no action is taken by the public servant. Their Lordships quoted with approval the decision reported in AIR 1939 43 (Federal Court) where dealing with a similar question, their Lordships held that two distinct offences having been committed in the same transaction, one an offence of misappropriation u/s 409, for which no sanction is necessary and the other u/s 477-A, Indian Penal Code, which requires the sanction of the Governor, the circumstance that cognizance could not be taken of the latter offence without such consent was not considered a bar to the trial of the Appellant with respect to the offence u/s 409. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further held: Though in our judgment, Section 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which complaint of the Court of the public servant is required. Applying the above test to the facts of the present case it has to be seen whether the allagations against the accused persons constitute distinct offences for which no special complaint was necessary or is it a case where the special complaint was evaded by a device or camouflage. I have already shown that the allegations against the accused persons relate to various sections of the Indian Penal Code, each one of which is a distinct offence triable without cognizance being taken in the manner laid down in Section 195(1)(a) of the Code. 5. I have already shown that the allegations against the accused persons relate to various sections of the Indian Penal Code, each one of which is a distinct offence triable without cognizance being taken in the manner laid down in Section 195(1)(a) of the Code. 5. It was contended on behalf of the Respondents that the offences as disclosed in the first information concerning the public servant is essentially one of obstruction in the discharge of his duty as a public servant and as such is punishable u/s 186 of the Indian Penal Code. I regret I cannot accede to this view. Section 332 in Chapter XVI relates to an offence affecting human body, whereas Section 186 in Chapter X relates to contempt of the lawful authority of public servant. The punishment provided u/s 186 is only three months' R.I., and is a summons case and is not cognizable, whereas the offence u/s 332, Indian Penal Code, is a warrant case and in cognizable and is punishable with imprisonment upto three years. When hurt is caused to a public servant, as contemplated u/s 332, Indian Penal Code, he has a right just like any other ordinary citizen to seek redress by the procedure available to such a person unconnected with the fact that he is a public servant. In other words, in every case of hurt a personal remedy is available, and a public servant cannot deprived of that right, merely because he received the hurt while discharging his duties as a public servant. An obstruction to a public servant in the discharge of his public duties is something entirely different from a personal hurt caused to such a person. Thus, both the offences though have some common elements, are quite distinct and distinguishable in their nature and application. The legislature has purposely omitted to put Section 332 u/s 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That apart, in the present case there are allegations of theft, unlawful assembly etc. In this view of the matter, it cannot bee said that the allegations against the accused persons essentially disclosed an offence u/s 186, Indian penal Code, so as to require cognizance u/s 195(1)(a) of the Code of the Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate was therefore clearly wrong in discharging the accused persons, and his order cannot be substained, and is set aside. The learned Magistrate was therefore clearly wrong in discharging the accused persons, and his order cannot be substained, and is set aside. The learned Magistrate or any other Magistrate at the Station may now proceed with the case in accordance with law. There is however no bar to a special complaint being filed for an offence u/s 186, Indian Penal Code. 6. Learned advocate for the Respondents contended that the present Government Appeal is not maintainable, as the order passed by the learned Magistrate does not amount to an order of acquittal. I think there is a good deal of force in this contention. An order of discharge u/s 251-A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be treated as an order of acquittal for the purpose of an appeal u/s 417, Code of Criminal Procedure. So an appeal under the circumstances of the case is incompetent. But since it is open to this Court to treat the appeal as an application in revision, there is no legal difficulty in proceeding with the Case on merits. In the result, therefore, Government Appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Magistrate is set aside. Final Result : Allowed