JUDGMENT 1. THE only point I have been called upon to decide in this second appeal by the plaintiffs (lessors) in an action in ejectment is whether or no the notice dated June 14, 1952, calling upon the defendant lessee "to deliver vacant and peaceful possession" of the subject of the lease (a parcel of land admeasuring 2 odd cottahs) "immediately with the end of the year of tenancy" comes on the edge of the law, both the courts below hold, it does. Vagueness, they observe, defeats such a notice which could only mislead the defendant. 2. A number of authorities have been cited at the Bar. But one which contributes most has not been. It is (1) Jatindra Nath Shee v. Malai Ham Shaw: 88 C. L. J. 119 which holds that a notice demanding possession, "with the end of 31st July, 1945 or at the end of a month of your tenancy which would expire next after fifteen days from the receipt of this notice" is neither "bad nor invalid nor insufficient" and "had duly determined the defendant's tenancy". Of the two alternatives, the first demanding possession "with the end of 31st July, 1945" failed, the notice having been served on July 19 preceding, three days too short. It had "no answer", to quote P, N. Mookherjee, J., whose decision Jatindra Nath Shee's case is. But the second alternative demanding possession ":at the end of a month of your tenancy etc. " was held to be too good. (2) Ganga Prasad v, Prem Kumar Kohli: A. I. R. 1949 All. 173, and (3) Doe d. Digby v. Steel; 13 R. R. 768, cited on behalf of the appellants, are examples of notices with two alternatives-one defective and another not. Now, of the two alternatives, if one is bad and another good, the good one is good by itself. It does not need an alternative to make it good. That is just the case before me. The notice dated June 14, 1952, demands possession "immediately with the end of the year of tenancy". What is the year of tenancy? And when does it end? The lease (Ex. 2) is for Falgun, 1344 B. S. to Chaitra, 1350 B. S. It is dated Falgun 3, 1344 B. S. corresponding to February 15, 1938. The notice dated June 14, 1952, demands possession "immediately with the end of the year of tenancy". What is the year of tenancy? And when does it end? The lease (Ex. 2) is for Falgun, 1344 B. S. to Chaitra, 1350 B. S. It is dated Falgun 3, 1344 B. S. corresponding to February 15, 1938. A unilateral document, it offends against the third paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. So the legal form fails. But neither for agricultural nor manufacturing purposes, it becomes a lease from month to month by the "deeming" provisions of section 106 ibid, not terminable however by fifteen days' notice but by six months' expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy, because of section 9 (1) (b) (iii) of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 20 of 1949. It is now time to answer the questions posed. The year of tenancy is from Falgun 3 of a Bengali year, as is the evidence of the first appellant (P. W. 2), to Falgun 2 of the succeeding Bengali year, just when twelve months expire [(4) Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Baker Ali: 64 C. W. N. 641], And the year of the tenancy therefore necessarily end on Falgun 2 of a Bengali month. 3. ONCE the conclusion is so, the notice dated June 14, 1952, corresponding to Jaistha 31, 1359 B. S., refused by the respondent three days later [vide exhibits 1-a and 1] is more than six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy on Falgun 2, 1359 B. S. Less than six months will make the notice bad. More than six months will not. If such an approach suffers from no flaw, the notice is well enough. Mr. Guha, the learned advocate for the respondent, admits that there is no error in the arithmetical calculation of more than six months, but submits that there exists more than one flaw in other respects. To what Mr. Guha calls flaws I now turn. 4. ONE, if a notice so widely worded receives effect, it will mean the landlords' paradise. The paradise, if the landlords had that ever, has long been lost, thanks to the legislation of the last few years. That apart, to say that the words "with the end of the year of the tenancy" are very wide is to say too much. ONE, if a notice so widely worded receives effect, it will mean the landlords' paradise. The paradise, if the landlords had that ever, has long been lost, thanks to the legislation of the last few years. That apart, to say that the words "with the end of the year of the tenancy" are very wide is to say too much. These words are addressed to none else than the respondent, the tenant. If such a one docs not know when the year of his tenancy ends, who will ? The language of Lord Atkinson delivering the judgment of the Board in (5) Harihar Banerjee v. Ramsashi Roy [23 C. W. N. 77: 45 I. A. 222] is apt to fit the question I am considering now: "the test of sufficiency (of the notices) is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer, but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with all those facts and. circumstances " Mr. Guha points out that this Privy Council decision turns on the erroneous statement of the contents of the "jumma" of Rs. 25/- having issued out of a 6-cottah land, though in fact it issued out of land some seven times more: 421/2 cottahs. That indeed is true. But there can be no mistaking the principle their lordships enunciate. The principle is what would the notice mean to the tenant who presumably knows what his tenancy is. If there is any ambiguity-here there is none-it should be construed in a manner that it may flourish rather than perish. It is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void. More, as Mr. Banerjee, the learned advocate for the appellants, submits, their lordships them selves, in support of the principle laid down, cite cases in which the point at issue was the date of termination of the tenancy not a wrong statement about the area of the tenancy: for example, (6) Doe d. Huntingtower v. Culliford (4 Dow and Ry. 248) where the notice dated September 28, 1822, to quit "at Lady Day next (March 25, 1823)or at the end of your current year" (August 4, 1823) was held to be a good notice to quit on Lady Day. I cannot therefore depart from the principle Harihar Banerji case lays down. 248) where the notice dated September 28, 1822, to quit "at Lady Day next (March 25, 1823)or at the end of your current year" (August 4, 1823) was held to be a good notice to quit on Lady Day. I cannot therefore depart from the principle Harihar Banerji case lays down. Nor has it been departed from ever. On the contrary, to allow a tenant, as the respondent is, to take refuge behind a sham plea of vagueness, though there is nothing like it here, will be to encourage fencing. On top of that, Jatindra Nath Shee's case (supra), a good authority by itself, has been rendered a still better authority by a Bench decision affirming it in Letters Patent appeal no. 13 of 1951 decided on Nov. 25, 1952. My Lord, P. N. Mookerjee, J. and 1 took the same view in (7) Birendra Nath Dutta v. Mohanlal Sah: [appeal from Appellate Decree no. 676 of 1961 decided on October 4, 1961]. The date of commencement of the tenancy here being certain, to wit, Falgun 3, 1344 B. S., (8) Mozzam Shaikh v. Annada Prosad Bhandra: 46 C. W. N. 366-which Mr. Guha refers to-can do him little good. There the date of commencement of the tenancy could not be known upon evidence. By parity of reasoning (9) Surya Kumar Manjhi v. Trilochan Nath: 59 C. W. N, 526 Mr, Guha cites, cannot avail the respondent. In that case the plaint did not disclose the commencement or termination of the tenancy. The plaint I am seized of is clear enough on that point. No less the evidence. I cannot therefore uphold mr. Guha's contention of any flaw lurking here. 5. TWO, the respondent is entitled to a year more after the end of six months' expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy from the date of the service of this notice. Translated to facts here, Mr. Guha's contention comes to this: the end of the respondent's tenancy is either at the first moment of Falgun 3, 1359 B. S. or the last moment of the day before. A year be added to that; the first moment of Falgun 3, 1360 B. S. or the last moment of the day before. That will make a good notice according to Mr. Guha. A year be added to that; the first moment of Falgun 3, 1360 B. S. or the last moment of the day before. That will make a good notice according to Mr. Guha. The reason for this contention is a passage in Mulla's Transfer of Property" Act, 4th edition, at page 622; it is usual after mentioning the date of the tenancy to add in the alternative some such general words as "at the end of the year of the tenancy which will expire next after the end of one-half year from the date of service of this notice. " reading and re-reading the passage and fitting it in the facts here I get; I. Date of service of the notice. . Say, Jaistha, 31, 1359 B,s. II. End of one-half year from that. Last moment of Agrahayana, 3359 B. S. III. End of the year of tenancy ex-piring Last moment of Falgun 2, 1359 B. S. or next after the last day of the first moment of Falgun 3 following, Agrahayana, 1359 B. S,. . the anniversary day of the tenancy. So, where does a year more for which Mr. Guha pleads come from ? mr. Guha relies too on (10) Bathavon Rural District Council v. Carlile: [1958] I All E. R. 801 where Hodson, L. J. delivering the judgment of the court of appeal calls in question of validity of notice ''highly technical", quotes a passage from (11) Sidebotham v, Holland: [1895] 1 Q. B. 378 at page 388 to the effect that "the technicalities are too deply rooted in our law to be now got rid of" and observes at page 804 of the report: "it is scarcely necessary to point out that the trap laid by this technicality is commonly avoided by the addition of words to the effect that if the date mentioned is not the real date on which the period expires, then the notice to quit is to expire on the proper day of expiry next after the expiration of the current period," 6. GOVERNING my self by this passage I find that the current period in terms of the notice before me expired on Falgun 2, 1359 B. S. and that the notice expired on the first moment of the anniversary day, Falgun 3, 1359 B. S., the proper day of expiry next alter Falgun 2, 1359 B. S. So I again ask myself: where does Mr. Guha get an extra year from ? three, the notice is not expressed in alternative forms. It is not. So what To Jatindranath Shee's case (supra) again. Of the two alternatives one failed and another stood. So a notice couched only in that form which stood (as here) cannot fail. When the passage quoted from Mulla's Transfer of Property Act says "it is usual", it cannot lend itself to the interpretation that it is illegal if you do not express your-self in the alternative. In (12) Doe D. Gorst v. Timothy: 175 E. R. 145, cited by the appellants the notice to quit "at the expiration of the present year's tenancy" was held sufficient. So this criticism of the notice by Mr. Guha lacks substance too. Four, the notice and the plaint run in opposite directions, in that the averment in paragraph one of the plaint is that the respondent was asked to quit with the end of Chaitra, 1350 B. S. But it is overlooked that paragraph one does not, and paragraph four does, aver the allegation of notice. And what is in paragraph four is just in line with the notice I see before me. They run in the same direction. Paragraph one merely recalls the history that the term of the lease nearing its end-it was for Falgun 3, 1344 B. S., to Chaitra, 1350 B. S.-the lessee was asked to quit by 1350 Chaitra's end The notice says as much too in its introductory portion. Thus the plaint and the notice speak in the same voice. And Mr. Guha's contention fails again. Five, the last flaw Mr. Thus the plaint and the notice speak in the same voice. And Mr. Guha's contention fails again. Five, the last flaw Mr. Guha refers to is the cause of action stated in the plaint's sixth paragraph to have arisen 'on 1st day of Baisakh, 1351 B. S. ' The draftsman had obviously in his mind the lease came to end by efflux of time on Chaitra 31, 1350 B. S. For one thing, paragraph six does not stop with "on 1st day of Baisakh, 1351 B. S. " It goes a little more: "and on successive days including those when demands for possession were made and ultimately on the date of service of the notice viz., June 19, 1952 and on the date stipulated in the said notice to quit and vacate the suit property. " so there appears to be enough to make the averment about cause of action a complete one, As Mr. Banerjee submits, quoting (13) Engineering Supplies Ltd. v. Dhandhania and Co., I. L. R. 58 Calcutta 539, one finds in the sixth paragraph the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim, "everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment ",every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, every fact which the defendant could have a right to traverse". (14) Samarendra Nath Mitra v. Pyaree Charan Laha: I. L. R. 61 Calcutta 1023, another case Mr. Banerjee cites is to that end too, "cause of action" means all the congeries of facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish before he can ask the Court to grant the relief he claims in the suit. So there is little wrong in the averment For another thing, even if there is, the bad be excised. What remains still is good enough to make it a good suit. After these matters resting on technicality must not be weighed in scales of gold. "the validity of a notice to quit ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw": (11) Sidebotham v. Holland [1895] 1 q. B 378 at page 383. And in any event I see nothing for which I can non-suit the appellants. 7. THUS, al1 the contentions urged by Mr. Guha fail. The notice which might have been better is good enough. And in any event I see nothing for which I can non-suit the appellants. 7. THUS, al1 the contentions urged by Mr. Guha fail. The notice which might have been better is good enough. It only remains for me to record that Mr. Guha does not support either the reasoning or the finding of the learned appellate judge that six months' notice must expire with the end of the Bengali year meaning a year ending the last day of Chaitra, And I leave it at that. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. The judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the appellants' suit be decreed. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. 8. IT is now well-held that leave to appeal should not be granted too lightly. There must be certain principles to go by. One such principle I see here. The point raised and decided in this appeal is a question of general importance. For all I know, there are two authorities so far. The importance of the matter demands that there may be one more. First and last a more authoritive decision should be given than is possible at the hands of a single Judge. Hence I grant the leave prayed for.