JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a second miscellaneous appeal against an order of the Court of Appeal below affirming an order of the executing Court allowing a petition under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendant judgment-debtor for ejectment and for damages as also for arrears of rent. At the date when the suit was instituted, there is no dispute before me that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. "but the parties entered into a compromise. Under the terms of the compromise the plaintiff withdrew his claim for ejectment and the defendant suffered a decree for a sum of Rs. 3,200/ -. The compromise decree stated that the aforesaid sum of Rs. 3,200/-was due on account of arrears of rent. 2. AN objection was taken under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure whereby the judgment-debtor asserted that the Trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction for passing a decree for a sum of Rs. 3,200/- and the pecuniary limit of the Trial Court was up to Rs. 2,000/ -. This objection was upheld by the Trial Court and the decree was declared null and void and the objection under section 47 of the Code was allowed and the petition for execution was dismissed. Against that order, there was an appeal to the Court of Appeal below and that appeal was dismissed. Mr. Shyama Charan Mitter on behalf of the decree-holder urged two points. The first is, the trial Court had complete jurisdiction to grant the decree and the decree was not null nor void. Secondly, the executing court could not go behind the decree and the question whether the Trial Court had pecuniary jurisdiction or not, should have been raised at the Trial Court and the defendant, having suffered a decree on compromise, is estopped from challenging the decree on the ground of nullity. With regard to the first point, it is indeed true that the decree was stated to be one for a sum of Rs. 3,200/- on account of arrears of rent and, if it was the decree for arrears of rent, it may be said that the decree was bad; but at the date when the suit was instituted, the arrears of rent would not amount to Rs. 3,200/ -. The plaintiff applied for arrears of rent and for mesne profits. 3,200/- on account of arrears of rent and, if it was the decree for arrears of rent, it may be said that the decree was bad; but at the date when the suit was instituted, the arrears of rent would not amount to Rs. 3,200/ -. The plaintiff applied for arrears of rent and for mesne profits. The plaintiff also stated that the suit was instituted after the tenancy was determined. There is no statement in the compromise petition that the original tenancy would continue and that the notice to quit had been waived. Had there been any such statement, namely, had the notice to quit been waived, then the original tenancy would continue and the amount would be arrears of rent and that arrears of rent would accrue subsequent to the date of the suit. The statement is that the claim for ejectment was withdrawn. The result is that a new tenancy was created with effect from the date of the solenama and the sum that fell due to the plaintiff landlord on account of use and occupation of the defendant would be really mesne profits and not arrears of rent, because there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties during the time the suit was pending and till the date of the solenama. In view of the decision in our Full Bench between Bidhya Dhar and Manindra Nath (1) reported in 29 C. W. N., 869, if the assessment on mesne profits exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the decree is not null nor void. I, therefore, construe the decree to mean that the sum of Rs. 3,200/- was awarded not on arrears of rent as between the landlord and the tenant but as mesne profits as between the ex-landlord and ex-tenant. Therefore, on this ground I cannot hold that the decree was null and void or without jurisdiction. The next question is, supposing the Trial Court had not the pecuniary jurisdiction, would the decree passed by the Trial Court in a suit, which was instituted in a Court competent to try the suit, be considered to be null and void? Mr. Sanyal refers to the Full Bench decision in Gora Chand Haider's case reported in (2) 53 Calcutta, 166, Full Bench. Mr. Mr. Sanyal refers to the Full Bench decision in Gora Chand Haider's case reported in (2) 53 Calcutta, 166, Full Bench. Mr. Shyama Charan Mitter has, however, referred to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in (3) A. I. R. 1962, S. C., page 199, between hiralal v. Kalinath. He has further referred to another Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court reported in (4) I. L. R. 39, Patna, page 121 between Shyam Nandan v. Dhanapati Kuer. 3. THE Supreme Court decided that, if a Court had not the territorial jurisdiction to entertain a suit and if no objection was taken by the judgment-debtor at the earlier stage of the suit, that objection regarding jurisdiction could not be taken at the executing stage for the reason that there is no inherent incompetency of the Court to entertain the suit and objection not being taken at the proper time, the defendant would be stopped from raising any objection. The Supreme Court referred to sec. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the judgment-debtor could not raise the objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction at the time of execution. Mr. Mitter says that the same principle would apply with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction as well. Mr. Sanyal says that territorial jurisdiction stands on a different basis from pecuniary jurisdiction on the ground that there is a provision in section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on which the Supreme Court relied which states:- "no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity. " According to Mr. Sanyal, this is a special provision relating to territorial jurisdiction and the Supreme Court relied on section 21 of the Code; but there is no corresponding section relating to pecuniary jurisdiction and, therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above has no application to the case of pecuniary jurisdiction. 4. SINHA, C. J. considered the question first of competence and held that the Court in which the suit was instituted was a competent Court and further held that there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction. 4. SINHA, C. J. considered the question first of competence and held that the Court in which the suit was instituted was a competent Court and further held that there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction. The result was that the exercise of jurisdiction might have been irregular but it could not be said on the principles of (5) 13 Indian Appeals, page 134, between Ledgard v. Bull that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction so far as the Court which entertained the matter. The Code of Civil Procedure refers to the word 'jurisdiction' under section 4. It refers to pecuniary jurisdiction in section 6 and section 6 is the specific section which is applicable. Section 6 is as follows: "save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits of its ordinary jurisdiction. " 5. THE question whether the Court can pass a decree beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction after the suit is filed in a Court, which has the pecuniary jurisdiction to try, is a matter on which there has been very great diversity of opinion las between different High Courts in India. It has been held by the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Patna and Rangoon and the Courts of the Judicial Commissioners in Sind, Nagpur and Oudh that, if there is the tentative value or if there is future mesne profits to be assessed, the Court can. The reason is that, if the Court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, it cannot lose its jurisdiction because of the subsequent change in the value of the subject-matter of the suit. In fact, if subsequent change in value of the subject-matter is taken into consideration, that will give rise to very great difficulties. A property valued at the date of the suit may be worth less than Rs. 2,000/- but may become more than Rs,. 2,000/- at the date when the decree was passed and, if somebody subsequently proves that the value rose at the date of the decree, the decree would be considered to be null and void. A property valued at the date of the suit may be worth less than Rs. 2,000/- but may become more than Rs,. 2,000/- at the date when the decree was passed and, if somebody subsequently proves that the value rose at the date of the decree, the decree would be considered to be null and void. That is the basic reason why the Courts found that subsequent change of the value during the pendency of the suit is not material and does not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction if the suit had been instituted in a proper Court. I have already held on an interpretation of the document that the compromise decree is, in substance, a decree for mesne profits and therefore the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and further had jurisdiction to grant a decree exceeding the pecuniary limit on that basis. 6. BUT the further point urged is supposing the decree is considered to be a decree for arrears of rent and supposing it be considered that tie relationship of landlord and tenant continued during the pendency of the suit, would the decree be null and void and can the judgment-debtor take that objection in execution proceedings? I have referred to section 6 for this purpose where the Code refers to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure again refers to the jurisdiction of Provincial Small Cause Courts and than to the jurisdiction of the Presidency Small Cause Courts. Then it says in section 9, "the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. " Hence, reading section 9 together with section 6 it means that a Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits but nothing in the Code shall operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits of its ordinary jurisdiction. " Hence, reading section 9 together with section 6 it means that a Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits but nothing in the Code shall operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits of its ordinary jurisdiction. Coming now to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that section deals with the doctrine of res judicata and that section says, "no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has subsequently been raised, and has been heard and finally decided. " It is striking to remember that the section does not say "any Court having jurisdiction to try such subsequent suit. " The Code has used the words "any Court competent to try such subsequent suit. " Having used the word 'jurisdiction', in section 6, section 7, section 8 and also section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they do not choose the same word 'jurisdiction' but refer in section 11 to the competence of the Court. Section 11 of the Code says, the decision of a Court not competent to try the subsequent suit will not be barred. Hence, a matter which touches territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction but does not touch the competence of the Court would still be barred. In Bhawan Dayal v. Smt. Reoti Debi (6) A. I. R. 1962, S. C. 287, the Supreme Court held that the Revenue Court was not competent to try the subsequent suit and hence the bar under sec. 11 of the Code will not operate. Hence, the competence of the Court is not the same thing as the jurisdiction of the Court. When a Court is formed in accordance with law, the Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law but unless a Court is formed in accordance with law, the Court is not a competent Court and unless there are two persons litigating before the Court, the Court is not competent to entertain the dispute. When a Court is formed in accordance with law, the Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law but unless a Court is formed in accordance with law, the Court is not a competent Court and unless there are two persons litigating before the Court, the Court is not competent to entertain the dispute. If the Court is not validly created, the Court is rot competent and there would be no question of exercising jurisdiction. If one of the parties is dead, then there are no parties before the Court with regard to whom the Court would entertain the matter and these matters attract the competence of the Court to decide the matter. The competence of the Court may be denied because of certain special legislation. The special tribunal may be created by which the powers of the Civil Court to decide with regard to a particular matter may be taken away or by which the particular Court may be given powers to determine particular matters, as in (5) 13 Indian Appeals between Ledgard v. Bull the District Judge's Court was the only Court competent to entertain a suit relating to patent or, in other words, that was the exclusive Court which could determine that matter and no other Court could have determined that matter. Sinha, C. J. in the Supreme Court has held, the territorial jurisdiction of a Court does not affect the competence of a Court to try a matter. The Court concerned was competent to try a civil suit but the power of the Court was limited to a certain extent, namely, over a particular territory. Therefore, that relates to the exercise of the power of the Court but does not relate to inherent jurisdiction or competence of the Court. It is indeed true Sinha, C. J., referred to section 21 but the reason of his judgment is not based on section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the other hand, this principle has been recognised in the Code of Civil Procedure in section 21. In my opinion, when a Civil Court is formed, it is for the legislature to decide what powers it will give to that Court and it gives certain powers with regard to certain territories as also within certain pecuniary limits. In my opinion, when a Civil Court is formed, it is for the legislature to decide what powers it will give to that Court and it gives certain powers with regard to certain territories as also within certain pecuniary limits. These are matters which relate to the exercise of the powers which have been granted and this scope within such power to exercise is called jurisdiction. That is the field within which a Court is to exercise its powers; that field may be territorial, that field may be pecuniary but that merely relates to the field within which the Court is to exercise its powers. It depends therefore on the competence of the Court; after there is a competent Court, the question of jurisdiction arises. But if there is no competent Court or if there are not parties, there is no competence of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in the dispute. I am, therefore, of opinion that the question of pecuniary jurisdiction stands on the same footing as the question of territorial jurisdiction. The question of pecuniary jurisdiction is a matter of the limit of the power within which a competent Court is to exercise its function. Therefore, if a Court goes beyond the limit, it exercises a jurisdiction not vested in flaw; but that exercise is an irregular exercise of jurisdiction. That does not affect the inherent competence of the Court to entertain the suit or to pass a decree. In this case, however, the suit was instituted in a proper Court and there is no challenge to the competence of the Court to entertain the suit. The question is whether the Court was competent to pass the decree or, in other words, whether the Court decided illegally in allowing a decree for a sum exceeding its pecuniary jurisdiction and if it did, it merely exercised erroneously its jurisdiction. Such exercise of jurisdiction would not affect the inherent competence of a Civil Court to decide matters but it affects the limits of the powers given to a competent Civil Court. Therefore, in the exercise of its powers the Court went beyond its jurisdiction but acted within its competence. In that view of the matter, I would respectfully follow the decision of the Supreme Court in preference to the Full Bench decision in (2) Gora Chand Haider's case. Therefore, in the exercise of its powers the Court went beyond its jurisdiction but acted within its competence. In that view of the matter, I would respectfully follow the decision of the Supreme Court in preference to the Full Bench decision in (2) Gora Chand Haider's case. The result is that the judgment-debtor not having raised that objection regarding the pecuniary limits of the Court for passing a decree, that objection cannot subsequently be raised at the stage of execution. The result remains that the decision in our Full Bench case in (2) Gora Chand Haider's case stands modified because of the decision of the Supreme Court with regard to territorial jurisdiction. But so far as the jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, so far as the jurisdiction regarding the persons, the decision of the Full Bench case will stand on the ground that, if a subject-matter is taken away, then the Court becomes incompetent to decide that matter. If a party is dead, the Court is deprived of its power as the Court has no power over a dead man. Therefore, so far those two matters- are concerned, the Supreme Court decision has not affected the decision of the Full Bench case but so far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, in my opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court over-rules the decision of the Full Bench case in (2) Gora Chand Haider's case. I have arrived at the same result from another point of view. Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, "no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied etc. for. . . . . . any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings not affecting the merits- of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. " It is stated that this provision makes it quite clear that there was want of jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, the decree could be challenged as null and void "whenever and wherever it is sought to be in force or relied upon even at the stage of the execution and even in collateral proceedings. " Refer Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and Ors. (7) 1955 (1) S. C. 107, at p. 121. " Refer Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and Ors. (7) 1955 (1) S. C. 107, at p. 121. But the aforesaid judgment itself refers to section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887 which is as follows:- "notwithstanding anything contained in section 99 of the C. P. C., an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or undervaluation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower appellate Court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto, shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless. . . . . . " Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act therefore makes it clear that a question of over-valuation or a question of under-valuation cannot be challenged in appeal before any appellate Court. If it cannot be challenged in an appellate Court, it cannot certainly be challenged in execution proceedings. Hence, section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act serves the same purpose with respect to pecuniary jurisdiction as section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure serves to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. In this connection we may again refer to section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure which says, "save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction. " Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, therefore, subject to further provision expressly made and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act makes that further provision. Therefore, the language of sections 6 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act makes it clear that a question regarding pecuniary jurisdiction can be entertained in the Trial Court. If it is not taken in the Trial Court, it will not be taken in the appellate Court unless condition 1 (a) or 1 (b) of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is complied with, Therefore, the pecuniary jurisdiction stands on the same footing as territorial jurisdiction. If either of them has not been taken in the Trial Court, it cannot be taken unconditionally before the appellate Court and it would not invalidate the decree, at most it may be an irregular exercise of jurisdiction. If either of them has not been taken in the Trial Court, it cannot be taken unconditionally before the appellate Court and it would not invalidate the decree, at most it may be an irregular exercise of jurisdiction. I have already referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and ors. (7) 1955 (1) S.C. 107, at p. 121, where Venkatarama, J. observed as follows:- "the policy underlying sections 21 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when the case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. " 7. IF this is the law, then it applies to all execution proceedings with greater force for the reason that the executing Court can never go behind the decree. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed without costs of all Courts and the judgments and orders of the Courts below are set aside. The execution proceedings will continue and the petition under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure will stand dismissed. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is prayed for and is granted.