The petitioner Surendra Chandra Das who is a manufacturer of umbrella handles, carrying on his busi­ness at Agartala under the name and style of "Das Brothers," has applied for a Writ of mandamus or other appropriate Writ to cancel the monopoly-cum-royalty lease Annexure 'I' dated 26-12-1960, granted by the Tripura Ad­ministration in favour of the fifth respondent Pyari Mohan Bhakta Choudhury, by which a monopoly has been given to the 5th respondent in the southern forest sub-divi­sions of Tripura to collect umbrella handle sticks there-from for a period of one year from 1-1-1961 to 31-12-1961. His ground is that the said monopoly interferes with the fundamental rights guaranteed to him under Arti­cles 14 and 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. (2) The petitioner's case is as follows: He has been carrying on this business of making umbrella handles within the Territory of Tripura for many years and for this purpose he had to collect bamboo sticks from the forests of Tripura and particularly the forests in the southern sub-divisions of Tripura where the bamboo necessary for such umbrella handles was available. In the years 1959 and 1960, he got the per­mits Annexures V series from the Forest Department of the Tripura Administration for such collection on pay­ment of the usual royalty at the rate of Re. 1 annas 14 for thousand sticks. In that manner he removed thousands of umbrella handle sticks in 1959 and 1960. In the same manner he applied in 1961 by Annexure IV dated 2-2-1961 to the Forest Officer, Udaipur Range for a permit for twenty thousand umbrella handle sticks on payment of the usual royalty. The said application was received by the said Range Office on 4-2-61, as seen from Annexure IV(a), and the Forest Officer on receipt of the petition refused to issue the permit on the plea that a monopoly for the collection of such umbrella handle sticks has been given to the fifth respondent on a monopoly-cum-royalty basis by the Forest Department of the Tripura Administration. (3) He contends that such granting of monopoly was against public interest and public policy and involved eli­mination of free competition in business and a restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and further that such monopoly amounts to a discrimination which would offend Article 14 of the Constitution. (3) He contends that such granting of monopoly was against public interest and public policy and involved eli­mination of free competition in business and a restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution and further that such monopoly amounts to a discrimination which would offend Article 14 of the Constitution. It was pointed out that the petitioner, like all others, has a legal and fundamental right to collect such umbrella sticks from any part or the Territory of Tripura without any hindrance on pay­ment of royalty and that this right has been illegally de­nied to him by the grant of the monopoly to the fifth respondent. It was stated that the fifth respondent objected to the petitioner's collecting the umbrella sticks from the southern sub-division. On coming to know of the monopoly, the petitioner gave the notice Annexure III on 3-1-61 to the Secretary, Forest Department of the Tripura Administration, respondent 3, to cancel the said lease. But the notice had no effect except that the fifth respondent who had been allowed to pay the pre­mium of Rs. 1,600/- in four instalments was directed to pay the entire amount in a lump sum. After the peti­tioner was refused the grant of a permit, when applied for, by Annexure IV, he gave the further notice Annexure I on 10-2-61 to respondents 2-4, the Chief Commissioner, the Secretary, Forest Department and the Divisional Forest Officer of Tripura to cancel the monopoly. But the notice had no effect. Hence, he had to come forward with the Writ application which he filed on 21-2-61. (4) Respondents 1-4 have filed counter denying that the petitioner has got any fundamental right which would prevent the Tripura Administration from giving a mono­poly to the fifth respondent. They .state that for many years past the revenue yielded from the collection or umbrella sticks in the southern sub-division was very little, that in the years 1959 and 1960 together, the revenue realised was only Rs. 1,051.11 N.P. and the forest Department tried its utmost to lease this right but with no success, that similarly the revenue realised In 1959-60 in the Kailasahar Range from bamboo sticks was only Rs. 13-12 N. P., that they were however able to lease out the said right for the year 1981 for a sum of Rs. 10,521/- on an outright sale system, but. 13-12 N. P., that they were however able to lease out the said right for the year 1981 for a sum of Rs. 10,521/- on an outright sale system, but. a simi­lar attempt to lease but by outright sale in the southern sub-division was not successful, though tenders were called for on two occasions, that it was suspected that come interested parties had joined hands not to take lease, that ultimately it was found possible to lease out the southern sub-divisions on a monopoly-cum-royalty basis to the fifth respondent by Annexure 'I' dated 26-12-60 for the year 1961 for Rs. 1,600/-, that it was done in the interest of the public, that it has not affected any right of the petitioner as he could make arrangement for collection of the forest produce from the southern and northern forest sub-divisions according to Forest Rules or he could get the umbrella sticks by arrangement with the fifth respondent in the southern forest' sub-division. It was stated that the Forest Department had the right to sell or lease out the forest produce and that no fundamental right of the petitioner can interfere with this right of the Forest Department. It was also point­ed out that the fifth respondent had published the notice Annexure D in the local daily paper "Jagaran" on 17-1-61 inviting the attention of all persons interested In the collection of 'bamboos for umbrella sticks and stating that he was willing to extend all facilities to them in the matter of collection of this forest produce subject to the provisions of the Forest Law. It was next stated that the petitioner was not granted a permit to collect bamboos in 1961, because he did not fulfil the requirements of law before making the application for the permit. (5) The fifth respondent filed a counter statement more or less on the same lines as respondents 14 but adding further that the petitioner had no legal right to collect the umbrella sticks on payment of royalty, as he had not taken a trade licence for his business. At the time of the arguments, the counsel for the fifth res­pondent did not take any part, evidently because the period of the monopoly had expired on 31-12-1961. At the time of the arguments, the counsel for the fifth res­pondent did not take any part, evidently because the period of the monopoly had expired on 31-12-1961. (6) Before I proceed to deal with the merits of the case, it has to be made clear that we are dealing in this case with what are known as the protected forests of the Government under Sections 29 and 30 of the Indian Forest Act. In respect of such forests various rules have ' been framed by the Tripura Administration under Section 32 of the Forest Act Both sides were relying on these Forests Rules for the purpose of their respective cases. For the petitioner my attention was drawn to Section 32(c), (d) and (e) of the Indian Forest Act and Rule 2 of the Rules framed under Section 32 and issued as Notification No. 3 dated 29-4-1952. It will be better that I give the section and the Rule hereunder:- "32. Power to make rules for protected forests. The (State Government) may make rules to regulate the following matters, namely,- (a) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of trees and timber, and the collection, manufacture and re­moval of forest produce, from protected forests; (b) the granting of licences to the inhabitants of towns and villages in the vicinity of protected forests to lake trees, timber or other forest produce for their own use, and the production and return of such licences by such persons; (c) the granting of licences to persons felling or re­moving trees or timber or other forest produce from such forests for the purposes of trade, and the produc­tion and return of such licences by such persons; (d) the payments, if any, to be made by the per­sons mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) for permission to-cut such trees, or to collect and remove such timber or other forest produce; (e) the other payments, if any, to be made by them, in respect of such trees, timber and produce, and the places where such payment shall be made." * * * * * "Rule 2. Trees other than the species referred to in paragraph 1 above or any forest produce shall not be-lopped, -felled, cut, girdled, barked, sawn, collected, used or removed, or cattle grazed in a protected forest with­out the written permission of a Forest Officer empowered to issue permits and without payment of royalty or graz­ing fee thereof at the prescribed rates." (7) For our purpose Section 32(f) to (1) and the-proviso to Rule 2 are not necessary as they relate to other matters. Section 32(c) permits the Government to-make rules to regulate the granting of licences to per­sons for felling or removing trees or timber or other forests produce from protected forests for the purpose of trade. Section 32(d) and (e) relate to the payment of royalty to be made by such persons, for which also rules can be made by the Government. It is in accord­ance with this power to frame rules that Rule 2 has-been framed providing inter alia that forest produce-shall not be collected or removed from a protected forest without the written permission of a Forest Officer em-; powered to issue permits and without payment of royalty' thereof at the prescribed rates. Bamboos fit for umbrella sticks with which we are concerned in the pre-j sent case will come within the meaning of forest produce. (8) I take it that the permits referred to in Rule 2, are the same as the licences referred to in Section 32 (c)-of the Indian Forest Act. Thus the position is that in-the case of persons who, for purposes of trade, wish to fell or remove forest produce like bamboo from protected' forests, the State Government can make rules to regulate the granting of licences in such cases and to regulate the payments to be made by such persons. Rule 2 hast provided that without the written permission of a Forest Officer empowered to issue permits and without payment of royalty at the prescribed rate, forest produce like bamboo cannot be felled or collected or removed. Thus the section and the Rule read together will show that any person, for the purposes of trade, can fell or collect or remove such bamboos from protected forests by ob­taining the written permission of a Forest Officer and by payment of royalty. Thus the section and the Rule read together will show that any person, for the purposes of trade, can fell or collect or remove such bamboos from protected forests by ob­taining the written permission of a Forest Officer and by payment of royalty. No restriction has thus been placed on such persons except the obtaining of the written permission and the payment of royalty and these restrictions are applicable to all persons and the restric­tions are also permitted by the Statute and under the rule framed in accordance with the Statute. Such restrictions which are necessary for the protection of the forests, by regulating such extraction of forest produce and for purposes of revenue, are certainly reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. (9) The petitioner as one such person, who wanted to cut and remove bamboo for umbrella sticks from the protected forests for his business, had also obtained written permissions and paid royalties and removed such bamboos from the protected forests in the southern sub­division for many years past in accordance with the Forest Rules. This was not disputed in the counter state­ments. The petitioner has produced Annexures V series, which are the written permits issued to him for cutting and removing tons of thousands of such bamboo sticks in 1959 and 1060. They show that in 1959, he obtain­ed such permit for fifty-five thousand bamboo sticks and in 1960, for sixty-four thousands such sticks. It was at the end of 1960 that this was stopped by granting the monopoly by Annexure "I" dated 26-12-60 to the fifth respondent and this monopoly made it impossible for the petitioner to get such permits in 1961 from the Forest Department. His application for such a permit by An­nexure IV dated 4-2-61 was clearly rejected for the rea­son that a monopoly has been given to the fifth res­pondent. (10) In the counter statement, no doubt, it was stated that that it was rejected because, the petitioner .did not fulfil the requirements of law before making the prayer. This is rather a vague statement. (10) In the counter statement, no doubt, it was stated that that it was rejected because, the petitioner .did not fulfil the requirements of law before making the prayer. This is rather a vague statement. When the respondents were asked to clarify the statement, the learned Government Advocate stated that the petitioner was a person carrying on trade in forest produce and that under Notification No. 8 dated -294-1952, rules have been framed under Section 76(d) of the Indian forest Act for the registration of traders and for the issue of licences to such registered traders and that the petitioner had not taken out such a licence and so his prayer for permit for bamboo sticks was rejected. What Rule 3 in the said rules states is that no person shall carry on trade in forest produce within a mile of the boundaries of reserved or protected forests without registering his name and obtaining a licence. So unless, the petitioner was carrying on trade within a mile of reserved or protected forests, he did not have to obtain a licence. It was not stated in the counter that the petitioner was carrying on trade within a mile of any reserved or protected forest. Hence, no licence was required to be taken out by him. Further if any such licence was required, he would not have been given per­mits in 1959 and 1980 as seen from Annexure V series and so it is clear that his application for permit was not rejected in 1961 on that ground. Moreover, by granting the monopoly to the fifth respondent, the Forest Department have made it impossible for themselves, even if they wanted, to give permits to anybody except the fifth respondent and his men. This is clear from the very fact that Annexure "I" is called a monopoly-cum-royalty lease and also from paragraph 6 of the said Annexure in which it is said that on the strength of the said lease, the lessee or other persons employed by him, with the approval of the Forest Office can alone operate the Mahal. Again, the fifth respondent had admittedly published in the paper by Annexure D which has been produced by the respondents that he was willing to give the neces­sary facilities to persons who are engaged in such trade, who wanted to collect umbrella sticks, thereby showing that he had the monopoly right. Again, the fifth respondent had admittedly published in the paper by Annexure D which has been produced by the respondents that he was willing to give the neces­sary facilities to persons who are engaged in such trade, who wanted to collect umbrella sticks, thereby showing that he had the monopoly right. I may also refer to An­nexure J, the reply of the Divisional Forest Officer to one Govinda Sundar Basak dated 28-2-fil in which the D. F. O. had stated in reply to the said Basak's petition for cancellation of the lease given to the fifth respondent that the said Basak may arrange for extraction of umbrella sticks on obtaining authorisation from the lessee, the fifth respondent. Thus the Forest Department can­not issue licences for extraction of umbrella sticks to any person after granting the monopoly in favour of the fifth respondent except on authorisation by the fifth res­pondent. Reference may also be made to Annexure B, a letter written by the S. D. F. 0. south Sonamura to the D. F. O. in which in paragraph 10, he admitted that the Range Officer, Udaipur could not issue a permit for collection of umbrella sticks to any person other than parties authorised by the lessee, the fifth respondent. This is exactly what the petitioner has stated in this Writ petition and so it is clear that the reason for not issuing permit to the petitioner was because monopoly had already been granted. It is idle for respondents to contend that they did not give the permit to the peti­tioner in 1961, because he did not fulfil the require­ments of the law. (11) Before I proceed to deal with the question whe­ther there has been any violation of fundamental rights by grant of this monopoly, it is better to state how the monopoly happened to be granted. I am calling it a lease for the present, because Annexure "I" itself states that it is a monopoly-cum-royalty lease. Later, we shall see whether it is a lease or only a licence. It would appear that in 1960 the Forest Department wanted to sell outright the right to collect umbrella sticks from the various Ranges in the southern subdivision. Hence, tenders were called for by Annexures K and L for the lease of the umbrella stick Mahals in the various Ranges in the southern subdivision on outright sale system. It would appear that in 1960 the Forest Department wanted to sell outright the right to collect umbrella sticks from the various Ranges in the southern subdivision. Hence, tenders were called for by Annexures K and L for the lease of the umbrella stick Mahals in the various Ranges in the southern subdivision on outright sale system. It would appear that to the first tender Annexure K, dated 15-8-60, there was no response at all, while to Annexure L, dated 8-10-60, the fifth respondent alone gave a re­ply, Annexure M. But it was not a tender but a counter offer. In Annexure M, he stated that he was willing to take all the four Ranges in the southern subdivision on monopoly for 3 years at Rs. 1,600/- per year in addi­tion to the payment of royalty of Re. 1-14-0 per thou­sand as per Government Rules. On receipt of Annexure M, the S. D. F. O. southern subdivision wrote to the Divisional Forest Officer that only the offer of the fifth respondent by Annexure M has been received and that it would be better if all the umbrella stick Mahals of the southern subdivision were sanctioned on monopoly-cum-royalty system to the fifth respondent on his pay­ing Rs. 1,6007- per year for 3 years from 1961 to 1963 as offered by him. But the D. F. 0. was willing to give it only for one year from January, 1961 (see Annexure N) and he wanted the S. D. F. O. to find out from the fifth respondent whether he was willing to take for one year and the fifth respondent agreed to take it for one year by his letter Annexure 0. It was on this that the Secre­tary, Forest Department conveyed the sanction of the Chief Commissioner to the said monopoly-cum-royalty lease by Annexure C, dated 19-12-60. (12) It will be seen from the above that the fifth respondent's offer was not accepted as a result of the two tenders Annexures K and L. What was advertised for tender was to take on outright sale system, but what was accepted was the monopoly-cum-royalty system. If they are going to change the system, the Forest De­partment should have, under the rules of tender, called for fresh tenders on that system and they cannot accept an offer like this made by the fifth respondent except by calling for fresh tenders. If they are going to change the system, the Forest De­partment should have, under the rules of tender, called for fresh tenders on that system and they cannot accept an offer like this made by the fifth respondent except by calling for fresh tenders. We are, however, not very much concerned about this Irregularity In the present case. The question we have to consider is whether the grant to the fifth respondent on the monopoly-cum-royalty system, even if it was done in accordance with the rules of tender, was a grant which the Tripura Administration had the right to make. The respondents have produced Annexures A and H to show that for the Kailasahar Range they gave on the outright sale system in 1961 and that the revenue from the said Range thereby went up from Rs. 13-12 in 1960 to Rs. 10,521/- in 1961. This was intended to show that the outright sale system was at­tempted in all the Ranges, that it had increased the re­venues in the Kailasahar Range considerably and that because no tenders were received for the outright sale system for the southern subdivision, they had to give it on the monopoly-cum-royalty system to the fifth respon­dent. I do not have to decide in this case whether the outright sale system adopted in the Kailasahar Range was in accordance with rules, as the said sale has not been challenged before me. I am only concerned in this application with the monopoly-cum-royalty system adopted in the southern subdivision. (13) The petitioner, who is a trader in umbrella sticks, was being given licences for the extraction of um­brella sticks from the southern subdivision for a number of years. It is the petitioner's occupation and business to trade in umbrella sticks. Under Article 19 (1} (g) he has the right to practice his occupation trade or business. For the said business, he has to collect umbrella sticks from the Tripura forests. If any restrictions are placed in the said collection of umbrella sticks except the res­trictions as provided under Section 32 of the Forest Act and the rules framed thereunder, they will have to be held as infringements of his fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g). I have dealt with the restrictions under Section 32 and the rules framed thereunder. If any restrictions are placed in the said collection of umbrella sticks except the res­trictions as provided under Section 32 of the Forest Act and the rules framed thereunder, they will have to be held as infringements of his fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g). I have dealt with the restrictions under Section 32 and the rules framed thereunder. The said restrictions are that he has to obtain a permit from the Forest Officer and to pay the royalty fixed under the rules. They have to be accepted as reasonable restrictions im­posed by law, which are permitted under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. They are not questioned in this Writ. But what is questioned is that the monopoly by Annexure "I", given to the fifth respondent, has imposed a further restriction on the petitioner in collecting the umbrella sticks which is not permitted under the Forest Act or the Forest Rules and which will amount to a total prohibition. It was pointed out that the effect of granting the monopoly is that the petitioner cannot any longer get a permit from the Forest Department and that he is left to the mercy of the monopoly-holder if he wants to collect umbrella sticks and ths monopoly-holder will be entitled to impose whatever conditions he chooses for granting the permission to the petitioner to collect the sticks. He can insist on payment of consideration over and above royalty which has to be paid to the Govern­ment under the Rules. It was pointed out that unless the monopoly-holder does so, he will not have any profit as he has paid Rs. 1,6007- for getting the monopoly. It was urged that the result will be that the price of umbrella sticks would go up and the general public would suffer and that this new restriction is not a restriction in the interest of the general public. Again, it was stated that it was not a restriction which was permitted by the very rules framed by Government. (14) It has to be accepted that the above contentions are valid. There is nothing in the Rules framed under the Forest Act which will permit the Tripura Administra­tion to grant such a monopoly permit to one trader to the exclusion of all the other traders. The fifth respondent is a trader in umbrella sticks like the petitioner. (14) It has to be accepted that the above contentions are valid. There is nothing in the Rules framed under the Forest Act which will permit the Tripura Administra­tion to grant such a monopoly permit to one trader to the exclusion of all the other traders. The fifth respondent is a trader in umbrella sticks like the petitioner. Ac-| cording to Rule 2 of the Forest Rules mentioned above, any person for purposes of his trade can apply for a per­mit and the permit cannot be refused on the ground that monopoly has been given to a single person and that any application for permit should come through him and that applications which do not come through him will be rejected. Thus, in granting monopoly to the fifth respondent, a restriction is imposed which under the very rules framed by them the Tripura Administration had no right to impose. Again, a monopoly in favour ot one trader to the exclusion of all other traders will amount to a discrimination which is not permissible un­der Article 14 of the Constitution. (15) In this connection, I may refer to the decision-of the Supreme Court: Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163 . In that case the Municipal Board framed a bye-law that no person shall establish 8 market for wholesale transaction in vegetables except with the permission of the Board. Another bye-law was for the grant of a monopoly to a contractor to deal in wholesale transactions at the place fixed as a market. Accordingly, the Board granted a monopoly to one Habib Ahmed. The result was that the Board became powerless to grant licence to any other person to carry on the business within the municipal limits and it actually re­fused an application on the ground that there was no bye-law under which the Board could grant the licence. Thereby carrying on wholesale business was completely prohibited. It was held by the Supreme Court that the prohibition by the bye-law in the absence of any provi­sion for issuing licences became absolute and further that the restrictions placed by the grant of the monopoly were more than reasonable restrictions, as were con­templated by Article 19 (6) and the bye-laws were declared void. It was held by the Supreme Court that the prohibition by the bye-law in the absence of any provi­sion for issuing licences became absolute and further that the restrictions placed by the grant of the monopoly were more than reasonable restrictions, as were con­templated by Article 19 (6) and the bye-laws were declared void. The facts are more or less similar in the present case with one vital difference namely, that in the Su­preme Court case, the bye-law amounted to a law and that even though the monopoly was granted under the law, the said law was declared ultra vires, whereas in our present case the monopoly in favour of the fifth respondent was not granted under any law but in viola­tion of the Forest Act and the Forest Rules, as I have pointed out above. Here also the petitioner has been prevented from getting a licence as a result of the monopoly granted to the fifth respondent, by which the Tripura Administration divested themselves of the right to grant licences to other traders. Such a monopoly can­not be upheld. (16) I may also refer to another decision of the Supreme Court: Mohammad Yasm v. Town Area Com­mittee, AIR 1952 SC 115 . In that case the Town Area Committee framed certain bye-laws, under which all right and power to levy or collect commission on sale or pur­chase of vegetables or fruits within the limits of the Town vested in the Committee or any other agency ap­pointed by the Committee and no one except the Committee was authorised to deal in- wholesale vegetables and fruits and collect the commission thereof in any place or in any event. The Committee did not frame-any bye-law for issue of licences to the vegetables and fruits merchants. The Committee then gave the contract for sale of vegetables and fruits and for collecting the com­mission for one year to one Biswambar. The result was that the wholesale dealers in vegetables and fruits had to pay a prescribed fee of one anna a rupee to the said Biswambar on the auction sale of the vegetables and fruits brought by the growers to the market and their Lord­ships found that the effect of the bye-law was to bring about a total prohibition of the business of the whole­sale dealers. The Supreme Court held that the said tee amounted to a licence fee on a business and that it would operate as a restriction on the right to carry on business and that if the licence fee cannot be justified on the basis of any valid law, no question of its reason­ableness can arise, for, an illegal impost must at all times fee an unreasonable restriction and will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to carry on his occupation, trade or business under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. The said bye-laws were framed under Section 298 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Their Lordships found that the said section did not empower the Town Area Committee to make any bye-law authorising it to charge any fee otherwise than for the use or occupation of any property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Committee and that the bye-laws went beyond the said powers. The bye-laws were, therefore, struck down by the Supreme Court. I have already pointed out that in our present case, the Forest Rules did not permit the grant of the monopoly. The effect of the monopoly is to impose a restriction on the petitioner that he cannot get a permit unless he ap­plied through the monopoly-holder and the latter, it is j certain, will demand payments over and above the royalties ;for granting such permission, as otherwise he will be a loser by taking the monopoly. Such a restriction which : Is not permitted under the Rules will infringe the right j of the petitioner to carry on his occupation, trade or business under Article 19(l)(g). (17) Another decision of the Supreme Court: Harnam Singh v. Regional Transport Authority, Calcutta Region, AIR 1954 S C 190 deals with the converse pro­position. In that case, the owners of big taxis in Calcutta, who alone had been allowed under Rule 179 of the Bengal Motor Vehicle Rules to ply taxis, protested when the rule was amended and small taxis on a lower tariff rate were allowed to ply in Calcutta. They claimed that they would go out of business if the lower tariff was introduced and small taxis were allowed to ply and that It violated their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(l)(g) and Article 14 of the Constitution. They claimed that they would go out of business if the lower tariff was introduced and small taxis were allowed to ply and that It violated their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(l)(g) and Article 14 of the Constitution. In other words, they claimed that they had been given a monopoly under the existing rule and that the rule should not be amended so as to take away this monopoly right. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and said that Article 19(l)(g) did not guarantee a monopoly to a particular individual or association to carry on any oc­cupation and if other persons were also allowed the right to carry on the same occupation and an element of competition introduced in business, that does not in the absence of any bad faith on the part of the autho­rities amount to a violation of the fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g). This decision, in fact, goes against the monopoly right granted to the fifth respon­dent and will show that such monopoly right, if introduced, is itself against Art. 19 (1) (g). (18) In that connection, I may also refer to Article 14 which specifically lays down that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the Territory of India. Thus granting of a monopoly is definitely against Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 19(6) permits the enactment of a law relating to, the carrying on by the State of any trade, business or industry to the complete or partial exclusion of citizens. That will permit a mono­poly in favour of the State. But it does not permit the State to discriminate between citizens and grant a mono­poly to one trader to the exclusion of all other traders. In our present case, the monopoly was also not based on any law, but in violation of the law. (19) It was next argued by the learned Government Advocate that Annexure "I" was a lease of Government property to the fifth respondent and that the Government like all other owners of property have every right to grant a lease of its property under the Law of the Land and that the petitioner cannot object to it on the ground that it amounts to a monopoly. The short answer to this argument is that the Govern­ment like all other property owners are also bound by law and rules framed under law and so in the case of pro­tected forests belonging to the Government, they cannot give any lease or licence in violation of the Forest Act and Forest Rules. Annexure "I", though it is called a lease, is really not a lease, as the fifth respondent did not get any right in the property thereby, but only the right to collect umbrella sticks and hence, it amounted only to a licence within the meaning of Section 52 of the Easements Act. By Section 32 of the forest Act, the Government are given the power to frame rules re­gulating the issue of licences to collect forest produce. It is this licence which has been given to the fifth res­pondent by Annexure "I" to the exclusion of all others. As I said, it is for the issue of such licences that Rule 1 of the Forest Rules in Notification No. 3 has been fram­ed by the Chief Commissioner. The said Rule will not permit the Tripura Administration to grant a monopoly licence to any person. On the other hand, the Rule read with Section 32 of the Forest Act allows persons who wish to collect forest produce from protected forests to obtain permits from Forest Officers. (20) Government are themselves bound by the Forest Act and the Forest Rules framed by them under the said Act. Government property like protected forests can be utilized and managed by the Government only in accord­ance with the provisions of the Forest Act and the Forest Rules. Even if Annexure "I" amounts to a lease as con­tended by the Government Advocate, a lease of Govern­ment property which amounts to a monopoly will also be subject to the provisions of the Forest Act and Forest Rules and if any lease granted to a person deprives the Government of the right to grant the licences contem­plated under Section 32 of the Forest Act and the Forest Rules framed thereunder and makes it impossible for traders like the petitioner to obtain such licences, it will amount to discrimination not even by law as provided under Article 19(6) of the Constitution, but by executive action which is certainly not permitted under the Consti­tution. The petitioner's contention that he has a right to carry on his trade, which is guaranteed to him under Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution and that the monopoly granted by Annexure 'I' amounts to a denial of equality before law, which is guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution is, therefore, well-founded. (21) I am not impressed with the argument of the learned Government Advocate that there are other forest areas in Tripura wherefrom the petitioner could collect umbrella sticks. Annexures A and H and the counter statement by the respondents show that the Kailasahar Range had also been let out on monopoly system during the same year and thus it was not available for traders like the petitioner. Further Forest Act and Forest Rules have to be applied equally to all protected forests and respondents cannot say that they are entitled to go against the Act and Rules in respect of any portion of the forest on the plea that they are observing the Act and Rules in respect of other portions of the forests. (22) It was brought to my notice that the period under Annexure "I" was already over on 31-12-61 and that it was no longer necessary to cancel the document. The petitioner had come forward with this Writ even in February, 1961 and the delay in the disposal of the application was because the respondents did not file their counter statements in time. The petitioner even applied In August, 1961 to stay the grant of further monopolies la the year 1962 pending the disposal of the application. I did not grant any stay, because it was not known at that stage whether the Government contemplated creat­ing such monopolies in 1962 also. I am informed that In view of the pendency of the Writ, no such monopoly has been given. It is, however, necessary that the right of the Tripura Administration to grant such monopolies under the existing Act and Rules has to be decided, even though the period of Annexure "I" is over and I have come to the conclusion that such monopolies cannot be granted. It is, however, necessary that the right of the Tripura Administration to grant such monopolies under the existing Act and Rules has to be decided, even though the period of Annexure "I" is over and I have come to the conclusion that such monopolies cannot be granted. Thus, though it may not be necessary now to cancel Annexure "I" as its period has expired, it is neces­sary to declare that it is a void document as it is in­consistent with the fundamental rights of the petitioner, guaranteed under Article 14 and Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution and also as the Tripura Administration had no right to grant such monopoly under the Forest Act and the Forest Rules. (23) It was pointed out for the respondents that the grant of the monopoly has increased the revenues of the Government and my attention was drawn to the monopoly granted in the Kailasahar Range which was said to have realised over Rs. 10,000/- while in the previous year the revenue was only Rs. 13 and odd. This argument does not appeal to me, because increase in revenue which Is quite desirable, should be achieved only in accordance with the provisions of the Statute and the Rules framed thereunder. If the Government wishes to increase the revenue, it cannot be done by mere executive action, but by arming themselves with the power to do so by proper legislation. (24) For the above mentioned reasons, this Writ ap­plication has to be allowed and a Writ has to issue de­claring that the monopoly granted by Annexure "I" in favour of the fifth respondent by respondents 2-4 is void. Ordered accordingly. Respondents 14 will pay the costs to the petitioner. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-. Petition allowed.