A. R. SOMNATH IYER, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this revision petition was the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings against whom certain properties were brought to sale and sold in lots at the instance of the decree-holder. The decree-holder purchased four items of properties and respondent 3 purchased three lots. The sale was held on June 10, 1957. ( 2 ) ON July 10, 1957, the judgment-debtor made an application in- which he stated that the decree had been adjusted out of Court by the payment of a sum of Rs. 1225/- by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder and by the agreement between the parties for the recovery of the balance of the decretal amount in due course after the remission of a part thereof. The five per cent solatium which had to be deposited for payment to the auction-purchaser was also deposited in Court. But the Courts below dismissed the judgment-debtor's application on the ground that since the entire amount of the decree had not been paid by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder, which alone in their opinion, could constitute an adjustment, the application which was presented under rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, could not lie. The Courts below accordingly refused to set aside the sale. ( 3 ) IN this revision petition, the judgment-debtor complains that the construction placed by the courts below on the adjustment on which he relied is entirely mistaken. H seems to me that Mr. Vittal Rao is right in asking me to take that view although Mr. Datar presented an argument to the contrary and contended that so long as the entire decree was not wiped out and satisfied, the arrangement on which the judgment-debtor depended would not amount to an adjustment. This argument which found favour with the Courts below, entirely overlooks the distinction between the payment of the decretal amount to the decree-holder and an adjustment of the decree, both of which can be pleaded, under the provisions of Rule 2 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. This case was one in which part OT the amount of the decree was paid by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder and there was an arrangement reached between the parties for the recovery of the balance of the decretal amount. This case was one in which part OT the amount of the decree was paid by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder and there was an arrangement reached between the parties for the recovery of the balance of the decretal amount. It is difficult to understand how anyone can suggest that this is not an adjustment. In my opinion, the Courts below were therefore in error in thinking that there was no adjustment of the decree such as would fall within the purview of Rule 2 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 4 ) ORDINARILY, what I have said so far would have been sufficient to ensure the success of this revision petition. But Mr. Datar contends that the petitioner cannot succeed in this revision petition since the application which was made under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil procedure was presented in the wrong forum. He has pointed out that the sale was held in this case not by the executing Court but by the Collector to whom the decree had been transferred for execution under the provisions of Section 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That being so, it was contended that the application together with the deposit of the five per cent solatium payable to the auction-purchaser should have been made to the Collector and not to the executing Court which it was argued had no jurisdiction or competence to deal with that application. ( 5 ) NOW, it is well settled law as pointed out by this Court in Shivaji Rao v. Niranjaniah, 39 Mys lj 587: (AIR 1962 Mys 36) that if there is an adjustment of the decree between decree-holder and the judgment-debtor and that adjustment is reported to the Court through an application presented under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is accompanied by the deposit of the five per cent solatium payable to the auction-purchaser, the application is one properly presented under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code, entitling the judgment-debtor to a cancellation of the sale. ( 6 ) MR. Datar does not dispute that it is so as indeed he cannot, having regard to the declaration of the law on that matter by this Court. ( 6 ) MR. Datar does not dispute that it is so as indeed he cannot, having regard to the declaration of the law on that matter by this Court. But he urges that this is a case in which the matter is complicated by the fact that the application was presented not to the Collector who had sold the property but to the Court which had transferred the decree to the Collector for execution. Sustenance for this contention was sought to be derived from the decision of this Court in veerabhadrappa Sangappa v. Sakhalchand, 37 Mys LJ 129, in which it was pointed out that for the purpose of obtaining the cancellation of a sale held by a Collector to whom the execution of the decree has been entrusted under Section 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of an irregularity in the conduct of the sale by the Collector, the application should be presented to the Collector and not to the executing Court which transferred the decree to him. The question is whether on that principle it would be possible to hold that an application like the one presented by the judgment-debtor in this case under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of civil Procedure should have been made only to the Collector and not to the court. ( 7 ) RULE 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:- " order XXI. Execution of Decrees and Orders. ** ** ** ** ** 89. (1) Where immovable property has been sold in Application execution of a decree, any person, either to set aside owning such property or holding an interest sale on de- therein by virtue of a title acquired before posit. such sale, may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court,- (a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to five per cent. of the purchase-money, and (b) for payment to the decree-holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree-holder. * * * * * *" Rule 2 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure under which a report may be made that a decree has Seen adjusted, reads:- "2. * * * * * *" Rule 2 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure under which a report may be made that a decree has Seen adjusted, reads:- "2. (1) Where any money payable under a decree of Payment out any kind is paid out of Court' or the decree of Court to is otherwise adjusted in whole or in part to decree hol-the satisfaction of the decree-holder, the der. decree-holder shall certify such payment or adjustment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, and the Court shall re cord the same accordingly. (2) The judgment-debtor also may inform the Court of such payment or adjustment, and apply to the Court to issue a notice to the decree-holder to show cause, on a day to be fixed by the Court, why such payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified; and if, after service of such notice, the decree-holder fails to show cause why the payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified, the Court shall record the same accordingly. (3) A payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid, shall not be recognised by any Court executing the decree. " It is clear from the provisions of Rule 2 of Order XXI of the Code that whether it is the decree-holder that reports the adjustment of a decree or whether it is the judgment-debtor that does it, the report in both cases could be made only to the Court executing the decree. It is also clear from Sub-rule (3) of this rule that the adjustment which can be recognised by the Court executing the decree is an adjustment which is certified or recorded by it. ( 8 ) RULE 89 of Order XXI also makes it manifest that the deposit required to be made by that rule in order that the sale may be set aside should be made only in the Court executing the decree from which it follows that an application for that purpose had also to be made to that Court. ( 8 ) RULE 89 of Order XXI also makes it manifest that the deposit required to be made by that rule in order that the sale may be set aside should be made only in the Court executing the decree from which it follows that an application for that purpose had also to be made to that Court. So, in cases where an application for the cancellation of a sale is made and it is accompanied by the deposit of the amount payable to the decree-holder and the solatium payable to the auction-purchaser, that that application has to be made to the Court which means the executing court, is, I think, incontrovertible having regard to the plain language of the rule. Similarly, where the cancellation of the sale is sought on the ground that there is an adjustment for which purpose the recording of that adjustment is necessary under Rule 2 of Order XXI of the Code of civil Procedure, it is equally plain from the language of Rule 2 of Order XXI of the Code that an application for that purpose has to be made only to the Court executing the decree. It is likewise clear that the deposit of the five per cent solatium payable to the auction-purchaser has normally to be made only in that Court. If, that, is the plain requirement of Rules 2 and 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, can it be said that those applications should be made to the collector in all cases in which the decree has been transferred to him for execution, and can it be said that if it is not made to the Collector but to the executing Court and the deposit is also made in the Court and not with the Collector, the judgment-debtor is not entitled to have the cancellation of the sale? ( 9 ) THERE have been cases in which the question which really engaged the attention of the Court was not whether an application made to the executing Court and a deposit made in it was a valid application or a valid deposit but whether an application made to the Collector accompanied by a deposit with him was a valid application and deposit entitling the judgment-debtor to a cancellation of the sale. No one has questioned until now, so far as I have been able to see the validity of an application made to the Court although the sale was held by a Collector, and, it seems to me that it would have been impossible for anyone to suggest that notwithstanding the requirements of Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment-debtor cannot make an application to the Court executing the decree although it has entrusted the Collector with the execution proceedings, but is under a duty to make his application to the Collector and deposit the amount with him. I can understand a difficulty arising in the case of an application presented to the Collector but I can never understand what difficulty can be presented by an application presented to the Court even in cases in which the Collector is entrusted with the execution of the decree. ( 10 ) IN Abdul Wahid v. B. Ram Krishna, AIR 1931 All 303, the properties were sold by a collector obviously under Section 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The transferee from the judgment-debtor deposited the required amount in the office of the Collector who sold the property but the money so deposited by him was transferred to the Civil Court account and intimation thereof was sent to the civil court within the prescribed period of thirty days by the collector. The question which was discussed in that case was whether the deposit with the Collector was a good deposit, the contention to the contrary being that the deposit should have been made in the court and not with the Collector. Niamatullah J. , repelling the contention that the deposit was not a good deposit thought that the transfer of the deposit to the Civil Court by, the Collector and the report thereof made by him to the Civil Court was sufficient compliance with Rule 89 of order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. This is what he said on page 304:- "it is not disputed that Ram Krishna was competent to make an application under Order 21 Rule 89, Civil P. C. The only question on which the decision of the case hinges is whether the deposit made in the Collector's office and not in the civil Court was a good deposit for the purpose of an application under Order 21, Rule 89. It is true that the rule requires the judgment-debtor, or any person deriving title from him, who desires to have the sale set aside on depositing the decretal amount and 5 per cent on the purchase money, to deposit it in "court. " which means "the Court executing the decree" and not the sale office. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case I am of opinion that the provisions of Order 21 Rule 89 were complied with. When a deposit is made in a civil Court, only a tender is filed in the Civil Court and the deposit in cash is actually made in the local treasury. In this case money was actually deposited in the Treasury on 3rd August 1929. Besides the intimation sent by the Collector's office on 12th August 1929 to the effect that the money had been transferred to the account of the civil court, the application under Order 21, rule 89, contained an allegation of payment required by Order 21, Rule 89. The civil Court called upon the applicant Ram Krishna to make a further payment of Rs. 7/-, which he did. The proceedings referred to are in my opinion tantamount to a tender made in the civil Court and deposit made in the Treasury to the account of the civil Court within 30 days of the date of sale. " The reasoning employed by the learned Judge in this case makes it perfectly manifest that even in cases in which the property is sold by the Collector, the deposit which may be made under rule 89 of Order XXI has to be made in the Civil Court and not with the Collector and that difficulties may be presented not in cases in which the deposit is made in the Civil Court but in cases where on the contrary the deposit is made with the Collector. ( 11 ) THE same process of reasoning was employed by their Lordships of the High Court of bombay in Mahadu Tukaram v. Patlu Sadu, AIR 1929 Bom 189 in which an application to the mamlatdar under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure was treated as an application made to a civil Court. ( 11 ) THE same process of reasoning was employed by their Lordships of the High Court of bombay in Mahadu Tukaram v. Patlu Sadu, AIR 1929 Bom 189 in which an application to the mamlatdar under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure was treated as an application made to a civil Court. Patkar J. , at page 190 of the report observed, after referring to rule 91-A of Order XXI made by the High Court of Bombay under Section 122 of the Code of civil Procedure, that an application under Rule 89 with a deposit made to the Collector or other officer to whom a decree is referred for execution shall be deemed to have been made to the court within the meaning of Rule 89 of Order XXI. ( 12 ) I must now turn to Rule 91-A made by the High Court of Bombay under Section 122 of the code of Civil Procedure. That rule by which the present case is governed reads: "91-A. Where the execution of a decree has been transferred to the Collector and the sale has been conducted by the Collector or by an officer subordinate to the Collector, an application under Rules 89, 90 or 91, and in the case of an application under Rule 89, the deposit required by that rule if made to the Collector or the Officer to whom the decree is referred for execution in accordance with any rule framed by the local Government under Section 70 of the Code shall be deemed to have been made to or in the Court within the meaning of Rules 89, 90 and 91. " ( 13 ) THIS rule on which Mr. Datar strongly depended far from supporting his contention in my opinion entirely negatives it. That rule which was enacted obviously for the purpose of overcoming the difficulties presented by applications and deposits made to the Collector under rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure directs an application made to him to be regarded in law as an application presented to the Court. In other words, it creates a fiction by which what had to be done by the judgment- debtor is regarded to have been done by him although he did not do it as directed by Rule 89 of Order XXI. In other words, it creates a fiction by which what had to be done by the judgment- debtor is regarded to have been done by him although he did not do it as directed by Rule 89 of Order XXI. So the rule makes it clear that the requirement of the law is that the application should be made to a Court and seeks to relieve a judgment-debtor from the hardship to which he would be exposed by the mistake committed by him in presenting the application to the Collector and not to the Court. That rule, in my opinion, has application only to cases in which a mistake of that description is committed by the judgment-debtor and cannot be pressed into service against a judgment-debtor who in strict obedience to the statutory requirement incorporated in Rule 89 makes an application to the Court and not to the Collector and deposits the amount in Court instead of depositing it with the Collector. ( 14 ) THAT was exactly the view which was expressed on the effect of Rule 91-A by a later decision of their Lordships of the High Court of Bombay in Veerappa Channappa v. Iratappa Malagi, AIR 1938 Bom 209. That was a case in which a decree was transferred to the Collector for execution and the period of limitation for an application under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil procedure expired on a day on which the Civil Court was closed. The judgment-debtor who sought the cancellation of the sale made an application for that purpose under Rule 89 to the civil court together with the deposit which he was required to make. The contention was that since the Collector's office was open when the period of thirty days expired within which an application could have been made and no such application was presented to the Collector, the application presented to the Court was barred by limitation. This contention was repelled on the ground that it was permissible for the judgment-debtor to make the application to the Civil Court since he was entitled to make that application to it under rule 89 and that Rule 91-A on the basis of which that application had been resisted had no application to the case. This contention was repelled on the ground that it was permissible for the judgment-debtor to make the application to the Civil Court since he was entitled to make that application to it under rule 89 and that Rule 91-A on the basis of which that application had been resisted had no application to the case. While discussing this question, this is what Beaumont C. J. , observed on page 209 of the report:- "the learned Judge took the view that inasmuch as the applicant might have made his application to the Collector within 30 days from the date of the sale, therefore he was not entitled to take advantage of Section 4, Lim. Act. I am quite unable to concur in that view. Rule 91-A is plainly conditional. It provides for what is to be the effect if an application is made to the collector. But it no application is made to the Collector, the Rule never comes into operation at all. There is nothing whatever to compel the applicant to make his application to the Collector, rather than to the Court. " If I may say so with respect, I entirely agree with what Beaumont C. J. has said in this case. So far as I am able to see, I see nothing in Rule 91-A of the Code of Civil Procedure which makes it obligatory on the part of the judgment-debtor to make his application only to the Collector although he has clearly a right to make an application to the Court under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. I do not find anything in AIR 1938 Bom 209 which can be regarded as any enunciation of a contrary principle. That was a case in which all that was decided was that the regularity of a sale conducted by a Collector cannot be questioned in an application made to the executing Court under Rule 90 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil procedure. That being so, that case has no resemblance to the case before me. ( 15 ) IN my opinion, the application presented by the judgment-debtor was a good application and could not have been dismissed by the Courts below. I reverse their orders and, in their place, I make an order setting aside all the sales under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil procedure. ( 15 ) IN my opinion, the application presented by the judgment-debtor was a good application and could not have been dismissed by the Courts below. I reverse their orders and, in their place, I make an order setting aside all the sales under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil procedure. All the sales held on June 10, 1957, by the Collector of all the seven lots of property are hereby set aside. ( 16 ) IN the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.