JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. These appeals arise out of two suits instituted by the plaintiff now deceased, who may referred to as the plaintiff and is represented by two of his children, who are the respondents. O. S. 162 of 1951, the earlier suit was filed in the Crangauore Munsiff's Court for eviction of the two defendants who are the appellants in these appeals from the part of a building alleged to be in their possession as tenants, and O. S. 253 of 1951, the later suit was filed in the Anjikaimal District Court for a declaration of the plaintiff's title and possession in respect of the remaining part of that building, viz., the central room and of an area of 1 acre 40 cents of the paramba on which the building stands. They were both transferred and renumbered as O. S. 190 of 1955 and O. S. 187 of 1955 of the court of the Subordinate Judge at Irinjalakuda and were tried and disposed of jointly. The title of the plaintiff, to the paramba and the building which may be referred to in this judgment wherever necessary as the suit property, has been declared and he has been allowed to recover possession by the subordinate Judge, though the tenancy set up in O. S. 190 of 1955 has been found against. A. S. 601 of 1957 is directed against the decree in O. S. 190 of 1955 and A. S. 602 of 1957 is directed against the decree in O. S. 187 of 1955. It is convenient to refer to the appellants as defendants 1 and 2 according to their rank on the array of the defendants in O. S. 187 of 1955, the first defendant being the wife of the 2nd defendant. 2. The parties are Nairs. The plaintiff had three brothers and three sisters, one of his sisters Karthiayani Amma the mother of the 1st defendant having predeceased him, and the other two being Kunjipilla Amma and Madhavi Amma, There was a partition of their properties between the plaintiff, his brothers, the two surviving sisters and the first defendant by Ext. 2. The parties are Nairs. The plaintiff had three brothers and three sisters, one of his sisters Karthiayani Amma the mother of the 1st defendant having predeceased him, and the other two being Kunjipilla Amma and Madhavi Amma, There was a partition of their properties between the plaintiff, his brothers, the two surviving sisters and the first defendant by Ext. L on Mithunam 6, 1106, in which the plaintiff's mother, who may be referred to as Pappi Amma (senior) and the plaintiff look their share as one group in schedule A. Item 1 in that schedule was the kudiyiruppa which consisted of a paramba and the building thereon, and has been referred to in the evidence as tarwad property though really no property was partitioned as tarwad property. After the death of Pappi Amma (senior), by Ext. III dated Mithunam 5, 1109 the plaintiff conveyed item 1 of A schedule in Ext. L to Madhavi Amma and her two daughters, to the first defendant and her sister Pappi Amma (junior) now no more, and to their sons on account of natural love and affection. Later by Ext. IX dated Karkatakam 12, 1111 the first defendant and her son conveyed the 2/7 share which they had under Ext. III to Kunjipilla Amma. It is the first defendant's case, that Ext. III was executed by the plaintiff to pacify some of the female members and Ext. IX was executed by the first defendant, but at the instance of the plaintiff to pacify Kunjipilla Amma, because they had a grievance that all was not fair with Ext. L. The case of the first defendant is also, that in consideration of her having parted with her right and the right of her son by Ext. IX, the plaintiff orally sold the suit property to the first defendant. The defence to the suits was that the 1st defendant has thus obtained title to the suit property and been in possession as full owner. 3. The first and most important question for decision in these appeals is whether the suit property including the building, was orally conveyed to the first defendant as pleaded. The properties divided under Ext. L were those which were said to have been acquired in the name of his mother and one of the brothers and those which had been bequeathed by the plaintiff's father. The properties divided under Ext. L were those which were said to have been acquired in the name of his mother and one of the brothers and those which had been bequeathed by the plaintiff's father. The evidence is not clear, what the specific objections were of the female members to the partition or who the objectors were, nor is it necessary to pronounce upon the merits of the objections; the evidence is also discrepant when such objections were raised, whether before or after the execution of Ext. L. But the fact that Ext. III was executed by the plaintiff notwithstanding a clause in Ext. L that the properties allotted in schedule A would vest in the plaintiff absolutely after the death of his mother, and after a prior attempt by him to lease that property by Ext. II dated Idavam 10, 1109 had failed, is suggestive that there was grumbling by some of the female members about the allotment, which was patched up thereby. Kunjipilla Amma's exclusion from the benefit under Ext. III and the subsequent transfer in her favour by Ext. IX are indicative, that her grievance came to be redressed only by the latter. There is good reason to think, notwithstanding the protestations of the plaintiff to the contrary, that Ext. IX was executed at the instance of the plaintiff. So far the first defendant appears to be on firm ground, but it seems to me on a balancing of the opposing considerations she cannot put her case higher than this. 4. The entire property of which the suit property is a part, comprised an area of nearly ten acres and belonged originally to the plaintiff's father. He mortgaged it to the plaintiff by Ext. A in the year 1084 and took it back on lease on the same date by Ext. B. The plaintiff sued on Exts. A and B and in execution purchased the property and obtained delivery of possession under Ext. D in the year 1087. As seen from Ext. F sale deed which the plaintiff executed for a part of the property in the year 1105 to P. W. 3, he had attorned to the jenmi in the year 1089. According to the first defendant, soon after Ext. D in the year 1087. As seen from Ext. F sale deed which the plaintiff executed for a part of the property in the year 1105 to P. W. 3, he had attorned to the jenmi in the year 1089. According to the first defendant, soon after Ext. L, Pappi Amma (senior) and (junior), the plaintiff and the first defendant came away from the kudiyiruppa and took up residence in the building in the suit property. The marriage of the first defendant and her sister took place in the year 1107. Later, there was some difference of opinion or quarrel between them and the latter returned with Pappi Amma (senior) to the kudiyiruppa and lived there for the rest of their lives, while not long after, the plaintiff came to live in a house which was allotted to his wife on her tarwad partition, the first defendant and her husband continuing to live in the building in the suit property. It is also her case, that when the plaintiff, Pappi Amma (senior) and Pappi Amma (junior) removed themselves, the plaintiff permitted the 1st defendant to be in possession of the suit property including the building, that upon the oral sale of the property he put her in independent possession thereof as owner and that she has been in possession as such ever since. But according to the plaintiff, he himself has been in possession of the paramba till the date of the institution of O. S. 187 of 1955 and of the building until he leased it to the defendants on Makaram 5,1121, keeping the central room to himself and in his possession. Even if Exts. III and IX were executed to redress the grievance of some of the female members, whether fancied or real, the first defendant has still to prove the passing of title by an oral sale of the suit property. In support of this, all that she could point to apart from the oral evidence is, an item of probability that she would not have parted with her rights, which were not valueless, by Ext. IX, but for some consideration which proceeded from the plaintiff. As against these are other items of probabilities and even the oral evidence has to be evaluated in the light of such probabilities. 5. IX, but for some consideration which proceeded from the plaintiff. As against these are other items of probabilities and even the oral evidence has to be evaluated in the light of such probabilities. 5. The first of these which strikes me, is the absence of a document to evidence the sale and the lack of a proper explanation for that circumstance. Although the evidence adduced by the defendants is by no means clear on the point, it would seem or it may be supposed, that one of the grievances of the females was that the suit property was not also brought into the hotch-pot for partition. The history of the acquisition of the property related above does not show that the grievance was well founded. It may be observed, that apart from the attornment to the jenmi, referred to earlier, the sale deed Ext. F for the eastern portion of the property has stood unchallenged all this time. In spite of this, the execution of Ext. III may be viewed as indicative of some grievance whether well or ill founded, felt by some of the females. But the conduct of the plaintiff deserves notice. In spite of a promise by him to convey the kudiyiruppa to Madhavi Amma, as alleged in the written statement in O. S.190 of 1955 or to make amends as alleged in the written statement in the other suit, after the death of his mother, what the plaintiff did was to execute the lease deed Ext. II for that property to stangers, when on account of the obstruction offered by some of the females, the lessees were not able to get possession and surrendered their right whatever, it was with an endorsement on Ext. II on issuing a notice Ext. IV. It was then that Ext. III was executed. This attempt to lease the kudiyiruppa came on the top of their complaint that they had been wronged at the time of partition by the plaintiff. I am prepared to believe D. W. 7 and D. W. 11 when they said, that the females had lost all faith in the plaintiff. It was at about that time and in that situation, that Ext. IX was executed. It was executed on Karkadakam 12, 1111, and registered on the next day, along with Ext. V a lease deed by the plaintiff's wife for her property. It was at about that time and in that situation, that Ext. IX was executed. It was executed on Karkadakam 12, 1111, and registered on the next day, along with Ext. V a lease deed by the plaintiff's wife for her property. Normally the plaintiff may be supposed to have attended the registry notwithstanding that he is not an attestor in Ext. IX or Ext. V, and indeed the cross examination of the plaintiff might suggest, that that was the first defendant's case too. But some of her witnesses also said that he was ill that day due to stomach ache, while others including the first defendant thought, that this did not prevent him from going over to the suit property formally to put the first defendant in independent possession. According to D. W. 4 and to D. W. 9 the first defendant, even a draft of the sale deed to the latter for the suit property was prepared. It is strange that it was not registered. If Kunjipilla Amma could insist upon a sale deed like Ext. IX, why could not the first defendant insist upon one and refuse to execute Ext. IX until her interests were properly secured? The explanation offered for this conduct has no substance. 6. In the absence of a document of sale, I can find no reasonable explanation for the first defendant's conduct in not setting out the circumstances such as they were, under which she came to execute Ext. IX, whether the recital would bind the plaintiff or not. If as stated, the plaintiff was a party to the arrangement, he would not have taken exception to such recitals in Ext. IX, but on the contrary might have welcomed them as any further complaint on that score from Kunjipilla Amma would be ruled out for all practical purposes, and as his own interests under Ext. L would be advanced. As it is, the recitals in Ext. IX still left Kunjipilla Amma herself at large, although she was a party to Ext. L, like some others who took Ext. III. The only explanation which the learned counsel was able to suggest for this strange conduct was, that the scribe who wrote Exts. L would be advanced. As it is, the recitals in Ext. IX still left Kunjipilla Amma herself at large, although she was a party to Ext. L, like some others who took Ext. III. The only explanation which the learned counsel was able to suggest for this strange conduct was, that the scribe who wrote Exts. V and IX was a relation of the plaintiff's wife, but this, valueless as it is as an explanation, overlooks the assumption on which the entire case was built that the plaintiff was a consenting party to the arrangement, had no mental reservations about it, even put the first defendant in independent possession of the property, and his own interests under Ext. L would be secured to the extent possible. 7. The subsequent conduct of the parties also is against the theory of a sale in the year 1111. D. W. 11 Madhavi Amma's son has given evidence, that the first defendant had been demanding a document but that the plaintiff had been evading. The plaintiff was said to have told D. W. 4 and 8, that he was proposing to effect a settlement when he would settle the suit property on the first defendant. The first defendant has made no written demand She did not attorn to the jenmi when if the plaintiff objected matters would have reached a critical stage, or move for the transfer of the jama. She did not even pay the jenmi's dues direct, and at the last stage of the trial a theory was attempted, that she paid the proportionate dues into the hands of the plaintiff for payment to the jenmi. In the year 1120, about six years before the suit the plaintiff executed openly and got registered a will Ext. M by which the entire property including the suit property was bequeathed to his children. To Ext. C notice of suit, the 2nd defendant sent a reply which spoke of an agreement to sell. The oral sale was not even indicated, nor was the handing over of possession to her said to be connected with it. 8. The allegation in the written statement in O. S. 190 of 1955 was that on objections to Ext. L being raised a settlement would be made with Madhavi Amma, which is different from the allegation in the written statement in the other suit. 8. The allegation in the written statement in O. S. 190 of 1955 was that on objections to Ext. L being raised a settlement would be made with Madhavi Amma, which is different from the allegation in the written statement in the other suit. The witnesses for the defendants could give no explanation for omitting Kunjipilla Amma in Ext. III; if as was suggested by the defendant she had property and building, so too Madhavi Amma had none. The above allegation in O. S. 190, would seem to exclude the first defendant and her son from the benefits of the proposed transfer. The witnesses have not given a true picture of the objections raised to the partition and when they were raised. D. Ws. 3, 4, 6 and 7 seemed to think that the objections were removed before Ext. L was executed, but D. W. 11 said otherwise. The two sisters of the plaintiff and the first defendant, a daughter of the third sister were parties to Ext. L. If the objections were all cured before the partition was effected, the clause in Ext. L, that on the death of the plaintiff's mother, the properties in schedule A would devolve on the plaintiff, and not on the members of the tarwad seems very significant. It may be, that the objections arose or were revived shortly after the death of the plaintiff's mother. Even then by the execution of Ext. IX and perhaps also of Ext. III absolute immunity against challenge could not be secured as they left other members free to impeach Ext. L before it became indefeasible by lapse of time. 9. The circumstance, that two of the brothers, a nephew and a brother-in law of the plaintiff have come forward to support the first defendant is not of much importance in the light of the above circumstances. The information of D. W. 3 as to the oral sale was hearsay, and he made no secret of his feeling that he himself had been victimised. D. W. 7 the brother inlaw Madhavi Amma's husband, had quarrelled with the plaintiff and did not even call on him during his last illness or attend his funeral. The information of D. W. 3 as to the oral sale was hearsay, and he made no secret of his feeling that he himself had been victimised. D. W. 7 the brother inlaw Madhavi Amma's husband, had quarrelled with the plaintiff and did not even call on him during his last illness or attend his funeral. D. W. 8, the eldest brother of the plaintiff had taken more than his due share at the partition and some of the acquisitions in his name were left out of it; he was adjudicated as insolvent in the year 1119 and all his properties were sold by the receiver and apparently has not much stake now in the matter. To such an extent did he identify himself with her niece the first defendant, that he said, that after the year 1091, he gave up management to his younger brother the plaintiff, apparently with a view to support the theory of the first defendant which was not so much persisted in that all his acquisitions were joint. D. W. 11 the nephew, being Madhavi Amma's son was only 22 years old at the time of Ext. L, and spoke to the proportionate payment of jenmi's dues by the first defendant to the plaintiff, which is palpably false. 10. On possession of the suit property as a circumstance in support of the case of oral sale, the burden is undoubtedly on the 1st defendant, though however as a matter for proof under Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act it would be otherwise ; the latter aspect may be adverted to at a later stage. The complaint of the plaintiff's learned counsel, that the Subordinate Judge did not advert to the plaintiff's evidence and in particular to one or two clinching circumstances to be mentioned presently, in recording a finding of possession in favour of the 1st defendant under the issue as to limitation seems justified. It is the plaintiff's case, that the central room in the building has always been in his possession and was never in the occupation of the defendants, whether as tenants or not. There is good reason to think that this is true. It is the plaintiff's case, that the central room in the building has always been in his possession and was never in the occupation of the defendants, whether as tenants or not. There is good reason to think that this is true. Admittedly, the key of that room was produced by the plaintiff before the commissioner, who made a local inspection of the property shortly after the first suit was instituted in the year 1951, and filed the report Ext. J ; the defendants had no key with them. Their present explanation is, that the central room also was in the first defendant's possession till about four or five years previously, that one day the plaintiff demanded its key from her for storing paddy and cocoanuts, and that she gave the key which is being wrongfully retained by him. In Ext. G the suit notice, the possession of that room by the plaintiff notwithstanding the tenancy was asserted in no unmistakable terms; yet the second defendant in his reply did not mention a word about the key, or about the possession of the room in particular, but contented himself with a bald statement, that the whole building was in the first defendant's possession. This is extraordinary, if as the defendants have now attempted to show, they had a specific case that the key was obtained by the plaintiff under some false pretence, and was wrongfully withheld by him. I find it impossible to place any reliance upon this part of the evidence of D. Ws. 3, 6, 9 and 10. That room is more a granary than a room as the evidence has disclosed, and even in the year 1094 when the building was leased by the plaintiff to one Subramonia Iyer under Ext. VI, it was preserved for his use. This shakes the theory of the oral sale. P. W. 3, who had taken Ext. F for the eastern portion and is in possession has testified to the demolition of the kitchen and a lean attached to this building, by the plaintiff in the year 1124 or 1125 and he was not cross examined on the point. D. W. 6 also said, that the lean has been demolished. As for the property itself, apart from Ext. E, the commissioner has said in Ext. D. W. 6 also said, that the lean has been demolished. As for the property itself, apart from Ext. E, the commissioner has said in Ext. J, that there is no boundary fence or other thing to mark off the suit property from the rest of the property in the possession of the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the defendants referred to a water channel on the western side which by itself does not signify anything. It was by a strained process of reasoning, on account of cocoanut plants 10 years old, a few arecanut plants two years old, and four jack plants ten years old in that part of the paramba, that the commissioner said in Ext. J that it could be "deemed to be a separate plot" from the remaining area. 1 do not think such plantings in the ordinary course of husbandry, presumably by the occupant of the building, whoever be may be, afford indicia of exclusive possession. The plaintiff has been paying jenmi's dues all along and not the first defendant. The defendant's evidence as to exclusive possession thus depends entirely on the oral evidence on her side, while the plaintiff can rely on the above circumstances. The evidence as to independent possession from the year 1111 led by the first defendant is inextricably connected with the case of oral sale and cannot stand apart from it. If the burden of proof lay on the 1st defendant to prove possession of the property as a circumstance she has not succeeded. However the question also arises on the issue of limitation. 11. The oral evidence has disclosed several discrepancies as regards the exact date on which the sale took place. The written statement mentioned the 11th of Karkadakam 1111 as the date. According to the defendants, the property was given on the date of the registration of Ext. IX which was Karkadakam 13. D. W. 4 at first said that it was in Mithunam, but later said that the entrustment of the property on the sale was about three or four days before Ext. IX. The evidence of D. Ws. 6 and 7 seems to show that the sale was on the date of the execution of Ext. IX. According to D. W. 11, it was on the 11 or 12th Karkadakam and the entrustment was on the date of the registration of Ext. IX. IX. The evidence of D. Ws. 6 and 7 seems to show that the sale was on the date of the execution of Ext. IX. According to D. W. 11, it was on the 11 or 12th Karkadakam and the entrustment was on the date of the registration of Ext. IX. According to D. Ws. 4, 9 and 10, the plaintiff had been to the property to make the entrustment and the handing over to the first defendant, while according to D. W. 6 this took I place from the house of the plaintiff. The evidence of the witnesses is not clear and is discrepant as to whether there was only a promise of sale or a completed sale itself. D. Ws. 4 and 8 said that the plaintiff said he would make a settlement of all his property. I quite agree that the plaintiff's deposition is a tissue of lies from the beginning, but on this point he has to succeed in spite of himself. 12. On the above facts after a balancing of the circumstances and the probabilities I come to the conclusion, that the defendants have not sustained the onus of proving that the suit property was sold to them. The plaintiff's title has to be upheld. 13. There is no evidence worth the name, in support of the tenancy for the building in favour of the defendants, set up by the plaintiff and this was not pressed. It was not disputed, that even if the tenancy is disproved, the plaintiff1 can still succeed on his title if he proves possession within twelve years of the date of the suit. This would apply to the part of the building comprised in O. S. 190 of 1955. But the learned counsel for the first defendant contended, that with regard to the rest of the property also viz., the paramba and the central room, Article 142 and not Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, would apply. The central room has been found to be in the possession of the plaintiff and so he is entitled to a declaration of such possession in O. S. 187 of 1955. The central room has been found to be in the possession of the plaintiff and so he is entitled to a declaration of such possession in O. S. 187 of 1955. To me it seems, that the question of the proper article on which much has been said by the High Courts does not arise, if it is found that the defendants' possession, if at all, has been permissive, for then the plaintiff has to succeed even under Article 142. If possession was permissive at its inception, in the absence of anything to show that the nature of the possession changed, it continued to be permissive. This proposition was not disputed at the bar. The Subordinate Judge gave the decree for possession in the two" suits on the ground, that as admitted by the defendants and as proved by the evidence of their witnesses, the possession of the defendants was permissive all the time. As remarked, the case in the written statements was, that the possession of the 1st defendant which commenced in the year 1108 after Pappi Amma (senior) and Pappi Amma (junior) returned to the kudiyiruppa, was permissive ; but they had also a further plea, that possession from the date of the oral sale was exclusive and independent. There was therefore no admission in the pleadings of permissive possession at any time within the relevant period of twelve years before the date of the suit. D. Ws. 3, 6 and 7 have testified to the permissible origin of the possession. Speaking generally, the defendants' witnesses have also spoken to the change in the character of the possession as from the date of Ext. IX, but this was as a part of and as integrally connected with the oral sale and cannot stand independently of it. The subsequent change in the nature of the possession has not been proved. If so, the presumption is that the permissive character of the possession continued. As observed, the plaintiff has a complaint that the evidence of his witnesses, particularly of P. W. 3 has not been looked into, but in the view I take of the permissive character of the possession, such evidence is not material. 14. If so, the presumption is that the permissive character of the possession continued. As observed, the plaintiff has a complaint that the evidence of his witnesses, particularly of P. W. 3 has not been looked into, but in the view I take of the permissive character of the possession, such evidence is not material. 14. I had a doubt whether having set up a case of actual possession of the paramba and the central room, in O. S. 187 of 1955, the plaintiff can rely on the evidence of the defendants' witnesses to prove the permissive origin of the defendants' possession. The suit being on title, even if the plaintiff's present possession is not proved, he can recover if otherwise he is entitled. In a case as in O. S. 190 of 1955, where the plaintiff sets up a tenancy, which is found against, decisions have held that the plaintiff can prove permissive possession. (See Krishna Pillai v. Kumara Pillai (AIR 1954 T. C. 449) and Venkiteswara Iyer v. Cheriyathu Mathen (AIR 1957 T. C. 223). The principle is stated thus in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad AIR 1951 S. C. 177 at page 179): "A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil P. C. to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the Ct. to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the Ct. cannot grant relief to the plff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings & which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plff. could have made, was not only admitted by the deft, in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plff. made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plff. a decree upon the case which the deft, himself makes. A demand of the plff. could have made, was not only admitted by the deft, in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plff. made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plff. a decree upon the case which the deft, himself makes. A demand of the plff. based on the deft.'s own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter & no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the deft, in his pleadings." The rule was also stated thus by Mookerjee J. in Ananda Chandra Chakrabarti v. Broja Lal Singha (AIR 1923 Calcutta 142 at p. 145): "The rule that the pleading and proof must correspond its intended to serve a double purpose: first, to apprise the defendant distinctly and specifically of the case he is called upon to answer; and, secondly, to preserve an accurate record of the cause of action as a protection against a second proceeding upon the same allegations. The test thus is, whether the defendant will be taken by surprise if relief is granted on the facts established by the evidence, or, as has sometimes been said, a variance between a pleading and what is proved is immaterial unless it hampers a defence or unless it relates to an integral part of the cause of action" . These considerations seem apposite to the present case. The defendants cannot be heard to complain, that they have been taken by surprise in thus acting upon evidence which they themselves have led. In view of these pronouncements and of the permissive nature of the possession, it is unnecessary to refer to other cases which were cited at the bar. It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the building comprised in O. S. 190 of 1955 and the paramba comprised in O. S. 187 of 1955 and to a declaration of the possession of the central room also comprised in the latter suit. 15. On issue 3 in O. S. 190 of 1955 as regards the rate of mesne profits the subordinate Judge has fixed it at Rs. 6/- per month on the erroneous supposition that Ext. VI, coolicharth has provided for rent at Rs. 3/- per month which was doubled to represent the rent at the present time. Ext. VI fixed Rs. 15. On issue 3 in O. S. 190 of 1955 as regards the rate of mesne profits the subordinate Judge has fixed it at Rs. 6/- per month on the erroneous supposition that Ext. VI, coolicharth has provided for rent at Rs. 3/- per month which was doubled to represent the rent at the present time. Ext. VI fixed Rs. 3/- as the rent for a year. I consider being a case of accidental error, this part of the decree may be allowed to be corrected suo moto and I order accordingly. Accordingly in A. S. 601 of 1957 the mesne profits would be at Rs. 6/- per year, 16. The only point pressed in the objection memorandum in A. S. 602 relates to the mesne profits of the property. There is no admission as contended in the security bond executed by the defendants as to the rate of mesne profits, and do not think that the Judge's finding calls for modification. In A. S. 602 of 1957 the plaintiff is given a declaration that he is in possession of the central room. Subject to this modification, and to the reduction of mesne profits to Rs. 6/- per annum in A. S. 601 of 1957, the appeals are both dismissed. The plaintiff has made false allegations as to tenancy in A. S, 601 of 1957 and his deposition is false. The Judge has allowed his costs in the two suits. In view of these and in the circumstances of the case I do nor order costs in this court, the parties shall bear their costs here. The objection memorandum also is dismissed without costs.