MODI, J.—This is an appeal by the State against a judgment and order of the first class Railway Magistrate, Jodhpur dated the 2nd January, 1960, acquitting the accused respondent Padmaram of an offence under Sec. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, (Act VIII of 1878) read with Sec. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (Act VII of 1947). 2. The prosecution case was briefly this. It was alleged that on the 18th October, 1957. information having been received that smuggled gold was being carried by certain passengers, (whose names were not mentioned) travelling by the railway train bound from Barmer for Jodhpur, P. W. 5 Kuberdan, a Deputy Superintendent of Police who, was deputed on special duty at Jodhpur in connection with anti-smuggling operations and P. W. 2, S. S. Chawla, a Deputy Superintendent of Customs at Barmer who was also at Jodhpur on that date in the same connection reached the Jodhpur Railway station at about 6-30 A.M. which was the time when the said train was to arrive at Jodhpur. They were accompanied by P. W. 1 Mohan Singh, an Inspector of the Central Excise Department, and P.W. 3 Lal Singh a Sub-Inspector of Police who also formed part of the anti-smuggling squad. P. W. Mohan Singh was standing on platform No. 2 of Jodhpur Railway Station when he saw that the accused Padmaram got down from the train towards the second line and was going towards the station platform. Mohan Singh stopped the accused as he was carrying a bag in his hand and asked him what he had therein. The accused told Mohan Singh that he did not know what was in the bag. We have it from Mohan Singh further that the accused did tell him at the time that the bag had been given over to him by some merchant (the exact word used in this connection is Bania) who was travelling with him in the same compartment but he did not know what it contained. This naturally excited his suspicion and he brought the accused on the platform with the bag. This naturally excited his suspicion and he brought the accused on the platform with the bag. The accused was then searched in the presence of Kuberdan, S. S. Chawla and two Motbirs P. W. 4 Kishan Chand and P. W. 5 Sheodutt, and it was found that tied in two pieces of cloth (and these pieces were in turn wrapped in a towel), there were two lots containing ten flat pieces of gold, biscuit shaped, and each of this pieces, weighing ten tolas, had a seal on it bearing the name of N. M. Rothchild and Sons and further bearing the figures 99.9 thereon, the latter mark presumably indicating the quality of the gold. A recovery list (Ex. P. 1) was immediately made and signed by P. Ws. Kuberdan, S.S. Chawla and Lal Singh and three Motbirs Arjun Singh, an Assistant Station Master of Jodhpur, and Sheo-Dutt, a Travelling Ticket Examiner, and by Kishan Chand, a hotel-keeper, and the last two were produced by the prosecution at the trial. A complaint was consequently filed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Ajmer, in the court of the Rly. Magistrate, Jodhpur, 27.6.58, on the aforesaid allegations, and further stating that the marks inscribed on the pieces of gold recovered from the accused indicated that the same were of foreign origin and that the officers concerned had seized the same in a reasonable belief that they had been smuggled from foreign territory in contravention of the prohibition imposed on the import of gold by the Government of India vide notifications Nos. 12(II)FI/48 dated 25th August, 1948 and I2(II)FI/5I dated the 27th February, 1951, issued under Sec. 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation, Act, 1947, and, therefore, it was alleged that the accused committed an offence under Sec. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act 1878 read with Sec. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947. It was also stated in the complaint that the Assistant Collector of Central Excise at Ajmer had authority to lodge the complaint according to a certain notification referred to therein; but we need not mention any details in that connection as the authority of the Officer concerned to file the complaint is not the subject-matter of any controversy whatever. 3. The accused respondent Padmaram pleaded not guilty to the charge which was levelled against him. 3. The accused respondent Padmaram pleaded not guilty to the charge which was levelled against him. His case, put briefly, was that he was not the owner of the gold in question nor was the gold ever recovered from his possession. According to him, two merchants were travelling with him in the same compartment and the bag from which the gold was recovered belonged to them. What had really happened, according to the version of the accused, was that the Thanedar had caught hold of all these three persons in the railway compartment itself and when the Mahajans saw the Thanedar coming, they kept the bag on the seat on the other side whereof the accused was sitting. The Thanedar asked each one of them to whom the bag belonged and to this question the Mahajans as well as the accused replied in the negative. Thereafter, the said Officer brought all the three of them to the station platform and the bag was opened there in the presence of the Motbirs and gold was found therein. Thereafter the police Officer somehow left the Mahajans scot free and implicated him. The accused produced two witnesses in his defence and we shall have occasion to refer to their evidence at the proper place. 4. In support of its case, the prosecution produced P. W. 3, S. S. Chawla, the Deputy Superintendent of Central Customs and P.W. Kuberdan, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, and P. W. 1 Mohan Singh, the Inspector of Central Excise and P.W. 3 Lalsingh the Sub-Inspector of Police, apart from P.Ws. 4 and 6 the Motbirs in whose presence the accused was searched and gold was recovered from him. As it transpired, the Motbirs staged a somersault, and more or less repudiated the recovery of gold which had been made from the accused vide Ex. P. 1. Apparently, the learned Magistrate was inclined to prefer the evidence of the Motbirs as against that furnished by the various officials referred to above and came to the conclusion that the recovery of gold from the possession of the accused had not been satisfactory established. The learned Magistrate also relied on certain contradictions to which we will have occasion to refer hereafter. The learned Magistrate also relied on certain contradictions to which we will have occasion to refer hereafter. He also found that Sec. 178A of the Sea Customs Act upon which the prosecution placed its reliance was violative of Art. 19 of the Constitution, and reliance was placed in coming to this conclusion on N.S. Chetty V. Coll. of Customs(1) Therefore, according to the learned Magistrate, the burden of proving that the gold was smug gled lay on the prosecution and this burden it had failed to discharge. The learned Magistrate, however, was clearly of the opinion that the defence evidence led by the accused was entirely unworthy of belief; but as he was of the view that the prosecution had failed to prove its own case, the worthlessness of the defence evidence was of no consequence, and in that view of the matter, he acquitted the accused. Hence the present appeal. 5. The learned Government Advocate has strenuously attacked the judgment of the trial Magistrate, and we shall deal with his grounds one by one. 6. The learned Government Advocates first ground of attack was that the finding of the learned Magistrate that twenty gold pieces were not proved to have been recovered from the possession of the accused was entirely wrong and almost bordered on perversity. It was submitted in this connection that there was no reason to doubt the evidence of witnesses for the prosecution having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the more so as the learned Magistrate had entirely disbelieved the defence evidence on this aspect of the case. There is force in this submission. The most important evidence relating to this aspect of the case is that of Inspector Mohan Singh P. W. 1. The testimony of this witness is that as the accused was going towards the station having alighted from the train in the direction of the second line, he stopped him and asked him what he had in his bag. The accused said that the bag had been handed over to him by some Mahajans and that he did not know what it contained. The accused said that the bag had been handed over to him by some Mahajans and that he did not know what it contained. This was perfectly sufficient to lead the witness to entertain the reasonable belief that he was carrying smuggled goods and this belief was more than justified when the accused was searched by the witness in the presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police Kuberdan and the Deputy Superintendent of Customs S.S. Chawla and twenty pieces of gold weighing 200 tolas were found hidden in his bag and these pieces bore marks of foreign manufacture. The evidence of Mohan Singh is fully supported by that of S. S. Chawla and Kuberdan. In these circumstances, we are amazed that the learned Magistrate should have held that the recovery of the gold from the possession of the accused was not fully established. We are not unmindful in this connection of the circumstance that the two Motbirs who had witnessed the recovery of the gold had turned turtle. But it should have been quite obvious to the learned Magistrate that the evidence which they gave in court ran directly contrary to that furnished by the memo of recovery which was signed by them. No room for the slightest doubt in this connection could have remained in any reasonable mind when the accused himself admitted that gold had been recovered from the bag in the presence of the Motbirs. 7. The only question which then remains to consider is whether the bag was in the possession of the accused when he was caught. The story related by the accused in this connection is fantastic. According to him, he was caught by the Thanedar while he was sitting in the train along with two other Mahajans, (the person who actually caught him was Mohan Singh but , that hardly makes any difference), and the Mahajans to whom the bag belonged left it on the seat in between themselves and the accused, and when the Thanedar interrogated each one of them to whom the bag belonged, they all disowned it and then all these three persons and the Thanedar got down from the train and the bag was searched and thereafter these two other persons were allowed to go and the accused was implicated in the crime. "We find it extremely difficult to believe this story because if that was so, then accused would not have been found in the actual possession of the bag when he was searched. It is not the case of the accused that the bag had been thrust into his possession by the police before he was made to get put of the compartment. And if that was so how he was searched by Mohansingh in the presence of the officers and the Motbirs. Learned counsel for the accused has no answer to return to this difficulty of defence case. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the story concocted by the accused that the bag belonged to two other persons and that he did not know anything about it or the contents therein is a simple myth, and it is entirely incredible. In fact, this is the story which, in the main, the defence witnesses were prepared to give and the learned Magistrate came to a positive finding that evidence was entirely useless, a finding with which we entirely agree, and yet, to our intense amazement, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the evidence of the prosecution relating to the recovery was not worthy of belief. Quite obviously, it will be ridiculous to suggest that the officials concerned had spuriously planted such a heavy quantity of gold, easily, of the value of about Rs. 20,000/- if not more, into the bag of the accused. 8. We shall now deal briefly with some of the contradictions which seem to have weighed unnecessarily heavily with the learned trial Magistrate. In the first place, he thought that while P. W. 3 Lalsinghs evidence was that he and Mohansingh had searched the accused together, Mohansingh did not mention the name of Lalsingh in that connection, although the learned Magistrate himself accepts that even according to Mohansingh, Lalsingh was at the railway station on that particular morning. Assuming that there is a slight inconsistency in statement": of P. W. Lalsingh and Mohansingh as to the happenings at that particular stage, we are clearly of opinion that nothing really turns on that. It is possible that Lalsingh may have really come to the place where the accused had been caught hold of by Mohansingh a little later. Assuming that there is a slight inconsistency in statement": of P. W. Lalsingh and Mohansingh as to the happenings at that particular stage, we are clearly of opinion that nothing really turns on that. It is possible that Lalsingh may have really come to the place where the accused had been caught hold of by Mohansingh a little later. That does not falsify the evidence of Mohansingh, and even the learned Magistrate was not prepared to hold that the evidence of Mohansingh could be disbelieved on that account. 9. Another slight inconsistency which seems to have loomed large in the mind of the learned Magistrate was that whereas according to Mohansingh, that recovery list was prepared by S. S. Chawla himself, the latter said that it had been prepared by Lalsingh under his directions and that he had signed it. We are entirely unable to understand that an inconsistency of that description can have any real relevance on the substance of the case. There is no doubt that a recovery memo was prepared of the gold which was found in the possession of the accused and that the same had been signed by a number of persons including S. S. Chawla himself. 10. Yet another factor which seems to have greatly exercised the mind of the learned Magistrate is the evidence of the Motbirs Kishenchand and Sheodutt. We have had some thing to say about the worth of the evidence of these witnesses in the foregoing part of our judgment and having regard to what we have said above we have not the slightest hesitation in saying that the evidence of these witnesses was false and incredible and such evidence could not on any rational principles of appraisement of evidence be preferred to the other evidence of the witnesses with whose veracity no serious fault could be found. 11. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the finding of the learned Magistrate that the gold was not proved to have been recovered from the possession of the accused is completely wrong and we are fully satisfied that there is no valid reason not to accept the case of the prosecution at its face value so far as this aspect thereof is concerned. We hold accordingly. 12. We hold accordingly. 12. This brings us to the next question pertaining to the unconstitutionality of S. 178 A of the Sea Customs Act on account of its alleged conflict with Art.19 (1) (f) (g) of the Constitution. Sec. 178A reads as follows:— 178—A. Burden of proof.—(l) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods are seized. (2) This section shall apply to gold, manufactures, diamonds and other precious stones, cigarettes and cosmetics and any other goods which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. (3) Every notification issued under Sub-s.(2) shall be laid before both houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is issued. Fortunately for us, it is unnecessary to canvass this contention at any length as in the meantime this very controversy happened to engage the attention of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Collector of Customs, Madras, and another Vs. Nathella Sampatha Chetty and another, and the Collector of Customs, Madras (Civil appeals No. 408 to 410 of 1960). This decision is still unreported but a blue print thereof is before us for our perusal, and after an elaborate discussion of all the relevant grounds of attack, if we may say so with all respect, it was held by their Lordships that the rule of evidence contained in Sec. 178 A was in the interest of general public and that it was not correct to say that the rule travelled beyond the due bounds of reasonableness because it could not be said that the social good to be achieved by this kind of legislation was disproportionate to the importance of the object to be achieved by it, namely, the prevention and eradication of smuggling. That being so, the view entertained by the learned Magistrate based on N.S. Chetty V. Collector of Customs (supra) must be held to be no longer tenable and has to be vacated, and the prosecution would undoubtedly be entitled to the benefit of this provision provided that it can properly bring itself within the four walls of this rule. 13. That being so, the view entertained by the learned Magistrate based on N.S. Chetty V. Collector of Customs (supra) must be held to be no longer tenable and has to be vacated, and the prosecution would undoubtedly be entitled to the benefit of this provision provided that it can properly bring itself within the four walls of this rule. 13. Therefor, there can be no doubt that if any goods, to which S. 178 A applies, were seized in this case under the reasonable belief that they were smuggled, then the prosecution are relieved from the burden of proving that the goods are smuggled ones and the burden of proving that they are not smuggled must rest on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. Now, it is not the contention of the defence that the kind of goods, namely gold, which was seized in this case does not fall within the mischief of this section. The only question, therefore, is whether they were seized by the person or persons concerned in the reasonable belief that they were smuggled. Our attention has been drawn in this connection to the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Manka Vs. The State(2) in so far as it bears on the question of reasonable belief, and it is a submitted that the question of reasonable belief is a subjective affair for the Officer making the seizure, and, therefore, where affirmative evidence as to such Officer having entertained the requisite belief has not been given, as in the present case, it will not be right for the court to infer, from the circumstances which might have inspired a reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled, that Officer had entertained a reasonable belief to that effect. And that being so, fully granting that Sec. 178A is valid, the prosecution would still not be entitled to the benefit of the rule contained in Sec. 178A, and the burden of proving that the goods were smuggled would still lie on it where such evidence is not forthcoming. It would not be inappropriate, if we state the learned Judges view in his own words before we proceed to consider it:— "It will be seen that neither of the two officers stated that he seized the gold in the reasonable belief that it was smuggled. It would not be inappropriate, if we state the learned Judges view in his own words before we proceed to consider it:— "It will be seen that neither of the two officers stated that he seized the gold in the reasonable belief that it was smuggled. The evidence and circumstances appearing in the statements of these two officers are such that it was possible for them, to have entertained a reasonable belief that the gold recovered from the possession of Manka was smuggled gold. But whether or not they did actually entertain such a belief or merely a suspicion, they alone could know. The court can only infer on the basis of the evidence and circumstances proved in the case whether there were reasonable grounds existing on the basis of which the officers could have entertained a reasonable belief. But the court cannot say whether or not they did enter tain such a belief or merely a suspicion, Belief is a subjective matter. For a belief to exist there must be a believer and it is that believer who must believe that the gold is smuggled gold at the time he seizes them. Then alone the provisions of Sec. 178-A are attracted. I accordingly hold that in the present case it has not been proved that the gold was seized by the customs officers under the reasonable belief that it was smuggled one. The provisions of Sec. 178-A are accordingly not attracted. The burden, therefore, lay on the prosecution to prove that the gold was smuggled one." With respect, it appeared to us at the time of the arguments that the view of reasonable belief which is propounded in the paragraphs extracted above was perhaps unduly narrow. The reason is that the real requirement of the provision is not a mere belief which would be entirely subjective, but a reasonable belief, that is, a belief which should be supported by reasons. And to prove such a requirement, the mere repetition on the part of the seizing Officer that he had a reasonable belief should hardly improve matters so far as the satisfaction of this particular requirement goes. What we mean to say is that the Legislature could have hardly considered sufficient a mere repetition of the phrase "reasonable belief" as a sort of an incantation unless the belief could be supported by reasons. What we mean to say is that the Legislature could have hardly considered sufficient a mere repetition of the phrase "reasonable belief" as a sort of an incantation unless the belief could be supported by reasons. Therefore, where no reasons can be shown for the mere subjective belief on the part of the Officer concerned that the goods were smuggled, Sec. 178 A would, in our opinion, not be satisfied even if the Officer making the seizure repeated these words. Per contra, it seems to us that whether the Officer repeated these words or not, if it can be shown on the material before the Court that he had or could have a reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled and therefore he had it, no matter that he did not use the specific words in the evidence he gave in court, even then the requirements of this section would be satisfied, and then the presumption contained therein would arise in favour of the prosecution, and then it would be for the accused to prove that the goods were not smuggled. In other words, the requirement of "reasonable belief" is in fact an objective requirement and there is no reason in logic or in common-sense why it should not be held that to be satisfied if there happen to be evidence and circumstances appearing in the prosecution case on the basis whereof the Officer seizing the goods could have entertained a reasonable belief that the goods recovered were smuggled. 14. We feel greatly fortified in the view we have propounded above by certain observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Collector of Customs, Madras, and another Vs. Nathelia Sampathu Chetty and another, and the Collector of Customs, Madras (supra). 14. We feel greatly fortified in the view we have propounded above by certain observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Collector of Customs, Madras, and another Vs. Nathelia Sampathu Chetty and another, and the Collector of Customs, Madras (supra). As one of the grounds on which the validity of S. 178A was attacked before the Supreme Court, it was urged that the requirement of Sec, 178A, namely., that the belief of the Officer seizing the goods should rest on reasonable grounds provided, no safeguard to the citizen, as the seizing-officer would entertain such a belief on unproved information gathered from sources which most often are not and in practice cannot he expected to be disclosed to the parties affected, and in that connection it was further urged , that the reasonable belief of the Officer was one entirely for his subjective satisfaction and that this rendered the protection wholly illusory and, therefore, unreasonable. And in support of this submission, a passage from an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Babulal Amthalal Mehta Vs. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta (3) was relied on which runs as follows:— "the only pre requisite for the application of the section is the subjectivity of the Customs Officer in having a reasonable belief that the goods are smuggled." The learned Solicitor-General, who appeared on behalf of the Collector of Customs, candidly accepted that the passage quoted above was "just an observation and that he would not support it," and it was accepted that a seizure to which Sec. 178A was applicable was merely a preliminary to proceedings before a quasi-judicial authority under Sec. 182, and that when the matter came up for adjudication before that authority, the latter would have to be satisfied that the seizure was made "in the reasonable belief that the goods seized had been smuggled ones, and that such satisfaction would necessarily involve the examination of the grounds upon which that belief was entertained with a view to ascertain whether the belief was reasonable. Their Lordships obviously accepted this view and observed as follows:— "It is, no doubt, true that in some cases there might be pieces of information on the basis of which the seizure was effected which might not be capable of being disclosed to the affected party because it might consist of information supplied by customs informers, but if that information would have to stand the test of scrutiny as to credibility by an independent officer dealing with it in a quasi-judicial capacity it cannot be said that the protection is illusory. It has also to be added that at the stage of appeal or revision from the orders of the officer adjudging confiscation under sec. 182 of the Act each successive appellate or revisional authority has also to address itself to this requirement." Earlier, their Lordships had also observed in their judgment that although there, was no doubt on the language of Sec. 178A that the presumption of the goods being smuggled would arise only when the seizure was made by an Officer entertaining a reasonable belief that the goods are smuggled, and in that sense the reasonable belief of the seizing Officer was a prerequisite for the statutory onus to arise, but it was also true that at the stage of the adjudication the reasonableness of the belief of the officer affecting the seizure that the goods were smuggled would be the subject-matter of investigation by the adjudicating Officer. All that we should like to add further in this connection is that what their Lordships observed as respects the necessity of satisfying the adjudicating authority under Sec. 182 as to the reasonableness of the belief on the part of the Officer seizing the goods that they were smuggled ones would a fortiori apply in the case of a criminal trial which is before a court of law. In other words, before the prosecution can be allowed to rely on the presumption arising under Sec. 178-A, it must prove that there were facts and circumstances, on the basis of which the officer seizing the goods could have entertained the reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled. We hold accordingly. 15. In other words, before the prosecution can be allowed to rely on the presumption arising under Sec. 178-A, it must prove that there were facts and circumstances, on the basis of which the officer seizing the goods could have entertained the reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled. We hold accordingly. 15. The true question for determination, therefore, as a pre-requisite for the application of S. 178-A would be whether it can be said on the circumstances and facts of the present case that the seizing officer had at the time of the seizure of the goods reasonable grounds to entertain the belief that the goods seized had been smuggled, and a mere repetition of the words "reasonable belief" at the trial or a mere failure to do so on the part of such officer could not really be decisive. 16. Now, let us look at the evidence offered by the prosecution in this case in the light of the principle we have enunciated above. The facts brought to light in this connection may be summarised as follows:— (1) P.W. 1 Mohansingh, the Inspector of Central Excise Department, was the man who first detected the accused. His evidence is that he found the accused alighting on the wrong side of the Jodhpur Railway Station from the railway train which was coming from Banner, a town near the border between Pakistan and India. (2) This man was carrying a bag in his hand and so he stopped him and asked him what he had in the bag. (3) The accused was obviously flabbergasted, and what may be said at the best for him was that he said that the bag did not belong to him and that two Mahajans had given it to him and that he did not know what was contained therein. This naturally caused reasonable suspicion that all was not well. (4) Then the Inspector brought the accused to the station-platform and produced him before P.Ws. Kuberdan and S. S. Chawla, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent, Customs Department, respectively. These officers ordered his search whereupon it was found that inside the bag in two lots covered by two pieces of cloth, which in their turn were wrapped in a towel there were in all twenty biscuit-shaped flat pieces of gold weighing asmuch as 200 tolas. These officers ordered his search whereupon it was found that inside the bag in two lots covered by two pieces of cloth, which in their turn were wrapped in a towel there were in all twenty biscuit-shaped flat pieces of gold weighing asmuch as 200 tolas. (5) What was more, it was also found that on each of these pieces, the name of N. M. Rothchild & Sons together with the figures 99.9 was inscribed and the officers knew that the said firm was a foreign firm, and, therefore, the gold was of foreign manufacture. (6) The accused was not a dealer in gold and besides he was hardly a person who could have purchased 200 tolas of gold in the open market in the normal course of trade. | 17. We may also point out in this connection that S. S. Chawla, the Deputy Superintendent of Customs, clearly stated in court that the gold which was seized from the accused was of foreign manufacture and that the gold which is produced in India is of the fineness of 99.5 and not of 99.9 as the gold recovered was. In his cross-examination, Chawla had further stated that when the accused had been interrogated as to what was contained in his bag, he replied that he did not know, Even if we were to accept the evidence of Lalsingh on this point, who, as we have said above, appears to us to have come later, the accused kept quiet and did not give any reply. Even that was sufficient to arouse reasonable suspicion that the accused was carrying smuggled goods. 18. The short question on the facts and circumstances narrated above was whether the officer or officers effecting the seizure could be said to entertain a reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled within the meaning of S. 178-A. Our answer to this question is positively yes. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the seizing-officer or officers had, at the time of effecting the seizure, a reasonable belief that the goods recovered from the accused were smuggled ones. It must follow therefore that the burden that the goods were not smuggled statutorily shifted on to shoulders of the accused. Such proof is utterly lacking in this case. It must follow therefore that the burden that the goods were not smuggled statutorily shifted on to shoulders of the accused. Such proof is utterly lacking in this case. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the goods must be held to have been proved to be smuggled ones within the meaning of the Sea Customs Act. 19. The next question that falls for determination is whether the other requirements as to knowledge and intention which are the essential ingredients of an offence under S. 167 (81) are fulfilled in this case. Firstly, as to whether the accused was knowingly carrying smuggled goods: what does this requirement involve? Our attention in this connection has again been invited to certain observation in Mankas case (supra,)— "Even in cases in which a presumption can be drawn under Sec. 178-A, it has further to be established that the person knew that goods were smuggled ones. For the presumption raised under that section is not that the person from whom the gold is seized under a reasonable belief is a smuggler or is in any manner concerned in smuggling of that gold or that he is in possession of it knowing that it is smuggled." We have carefully considered this matter and are disposed to hold that where sec. 178-A has once rightly come into play, then the burden of proving that the goods were not smuggled shifts by force of statutory law on to the accused, and the prosecution is relieved of the duty of affirmatively proving that the goods were smuggled, and that in that class of cases, therefore, where the accused fails to give any satisfactory explanation for his possession then all that would be further necessary for the prosecution to establish would be that the accused was doing any one of the things mentioned in sec. 167(81) knowingly, that is, consciously, or, if we may say so, otherwise than by sheer accident. We are, therefore, unable to see any merit in the view that the prosecution must still establish in a case of this character by evidence aliunde that the goods which he was in possession of or was otherwise concerned with were smuggled. It may be that the accused in a conceivable case does succeed in explaining his possession even where a presumption is raised under sec. It may be that the accused in a conceivable case does succeed in explaining his possession even where a presumption is raised under sec. 178-A such as by proving that the goods had been dumped into his godown by any inimical rival without his knowledge or that he had purchased the goods in the open market for a fair price in the normal course of his trade and had, therefore, no reason to suspect that the goods were smuggled, and in this class of cases we think that it would be certainly for the prosecution to establish the two-fold ingredient of (1) knowingly and (2) possessing or being otherwise concerned with "smuggled" goods. But in a case where a presumption can be properly raised under Sec. 178A and the accused has furnished no explanation whatever for his possession of a dutiable or a prohibited commodity and or the explanation offered by him is unworthy of credence, then, in our opinion, all that would be necessary to satisfy the ingredient of knowledge within the meaning of Sec. 167(81) would be for the prosecution to prove that the accused was in conscious possession of the goods in question or was otherwise consciously connected with them in any one of the modes mentioned therein. If that is a correct exposition of the law on this aspect of the case as we think it is, then we find ourselves unable to agree with the view propounded in Mankas case (supra) if and in so far as it lays down anything to the contrary, and would hold that it is not sound. 20. Let us now apply the aforementioned principles to the present case. We have already held that Sec. 178 A was rightly attracted into application in this case. We have also held that 200 tolas of gold was recovered from the possession of the accused. There was, therefore a strong prima facie case against the accused. The explanation offered by the accused for his possession has also been held to be entirely incredible and therefore the burden to prove that the goods had been duty paid or had been imported lawfully lay on the accused which has not been discharged. The question then is was the accused harbouring these goods knowingly? We have no doubt that the accused was knowingly, that is, consciously carrying the goods in the present case. The question then is was the accused harbouring these goods knowingly? We have no doubt that the accused was knowingly, that is, consciously carrying the goods in the present case. There can be no question that the bag in which the gold was contained, and this gold was weighing 200 tolas, could have been carried by him accidentally or that some body had forcibly thrust it into his hand of which there is neither an allegation nor proof. Again, it is not the case of the accused that he had purchased these goods from some body in the open market and in the ordinary course of trade, and, therefore, he had no knowledge or reason to believe that the goods were uncustomed. We, therefore, hold that the requirement of knowingly carrying smuggled goods is fully established in this case. 21. The only other question is whether the necessary intent to defraud the Government of any duty payable thereon or to evade any prohibition or restriction for the import of gold into India can be held to have been established as well. Now, the law is well-settled that intention is not a matter which can be directly proved and has to be inferred on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Where, therefore, the prosecution is able to prove that the goods were smuggled and that the accused had them in his conscious possession for use or sale, it would as a rule follow in the absence of any other circumstance that he intended to defraud the revenue or evade the restrictions imposed on the import of the goods which were recovered from his possession. See R.V. Cohen (4) and Sayce Vs. Coupe(5) in this connection. It may perhaps be possible to conceive of cases where such an intent may be negatived; but we see no such circumstances in the present case, and, therefore, hold that the requisite intent prescribed under Sec. 167(81) also stands proved. 22. From what we have said above, we hold that the accused is guilty of an offence under Sec. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act read with Sec. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 23. 22. From what we have said above, we hold that the accused is guilty of an offence under Sec. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act read with Sec. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 23. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Magistrate and hereby convict the accused respondent of an offence under Sec. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act read with Sec. 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, and sentence him to one years rigorous imprisonment. As the accused is out on bail, we hereby direct the District Magistrate, Jodhpur, to take the necessary steps to arrest him and send him to jail to undergo the sentence we have awarded to him. 24. A prayer for grant of a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court is made; but we see no sound reason to grant the same. The prayer is rejected.