MEHROTRA, C. J.: These three appeals raise common questions and are disposed of by one judgment. (2) Briefly the facts giving rise to these appeals are that the decree-holders respondents brought a suit for recovery of some amounts against the appellant judgment-debtor as maintenance and for accounts on the ground that under a certain Wakf the plaintiffs were entitled as beneficiaries to certain amount of money and share in the wakf property. The appellant judgment-debtor was asked to render accounts. The defence taken by the Mutawalli apart from other defences was that the plaintiffs have overdrawn a large sum of money. There were two suits filed by different sets of beneficiaries. The suits were decreed by the trial court and two appeals numbered as First Appeals Nos. 8 of 1956 and 9 of 1956 were filed by the judgment-debtor before this court. The parties compromised the matter m first appeal on the 16th December, 1958 and the appeals were accordingly disposed of in accordance with that compromise. The relevant portio of the compromise are as follows: "(d) That the trial Court passed a preliminary decree for accounts to be given by defendant No. 1, Mvi. Amoar Mi Barlaskar (Mutawalli) of the Wakf properties of the two Wakf deeds for the period from 1-1-1944 to 31-12-1952. Both the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 Ambar Ali Barlaskar agree that defendant No. 1, Mvi. Ambar Ali Barlaskar, will give accounts of the Wakf properties for the above period to the plaintiff, Ataur Rahman Barlaskar and others, within one year of the date of receipt of the account books from the Hon'ble Assam High Court and they (the plaintiffs) will scrutinize and examine the accounts. If, after such scrutiny and examination of accounts, both parties agree as to the amount due to the plaintiffs, or overdrawn by the plaintiffs, defendant No. 1 Ambar Ali Barlaskar, as Mutawalli, will pay the amount due to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs will also have to refund the amount, if any, found overdrawn by them, to defendant No. 1, Ambar Ali Barlaskar (Mutawalli).
If, after such scrutiny and examination of the accounts, plaintiffs and defendant No. 1, Ambar Ali Barlaskar, do not agree as to the amount due to the plaintiffs or overdrawn by the plaintiffs, or in case the defendant No. 1 failed to render any accounts as aforesaid, the matter will be referred to the decision of the following three arbitrators viz.,- 1. Shamsuddin Laskar, son of late Haji Abdul Tahir Laskar, of Uttar Khishnapur, Silchar. 2. Haji Fakaruddin, son of Safee Mahammad Ali of Silchar. 3. Abdul Jalil Laskar, son of Haji Isub Ali Laskan Rangpur, Silchar. and the decision of the arbibtrators or the majority f them on scrutinising accounts or account books, will De final and binding upon the parties; * * * * * (f) That till the final settlement of accounts, defendant No. 1, Ambar Ali Barlaskar, will pay to the plaintiffs Rs. 150/- in cash per month and 50 mds. of paddy er year as maintenance allowance and it will be received by plaintiff Ataur Rahman Barlaskar on behalf of all the plaintiffs. In default, the plaintiff Ataur Rahman Barlaskar will refer the matter to the aforesaid arbitrators and if the arbitrators fail to make any settlement within one month from the date of the reference the plaintiffs will be entitled to recover maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 3007- per month from the date of default i-n accordance with the order of the learned Subordinate Judge in said Title Suit by executing the said order as a decree passed In the suit." The compromise decree consists of two parts. One deals with the relief for accounts and the other deals with the relief for maintenance. So far as the question of settlement of accounts the compromise provides that the Mutawalli will submit accounts to the beneficiaries within a certain period. If the parties agree as to the actual amount which the plaintiffs had overdrawn or the Mutawalli has failed to pay, the parties will respectively pay the said amount to the other party. If however there was any dispute with ward to the actual amount, the matter was to be referred to certain arbitrators mentioned in the compromise itself.
If the parties agree as to the actual amount which the plaintiffs had overdrawn or the Mutawalli has failed to pay, the parties will respectively pay the said amount to the other party. If however there was any dispute with ward to the actual amount, the matter was to be referred to certain arbitrators mentioned in the compromise itself. As regards the maintenance, clause (f) of the compromise expressly provides that till the final settlement of accounts, defendant No. 1, Ambar Ali Barlaskar, will pay to the plaintiffs beneficiaries a certain sum of money as maintenance allowance. If there was any default in payment of the maintenance, the plaintiff Ataur Rahman Barlaskar will refer the matter to the aforesaid arbitrators and if the arbitrators fail to make any settlement within one month from the date of the reference the plaintiffs will b& entitled to recover maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 3007- per month from the date of default in accordance with the order of the learned Subordinate Judge in said Title Suit by executing the said order as a decree passed in the suit. The judgment-debtor according to the beneficiaries committed default in payment of the maintenance amount. Thereafter a notice was given by Ataur Rahman Barlaskar to the arbitrators referring the dispute to them for adjudication and pointing out to them that tne Mutawalli has committed default in payment of the maintenance and the arbitrators were empowered under the terms of the compromise to decide the dispute. As the arbitrators failed to settle the matter within one month of the receipt of the notice, the beneficiaries made application for execution of the decree of the trial court by recovery of Rs. 3007- per month as the maintenance against the MutawaMi. These appeals arise out of different applications for different periods. (3) The main contentions raised by the appellant are two. Firstly he contends that the notice which was given to the arbitrators was only given by one of the beneficiaries and not all the beneficiaries and as such the notice was not proper and the arbitrators could not act under that notice. The terms of the compromise have already been fully set out in the earlier part of our judgment.
Firstly he contends that the notice which was given to the arbitrators was only given by one of the beneficiaries and not all the beneficiaries and as such the notice was not proper and the arbitrators could not act under that notice. The terms of the compromise have already been fully set out in the earlier part of our judgment. In clause (f) it is expressly laid down that maintenance allowance will be received by plaintiff Ataur Rahman Barlaskar on behalf of all the plaintiffs and in default Ataur Rahman Barlaskar alone will be entitled to refer the, matter to the aforesaid arbitrators. In view of this express provision in the compromise that Ataur Rahman Barlaskar alone will be entitled to refer the matter to the arbitrators, It cannot be said that the notice was invalid and thus the arbitrators could not act on such a notice. Secondly it is contended that under rule 3 of Schedule 1 attached to the Indian Arbitration Act the period for submission of the award by the arbitrators is four months and unless the arbitrators submit their award the application for execution of the decree will be premature. There are two answers to this contention. Firstly on the plain interpretation of the terms of the compromise the right to apply for recovery of the maintenance amount by way of execution arises as soon as the arbitrators fail to give their award within one month of the reference, mere is nothing in the compromise therefore, which shows that the right to apply for execution will accrue only after the award has been given by the arbitrators. On the contrary clause (f) provides for a default clause. On the failure of the arbitrators to submit the award within one month the cause of action arose in favour of the decree-holders to apply for execution of the decree. The question therefore of the applications being premature does not arise. (4) It is further contended that as the arbitrators are supposed to know the provisions of rule 3 of Schedule I attached to the Arbitration Act and not of the terms 01 the compromise, the proper way of interpreting clause (t) of the compromise should be that the period of one month should start from the date of the submission of the award and not from the date of the notice. We see no substance in this contention.
We see no substance in this contention. It will be doing violence to the plain language of clause (f) of the compromise which expressly provides that the right to apply for execution arises if the arbitrators fail to give their award within one month of the reference. If the parties to the compromise intended that the period of one month was to run after the period of four months there should have been an express provision in the compromise to that effect. On the interpretation of the plain language of the compromise, in our opinion, the only meaning which can be put is that in case the arbitrators fail to submit their award within one month, the right to apply for execution of the decree of the trial court arose in favour of the beneficiaries after the expiry of the said period. (5) The second argument which has been advanced on behalf of the opposite parties is that section 3 of the Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration agreement, unless a different intention is expressed therein, shall be deemed to include the provisions set out in the first Schedule so far as they are applicable to the reference. Even if the argument of the judgment-debtor is accepted that the period of four months will be treated to be the implied term of the agreement, it will have to be subject to the express intention of the parties in the agreement itself ana we find that there is an express intention in the agreement to the effect that the period should be one month. Even assuming that the argument of the appellant is correct that the period of one month does not replace the period of four months for submission of the award, the only result which will follow from that will be that even if the award is submitted beyond one month but within four months the award may not be beyond time. But so far as the right of the beneficiaries to execute the decree is concerned, it arose on the failure of the arbitrators to submit their award within one month and we are only concerned at this stage as to whether the application for execution was maintainable .or not, and not with the validity or otherwise of the award submitted by the arbitrators.
The whole intention as disclosed from the document of compromise is that the beneficiaries should not suffer and should be entitled to draw their maintenance 'amount even though the matter of the settlement of accounts may be delayed. The entire object of the compromise will be frustrated if the arbitrators delay the decision and thus deprive the beneficiaries of their maintenance, we therefore, see no substance in these appeals and they are dismissed. Appeal No. 21 of 1961 is dismissed with costs and in the other appeals the parties will bear their own costs. (6) S. K. DUTTA J.: I agree. Appeals dismissed.'