JUDGMENT Brijlal Gupta, J. - This second appeal and second appeals 2509 of 1955 and 2376 of 1955 arise out of three suits which were consolidated and tries together and appeals against the decrees of which, were also disposed of by common judgment by the lower appellate court. 2. The appeals are by plaintiffs in the suits. The suits were for cancellation of leases in favour of the defendants and for recovery of possession. the suits were decreed by the trial court. The defendants went up in appeal to the lower appellate court negatived the case of the plaintiffs and Safdar Khan or that the cultivation by Safdar Khan of any plots as Khudkasht of Safdar Khan and were also in his exclusive cultivation until Safdar Khan executed the leases in favour of the defendants. This is a fact and naturally therefore it has not been possible for learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants to contest it before me. 3. The defendants raised the plea before the lower appellate court that having regard to the nature of the suits, the suits were liable to be stayed under R. 4(2) (v) and to be abated under R.5 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The lower appellate court accepted the plea, allowed the appeals of the defendants-appellants, set aside the decrees of the trial court and abated the suits. 4. The only point urged before me by learned before me by learned counsel for plaintiffs-appellants in the above appeals is that in R. 4(2) (v) the word "intermediary" is not confined only to a plaintiff-intermediary but may refer to any intermediary not necessarily a plaintiff-intermediary. This argument was addressed to the lower appellate court also but was negatived by it. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants has stated before me that the Board of Revenue has not accepted this interpretation has held that "intermediary" in that rule refers to plaintiff-intermediary and not to someone who may not be a plaintiff. Apart from the authority of the Board of Revenue on the point I am myself of the view that the word "intermediary" in the rule must refer to a plaintiff-intermediary. The word "defendant" occurs later on in the rule after the word "intermediary". From this it would seem to follow that the word "intermediary" must refer to a plaintiff-intermediary. Apart from the authority of the Board of Revenue on the point I am myself of the view that the word "intermediary" in the rule must refer to a plaintiff-intermediary. The word "defendant" occurs later on in the rule after the word "intermediary". From this it would seem to follow that the word "intermediary" must refer to a plaintiff-intermediary. Apart from to a appears to me that the whole object of the rule was the protection of the rights of a plaintiff-intermediaries generally other than a plaintiff-intermediary. In this view I am of the opinion that lower appellate court was perfectly right in staying and abating the suits. 5. I see no force in these appeals and dismiss them with costs.