The petitioner Bherudhan Charadia has been convicted under section 16 (1) (a) (i) read with sec­tion 7 (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') and sentenced to two months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3007- in default further simple imprisonment for two months. (2) The facts are that on the 27th July 1960 the petitioner was working as a salesman of Messrs. Commer­cial Trading Company at Bazaar Road, Tezpur. The Urban Health Officer, Tezpur on that date found stored in the shop some adulterated ghee. He took two sets of samples of ghee arid sent the same to the Public Analyst for chemical analysis. After the report of the Public Analyst complaint was filed and the prosecution started against the applicant. (3) The Magistrate convicted the petitioner and the conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal by the Sessions Judge, Lower Assam Division at Gauhati. (4) The defence taken was a denial of the guilt. It <was alleged that the ghee was not stored but was kept for the own consumption of the members of the family. The defence was not accepted by the Courts below. (5) Three points have been urged before me. It is firstly contended that the complaint was not instituted by a proper person as provided for under section 20 of the Act and as such the trial and the conviction were bad in-law. Secondly it is urged that the ghee was not stored with a view to sell it and thus no offence was made out against the petitioner on admitted facts. Lastly it is urged that the offence was a technical one and the sentence of fine would have met the ends of justice in the present case. (6) Section 7 (i) of the Act provides that no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, or distribute any adulterated food. Sec­tion 16 .(1) (a) (i) provides as follows : - "16. (1) If any person - (a) whether by himself or by any person on his be­half imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes, any article of food in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule made thereunder, * * * * * * * * * he shall, in. (1) If any person - (a) whether by himself or by any person on his be­half imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes, any article of food in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule made thereunder, * * * * * * * * * he shall, in. addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of Section 6, be puni­shable -- (i) for the first offence, with imprisonment for a term which extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both". Relevant portion of section 2 (i) which defines 'adulterated' reads as follows : "2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise re­quires,- (i) 'adulterated' - an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated- * * * * * * * * * (1) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the. prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescribed limits of variability". The public analyst has reported the contents of the sam­ple to be as follows : "Moisture ... 0.22% Reichert figure . . . 31.7 Free fatty acids as oleic acid ... 9.85% (large excess) B. R. Reading at 40°C . . .41.5" In the opinion of the Public Analyst the sample is of deteriorated Ghee having excessive free acidity and is as such adulterated. The percentage of acid found is in excess of the prescribed limits of variability. The sample thus shows that the ghee stored was adulterated ghee as defined under the Act. In sections 7 and 16 the word 'store' is not qualified and if the ghee was stored, the offence was complete. It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that it was stored with a view to sell it in future. On the findings thus arrived at by the Courts below, the offence against the petitioner has been established and there is no substance in the second contention raised by the petitioner. (7) The main question argued is that the complaint was not maintainable as it was not instituted by a pro­per person. Section 20 of the Act provides as follows . (7) The main question argued is that the complaint was not maintainable as it was not instituted by a pro­per person. Section 20 of the Act provides as follows . "No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or local authority". Only the relevant portion of the section has been quoted above. The complaint is in a printed form, Column No. 2 is headed as 'name of the complainant' 'and in that column 'Tezpur Municipal Board' is mentioned. At the bottom of the complaint the following words are printed : "Prosecution sanctioned and forwarded to the Magis­trate, for favour of prosecution". Under this printed matter is the signature of the Chair­man, Municipal Board, Tezpur. At the bottom of the complaint there is the signature of Sri K. K. Choudhury, Urban Health Officer and Food-Inspector, Tezpur Munici­pality. From the perusal of this document it will be clear that the complaint was instituted by the Chairman, Municipal Board, Tezpur, although in the column the name of the complainant is given as 'Tezpur Municipal Board1. The complaint was thus instituted by the Chairman of the Board. Section 20 provides that the following persons or authorities can institute prosecution under the Act : (1) State Government. (2) A person with the written consent of the State Government. (3) A local authority. (4) A person with the written consent of the local authority. (5) A person authorised in this behalf by the State Government. (6) A person authorised in this behalf by a local authority. (7) Be a purchaser referred to in Sec. 12 of the Act provided he is armed with a copy of the report of the Public Analyst and files it along with the complaint. Under section 2 (viii) 'local authority' means in the case of - (1) a local area which is - (a) a municipality," the municipal board or municipal corporation. If the complaint is treated to have been filed by Sri K. K. Choudhury, Urban Health Officer and Food Inspector Tezpur, it will have to be seen whether he had filed it with the written consent of the local authority. If the complaint is treated to have been filed by Sri K. K. Choudhury, Urban Health Officer and Food Inspector Tezpur, it will have to be seen whether he had filed it with the written consent of the local authority. If it can de held to have been filed by the Chairman, the question will be whether he was authorised in this behalf by the local authority. (8) The contention of the prosecution is that in case the complaint is treated to have been filed by Sri K. K. Choudhury, as the prosecution was sanctioned by the Chairman, the complaint was filed by a person with the written consent of the local authority as the sanction by the Chairman will be deemed to be consent of the local board. It is also contended that if the sanction granted by the Chairman can be deemed to be the consent or au­thorisation, by the Board, even the Chairman was compe­tent to file the complaint. There is no special resolution of the Board by which the Chairman of Sri K. K. Choudhury, the Urban Health Officer and Food-Inspector was empowered to file a complaint. (9) Reliance is placed on sections 37 and 227 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1955 (Assam Act XV of 1957). Sec­tion 37 (1) provides as follows : "The Chairman shall, for the transaction of the business connected with this Act, or for the purpose of making any order authorised thereby, exercise all the powers vested by this Act in the Board -. Provided that the Chairman shall not act in opposition to, or in contravention of, any order of the Board at a meeting, or exercise any power which is directed to be exercised by the Board at a meeting". Section 227 provides as follows : "Any person directly or indirectly selling, exposing for sale, hawking or manufacturing, storing or possessing for sale any adulterated food, shall be dealt with in accor­dance with provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Section 227 provides as follows : "Any person directly or indirectly selling, exposing for sale, hawking or manufacturing, storing or possessing for sale any adulterated food, shall be dealt with in accor­dance with provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. For this purpose the Board shall appoint at least one Inspector for the areas under its jurisdiction and may authorise such other persons to exercise such of the powers of an Inspector as may be prescribed by the Rules under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954." The contention on behalf of the State is that the Chairman is authorised by section 37 to exercise all the powers ves­ted by the Act in the Board for transacting the business connected with this Act or for the purpose of making any order authorised by the Act and as section 227 provides that a person storing adulterated food shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, any person who is prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adultera­tion Act will, by virtue of section 227 be deemed to be prosecuted under section 227 and thus the prosecution under S. 227 will be the prosecution under the Assam Muni­cipal Act. By virtue of S. 37 thus, the Chairman is em­powered to exercise the powers of the Board in respect of the prosecution under section 227, provided that the Chairman shall not act in opposition to or in contravention of any order of the Board at a meeting or exercise any power which is directed to be exercised by the Board at. a meeting. The power of the Board to launch prosecution under section 227 is not to be exercised at a meeting, nor is there any express resolution of the Board to the contrary. Thus the Chairman was empowered to exercise all the powers of the Board. (10) Before section 37 can be attracted, it will be necessary that the power should be exercised by the Chair­man for the transaction of the business connected with this Act or for the purpose of making any order authorised under this Act, and secondly that the Chairman should exercise the powers which are vested by this Act in the Board. (10) Before section 37 can be attracted, it will be necessary that the power should be exercised by the Chair­man for the transaction of the business connected with this Act or for the purpose of making any order authorised under this Act, and secondly that the Chairman should exercise the powers which are vested by this Act in the Board. Section 227 - first part - only casts a duty upon the Board to prosecute a person storing adulterated food under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and by virtue of the second part of this section the Board cart appoint an Inspector for a certain area and' also to authorise the inspector to exercise such of the powers of the inspector as may be prescribed by Rules under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In view of the first part of section 227 it can legiti­mately be argued that the prosecution for storing adulte­rated food is transacting a business connected with this Act. On the second part of section 227 it may be said that the section authorises the passing of an order appoint­ing the Inspector and conferring all the powers of the Inspector of Food on him as prescribed under the Act. It the Chairman had appointed Sri K. K. Choudhury as the Food Inspector and conferred on him the powers as prescribed under the Act, it could have been argued that the Chairman is exercising the power vested under section 227 in the Board for the purpose of mak­ing an order authorised under this Act. But nowhere it is shown that the appointment of Sri K. K. Choudhury as Food Inspector was made by the Chairman and that he had conferred on him the authority to file complaints, as conferred on the Food Inspector under the provisions of the Rules framed under the Act. (11) The Courts below have held that as under sec­tion 227 a person storing adulterated food can be prose­cuted in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the prosecution in effect is under section 227 and the Chair­man is exercising the powers for the transaction of the business connected with this Act and the power which is vested by this Act in the Board. Even if the argument of the State is accepted that by virtue of section 227 the Chairman is transacting business connected with this Act, the power to institute the complaint under the Act cannot be said to be vested in the Board under the Assam Municipal Act. It is not a power vestad in the Board under the provisions of this Act and thus section 37 does not in terms authorise the Chairman to exercise the powers vested in the Board under the Acts other than the Assam Municipal Act. Under the provisions of sec­tion 20 of the Act it is the Board alone or a person with the written consent of the Board who is empowered to institute a complaint. The written consent of the Chairman cannot be equated with the consent of the Board, unless the Board had by any special resolution, authorised the Chairman to give the written consent as required under section 20 of this Act. (12) Some of the authorities referred to at the bar may be examined. (13) In the case of Public Prosecutor v. K. Satyanarayana, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 27, the complaint was institut­ed in writing by the Commissioner of the municipality. It was held that under section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the complaint by the Commissioner of the Municipality though signed by the sanitary inspec­tor and the Municipal Health Officer also, was not a proper complaint and the cognizance by the Magistrate on such a complaint was without any jurisdiction. In the case of City Corporation of Trivandrum v. Aruna-chalam Reddiar, AIR 1960 Kerala 356, the sanction for the prosecution was granted by the Commissioner of the Corporation conferring authority on the Food Inspector to prosecute all persons who may be found to have com­mitted an offence under the Prevention of Food Adultera­tion Act. It was held that the Commissioner was not authorised under section 20 to grant the sanction. It was further held in this case as follows: "The sanction required by section 20 is not an empty formality. The sanction must show that the autho­rity giving the sanction had applied his mind to the alleged commission of an offence by the accused per­son and was satisfied that the accused has to be prose­cuted for the said offence. The sanction must be for the prosecution of specified individuals and for specific offences. The sanction must show that the autho­rity giving the sanction had applied his mind to the alleged commission of an offence by the accused per­son and was satisfied that the accused has to be prose­cuted for the said offence. The sanction must be for the prosecution of specified individuals and for specific offences. Hence a general sanction authorising the Food Inspector to prosecute all offenders under the Act be­fore a particular Court is invalid as not satisfying the requirements of section 20." In the case of Raghunath Mcdy v. Kurseong Municipality, AIR 1923 Cal 561, it was held that section 44 of th3 Bengal Municipal Act (1884) did not empower the Chairman to sanction prosecution under section 6 of the" Bengal Food Adulteration Act, 1919. Section 15 of the Bengal Food Adulteration Act was in the same terms as section 20 of the Act and section 44 of the Bengal Municipal Act (1884) was in the same terms as section 37 of the Assam Municipal Act. In the case of Municipal Board, Lucknow v. Shyam Behari, AIR 1950 All 117, it was held that the order by the Administrator, Municipal Board empowering the Medical Officer of Health to launch prosecutions was a valid sanction. The decision how­ever rested on the provisions of the Municipal Act. In, the case of Municipal Board v. State, AIR 1952 Ail 209, it was held that the Chairman could give a valid sanc­tion for the prosecution under section 12 of the U. P. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act which corresponds with Sec. 20 of the Act. That decision however, was based ^on the interpretation of section 50 (e) of the Municipali­ties Act which was as follows: "The following powers, duties, and functions of a board may be exercised, and shall be performed or dis­charged, by the Chairman of the Board and not otherwise, namely....... (e) all other duties, powers and functions of a board with the exception of- (i) where there is an executive officer, those vested in an executive officer, by section 60 (and where there is medical officer of health, those vested in the medical officer of health by section 60-A), (ii) those specified in Col. 2 of Sch. (e) all other duties, powers and functions of a board with the exception of- (i) where there is an executive officer, those vested in an executive officer, by section 60 (and where there is medical officer of health, those vested in the medical officer of health by section 60-A), (ii) those specified in Col. 2 of Sch. I, and (iii) those delegated by the board under S. 112." It will appear from the perusal of section 50 (e) that all the duties, powers and functions of the Board could be exercised by the Chairman. There was no limitation placed on the powers of the chairman as in the Assam Municipal Act. In the Assam Municipal Act the Chairman can only exercise the powers vested under this Act in the Board and not any other Act. This case is thus dis­tinguishable. (14) It cannot be doubted that in the present case if the complaint was not filed by a proper authority, the prosecution will be illegal. On consideration of the au­thorities cited above and on the plain reading of sec­tion 20 along with sections 37 and 227 of the Assam Municipal Act, I am of opinion that in the present case the complaint was not instituted by a proper authority. If the Municipal Board had by any general resolution authorised the Chairman to grant such sanction, it may have been open to the Chairman to do so. But sections 137 and 227 of the Assam Municipal Act do not empower the Chairman to exercise the powers vested in the Board under Acts other than the Assam Municipal Act. That being so, the conviction must be quashed. As regards, the contention of the petitioner as to the sentence of imprisonment, if I were inclined to uphold the conviction in the circumstances of the present case, the ends of justice would have been met by awarding a sentence of fine only. In the result therefore, this petition is allowed and the conviction and sentence is quashed. The rule is made absolute. Petition allowed.