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1962 DIGILAW 66 (RAJ)

State v. Jagdishram

1962-03-02

CHHANGANI, MODI

body1962
MODI, J.—This is an appeal by the State against a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Ganganagar, acting as Special Judge, under the Prevention of Corruption Act (No. III of 1947 acquitting the accused respondent Jagdishram of an offence under sec. 161 I.P.C. and sec. 5 (2) read with sec. 5 (1) (d) of the said Act. 2. The material facts leading up to this appeal may be shortly stated as follows. The accused was a Patwari of Circle Ghamadiya Tehsil Suratgarh at all the relevant times. One Sukhram wanted to know vacant Khasra numbers in the cultivable land commanded by the Rajasthan Canal, as he was desirous of having certain land allotted to him in that area and requested the accused, who was the Patwari, to supply him the required information. It is alleged that the accused put him off with a view to extract some bribe from him. Sukhram had P.W. 4 Lekhram, a cousin of his, who he thought was on terms of familiarity with the accused, and so the former went to the latter asking for his assistance to see the accused and have the necessary information supplied to him. The case for the prosecution is that then Sukhram and Lekhram both went to the accused who had his headquarters at Suratgarh and requested the latter to help Sukhram. The accused damanded a bribe of Rs. 40/- saying that he should be given ten rupees for each square of vacant land. Sukhram wanted information about four such vacant pieces of land. Both Sukhram and Lekhram felt aggrieved at the conduct of the accused and therefore they went to Bikaner and made the report Ex. P-1 on the 4th September, 1959, to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Bikaner. In this application, Sukhram complained that land was being allotted on a temporary basis in the area commanded by the Rajasthan Canal in Suratgarh and that he was an applicant for certain land therein and in that connection he had asked the accused Jagdish Ram to supply him information as to which Murabbas were vacant and available, but the accused who was in the habit of taking bribe for supplying such information gave evasive replies. It was further stated in this application that thereafter Sukhram took his cousin Lekhram with him and a bribe of Rs. It was further stated in this application that thereafter Sukhram took his cousin Lekhram with him and a bribe of Rs. 40/- had been settled with Jagdishram for supplying the numbers of four vacant murabbas, and that he had told the latter that he would return within three or four days. The applicant stated that he did not want to give any bribe to the Patwari and was anxious to have him caught red-handed as he was in the habit of accepting bribes without let or hindrance, and, therefore, he prayed that necessary action be taken against him. It is also mentioned in this application that the last date for making applications for allotment of land was 8th September, 1959, according to the information supplied to him. 3. This application was received by P.W. Mangatram, an Inspector of the Anti Corruption Department at Bikaner, as the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Department, Bikaner, had been transferred and his substitute had not arrived. Inspector Mangatram then made an application to the District Magistrate, Ganganagar, on the 7th September, 1959, in which he mentioned how Sukhram had come to him to seek assistance in connection with entrapping the accused, the latter having asked for an illegal gratification of Rs, 40/- for rendering him some assistance in connection with the temporary allotment of land in the Rajasthan Canal area, and further stated that the Deputy Superintendent of the Anti Corruption Department had gone on transfer and his substitute had not arrived, and in these circumstances he sought permission to lay a trap and to arrest the suspect and to investigate into the case in accordance with the provisions of sec. 5A(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The District Magistrate by his order of the same date, gave the required permission. Thereupon P.W. Mangatram reached Suratgarh Railway Station on the 8th September, 1959. It seems that he had already asked Sukhram and Lekhram to meet him at the said Railway Station on the morning of the 8th September. Information had also been gathered by Sukhram) and Lekhram that the accused who had gone out was to return to Suratgarh by the morning train reaching Suratgarh at 11 A.M. In the meantime, four currency notes often rupees each bearing Nos. Information had also been gathered by Sukhram) and Lekhram that the accused who had gone out was to return to Suratgarh by the morning train reaching Suratgarh at 11 A.M. In the meantime, four currency notes often rupees each bearing Nos. M1 624574, Z36 537638, D 47 327099 and Z77 172633, were produced by Sukhram before the Inspector who initialled them and gave them back to Sukhram with instructions to give them over to the accused as soon as he got down from the railway train reaching Suratgarh at 11 A.M. Consequently, when the accused alighted from the train, Sukhram gave the aforesaid four currency notes (Articles 1 to 4) to the accused and asked him to supply him the necessary information with respect to four vacant squares of land in the Rajasthan canal area. The accused accepted the notes, put them into the upper pocket of his shirt and asked Sukhram to come to his house to take the necessary numbers. It had already been arranged that when Sukhram had passed on the money to the accused, he would make a sign to Inspector Mangatram, and accordingly the former beaconed to the latter and Mangatram stopped the accused while he was at a distance of about four or five poundas from the exit gate at the Suratgarh Railway Station. The Inspector asked the accused to produce the currency notes which had been given to him by Sukhram. The accused denied that. Thereupon the Inspector told him that he would take his search, and at this the accused produced from his pocket two bundles of notes, one consisting of the four currency notes of Rs. 10/- each specified above, and the other bundle consisting of one ten-rupee note and four notes of one rupee each. The recovery memo Ex. P-3 was prepared immediately on the spot and the accused was arrested. This memo is signed by Rawatram son of Sukha Jat and another Rawatram son of Jodharam Jat, and Bahadur and Sahiram, and the Inspector Mangatram. It is significant that the accused also put his signature on that. The Inspector then filed the first information report Ex. P-5 on the next day, that is, the 9th September, 1959, at 8-30 A.M. at the police station Bikaner. The necessary sanction under sec. It is significant that the accused also put his signature on that. The Inspector then filed the first information report Ex. P-5 on the next day, that is, the 9th September, 1959, at 8-30 A.M. at the police station Bikaner. The necessary sanction under sec. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was applied for and obtained from the District Magistrate, Ganganagar, and the accused was then challaned in the court of the Special Judge for being tried under sec. 161 I.P.C. and sec. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with sec. 5 (1) (d) thereof. 4. The accused pleaded not guilty, and denied that he had ever asked for a bribe of Rs. 10/- per square for giving numbers of vacant land in the Rajasthan Canal area as alleged or that Sukhram had ever demanded such information from him. The accused admitted, however, that on 8th September, 1959, Sukhram did give him four currency notes, Articles I to 4, on the platform of the Suratgarh Railway Station in connection with the obtaining of of certified copies of certain Girdawari entries with reference to Khasra Nos. 186, 187 and 188 for which he had already made an application Ex. 3 in the Tehsil as that information was required by Sukhram in connection with a certain dispute relating to the aforementioned Khasra numbers, which was pending between him and his rivals Pannalal and Nandram. The accused also pleaded that Sukhram was on inimical terms with him and that he had filed an application Ex. D-4 dated the 7th April, 1959, against the accused to the Sub Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh, wherein he had complained that the accused was bent upon making a false entry in the Girdawari in collusion with Pannalal and others with respect to Khasra Nos. 116 and 187 and he had also prayed that an officer be appointed to make an investigation on the spot so that he might be saved from unnecessary harassment. There is material on the record to show that a report had been called for from the accused in that connection, and this report was submitted on the 8th April, 1959, which is part of Ex. D 4. There is material on the record to show that a report had been called for from the accused in that connection, and this report was submitted on the 8th April, 1959, which is part of Ex. D 4. The case of the accused was that Sukhram was, therefore, interested in falsely implicating him and that Lekhram who was his cousin and Sahiram who was also a close relation of his had joined him in that attempt. The accused produced three witnesses in defence, and with these we shall deal at the proper place. 5. The prosecution produced seven witnesses in all in support of its case. Of these, P.W.1 Sukhram is the principal witness from whom the accused is alleged to have demanded the bribe and at whose instance, a trap was laid by the inspector Mangatram, and the accused was caught with the money which had been paid to him. P.W. 4 Lekhram is an eye-witness in whose presence the money was paid by Sukhram to the accused and in whose presence earlier the accused had demanded that bribe. P.W.2&3 Sahiram and Bahadur are the witnesses of recovery of the four currency notes, in all amounting to Rs. 40/- and the accused P.W. 6 Mangatram is the Inspector of the Anti Corruption Department who arranged the trap and who had caught Sukhram with the four currency notes which had been paid to him by Sukhram on the platform of the Suratgarh Railway Station. P.W. 7 Girdharisingh is the Tehsildar of Suratgarh who was more or less a formal witness. 6. As for the defence witnesses, D. W. 1 Ramkumar was the Kanoogo in the Suratgarh Tehsil at the relevant time. The evidence of this witness is to the effect that the current Chausala Girdawari remains in the office of the Patwari and that the earlier ones are deposited in the office of the Kanoogo in the Tehsil. This witness has further deposed that a fee of Re.1/- is charged for supplying certified copies of entries in a Chausala Girdawari, and that a fee double of that is charged if urgent copies are required. This witness has further deposed that a fee of Re.1/- is charged for supplying certified copies of entries in a Chausala Girdawari, and that a fee double of that is charged if urgent copies are required. In his cross-examination, this witness deposed that although it was not the business of the Patwari to accept money from persons who were applicants for certified copies of certain entries made in the Girdawari deposited in the Tehsil, but there was a practice in vogue according to which the applicant gave money to the Patwari and the latter purchased the necessary stamps and filed them in the office of the Tehsil. It is important to remember, however, that this witness admitted in his cross examination that he did not hold the office of Kanoogo in this Tehsil at the time the application Ex. D-3 was made and that he did not know what action was taken on it. 7. The next witness is D. W. 2 Rawatram. He was one of the Motbirs in whose presence the recovery of the four currency notes of Rs. 10/- each was made from the accused. This witness, therefore, was certainly present at the Suratgarh Railway Station when the accused was interrogated by Inspector Mangatram and later arrested. According to this witness Sukhram was standing by the side of the accused on the platform when the former gave currency notes amounting to Rs.40/- to the latter and said that he was giving this money in connection with obtaining the copies of the Girdawari. Thereupon the accused put the money into his pocket. The witness was confronted with Ex. P-3 the recovery list and he admitted that it bore his signature. A further question was put to him whether it had been read out to him before he put his signature on it. The reply of the witness was that the list had been read out to him, but he could not understand what had been written therein. It deserves to be mentioned at this place that in Ex. A further question was put to him whether it had been read out to him before he put his signature on it. The reply of the witness was that the list had been read out to him, but he could not understand what had been written therein. It deserves to be mentioned at this place that in Ex. P-3 it was noted that when Inspector Mangatram asked the accused to produce the notes which had been given to him by Sukhram, the accused replied that he had no money whatsoever with him and that all that he had with him was his own ticket whereupon the Inspector threatened to take his personal search, and it was at that stage that the accused produced two bundles of notes which we have already described above. 8. D.W. 3 Birbal deposed that he was present at the time the accused had been arrested and that some 15 days before that Sukhram had come to the Patwari and told him that he had made an application for certain copies of the Girdawari and that he had not received the same. According to this witness Sukhram had also requested the accused to obtain copies for him whereupon the latter said that he would be going to Suratgarh and that he might come over there and bring with him a sum of Rs. 30/- or 40/- which would be chargeable in that connection and would have to be paid. 9. This is the entire evidence produced by the defence. 10. The learned Special Judge held as a result of his assessment of the evidence set out above that the prosecution had failed to prove that the currency notes amounting to Rs 40/-had been passed by Sukhram to the accused as an illegal gratification or bribe, and, therefore, a mere possession of these notes by the accused was not enough to satisfy the requirements of sec. 161 I.P.C. or sec. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge placed his reliance on a decision of this Court in the State Vs. 161 I.P.C. or sec. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge placed his reliance on a decision of this Court in the State Vs. Abhey Singh (1) and approached the case from the stand-point that the initial burden of proving that the gratification alleged to have been received by the accused was unlawful rested on the prosecution notwithstanding the provisions of S.4 of the Act of 1947 and that this burden had not been successfully discharged by it. The learned Judge further held that there was evidence on the record to show that Sukhram had occasion to give the aforesaid sum to the accused in connection with the making up of the deficiency in the matter of the copying charges payable for the certified copies of the Girdawari entries wanted by him, and further that the chances were that such money was paid to the accused in connection with the obtaining of these copies, and, therefore, the prosecution had failed to prove that the money was paid to him as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. We may also point out that although the learned Judge had throughout dealt with the case in the manner referred to above, he was prepared to conclude towards the end of his judgment that the accused "can be deemed to have discharged whatever burden he had under sec. 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act." In this view of the matter, the learned Judge acquitted the accused. The State has consequently come up in appeal. 11. In this appeal, it is strenuously urged by the learned standing counsel for the State that the judgment of the learned Special Judge is completely vitiated because his approach to the whole case was wrong and he had misunderstood the true import and effect of sec. 4 of the Act. This section, broadly speaking, provides that where it is proved that an accused person has accepted any gratification, other than his legal remuneration or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted it as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in sec. 161 or, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. 161 or, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. It was further submitted in this connection that the view taken by this Court in the case referred to above cannot be accepted as laying down the correct law on the subject as it stands over-ruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in C.I. Emden Vs. State of U.P. (3). This submission, with respect, seems to us to be correct. We have carefully read the judgment of the learned Special Judge and we cannot feeling that he was throughout relying on the view propounded in The State Vs. Abbey Singh (supra) and dealt with the case as if it was not sufficient for the prosecution merely to prove that extraneous gratification had passed from the complainant to the accused but that the prosecution must have further proved that such gratification was illegal, a view which can no longer be sustained in view of the decision of their Lordships of Supreme Court in C.I. Emden Vs. State of U.P. (supra). It is to be regretted that the learned Special Judge was not aware of this ruling nor was it brought to his notice by the learned counsel for the prosecution. That being so, we do not wonder that the question, which was rightly posed by the learned Judge, namely, whether the currency notes were given as an illegal gratification for obtaining numbers of four squares of vacant land as alleged by the prosecution or the amount was given to the accused to make up the deficiency in the copying fees in connection with the application Ex. D-3 for obtaining copies of certain Girdawari entries as alleged by the accused, was wrongly answered by him. 12. Before we discuss the factual aspect of the case, we consider it proper to set out the view which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in C.I. Emden Vs. State of U.P. (supra) and which is fully binding on us. "Paragraph 3 of sec. 161 of the Code provides that the word gratification is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or to gratifications estimable in money. Therefore, gratification mentioned in Sec. 4 (1) cannot be confined only to payment of money. State of U.P. (supra) and which is fully binding on us. "Paragraph 3 of sec. 161 of the Code provides that the word gratification is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or to gratifications estimable in money. Therefore, gratification mentioned in Sec. 4 (1) cannot be confined only to payment of money. What the prosecution has to prove before asking the court to raise a presumption against an accused person is that the accused person has received a "gratification other than legal remuneration"; if it is shown ... that the accused received the stated, amount, was not legal remuneration then the condition prescribed by the sec. is satisfied. In the context of the remuneration legally payable to, and receivable by, a public servant, there is no difficulty in holding that where money is shown to have been paid to, and accepted by, such public servant and that the said money does not consti tute his legal remuneration, the presumption has to be raised as required by the section. If the "gratification" is construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe, then it would be futile or superfluous to prescribe for the raising of the presumption. Technically it may no doubt be suggested that the object which the statutory presumption serves on this construction is that the Court may then presume that the money was paid by way of a bribe as a motive or reward as required by sec. 161 of the Code. In our opinion this could not have been the intention of the Legislature in prescribing the statutory presumption under sec. 4(1). In the context we see no justification for not giving the word "gra tincation" its literal dictionary meaning." Later, as respects the question as to what should be the quantum of proof which the accused would be expected to give where a presumption has been raised against him under sec. 4 (1), their Lordships left the point undecided in the case before them and they contented themselves by saying that they were prepared to assume in -favour of the appellant that the presumption would be rebutted even if the explanation given by him was a reasonably probable one. 13. That being the state of the law which is applicable to a case like the present, the whole position in this case boils down to this. 13. That being the state of the law which is applicable to a case like the present, the whole position in this case boils down to this. It is proved beyond any manner of doubt that the accused had received four ten-rupee currency notes amounting to Rs. 40/- from P.W. Sukhram. It is and can be nobodys case that this money was part of accuseds legal remuneration. Consequently, a presumption under sec. 4 of the Act undoubtedly arises against him. And that presumption is that unless he proves the contrary, he must be treated as having accepted the said money as a motive or reward within the meaning of sec. 161 I.P.C. 14. The question which then arises is whether the accused has given a reasonably probable explanation for his possession of the money in question so that it can be held that he has rebutted the presumption which arose against him. 15. Now, what is the explanation of the accused? His case is that he had not demanded or received the sum of Rs. 40/- as bribe or illegal gratification from Sukhram and that the latter had paid him the said money in connection with the obtaining of certified copies of certain Girdawari entries which were in the Tehsil and which related to the period between Smt. 1982 to sec. 2015-16 as he was under the necessity to produce them in a litigation which was pending between him and his alleged co-sharers Pannalal and others. In this connection, the learned Judge seems to have relied on the application Ex. D-3 which was filed by the accused in the Tehsil on the 17th August, 1959. The learned Judge further took into consideration the fact that Sukhram had not put in the requisite charges for the supply of these copies and that a sum of Rs. 46/- was atleast payable by him in that connection before the copies could be supplied to him. The learned Judge further took into consideration the fact that Sukhram had not put in the requisite charges for the supply of these copies and that a sum of Rs. 46/- was atleast payable by him in that connection before the copies could be supplied to him. Again, the learned Judge was not unmindful of the bad blood which had been engendered between the accused and Sukhram as the latter had complained to the Sub-Divisional Officer in connection with certain entries in the Girdawari which the complainant apprehended were likely to be made against him by the accused, and the learned Judge took into consideration certain contradictions between the evidence of Sukhram and that of Lekhram at the trial, and eventually he came to the conclusion that the chances were that the money had been paid to the accused by Sukhram in connection with the obtaining of the copies of certain entries in the Girdawari to which we have referred above. 16. We have given our most careful and anxious consideration to the points that we have set out above and we regret to have to say that we do not find ourselves in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Judge. It may be accepted that the complainant wanted to obtain copies of certain revenue records which were in the Tehsil. It may also be accepted that he had not put in the full charges which would be required in connection with the obtaining of those copies. The crucial question that we have to consider, however, is whether it is at all probable or reasonably probable that Sukhram complainant would entrust the work of obtaining these copies to the accused in the circumstances of this case. Our answer to this question is in an emphatic negative. In the first place, learned Judge below has himself found that the relations between the accused and Sukhram were not at all happy. The latter had made a complaint in writing against the accused before the Sub-Divisional Officer only as late as April 1959, and the present incident arose in September, 1959. In the second place, we do not understand how a sum of Rs. 40/- could be fixed as the charges which were payable by Sukhram in connection with the getting of there copies at all. In the second place, we do not understand how a sum of Rs. 40/- could be fixed as the charges which were payable by Sukhram in connection with the getting of there copies at all. The learned Judge below seems to have entertained the view that a sum of Rs. 46/- was payable in all in connection with the copies in question on the footing that such copies were required for three Khasra numbers and for 32 years and that the charge for obtaining one set of copies for four years was Rs. 1/- and if the application was made on an urgent basis as it was in this case, the sum payable would be double thereof. Calculating in the manner and deducting the Rs. 2/- which had already been paid by Sukhram, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that there was a deficit of Rs. 46/- which was payable by Sukhram for obtaining the necessary copies from Smt. 1982 to smt. 2016. We cannot help observing that the learned Judges calculation is not quite correct. If copies were required from Samwat year 1982 to Samwat year 2016, we have a total of 35 years for which copies had to be required. In other words, there would be nine sets for each khasra number, and 27 in all for the three khasra numbers 186, 187 & 188. Thus calculating on the basis that the copies were required on an urgent basis, we find that 54 rupees would be payable in all. Deducting Rs.2/- out of this which had already been paid, the complainant Sukhram would be required to pay Rs. 52/- and not Rs. 46/- as calculated by the learned Judge below. Now, what we cannot possibly understand is that if a sum of Rs. 52/- was required to enable the accused to obtain the relevant copies of the Girdawari record for Sukhram it was entirely futile for the latter to give and for the former to accept a sum of Rs. 40/- only, the simple reason being that the copies could not have been possibly obtained piece-meal, and unless the entire money required for their preparation was deposited in the Tehsil. In other words, what we wish to point out is that giving of Rs. 40/- by Sukhram to the accused was completely futile for the purpose in view. 40/- only, the simple reason being that the copies could not have been possibly obtained piece-meal, and unless the entire money required for their preparation was deposited in the Tehsil. In other words, what we wish to point out is that giving of Rs. 40/- by Sukhram to the accused was completely futile for the purpose in view. We definitely put a question to learned counsel for the accused as to how he would overcome this difficulty. The submission of learned counsel was that it was true that there would on this calculation be some money still to be paid beyond Rs. 40/* which had been paid to the accused; but perhaps the understanding was that the accused would pay the balance out of his own pocket, and then recover it from Sukhram the complainant. We cannot possibly accept this explanation, because no foundation for it is to be found on the record, and, in any case, we do not think it probable that the accused would be inclined to oblige the complainant by undertaking such a responsibility when the relations between him and Sukhram were, at any rate, not happy. In the third place the copies had to be obtained from the Tehsil office at Suratgarh, and according to the accused, the complainant was required by him to bring the money at that place and in fact the same was given to him there. Now if all that was so, we are unable to understand why it should have become necessary for Sukhram to pay the money to the accused at the Suratgarh railway Station when the former could have directly deposited it in the Tehsil and in that case he should have further been in a definite position to know how much more or less he was required to deposit. The more we consider the explanation of the accused, the more unsatisfactory it appears to us to be. Lastly, we cannot help referring to the conduct of the accused in this connection, when he was first interrogated by the inspector Mangatram and asked to produce the notes which had been given to him by Sukhram. The answer of the accused at that stage was that he had no money whatsoever with him, and all that he had with him was his own railway ticket. The answer of the accused at that stage was that he had no money whatsoever with him, and all that he had with him was his own railway ticket. The Inspector then threatened to search his person, and it was at that stage that the accused produced the two bundles of currency notes from the pocket of his shirt It clearly seems to us that if there was any truth in the explanation on which the defence now relies, the first thing that the accused should have naturally told the inspector was that he had certain notes with him which were given 10 him by Sukhram and that the latter had given these to him in connection with the obtaining of certain copies of the Girdawari entries which he required in connection with a litigation which was pending between him and his rivals. That the accused denied that he had any notes with him is proved to the hilt by the evidence of not only P.Ws. Sukhram and Lekhram but also by the witnesses of recovery, namely, P.W. 2 Sahiram, P.W. 3 Bahadur and P.W.6 Mangatram Inspector (except D.W. Rawatram who was produced by the defence) and we see no reason to disbelieve the unanimous testimony of all these witnesses on this point. So far as the evidence of Rawtram is concerned, we think it enough to say that he is completely falsified by Ex. P-3 the recovery memo to which he was himself a signatory. The learned Judge has discussed this aspect of the case in paragraph 18 of his judgment and felt persuaded to say that as the Inspector did not tell the accused that the money had been given to him by Sukhram for obtaining Khasra numbers of certain vacant land, the accused had no opportunity to say in what connection he had received the money from Sukhram. With all respect, we are entirely unable to comprehend what the learned Judge really meant by his last-mentioned observation. We have no doubt whatsoever that when the Inspector Mangatram taxed the accused with the possession of the notes which had been given to him by Sukhram, there was nothing whatsover to prevent him from saying that money had been paid to him by that person for the purpose on which the defence now relies. We have no doubt whatsoever that when the Inspector Mangatram taxed the accused with the possession of the notes which had been given to him by Sukhram, there was nothing whatsover to prevent him from saying that money had been paid to him by that person for the purpose on which the defence now relies. That was a most natural and a most obvious thing for him to say if there was any truth in the story of the defence. 17. The only other aspect of the case with which we may now deal is that relating to certain discrepancies which the learned Judge found in the statements of Sukhram and Lekhram which they gave at the trial. The first discrepancy which seems to have weighed with the learned Judge was that while Sukhram stated at the trial that the accused bad asked for a bribe of Rs. 10/- per square to be paid to him at the time of his initial meeting with the latter, he did not make any mention thereof in his report (Ex. P1) to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Department, Bikaner. In our opinion, this discrepancy is more apparent than real because the the complaint of Sukhram whether at the stage he made the application in the Anti Corruption Department or when he came to give his evidence at the trial throughout was that the accused was bent upon extracting illegal gratification from him. Then the other discrepancy to which the learned Judge refers in his judgment at some length is that P.W. Lekhram had deposed at the trial that after Sukhram had asked for his assistance in getting information relating to the vacant Khasra number he had accompanied him to the accused and then they felt greatly hurt by his attitude, and, therefore, thought of enlisting the support of the Anti Corruption Department for entrapping him, and in that connection they both went to Bikaner where that department was situate; but Lekhram in his statement under sec. 164 Cr. P.C. omitted to mention that he had at all gone to Bikaner and merely stated that after meeting the accused and the latter having told them that he required a bribe of Rs. 10/- per Murabba he went to his village and Sukhram went to Bikaner himself. 164 Cr. P.C. omitted to mention that he had at all gone to Bikaner and merely stated that after meeting the accused and the latter having told them that he required a bribe of Rs. 10/- per Murabba he went to his village and Sukhram went to Bikaner himself. This, in our considered opinion is again a kind of discrepancy which is of a very subordinate character. It seems to us that what the learned Judge thought were material discrepancies are if at all mere discrepancies on immaterial points and we therefore see no adequate reason to doubt the evidence of these witnesses, which, on the whole, is perfectly consistent and straightforward. 18. In these circumstances the question we have to answer is whether the explanation offered by the accused for his possession of the four marked ten-rupee notes can be accepted as reasonable and probable. We regret to have to say that we think, in disagreement with the learned trial Judge, that the explanation of the accused in this regard is wholly inadequate and cannot possibly be accepted as at all probable; and if we may say so, it definitely seems to us as an afterthought. 19. The result is that on the view of the law which has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in C. I. Emden V. State of U. P. (supra), the presumption which arose against the accused under S. 4 of the Act has not at all been rebutted by him, and, consequenly, it must be held that the prosecution has fully established the case against him under Sec. 161 I.P.C. and S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with S. 5(1) (d) thereof. 20. 20. In the last resort, learned counsel for the accused argued that even if we came to a conclusion adverse to the accused on the facts as held above, we should not interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge, inasmuch as, investigation into this case was made by an Inspector of the Anti Corruption Department who is an officer other than a Deputy Superintendent of Police being the designated officer under S. 5A of the Act and that there is nothing to show that the Magistrate in granting the permission under the last-mentioned section had realised the significance of his order giving him permission to investigate the case and had only mechanically issued the order as a sort of a formal compliance with the provisions of the section in question, and, therefore, the entire investigation was bad and could not be used as a lawful foundation for the conviction of the accused. Reliance was placed in support of this submission on State of M. P. V. Mubarak Ali (3). We have carefully considered this contention and are of the opinion that there is no force in it. In the case which was before their Lordships of the Supreme Court it is true that the investigation was made by an officer other than that designated under S. 5A; but a careful perusal of this case clearly shows that not only the Magistrate in that case granted the permission by an order which did not disclose any reason for the same, but the application on which the order was made also did not disclose any reason why and under what circumstances such permission was asked for and deserved to be granted. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships made the following observations:— "Neither the application nor the order made thereon discloses that any material was placed before the Magistrate on the basis of which he gave the permission. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships made the following observations:— "Neither the application nor the order made thereon discloses that any material was placed before the Magistrate on the basis of which he gave the permission. Ex facie, it appears to us, just like it appeared to the High Court, that the Magistrate did not realise the significance of his order giving permission, but only mechanically issued the order on the basis of the application which did not disclose any reason, presumably because he thought that what was required was only a formal compliance with the provisions of the section." Their Lordships, therefore, held that though objection was taken by the accused at the earliest stage of the trial that the order giving permission was invalid, no attempt was made by the prosecution to adduce any evidence to support the contention that the Magistrate had given permission to the Sub-Inspector only after satisfying himself on the advisability of doing so on the material placed before him. The principle that was laid down in this case was that in a case where an officer, other than a designated officer, seeks to make an investigation, he should get the order of a Magistrate empowering him to do so before he proceeds to investigate, and it is desirable that the order giving the permission should ordinarily, on the face of it, disclose the reasons for giving the permission. It was further laid down that if the said salutary practice was not adopted in a particular case, it was the duty of the prosecution to establish, if that fact was denied (and these words are important) that the Magistrate had in fact taken into consideration the relevant circumstances before granting the permission to the subordinate police officer to investigate the case. 21. Now, in the case before us, no objection was ever raised by the accused until at the last stage in this appeal that the permission granted by the District Magistrate to the Inspector to investigate the case was invalid. If such an objection had been raised, it would have been open to the prosecution, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. V. Mubarak Ali (Supra) to adduce evidence to show that the Magistrate had in fact taken into consideration the relevant circumstances before granting the permission to the Inspectors. If such an objection had been raised, it would have been open to the prosecution, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. V. Mubarak Ali (Supra) to adduce evidence to show that the Magistrate had in fact taken into consideration the relevant circumstances before granting the permission to the Inspectors. The other distinguishing feature of this case is that although the order of the Magistrate did not disclose the reasons for granting the permission on the application Ex. P-6, the application on which the order was made clearly disclosed the allegations against the accused by the complainant Sukhram to the effect that the accused had demanded an illegal gratification of Rs. 40/- for rendering him certain assistance in connection with the allotment of certain land and further that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Currup-tion Department, had left the station on transfer and his substitute had not arrived till then. It was under these circumstances that permission was sought by the Inspector Mangatram to lay a trap for the accused and to arrest him and to investigate the case in accordance with the provisions of S. 5A(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the District Magistrate granted it. 22. That being so, we are definitely of the opinion that it cannot be postulated of this case that the permission that was granted by District Magistrate was defective on the ground that the facts bearing such permission had not been brought to his notice or that he had not applied his mind thereto, even if we disregard altogether the further factor that the objection as to the validity of the permission was never raised by the accused at any stage of the trial. This objection, therefore, fails and we hereby over-rule it. 23. The result is that we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Special Judge and hold the accused Jagdishram guilty of an offence under S. 161 I.P.C. and S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentence him to one years rigorous imprisonment. The accused is out on bail, and, therefore, a direction will issue to the learned District Magistrate, Ganganagar, to arrest the accused and send him to jail so as to serve out the sentence we have awarded to him.