The petitioner Shri Sambhu Ratan Tewari who owns landed properties in the Sub­division of Kamalpur in the Union Territory of Tripura has filed this Writ application against (i) The Administrator and Chief Commissioner of Tripura, (2) The Revenue Secretary, Tripura Administration and (3) The Union of India through the said Administrator and Chief Commissioner firstly to quash the two notifications Annexures D and D (i) dated 13-4-1961 which were issued by the Administrator under Sec. i (3) and Sec. 134(1) respectively of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, secondly to forbear from giv­ing effect to and proceeding with the said notifica­tions in any manner whatsoever and thirdly to re­frain from giving effect to the Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 in any manner whatsoever after declaring the said Act either in whole or in part to be ultra vires the Constitution of India. (2) The Tripura Land Revenue and Land Re­forms Act (Act 43 of 1960) passed by Parliament received the assent of the President of India oil 21-9-1960 and was published in the Tripura Gazette-Extraordinary dated 2-12-1960. The preamble of the Act, which shows its purpose, mentions that it was for consolidating and amending the law re­lating to Land Revenue in the Union Territory of Tripura and to provide for the acquisition of estates and for certain other measures of land reforms. The Act consists of six parts. Part I contain­ing Chapter I covering Ss. 1 and 2, relates to the short title, extent, commencement and definitions. Part II, containing Chapters II to VIII covering Sees. 3 to 98, deals with Revenue Divisions, ap­pointment, powers and duties of Revenue Officers, Land and Land Records, and Survey, Settlement and Realisation of Land Revenue etc. In short, Part II deals with the first purpose mentioned in the preamble namely, the consolidation and amend­ment of the law relating to land Revenue. Parts III to VI deal with the other object namely, to provide for the acquisition of estates and for cer­tain other measures of land reform. Part III con­sisting of Chapter IX and X covering Ss. 99 to 132 deals with the rights of raiyats and under-raiyats in land. Parts III to VI deal with the other object namely, to provide for the acquisition of estates and for cer­tain other measures of land reform. Part III con­sisting of Chapter IX and X covering Ss. 99 to 132 deals with the rights of raiyats and under-raiyats in land. We are concerned in particular with Sec. 123 in Chapter X therein which provides for the restoration of possession of land to an under-raiyat where an under-raiyat of any land has, on or after the 10th of August, 1957, surren­dered, or been evicted from, such land and the surrender and eviction could not have taken place if this Act had been in force on the date of such surrender or eviction. The date 10-8-57 is signi­ficant as the date on which the original draft bill' was first published. Part IV consisting of Chap­ters XI and XII covering sections 133 to 161 deals-with the acquisition of estates and the assessment and payment of compensation to the intermediaries therein. Section 134 in Chapter XI, which pro­vides for the vesting of all estates in the Govt. has come in for special attack in this petition. Part V consisting of Chapter XIII and XIV cover­ing sections 162 to 184 deals with ceiling on land" holdings and prevention of fragmentation. These are some of the measures of land reforms mention­ed in the preamble. We are concerned in parti­cular with Section 167 (2) in Chapter XIII which provides that for the purpose of determining the excess land held by a person, any land transferred at any time during the period between 10th August, 1957 and the commencement of the Act, was, not­withstanding such transfer, to be deemed to be held by the transferor. Part VI consisting of Chapter XV containing Ss. 185 to 199 relates to General and Miscellaneous matters which are an­cillary to the earlier provisions and intended to help in giving effect to the earlier provisions. (3) It will be seen from Part I and S. 1 (3) that the Administrator is given the power to bring the various provisions of the Act into force in all the areas of Tripura by notification in the Official Gazette appointing the date or dates when they shall come into force. (3) It will be seen from Part I and S. 1 (3) that the Administrator is given the power to bring the various provisions of the Act into force in all the areas of Tripura by notification in the Official Gazette appointing the date or dates when they shall come into force. Part IV, section 134 (i)) gives the power to the-Administrator, by notification in the Official Gazette, to declare with effect from the date specified in the notification that all estates situated in any area or areas and all rights, "title and interest of every intermediary in any such estates shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. On 13-4-1961 the Administrator issued the two notifications Annexures D and D (i) by notification in the Official Gazette. These are the two noti-dcations impugned in this Writ. By Annexure D, -the Administrator appointed 14-4-1961 as the date on which various provisions of the Act were to come into force in the areas stated therein. The said notification is as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub­section (3) of Sec. 1 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, ,1960 (43 of 1960), the Administrator, Tripura is pleased to appoint the I4th of April, 1961, as the date, on which the under mentioned provisions of the Act shall come into force in the area stated below : (a) all sections of the Parts I, II, IV and VI and section 184 of Part V in the entire Terri­tory; (b) all sections of the Part III, except clause (c) of sub-section (i) of section 99, in Kamalpur Sub­division; (c) all the sections of Part III, except clause (c) of Sub-section (i) of Sec. 99, Ss. 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (i) of Sec. 118, sub-section (3) of Sec. 118, sections 119, 120, 126 127, 128, 129 and 130 in the Sub-divisions Sadar, Dharmanagar, Kailashahar, Khowai, Sona-mura, Udaipur, Amarpur, Belonia and Sabroom; (d) all sections of the Chapter XIII of Part V in Kamalpur Sub-division." (4) It will be seen from the notification that Parts I, II, IV and VI and Sec. 184 of Part V were brought into force in the entire Territory with effect from 14-4-1961. They relate to the appointment of Revenue Officers and their powers and duties and survey, settlement and realisation of land revenue and the acquisition and the assess­ment and payment of compensation of estates and the rule making powers of the Administrator. By the same notification, Part III except clause (c) of sub-section (i) of Sec. 99 as well as Chapter XIII of Part V were brought into force in the Sub­division of Kamalpur where the petitioner Sambhu Ratan Tewari has got his landed properties. Section 99 (i) (c) relates to the right of a raiyat to plant trees and to fell, utilise or dispose of the timber of any trees. Perhaps until the final settle­ment of the raiyats, it was not considered neces­sary to introduce Sec. 99 (i) (c). Chapter XIII of Part V relates to the ceiling on land holdings. It was not considered necessary evidently to bring Chapter XIV relating to the prevention of frag­mentation into force until the excess land over and above the ceiling had all been taken possession of by the Government and resettled on other persons. Thus Kamalpur has been chosen as the sub-divi­sion where all the main provisions of the Act were •to be brought into force immediately. With regard to the remaining sub-divisions also, Part III except section 99 (i) (c) and certain other sections which again relate to the ceiling on land holdings and the payment of compensation for the excess thereof, was brought into force. But Chapter XIII relating to the ceiling of land holdings has not been brought into force in the other sub-divisions by the notification. One of the chief complaints of the petitioner is that in the matter of the application of the Act, Kamal­pur sub-division wherein he owns land has been discriminated against and treated unfairly. But Chapter XIII relating to the ceiling of land holdings has not been brought into force in the other sub-divisions by the notification. One of the chief complaints of the petitioner is that in the matter of the application of the Act, Kamal­pur sub-division wherein he owns land has been discriminated against and treated unfairly. (5) The other notification Annexure D (i) is as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub­section (i) of Sec. 134 of the Tripura Land Reve­nue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (43 of 1960), the Administrator is pleased to declare that with effect from the I4th of April, 1961 all the estates situated in Kamalpur sub-division and all rights, title and interest of every intermediary in such estates shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances." By this notification again Kamalpur has been chosen as the first sub-division wherein the divest­ing of all estates and the abolition of rights, title and interest of every intermediary in the estates from the appointed date namely, 14-4-1961 has been ordered. Here again the complaint of the petitioner is that Kamalpur has been specially dis­criminated against by the Administrator. (6) On 13-4-1961 by another notification in the Official Gazette the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules, 1961 framed under Ss. 98, 132, 161, 184 and 197 of the Act were published. (7) On 15-5-1961, the petitioner served a notice on the Administrator calling upon him to withdraw and cancel the above two notifications stating that they have adversely affected him in common with many other persons in Kamalpur. As that was not done, he came forward with this Writ petition on 16-6-1961. (7) On 15-5-1961, the petitioner served a notice on the Administrator calling upon him to withdraw and cancel the above two notifications stating that they have adversely affected him in common with many other persons in Kamalpur. As that was not done, he came forward with this Writ petition on 16-6-1961. (8) Now the contention of the petitioner is that his rights and "interest in his lands vested in him and were protected and safeguarded by the Tripura enactments enumerated in the schedule to Sec. 199 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act and also by the provisions of the Constitution of India and that the said rights an4 interests have now been jeopardised by this new Act which has repealed the said Tripura enact­ments, that the new Act 43 of 1960 either in whole or in part with special reference to sub-section (3) of Sec. 1, Sec. 123, Sec. 134(1) and sub-section (2) of Sec. 167 is ultra vires the Constitution of India, that the notifications Annexures D and D (1) are arbitrary, illegal and inoperative and infringe the provisions of the Constitution with special refer­ence to Articles 13, 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitu­tion and further that the said notifications have not been properly issued in accordance with sub­section (3) of Sec. i and Sec. 134 of Act 43 of 1960. (9) The learned Government Advocate raised certain preliminary objections to the Writ peti­tion. He stated firstly that this Court cannot issue a Writ against the Union of India under Article 226 of the Constitution and hence, the Union of India cannot be made a party. Secondly, he said that the Writ petition was mainly and substantially directed against the Union of India as it impugned a Central Act and that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a Writ declaring a Central Act to be ultra vires and hence, it was not maintainable. He also stated that the attack against the Act as ultra vires the Constitution was too vague and indefinite to be answered by him. (10) The petitioner in his affidavit-in-reply clarified his stand and stated that he has impleaded the Union of India only as a proper party in whose presence this Writ petition should be heard and that his petition is mainly directed against the impugned notifications. (10) The petitioner in his affidavit-in-reply clarified his stand and stated that he has impleaded the Union of India only as a proper party in whose presence this Writ petition should be heard and that his petition is mainly directed against the impugned notifications. He also contended that this Court had every right under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a Writ against a Central Act for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and hence, the Writ filed against the Central Act was maintain­able. Regarding the unconstitutionality of the Act which was rather vaguely pleaded in this petition he has made his position clear by stating that he confines his plea of unconstitutionality to Sec. 1 sub-section (3), Sec. 123, Sec. 134 sub-section (i) and Sec. 167 (2). I shall deal with the objections regarding the said sections after disposing of the preliminary objections raised by the Government Advocate questioning the maintainability of the Writ petition. (ii) The objection of the learned Government Advocate that no writ can be issued by this Court against the Union of India and that the Union of India cannot therefore be made a party has to be accepted as valid. This matter has now been finally set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 532 . In the said case, the appellant before the Supreme Court filed a Writ application in the Jammu and Kashmir High Court against the Union of India in respect of an order issued by the Government of India retiring him from service, charactering the order as illegal, unwarranted and discriminatory. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the Union of India that they being outside the Territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the said High Court the Writ was not maintainable. This deci­sion of the said High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court by its majority judgment, Subba Rao J. dissenting. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the Union of India that they being outside the Territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the said High Court the Writ was not maintainable. This deci­sion of the said High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court by its majority judgment, Subba Rao J. dissenting. The Supreme Court thereby confirmed the view taker, in two earlier decisions of the Court namely, "Election Commission, India v. Venkata Rao", AIR 1953 SC 210 and "K. S. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission", AIR 1954 SC 207 in which a two-fold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue Writs under Article 226 were laid down namely, (i) the power is to be exercised "throughout the terri­tories in relation to which it exercises jurisdic­tion", that is to say, the Writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and (2) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such Writs must be "within those territories" which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within (those territories. In the earlier two decisions of the Supreme Court, the Writ was sought not against the Union of India but against certain authorities who were not located within the territories in relation td which the respective High Courts exercised juris­diction whereas in the latest decision namely, AIR 1961 SC 532 the Writ was asked for against the Union of India. It was held that though the Government of India was functioning throughout the Territory of India, it cannot be said to be located all over India and though the Constitution of India has not provided the seat of the Govern­ment of India to be at New Delhi, it was common knowledge that the seat of the Government of India is in New Delhi and the Government as such is located in New Delhi and hence, only the High Court which has got territorial jurisdiction over New Delhi can issue a Writ- against the Union of India under Article 226. (12) It is clear, therefore, that the petitioner cannot pray for the issue of a Writ by this Court against the Union of India. The petitioner has also fairly accepted this position in his affidavit-in reply. (12) It is clear, therefore, that the petitioner cannot pray for the issue of a Writ by this Court against the Union of India. The petitioner has also fairly accepted this position in his affidavit-in reply. But he would say that he has impleaded the Union of India as a proper party, so that the Writ petition may be heard in the presence of the Union of India. Actually in his petition, he has asked for the Writ to be issued against the Union of India also. But he has altered his stand evi­dently in view of the decision of the Supreme Court cited above. It is not proper in a Writ application to make the Union of India a party merely for the Writ being heard in their presence. They can be made a party only if any relief is claimed against them and as no relief can be grant­ed against them, they are not a proper or necessary party. Further, the Union of India is impleaded to be represented through the Administrator, Tripura. As the Administrator is made a party separa­tely, it was quite unnecessary to have made the Union of India a party. Article 239 of the Con­stitution is to the effect that, save as otherwise pro­vided by Parliament by law, every Union territory shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an adminis­trator to be appointed by him with such designa­tion as he may specify. Thus the Administrator is the agent or representative of the President in the Administration of Tripura which is a Union Territory. Orders or Writs can be issued by this Court to the Administrator who resides and has his office within the territory in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction. The Union of India is therefore, discharged from this petition and no Writ will be issued against it. (13) I am not, however^ prepared to accept the further argument of the learned Government Advocate that since no Writ can be issued against the Union of India by this Court, this Court can­not issue any Writ in respect of any provision in a Central Act on the. (13) I am not, however^ prepared to accept the further argument of the learned Government Advocate that since no Writ can be issued against the Union of India by this Court, this Court can­not issue any Writ in respect of any provision in a Central Act on the. ground that as the Act has been passed by Parliament which is outside the jurisdiction of this Court and made into law by assent being given thereto by the president who also resides outside the jurisdiction of this Court, the issue of a Writ in respect of a Central Act against an authority located within this Court's jurisdiction who is the agent or representative of the Union of India, would be doing indirectly what this Court could not do directly and would be pre­venting the agent or representative from carrying out functions enjoined to be performed by the Central Act. Under Article 13 (2) of the Constitution, the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and any law made in contravention thereof shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Article 226 of the Constitution gives the power to this Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue directions, orders or Writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. All laws for Tripura have to be enacted by Parliament as Tripura is a Union territory and the State referred to in Arti­cle 13 (2) so far as Tripura is concerned is the Government of India. This Court has therefore a right to examine any law passed by the State for enforcement in Tripura and to see whether such law takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. No doubt as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision AIR 1961 SC 532 , this Court cannot issue any order, direction or Writ to any person or. autho­rity or Government who are outside the territo­ries in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. No doubt as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision AIR 1961 SC 532 , this Court cannot issue any order, direction or Writ to any person or. autho­rity or Government who are outside the territo­ries in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. But if a law is to be enforced within the Terri­tory of Tripura by any person or authority resid­ing or having location within the Territory of Tripura, this Court can issue an order or Writ or direction to such person or authority if the law is found void under Article 13 (2) of the Consti­tution. (14) Coming to Act 43 of 1960, we find that though the Act is a Central Act and is extended to the whole of the Union Territory of Tripura by the Government of India, section i, sub-sec­tion (3) has given the power to the Administrator to bring it into force by notification in the Offi­cial Gazette. Again, section 3 gives the power to the Administrator to divide the territory into districts, subdivisions etc. Again, various sections in the Act like sections 98, 132, 161 and 184 gives the power to the Administrator to make rules to carry out the various purposes of the Act. Section 134 (i) again gives the Administra­tor the power to issue notification vesting estates in the State. It is unnecessary to deal with the various other sections vesting the authority in the Administrator to enforce and administer the various provisions of the Act within the territory. The Administrator is the final authority and there; is no provision for control by an appeal to the Government of India. It is sufficient to say that after laying down the policy, the working out and implementation of the policy by enforcement of the various provisions of the Act and the admi­nistration of the Act within the territory of Tri­pura is left by Parliament to the Administrator through Revenue officers, Survey officers and Set­tlement officers and other village officers and ser­vants, the manner of whose appointment and whose powers and duties are to be provided for by rules framed by him. Thus as the law is to be enforced by the authority namely, the Admi­nistrator who is within the territory of Tripura over which this Court has jurisdiction, an order, direction or Writ can be issued against the Ad­ministrator if it is found that any part of the law infringes Part III of the Constitution. (15) In this connection I may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court, A. Thangal Kunju v. Venkatachalam, (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 . In paragraph 29 of the said decision the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 is referred to in the following words :- "The jurisdiction under Article 226 is exercis­ed by the High Court in order to protect and safe­guard the rights of the citizens and wherever the High Court finds that any person within its ter­ritories is guilty of doing an act which is not authorised by law or is violative of the fundamen­tal rights of the citizens, it exercises that juris­diction in order to vindicate his rights and redress his grievances." In laying down the conditions for the exer­cise of that jurisdiction, the following observations of Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in the decision AIR 1953 SC 210 , "But wide as were the powers thus confer­red, a two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise. In the first place, the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", that is to say, the Writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. Second­ly, the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such Writs must be "within those territories", which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those terri­tories" were approved in the said decision. These ob­servations were, as seen earlier, approved by the Supreme Court in its later decision AIR 1961 SC 532 . (16) The decision (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 dealt with a case in which the first respondent therein was appointed as an authorised officer by the Income Tax Investigation Commission to investigate the appellant's income therein and the said officer had his residence in Travancore. But the Income Tax Investigation Commission who was respon­dent 2 had its location at New Delhi. But the Income Tax Investigation Commission who was respon­dent 2 had its location at New Delhi. After dealing with the various provisions of the Act which gave the officer the authority, the Supreme Court stated as follows:- "(28): It is clear from the above provisions that the authorised official has considerable powers conferred upon him in the conduct of the investigation and even though he could be called a mere arm of the Commission or an authorised agent of the Commission, he has important func­tions to discharge and is not merely a mouth­piece of the Commission or a conduit-pipe trans­mitting the orders or the directions of the Com­mission. He is no doubt under the general con­trol and supervision of the Commission but he performs the various functions assigned to him on his own initiative and in the exercise of his discretion. If, therefore, he does anything in the discharge of his functions as authorised official which is not authorised by law or is violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner, he would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. (29) Even though this is the 'prima facie' position, it was urged that he is acting under the directions of the Commission as its authoris­ed agent and as such no Writ can issue against him, because the principal who directs the acti­vities and not the agent would be liable for the same. This contention is unsound. There can be no agency in the matter of the commission of -a wrong. The wrong-doer would certainly be liable to be dealt with as the party directly res­ponsible for his wrongful action. The relationship between principal and agent would only be rele­vant for the purpose of determining whether the principal also is vicariously liable for the wrong perpetrated by his agent. On the analogy of cri­minal liability, the offender could certainly not be heard to say that he was committing the offence under the behest or directions of his principal. On the analogy of a civil wrong, the tortfeasor could certainly not protect himself against liabi­lity on the ground of having committed the tort under the directions of his principal. On the analogy of cri­minal liability, the offender could certainly not be heard to say that he was committing the offence under the behest or directions of his principal. On the analogy of a civil wrong, the tortfeasor could certainly not protect himself against liabi­lity on the ground of having committed the tort under the directions of his principal. The agent could in no event exculpate himself from liability for the wrongful act done by him and if he is thus amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court the High Court could certainly issue an ap­propriate Writ against him under Article 226. * * * * ***** The argument that by issuing a Writ against the agent under those circumstances the High Court would be putting him in a position whereby he would be compelled to disobey the directions of his principal is also of no avail for the simple reason that an agent is bound to obey all lawful directions of his principal and not directions which the High Court holds to be unlawful or not jus­tified in law. The agent could certainly be prohi­bited from obeying the unlawful directions of his principal and even if the principal cannot be reached by reason of his being outside the terri­tories, the arm of the law could certainly reach the agent who is guilty of having committed wrong and the High Court could certainly issue a Writ against him under Article 226. (3o): It was further contended that by issu­ing such a Writ against the authorised official, the High Court would be indirectly prohibiting the Commission from conducting the investigation within the territories even though it could not directly prohibit the Commission from doing so. If the Commission was doing something within the territories through its authorised official which was not justified in law, it would not lie in the mouth of the Commission to urge that the High Court could not issue a Writ of prohibition against its agent, the authorised official, who had his resi­dence or permanent location within the territories merely because it would be indirectly prohibited from perpetrating a wrong within the territories. The principal could, in no event, urge that his agent should be allowed to function for him with­in the territories in a manner which was not war­ranted by law or had no justification in law. The principal could, in no event, urge that his agent should be allowed to function for him with­in the territories in a manner which was not war­ranted by law or had no justification in law. It is expected that once this Court has declared the law the Investigation Commission would comply with it and not place its agent in the wrong by directing him to act contrary to the law so dec­lared. (31): * * * * * * * * In this case respondent 1 was actually claiming to exercise powers conferred upon him by certain sec­tions of the Travancore Act 14 of 1124 which, it was submitted, were contrary to law or discrimi­natory and consequently ultra vires the Consti­tution. The fact that respondent i was the agent of respondent 2, which being beyond its jurisdiction could not be reached by the High Court, could not make his acts any the less ob­jectionable or discriminatory and 'ultra vires'. It is sufficient to say that if his action was contrary to law or if the provisions of law under which he was claiming to act became, after the commence­ment of the Constitution, void under Arti­cle 13 (i) as being repugnant to Article 14 and the doer of the illegal act was within the reach of the High Court, the High Court had ju­risdiction under Article 226 to issue a Writ against respondent 1 and thereby prevent further infringe­ment of the petitioner's fundamental rights." (17) No doubt in that decision what Was questioned was Travancore Act .14 of 1124 which was a local Act of Travaucore and not a Central Act. But I find from the decision that the said local Act had expired and after Travancore be­came part of Indian Territory, the Indian Income Tax Investigation Commission had stepped on the scene by virtue of Act 44 of 1951 which was a Central Act and which had given the powers to the Commission to investigate cases referred to it under Act 14 of 1124. Thus what was virtual­ly questioned in the High Court was a Central Act and the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above related to the same. In the mat­ter now before us, the question is more or less similar. Thus what was virtual­ly questioned in the High Court was a Central Act and the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above related to the same. In the mat­ter now before us, the question is more or less similar. Here, as I have pointed out, though Act 43 of 1960 is a Central Act, the Administrator has been given the power to bring it into force with­in the Territory of Tripura and to administer the various provisions of the Act without reference to the Central Government and the full discretion is vested to him. In such a case, if he does any­thing in the discharge of his functions as autho­rised under the Central Act, which is found to be violative of the fundamental rights of the peti­tioners, he would be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court and it will be no argument to say that he is acting under the powers given to him by a Central Act and that the High Court would be indirectly issuing a Writ against the Govern­ment of India which is not within its jurisdiction. After the legislative function has been exercised by the legislature and the Act brought into force in a Territory over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, the High Court can certainly step in under Article 226 and if it is found that any pro­vision of the Act, as applicable to the said Terri­tory, is repugnant to Part III of the Constitution, an order, direction or Writ can be issued by the High Court to any authority,. within the said Territory who has been given the right to enforce the Act in the said Territory. (18) No decisions of any High Court or the Supreme Court holding that a High Court cannot issue a Writ in respect of the provision of a Cen­tral Act were cited before me by either side. But I have been able to find some instances where High Courts have held provisions of Central Acts to be ultra vires the Constitution. One such in­stance is reported in the F. B. decision of the Allahabad High Court Deoman Upadhyaya v. State, AIR 1960 All I in which section 27 of the Evidence Act and section 162 (2) Criminal Proce­dure Code were held to create an unjustifiable discrimination between persons in custody and persons out of custody and in that way offending Article 14 of the Constitution. I find that no argument was advanced before the Allahabad High Court that the Evidence Act being a Central enactment cannot be questioned in the High Court. No doubt, this view of the Allahabad High Court relating to the unconstitutionality was set aside by the Supreme Court in the decision State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR 1960 SC 1125 . But even before the Supreme Court, I do not find that any argument was ad­vanced that the High Court cannot deal with the question. Of course, in that case the matter did not come before the High Court in a Writ appli­cation under Article 226 of the Constitution but in the course of a criminal appeal. But the prin­ciple is the same. Where the . authority to en­force a Central Act is within the local limits of the High Court's jurisdiction, the High Court can deal with the matter and issue an order, Writ or direction against that authority. (19) A recent decision of the Supreme Court Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 showed that the Allahabad High Court had declared section I24-A, Indian Penal Code ultra vires Article 19 (i) (a) of the Constitution. There were three appeals by the State of Uttar Pradesh and two of them arose out of decisions in Criminal appeals by the Allahabad High Court, while one was against the order in a Writ of Habeas Corpus. In all of them section 124-A, Indian Penal Code was challenged as ultra vires and the Allahabad High Court accepted the plea and held section I24-A to be ultra vires. The said decision is reported in Ram Nandan v. State, AIR 1959 All 101 (FB). The Supreme Court, no doubt, set aside the said decision of the Allahabad High Court. But I do not find that either in the Allahabad High Court or before the Supreme Court, it was chal­lenged that in the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the High Court did not have the power to issue the Writ against section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code which is a Central enactment. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Allahabad High Court as it found that the section was not unconstitutional. Hence, this preliminary objec­tion raised by the Government Advocate cannot be upheld. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Allahabad High Court as it found that the section was not unconstitutional. Hence, this preliminary objec­tion raised by the Government Advocate cannot be upheld. (20) Now I shall proceed to deal with the provisions of Act 43 of 1960, which have been challenged. It is not all the provisions of the Ac| 43 of 1960 which have been questioned in this Writ but only section I (3), section 123, section 134 (i) and section 167 (2) of the Act. I shall deal with section 1 (3) last as other objections also have been raised in respect of section 1 (3). I may dispose of the objection relating to section 134 (i) straightway. The said section is as fol­lows : - "134. (i) As soon as may be after the com­mencement of this Act, the Administrator may, by notification in the. Official Gazette, declare that, with effect from the date specified in the notifi­cation (hereinafter referred to as the vesting date), all estates situated in any area or areas and all rights, title and interest of every intermediary in such estates shall vest in the Government free .from all encumbrances." (21) The petitioner in paragraph 19 of his affidavit-in-reply has, in fact, questioned the whole of Part IV Chapter XI of the Act of which section 134 (i) is the main provision relating to the vesting of estates in the State. The said Chap­ter deals with the acquisition of estates and rights of intermediaries therein. Chapter XII of Part IV, deals with the assessment and payment of com­pensation. The first objection of the petitioner is that the provisions of Chapter XI and particular­ly section 134 (i) is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. His second rejection is that the manner of implementation section 134 (i) leaving the discretion to the Administrator to apply the provision by notification estates situated in any area or areas of Tripura highly discriminatory, that the Act does not pros, de any guidance for its application by the Administrator leaving thereby a blanket power in his hands to apply the section indiscriminately and that there­by there has been excessive delegation of power to the Administrator which is not permitted. With regard to the first objection relating to Chapter XI and in particular to section 134 (i), I should think Article 3I-A of the Constitution is a complete answer and I cannot permit the peti­tioner to raise the plea at all. Article 31-A spe­cifically provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modifica­tion of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights confer­red by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31. This prevents the petitioner from urging the unconstitutionality of Chapter XI with special reference to section 134 (i). (22) With regard to the plea of excessive dele­gation of power to the Administrator by leaving the discretion to him to implement the section by notification in respect of estates in any area or areas, I think, this matter is also now concluded by various decisions of the Supreme Court which I shall presently refer to. The petitioner's maizi complaint is that by the notification Annexure D (i), the Administrator has exercised his discre­tion without assigning any reason in the Sub-divi­sion of Kamahpur alone, in which he owns lands and that no such notification has been issued in respect of other Sub-divisions, thereby showing discrimination against the estate-holders in Kamalpur alone. To this the respondents have pointed out that Part IV of the Act has already been enforced by the notification, Annexure D, throughout Tripura, but that the notification Annexure D (i) under section 134 (i) of the Act could be issued only in stages, as survey and settlement operations were being undertaken to obtain as clear and as accurate an enunciation as possible of the right to and possession of the lands, to effect adjustment in them as necessary in the interests of revenue as also of fairness and equity and to make an ac­curate map of all details inside villages and that this process involves a phased 5 year programme and that with the progress of survey and settle­ment operations, notifications similar to those of Kamalpur were being issued in the sub-divisions of Khawai, Sadar and Sonamura. Annexure F was also produced before me to show that in October, 1961, by further notifica­tion under section 1 (3) and section 134 of the Act the sub-divisions of Khowai, Sadar and Sonarnura have been placed on the same footing as Kamal­pur and it was argued that this process will go on until the entire Act is applied to all the sub­divisions in Tripura. (23) In dealing with this matter, we must keep in mind the fact that the legislature when passing the Act is not in a position to go into all the details which will arise in the implementation of the Act and cannot make provisions to cover all those details. The legislature can only lay down the policy and leave the implementation and working out of details to its chosen delegate. The Administration of Tripura is entrusted to an Ad­ministrator appointed by the President under Arti­cle 239 of the Constitution. Article 53 (3) (b) of the Constitution permits Parliament to confer by law functions on authorities other than the President, even though the executive power of the Union under Article 53 (i) is vested in the President. Thus the functions to be performed under Act 43 of 1960 were validly conferred by Parlia­ment on the Administrator appointed by the Pre­sident. Reading the Act, the preamble and the other provisions it is clear that Parliament has decided that all estates in Tripura shall vest in the Government and that there should be ceiling on land holdings throughout Tripura. It has given the direction that the entire provisions of the Act are to be introduced throughout the Territory of Tripura and the Administrator is bound to introduce the Act throughout the Territory. The discretion vested in him is to do so in area or areas by notification ap­pointing dates for the purpose. This will depend on local conditions and administrative convenience which the Parliament cannot envisage at the time of passing the Act. We have to accept the state­ment of the respondents that survey and settle­ment operations could not be undertaken simul­taneously throughout the entire Territory and that therefore the total implementation of the Act throughout the Territory has necessary got to be undertaken in the course of a phased period of 5 years. We have to accept the state­ment of the respondents that survey and settle­ment operations could not be undertaken simul­taneously throughout the entire Territory and that therefore the total implementation of the Act throughout the Territory has necessary got to be undertaken in the course of a phased period of 5 years. As to where the vesting of estates in the Government should begin under Section 134(1) is a matter left to the discretion of the Administra­tor and in such a matter the good faith of the Administrator has to be presumed by the Court until the contrary is proved. Thus what can be questioned is not on the ground of excessive dele­gation, but only on the ground of bad faith. But the good faith of the Administrator has not been questioned in this Writ. The issue of the notification under section 134 (i) of the Act first in Kamalpur cannot in any sense be called a discri­mination against Kamalpur in the sense of an un­favourable bias against it. When the whole Act is going to be introduced in the whole of Tripura within a short time, the selection of Kamalpur as the first place cannot be said to be a discrimina­tion against it. As I have already pointed out, the petitioner cannot question the provisions of the Act particularly those provisions relating to the acquisition of the estates under Articles 14, 19 and 31 as Article 31-A applies to such legislation. We are here concerned only with the question, whether there has been excessive delegation of power to the Administrator. (24) For the petitioner reliance was placed on^ three decisions of the Supreme Court namely, Vasanlal Maganbhai v. State of Bombay, AIR' 1961 SC 4, Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S. R. Tendol-kar, AIR 1958 SC 538 and Edward Mills Co., Ltd., Beawar v. State of Ajmer, (S) AIR 1955 SC 25 . After a close perusal of all these decisions, I do-not find anything in them which would warrant his contention that in leaving the implementation of the Act by notifications in different areas of Tripura on different dates to the Administrator, there has been excessive delegation of power. After a close perusal of all these decisions, I do-not find anything in them which would warrant his contention that in leaving the implementation of the Act by notifications in different areas of Tripura on different dates to the Administrator, there has been excessive delegation of power. In the first of these decisions namely, AIR 1961 SC 4 , the question which arose was whether section 6 (2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricul­tural Lands Act, 1948, which fixed the maximum rent payable by a tenant for the lease of land, but permitted the Provincial Government by noti­fication in the official Gazette to fix a lower rate of the maximum rent payable by the tenants of lands in any particular area, suffered from the vice of excessive delegation. By a majority decision with Subba Rao, J., dissenting, it was held that it will not amount to excessive delegation. In dealing with this question, their Lordships took into account the preamble to the Act to see whe­ther the legislative policy and principle had been enunciated in the Act with sufficient accuracy and clarity and held that if they have been so laid down, it is permissible for the legislature to dele­gate subsidiary and ancillary powers to a dele­gate of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by the Act. Applying this test to our present case, it is clear from the preamble that the Act is to be brought into force throughout the Territory of Tripura and various provisions of the Act have laid down the manner in which the policy enun­ciated in the preamble was to be worked out. Only the timing was left to the Administrator who had knowledge of the local conditions. Their Lordships further stated that it is for a Court to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits, but that the said liberal construction should not be carried by the Courts to the extent of always trying to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary -power on executive authorities and that it is the duty of the Court to strike down without any hesitation any blanket power conferred on the exe­cutive by the legislature. It cannot be said that in leaving the timing of the implementation to the Administrator, any blanket power has been vest­ed in him. It cannot be said that in leaving the timing of the implementation to the Administrator, any blanket power has been vest­ed in him. It is not an essential legislative func­tion or power and as pointed out in the same de­cision, when the legislatures have to enact laws to meet the challenge of the complex socio-economic problems, they often find it convenient and neces­sary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by their Acts. The same decision dealt with the question whether the power to issue a notification can be exercised only once or whether it can be exercis­ed from time to time and they held that the power can be exercised from time to time as oc­casion requires and they referred to section 14 of the Central General Clauses Act, 1897 for the said purpose. Thus in the present case, the Adminis­trator has the power to issue notifications from time to time, both under section 134 (i) as also under section i (3) of the Act. This decision, therefore, does not help the petitioner. In fact, Mr. Datta Majumdar who appeared for the peti­tioner was relying more on the dissenting judg­ment of Subba Rao, J., than on the majority judgment of the other four Judges. (25) The same decision considered (S) AIR 1955 SC 25 before coming to its conclusion and approved of it in stating that delegation may be resorted to as a subsidiary or ancillary measure. The said decision also does not, in any way, help the petitioner. In that decision, the fixation of minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was left under section 27 of the Act to be done by the Government to which power was also .given to amend the schedule to the Act by includ­ing further trades and industries in the schedule to which the Act will apply. The Supreme Court stated that conditions of labourer varied under different circumstances and from State to State and the expediency of includ­ing a particular trade or industry within the sche­dule depended upon a variety of facts which are by no means uniform and which can best be as­certained by the person who is placed in charge of the administration of a particular State. This observation would apply directly to our present case and it is for this reason that the discretion regarding the fixation of dates is left to the Ad­ministrator. (26) I am not able to see anything in the de­cision AIR 1958 SC 538 which would help the petitioner. Therein also, I find that the delega­tion of power which was made to the Government in that particular case was approved. (27) I may refer to a few other Supreme Court decisions cited by the learned Government Advocate which are more in point. The decision Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 139 related to the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 in which there was a provision namely, section 3 (i) which permitted a State Government from time to time by notification to declare that the estates specified in the notification has passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. This is almost similar to section 134 (i) of Act 43 of 1960. The Supreme Court repelled the argument that the said section gave an unfettered discretion to the State Government to issue or not to issue no­tification which gave room for exercising the dis­cretion against those Zamindars who opposed the ruling party in the election and to refrain from doing so with respect to others who were loyal to that party. In that connection, the Supreme Court observed: "The long title of the Act and the two pre­ambles which have been quoted above, clearly in­dicate that the object and the purpose of the Act is to abolish all the rights, title and interest of land in the intermediaries by whatever name known. This is a clear indication of the policy which is sought to be implemented by the opera­tive provisions of the Act. Whatever discretion has been vested in the State Government under section 3 or section 4 must be exercised in the light of this policy and therefore it cannot be said to be absolute or unfettered discretion, for sooner or later all estates must perforce be abolished. From the very nature of things a certain amount of discretionary latitude had to be given to the State Government. It would have been a colossal task if the State Government had to take over all the estates at one and the same time. It would have broken down the entire administrative ma­chinery. From the very nature of things a certain amount of discretionary latitude had to be given to the State Government. It would have been a colossal task if the State Government had to take over all the estates at one and the same time. It would have broken down the entire administrative ma­chinery. It would not be possible to collect suffi­cient staff to take over and discharge the respon­sibilities. It would be difficult to arrange for the requisite finance all at once. It was, therefore, imperative to confer some discretion on the State Government. It has not been suggested or shown that in practice any discrimination has been made. If any notification or order is made, not in fur­therance of the policy of the Act but in bad faith and as and by way of discrimination such notifi­cation or order, which by virtue of Article 13 (3) comes within the definition of "law", will itself be void under Article 13 (2)." (28) The above observations apply in toto to the present case and if we consider the preamble to Act 43 of 1960 and the various provisions of the Act, it is clear that the legislature has decided the policy of acquisition of all the estates in Tripura and has given detailed directions regarding the payment of compensation, the manner of tak­ing over etc., and has left the discretion to the Administrator to carry out the policy by issue of notification in area or areas. The explanation given by the respondents in paragraph 16 of their counter-statement that a phased 5 year program­me for the taking over of all the estates as the sur­vey and settlement operations are proceeding apace has to be accepted. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that even during the pendency of this Writ petition, notifications under section 134 W have been issued in respect of 3 other sub-divisions. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that even during the pendency of this Writ petition, notifications under section 134 W have been issued in respect of 3 other sub-divisions. (29) Another 'decision of the Supreme Court Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, (S) AIR 1955 SC 504 related to the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (6 of 1952) in which section 21 (i) provided as follows:- "As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the Government may by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption of any class of Jagir lands and differ­ent dates may be appointed for different classes of jagir lands." The provision is somewhat similar to the provision of section 134 (i) and in fact, goes a little further as different dates have been permit­ted to be appointed for different classes of jagir lands. This will be relevant when we deal with the objection raised in section 1 (3) of Act 43 of 1960 which also permits different dates to be ap­pointed for different areas and for different provi­sions of the Act. The contention raised before the Supreme Court that section 21 (i) of the Rajasthan Act must result in the law operating unequally was repelled by the Supreme Court rely­ing on the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 139 and it was held that the provision was obviously dictated by practical considerations such as administrative convenience and facilities for payment of compensation and cannot be held to be discriminatory, particularly as Section 21(1) applied to all the jagirs in Rajasthan. It fol­lows, therefore, that the objection raised to sec­tion .134 (i) is not valid. To a great extent, the same objection raised to section 1 (3) of the Act has also been covered by what I have stated above. (30) The next objection is in respect of sec­tions 123 and 167 (2) of the Act in so far as they made certain provisions of the Act retrospective in operation. Section 123 permits restoration of pos­session of land to an under-raiyat where he has surrendered the land or been evicted therefrom on or after 10-8-1957. (30) The next objection is in respect of sec­tions 123 and 167 (2) of the Act in so far as they made certain provisions of the Act retrospective in operation. Section 123 permits restoration of pos­session of land to an under-raiyat where he has surrendered the land or been evicted therefrom on or after 10-8-1957. Section 167 (2) states that any land transferred at any time between 10-8-1957 and the commencement of the Act shall be deem­ed to be held by the transferor for the purpose of determining the excess land under the section. The date 10th August, 1957, is the date on which the draft bill of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms was published It is patent that when such a bill is published giving security of tenure to under-raiyats and fixing ceilings on land, attempts would surely be made by persons, who are likely to be affected when the bill became an Act, to remove under-raiyats from possession of the land and to trans­fer excess holding held by them beyond the ceil­ing in order to avoid being affected by the Act. Under such circumstances, provisions like sections 123 and 167 (2) making the Act applicable with effect from 10-8-1957 should not only be held to be not wrong or objectionable but should be con­sidered as an essential provision, in any such Act as otherwise the objects of the Act are likely to be rendered nugatory. The scheme of the Act as a whole is to create peasant proprietors of lands and to abolish all intermediaries between such peasant proprietors and the State and to fix a ceiling on land holdings so that excess land should not be held by one-person or family to the detriment of other citi­zens who may wish to be peasant proprietors-. The policy of acquisition of estates under Chapter XI of the Act and fixation of ceilings under Chap­ter XIII was adopted by the legislature with the-above end in view. It cannot be gainsaid that the Act is on the whole a very beneficial mea­sure even though the rights of big land-holders in Tripura like the petitioner will be affected by it, for which, of course, there is provision for pay­ment of compensation. Section 123 and section 167 are provisions which are ancillary in character to the main provisions. It cannot be gainsaid that the Act is on the whole a very beneficial mea­sure even though the rights of big land-holders in Tripura like the petitioner will be affected by it, for which, of course, there is provision for pay­ment of compensation. Section 123 and section 167 are provisions which are ancillary in character to the main provisions. In such cases, retrospec­tive operation of the Act cannot be held to be in-any way unconstitutional or violative of any law. After all, the retrospective operation of the Act can be questioned by the petitioner at best only under Article 31 of the Constitution which deal' with the fundamental rights of a citizen against deprivation of property. But as Article 31-A ap­plies to the acquisition of estates by the present Act, the petitioner's argument that the retrospec­tive operation affects Article 31 of the Constitu­tion cannot hold water. In this view it is neces­sary to consider in detail the various Supreme' Court decisions on this point cited by the learned Government Advocate which have held that retros­pective operation will not be unconstitutional. The following decisions namely, The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Ghosh, 1954 SCR 587 : ( AIR 1954 SC 92 ) and Raghubir Singh v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1959 SC 475 held retros­pective operation in those cases to be constitutional. (31) Now I come to the objection raised re­lating to section I (3) of the Act and to the noti­fication Annexure D issued thereunder by the Administrator. Section i of the Act is as follows: - 1. (1) This Act may be called the Tripura. Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. (2) It extends to the whole of the Union ter­ritory of Tripura. (3) It shall come into force on such date as the Administrator may, by notification in the Offi­cial Gazette, appoint; and different dates may be appointed for different areas and for different pro­visions of this Act. The objection raised is two-fold. Firstly, it was urged that under section i (3), the Act cannot be brought into force in Tripura piece-meal and my attention was drawn to the first part of section-1 (3). The objection raised is two-fold. Firstly, it was urged that under section i (3), the Act cannot be brought into force in Tripura piece-meal and my attention was drawn to the first part of section-1 (3). "The Act shall come into force on such, date as the Administrator may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint;" The words which fellow namely, "different dates may be appointed for different areas and for different provisions of the Act" however indicate that the various provi­sions can be brought into force in the different areas step by step. But Mr. Dutt Majumdar for the petitioner ar­gued that reading section 1 (3) as a whole, the proper interpretation should be that in one and the same notification issued on a particular date bring­ing the whole Act into force in the whole of Tri­pura, the Administrator may appoint different dates for different areas and for different provisions, but that the whole picture relating to all the provisions and all the areas of Tripura must be there in the same notification. Based on that interpretation, it was argued that the notification Annexure D has not brought the whole Act into force in the whole of Tripura and that Chapter XIII has been brought into force only in Kamalpur and Chapter XIV has not been brought into force any­where in Tripura by Annexure D. (32) It is, however, not possible for me to ac­cept such an interpretation. If even according to that interpretation, different dates are appointed for different areas and different provisions in the same notification it means that the whole Act is not being brought into force in the whole of Tripura on one single date, and this would offend -the very interpretation sought to be placed on section 1 (3) by Mr. Dutt Majumdar. The em­phasis in the first part of section I (3) is not on the singular being used in the words "date" and notification, but on the appointing of date and that too by notification. Otherwise, we cannot re­concile the first part and second part of the sec­tion. Rules of interpretation require that such interpretation should be given to the parts of a section or sentence as would, if possible, without doing violence to the rules of grammar give a cogent and coherent meaning to the section or sentence read as a whole. Otherwise, we cannot re­concile the first part and second part of the sec­tion. Rules of interpretation require that such interpretation should be given to the parts of a section or sentence as would, if possible, without doing violence to the rules of grammar give a cogent and coherent meaning to the section or sentence read as a whole. If we read the whole of section 1 (3) together, it clearly permits the Administrator the discretion to appoint different dates for different areas and different provisions which means that he can bring the Act into force piece-meal, to suit local conditions and adminis­trative convenience and that separate notifications can be issued extending the various provisions to various areas of the Act provided, of course, that the entire Act is brought into force in the whole territory of Tripura in good faith within a rea­sonable time, in accordance with the legislative policy as seen from the preamble and the other provisions of the Act. In that connection, section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 may be referred to by which any power conferred by any Central enactment may be exercised from time to time as occasion arises, unless a different intention appears in the Act. In our present case, not only is there no different intention in the Act, but the latter part of section I (3) indicates that notifications can be issued in succession applying different provisions of the Act to the different areas. The Supreme Court decision, AIR 1961 SC 4 holds that where the power to issue a notification is given by an Act, it can be exercised from time to time and that if it was necessary to issue one notification it would follow by force of the same logic that circumstances may require the issue of further notifications. In our case, section 1 (3) itself permits the issue of successive notifications for the purpose of bringing the whole Act into force in the whole of Tripura. I have already refer­red to the decision (S) AIR 1955 SC 504 which dealt with a similar provision which has been held to be valid in the said decision. It is not possible for me, therefore, to accept the contention of the petitioner that the whole Act has to be 'brought into force on one date by one notification. I have already refer­red to the decision (S) AIR 1955 SC 504 which dealt with a similar provision which has been held to be valid in the said decision. It is not possible for me, therefore, to accept the contention of the petitioner that the whole Act has to be 'brought into force on one date by one notification. The notification Annexure D has to be held as valid in that respect. (33) The next argument was that if successive notifications are held to be permitted under sec­tion 1 (3) to bring the whole Act in force in the whole of Tripura, then the section will suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of power to the Administrator. I have already dealt with this matter in some detail in considering the validity of section 134 (1) of the Act. It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons again. When the entire policy of the Act has been laid down clearly in the preamble and in the various provisions, it has to be held that proper guidance has been given to the Administrator in the exercise of his discretion. As held in the Supreme Court decision AIR 1954 SC 139 if the petitioner can show bad faith on the part of the Administrator, this Court can interfere. But neither in the petition nor in the arguments advanced before me was it suggested that there was any bad faith on the part of the Administrator in applying the provisions first in the sub-division of Kamalpur. What was argued was only that there was the likelihood of discrimi­nation being shown, if such blanket power was given. But the respondents have shown in their counter-affidavit that Kamalpur was chosen for the application of the Act for administrative con­venience which made it necessary to fix a phased programme of 5 years for the application of the entire Act throughout Tripura. This has to be accepted by me and the notification Annexure D has to be held valid. (34) Thus no provision of the Act has been shown to offend any of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. This has to be accepted by me and the notification Annexure D has to be held valid. (34) Thus no provision of the Act has been shown to offend any of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. The Supreme Court decision AIR 1958 SC 538 lays down that there is always a pre­sumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, that the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression, that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are direct­ed to problems made manifest by experience and that in order to sustain the presumption of the constitutionality the Court may take into consi­deration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, and the history of the tunes and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. Applying these principles, Act 43 of 1960 includ­ing the impugned provisions namely, sections 1(3). 123. 134 (1) and 167 (2) has to be held to be validly enacted. (35) Now I come to the notification Anne­xure D (1) which was issued in respect of Kamal­pur sub-division alone under Sec. 134 (1) of the Act on 13-4-1961. As I hive held Sec. 134 (1) to be a valid section, if a proper notification is issued under the said section even if it is only in respect of one sub-division, Kamalpur, it cannot be struck down on the ground that Kamalpur sub-division was chosen first for the acquisition of estates. But what was argued by Mr. Dutt Majumder was that Annexure D(1) has not been issued in accordance with the provision in Sec. 134 (1). I find that this objection has to be accepted as a valid objection. It would be seen from Annexure D, the notification issued under Sec. 1(3) of the Act dated 13-4-1961, that Part IV was brought into force in Kamalpur and in the other sub-divisions of Tripura with effect from 14-4-1961, which was the appointed date. Now section 134(1) provides that the notification thereunder can be issued "as soon as may be after the commencement of the Act" which means that it must be on some date on or after 14-4-1961, whereas, in fact, Annexure D(1) was issued on 13-4-1961 along with Annexure D itself. Now section 134(1) provides that the notification thereunder can be issued "as soon as may be after the commencement of the Act" which means that it must be on some date on or after 14-4-1961, whereas, in fact, Annexure D(1) was issued on 13-4-1961 along with Annexure D itself. The Administrator gets the authority to issue the notification under Sec. 134 (1) only "after the commencement of the Act." Thus on 13-4-1961 when Sec. 134 (1) had not come into force, he did not have the authority. (36) The learned Government Advocate made a feeble attempt to argue that the words "the commencement of the Act" in Sec. 134 (1) does not mean "the date appointed under S. 1 (3) of the Act", but the date when the Act was publish­ed in the Tripura Gazette namely, 2-12-1960 after the assent of the President was given on 21-9-1960. But when it was pointed out to him from S. 2 (e) that "commencement of the Act" in relation to any provision meant "the date specified in respect of that provision in a notification under S. I (3)", he did not press his argument, but accepted that there has been an irregularity in issuing the noti­fication even on 13-4-1961. In Annexure D the vesting date of the estates has been fixed as 14-4-1961 which is the same date on which S. 134 (1) came into force. This is again irregular as it is clear on a reading of Sec. 134 (1) that the vesting date has to be a date after the commencement of the Act as the notification itself can be issued only after the commencement of the Act. This irregularity was also fairly conceded by the learn­ed Government Advocate. (37) I must also point out that there has been a third irregularity in the manner of publi­cation of the notification under sec. 134 (2). The manner of publication has been provided under rule 170 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules 1961 which were published along with the notification. In that it is stated that the notification under sub-s. (2) of Section 134 shall be published in at least two issues of each of two newspapers, one of which must be in the Bengali language. In that it is stated that the notification under sub-s. (2) of Section 134 shall be published in at least two issues of each of two newspapers, one of which must be in the Bengali language. It was pointed out for the petitioner that even -this publication as prescribed by the very rules framed by the Administrator has not been -complied with. In the counter-statement of the respondents, it was asserted that the publication has been made in accordance with rule 170 and Annexures B, B(1), C and C(1) were produced to show that the notification has been published as required under rule 170 in two issues of two news­papers, both of which were Bengali. I cannot but express my surprise that in a serious matter like this, the respondents should have relied on Annexures B, B (1), C and C (1) as showing proper publication. What is contained in Annexure B, the issue of the daily newspaper "Jagaran" dated 16-4-1961 is not the publication of the notification, but a news item published by the paper with the heading that Kamalpur is the first sub-division in which the rights of intermediaries were to be abolished and underneath the heading, the paper has given the substance of the notification. It was not an authorised publication of the notification as contemplated under rule 170. In the same way, Annexure C is again only a news item emanating from Agartala and it was published in the issue of the "Manush" a bi­weekly dated i2th April, 1961. The notification itself is dated 13-4-1961 and it is not known how the respondents could rely on such a news item published even before the issue of the notification as sufficient compliance of rule 170. Thus Anne­xures B and C cannot be treated as publication of the notification as prescribed under rule 170. There has thus been publication only in one issue of the two newspapers "Jagaran" and "Manush" and this cannot be called proper compliance with rule 170. When this was pointed out to the learned Government Advocate, he also agreed that there has been irregularity in the manner of publication. But we are not very much concerned in this Writ petition, with this irregularity which I have point­ed out, as it will not affect the validity of the notification itself, but only its effect. When this was pointed out to the learned Government Advocate, he also agreed that there has been irregularity in the manner of publication. But we are not very much concerned in this Writ petition, with this irregularity which I have point­ed out, as it will not affect the validity of the notification itself, but only its effect. Such publi­cation is mentioned in section 134 (3) to be con­clusive evidence of the notice of declaration to the intermediaries whose interests are affected by such. notification. Thus it will be relevant only on the question whether such publication will amount to conclusive evidence. I have only mentioned this, third irregularity in the manner of publication to show how utterly careless the Tripura Adminis­tration has been even in observing the very rules framed by the Administrator under the Act. (38) We are more concerned with the first two irregularities which I pointed out earlier and which the learned Government Advocate frankly conceded. The learned Government Advocate, however, stressed that the provision in sub-s. (1) of Section 134 that the issue of the notifica­tion by the Administrator must be after the com­mencement of the Act cannot be treated as a mandatory provision but only a directory one and that any irregularity in the issue of the notification will not invalidate the notification, if it is shown that there has been substantial compliance. 1 cannot agree with this argument. The provision in Sec. 134(1) is a mandatory provision. By the issue of the notification, all rights, title and in­terest of every intermediary in estates will be abolished and they will vest in the Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the vesting date mentioned in the notification. A provision in a statute which prescribes the manner in which valuable rights of citizens are taken away has to be treated as a mandatory provision which must be strictly complied with. Further until section 134 (1) came into force, the Administrator did not possess the authority to issue a notification under Sec. 134 (1). Thus if be issues the notification even before Sec. 134 (1) came into force, it is issued without jurisdiction and it has to be held that the notification so issued is totally void. Further until section 134 (1) came into force, the Administrator did not possess the authority to issue a notification under Sec. 134 (1). Thus if be issues the notification even before Sec. 134 (1) came into force, it is issued without jurisdiction and it has to be held that the notification so issued is totally void. No question of substantial com­pliance with the provision in Sec. 134 (1), can therefore arise, as it is an instance of total lack of compliance with the provisions of the section. It has to be declared, therefore, that the notification Annexure D(1) has been issued without any au­thority on 13-4-1961 and that it is, therefore, void and of no effect. The Tripura Administration has been careless not only in the manner of publication of the notification but even in the very issue of the notification. (39) The learned Government Advocate next stressed that in spite of the irregularities and the lack of authority in issuing the notification on 13-4-1961, this Court should not set aside the noti­fication, as no purpose at all would be served there­by and it was pointed out that the Administrator can immediately on the notification being set aside issue another notification under Sec. 134 (1) vest­ing all estates in Kamalpur in the Government. This Court is not concerned with what the Admi­nistrator would do or not do if the notification is set aside. I cannot permit valuable rights of a party to be divested by an invalid notification. The learned Government Advocate next said that if instead of issuing it on 13-4-1961, the Adminis­trator had issued it on 14-4-1961, fixing the vest­ing date as 15-4-1961, the petitioner would have had no ground for attacking the said notification That is, of course, correct. But it is no good arguing what would have happened if the Admi­nistrator and acted in compliance with the provi­sions in the section. It is because he has trans­gressed the Statute that this Court has to inter­fere. This Court is concerned with the situation actually found in this Writ application. But it is no good arguing what would have happened if the Admi­nistrator and acted in compliance with the provi­sions in the section. It is because he has trans­gressed the Statute that this Court has to inter­fere. This Court is concerned with the situation actually found in this Writ application. (40) For the petitioner, it was pointed out that after the Act was brought into force by a , notification under Sec. 1 (3) he expected a breath­ing space to elapse before another notification was Issued under Sec. 134 (1) during which he could arrange his affairs in respect of his estates to be ready for the eventuality of the take-over by the Government and that the effect of setting aside the invalid notification Annexure D (1), would be to give him that breathing space until the next notification is issued and that whatever rights the intermediaries had in the estates would continue until the next notification. There is no doubt that the petitioner and other estate-holders in Kamalpur will certainly be benefited, if the noti­fication Annexure D(1) is declared void and it. has to be declared void, because there has been total non-compliance with the provisions in Sec. 134 (1). (41) In the result, therefore, the petitioner's contentions that the provisions of Act 43 of 1960 with particular reference to Ss. 1(3), 123, 134 (1) and 167(2) are void as infringing the Constitution and that the notification Annexure D issued under Sec. 1(3) is not a valid notification are not valid and are hereby rejected. But his contention that Annexure D (1), the notification issued under Sec­tion 134 (1) dated 13-4-1961 is a void notification for non-compliance with the provisions of S. 134(1) is accepted and a Writ will issue declaring the said notification to be void. As the petitioner has succeeded in part and failed in part, the proper order regarding costs is that both parties -"rill bear their own costs. Order accordingly.