MEHROTRA, C. J.: 'This rule arises out of a petition under Arti­cle 226 of the Constitution filed on behalf of the Management of the National Power Supply Corpo­ration. One Sri Hirendra Nath Bhattacharjee, an employee of the petitioner, was dismissed by the Management and an industrial dispute was taken up by the Workers of the concern. The State Government by an order dated the 13th February 1959, referred the dispute to the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court for adjudication. The re­ference was numbered as Reference No. 10 of 1959. During the pendency of the said reference, one Sri Chitta Ranjan Mullick who is opposite party No. 3 to this petition, made an application under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (here­inafter called 'the Act') to the Labour Court stat­ing that he was a permanent worker under the petitioner Company and was dismissed by the Com­pany on 7th July, 1959, summarily without issu­ing a charge-sheet and without holding any en­quiry. It was further urged that the Management violated section 33 of the Act. Objections were filed by the petitioner to the said application alleging that Chitta Ranjan Mul­lick was guilty of gross misconduct which merited his summary dismissal. As the misconduct .was committed in the presence of the Director and the Principal Officer of the Company, no inquiry was necessary and there was no victimisation and un­fair labour practice. An objection was taken by the Company that the application was not main­tainable as there were no standing orders. It was further urged by the Company that as there were no standing orders, it was not necessary for the Company ,to apply for and obtain approval of the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court in terminating the service of a workman found guilty of miscon­duct. The Labour Court repelled the contention of the petitioner and gave an award entering into the merits of the case. The Labour Court held that the dismissal by the Management was with­out any justification. The award was published in the Assam Gazette dated I3th September, 1961. It is against this award that the present petition has been filed. (2) A number of points have been raised by the petitioner. It is firstly urged that as there was no standing order of the Company, no ap­proval was necessary before dismissing the work­man. The award was published in the Assam Gazette dated I3th September, 1961. It is against this award that the present petition has been filed. (2) A number of points have been raised by the petitioner. It is firstly urged that as there was no standing order of the Company, no ap­proval was necessary before dismissing the work­man. Secondly it was contended that even on the merits there was no breach or violation of any of the provisions o£ the standing orders. Thirdly it was urged that the defect of procedure adopted by the Management in terminating the services of the opposite party was cured by producing all re­levant evidence before the Labour Court and as such the exercise of managerial powers should not have been interfered with by the Labour Court. Lastly it was urged that there were no proceed­ings pending before the Labour Court in respect of an industrial dispute for any misconduct con­nected with the dispute. (3) The application was made by the opposite party No. 3 under section 33-A of the Act, which reads as follows:- "Where an employer contravenes the provi­sions of section 33 during the pendency of pro­ceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to such Labour Court, Tri­bunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint that Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in ac­cordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accord­ingly." Before a workman can apply under section | 33-A two conditions are essential, firstly that there has been a contravention o£ the provisions of section 33 and secondly that such a contravention must have been made during the pendency of proceedings before the Labour Court. If these two conditions are satisfied, an individual employee who has been aggrieved, has been given a right to apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the Industrial dispute. If the contravention of section 33 is established, the Labour Court on an applica­tion by the aggrieved employee gets a right to adjudicate upon the industrial dispute as if it were a reference under section 10 of the Act. If the contravention of section 33 is established, the Labour Court on an applica­tion by the aggrieved employee gets a right to adjudicate upon the industrial dispute as if it were a reference under section 10 of the Act. All the power which on reference the Labour Court acquires under section 10 of the Act to adjudicate upon the dispute is conferred by section 33-A on the Labour Court on an application by the ag­grieved employee in case of contravention of provi­sions of section 33 by the employer. In order to decide whether there has been a contravention of the provisions of section 33 in the present case, it is essential to refer to the provisions of section 33, which reads as follows :- "33' (r) During the pendency of any concilia­tion proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of art industrial dispute, no employer shall, (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the work­men, concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal 3r otherwise, any workman concerned in such dis­pute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pen­ding. (2) During the pendency of any such proceed­ing in respect of an industrial dispute, the em­ployer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dis­pute, - (a) alter, in regard to any matter not con­nected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by employer to the authority before which :he proceeding is pending for approval of the ac-:ion taken by the employer. * * * *" I have quoted above only the relevant provisions if the section. * * * *" I have quoted above only the relevant provisions if the section. Under sub-sec, (i) of this section an, employer is prohibited from altering to the preju­dice of the workmen concerned the conditions of service applicable to them or from discharging or punishing for any misconduct connected with the' dispute, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute save with the express permission in writing of the Labour Court. 1 Sub-section (2) provides that during the pendency of any proceedings an employer can proceed against any workman in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute provided he does so in accordance with the standing orders applicable to the workmen. If the action, however taken, fur­ther involves a discharge or dismissal, he will have to pay the workman one month's wages and simul­taneously file an application before the authority before which the proceeding is pending for its ap­proval of the action. The present section 33 was substituted by section 21 of the Industrial Dis­putes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (36 of 1956) for the former section 36 which ran as follows : - "36. The present section 33 was substituted by section 21 of the Industrial Dis­putes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (36 of 1956) for the former section 36 which ran as follows : - "36. During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or proceedings before a Tribunal in res­pect of any Industrial Disputes, no employer shall- (a) alter, to the prejudice of the workmen con­cerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the com­mencement of such proceedings, or (b) discharge or punish whether by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in such dis­pute, save with the express permission in writing of the Conciliation Officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case may be." This section in itself had substituted the ear­lier section which ran as follows: - "No employer shall during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute, alter, to the pre­judice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them imme­diately before the commencement of such proceed­ings, nor save with the express permission in writ­ing of the Conciliation Officer, Board or Tribunal as the case may be shall, during the pendency of such proceedings, discharge, dismiss or otherwise punish any such workmen except for misconduct not connected with the dispute." After May 1952, the words "except for misconduct not connected with the dispute" were omitted and thus there was a complete bar to an employer dis­missing or discharging an employee during the pendency of a dispute irrespective of the fact whether the misconduct was connected with the dispute or not, unless previous permission was taken. The present section has divided the old section into two parts Sub-section (i) of the sec­tion gives a right to the employer to alter the-conditions of service of a workman in regard to any matter connected with the dispute or to dis­charge or punish for misconduct connected with the dispute any workman with the previous permis­sion of the Labour Court during the pendency of a dispute. Sub-section (2) gives power to the em­ployer to alter the conditions of service applicable to a workman in regard to any matter not con­nected with the dispute in accordance with the standing orders without obtaining any such permis­sion. Sub-section (2) gives power to the em­ployer to alter the conditions of service applicable to a workman in regard to any matter not con­nected with the dispute in accordance with the standing orders without obtaining any such permis­sion. If, however, the employer wants to take ac­tion by way of punishment for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, he has to pay one month's wages to the workman and further he has to make an application to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. It will thus I appear that in case where the employer by way of punishment dismisses an employee for misconduct connected with the dispute, he has to take pre­vious permission. If, however, he intends to dis­miss an employee for misconduct not connected with the dispute, he can do so only after paying the workman one month's wages and obtaining the1 approval for the action taken by the employer. (4) The contention of the petitioner is that there were no standing orders of the Company and thus if the Company intended to dismiss the employee summarily, no approval of the action was needed, as sub-section (2) of section 33 will not be attracted. I do not think that the contention of the petitioner is correct. As I have already indicated, I section 33 (2) only provides that if the conditions of service have been altered in accordance with the standing orders in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, no previous permission is needed, but if the workman is discharged or dismissed by way of punishment for any miscon­duct not connected with the dispute, the approval of the action is needed under the proviso. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted, in cases where there is any standing order, even though an employee has been discharged for misconduct not connected with the dispute and in accordance with the terms of the standing orders, the order of dis­missal will not be valid unless the approval of the action has been taken. But if there is no standing order, no protection is afforded to an employee against dismissal during the pendency of the dis­pute before the Labour Court. But if there is no standing order, no protection is afforded to an employee against dismissal during the pendency of the dis­pute before the Labour Court. (5) As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in several decisions, the object of Sec. 33 is to allow continuance of industrial pro­ceedings pending before any authority prescribed by the Act in a calm and peaceful atmosphere un­disturbed by any other industrial dispute and the plain object of the section is to maintain status quo as far as reasonably possible during the pen­dency of the said proceedings. In the case of Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen re­ported in AIR 1961 SC 860 it was observed as follows : "Prior to its amendment by Act 36 of 1956 S. 33 applied generally to all cases whether altera­tion in conditions of service was intended to be made by the employer, or an order of discharge or dismissal was proposed to be passed against an employee without making a distinction as to whether the said alteration or the said order of discharge or dismissal was in any manner connect­ed with the dispute pending before an industrial authority. * * * * This led to a general complaint by the employers that several applications had to be made for obtaining the permission of the spe­cified authorities in regard to matters which were not connected with the industrial dispute pending adjudication; and in many cases where alterations in conditions of service were urgently required to be made or immediate action against an offending workman was essential in the interest of discipline, the employers were powerless to do the needful and had to submit to the delay involved in the process of making an application for permission in that behalf and obtaining the consent of the Tribunal. That is why, by the amendment made in S. 33 in 1956 the Legislature has made a broad division between action proposed to be taken by the employer in regard to any matter connected with the dispute on the one hand, and action pro­posed to be taken in regard to the matter not connected with the dispute pending before the authority on the other." Section 33 (i) virtually incorporates the unamended section and is confined in its operation where the proposed action on the part of the em­ployee is in regard to a matter connected with the dispute pending before an industrial authority. In cases falling under sub-section (2) the employer is required to satisfy the specified conditions but he need not necessarily obtain the previous consent in writing before he takes any action. The re­quirement that he must obtain approval as dis­tinguished from the requirement that he must ob­tain previous permission indicates that the ban imposed by S. 33(2) is not as rigid or rigorous as that imposed by S. 33(1). In dealing with cases fall­ing under S. 33 (2) the industrial authority will be entitled to enquire whether the proposed action is in accordance with the standing orders, whether the employee concerned has been paid wages for one month, and whether an application has been made for approval as prescribed by the said sub­section. It is obvious that in cases of alteration of conditions of service falling under S. 33 (2) (a) no such approval is required and the right of the employer remains unaffected by any ban. (6) In the present case, the employer has not succeeded in proving that he has dismissed the employee under the terms of the standing orders after paying one month's wages to him; nor has it been established in this case that the approval was taken of the order of dismissal as required under the proviso to Sec. 33 (2). That being so there was a clear contravention of the provisions of Sec. 33 (2) and the employee opposite party No. 3 was entitled to make an application under Sec. 33A. The dispute was thus to be adjudicated by the Labour Court as if a dispute has been referred to it under Section 10 of the Act. The Labour Court was thus entitled to decide whether the dismissal was justified or not. The dispute was thus to be adjudicated by the Labour Court as if a dispute has been referred to it under Section 10 of the Act. The Labour Court was thus entitled to decide whether the dismissal was justified or not. If there has been a managerial inquiry the Labour Court could not sit as a court of appeal and inter­fere with the findings of the Management, unless there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of the inquiry, 01 the case was one of victimization and the inquiry was malafide or on the face of it was perverse. In cases however, where admittedly there has been no inquiry, the question of interfering with the exercise of managerial power will not arise and the whole question is at large. It is open to the Labour Court to decide for itself whether the order of dismissal was or was not justified. In the present case no inquiry was admittedly held. The following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation reported in ATR 1960 SC 160 at p. 173 are apposite : "There is one more point which still remains to be considered and that is the effect of the Bank's default in not holding an inquiry in the present case. If the Bank has not held any en­quiry it cannot obviously contend before the tri­bunal that it has bona fide exercised its manage­rial functions and authority in passing the orders of dismissal and that the tribunal should be slow to interfere with the said orders. It is true as we have already pointed out that if the employed holds a proper enquiry, makes a finding in respect the alleged misconduct of the employee and then passes an order of dismissal the tribunal would be slow to interfere with such an order and would exercise its jurisdiction within the limits prescribed by this Court in the case of Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., 1958 SCR 667 : AIR 1958 SC 130 . Ltd., 1958 SCR 667 : AIR 1958 SC 130 . But it follows that if no enquiry has in fact been held by the employer, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal is at large before the tribunal and, on the evidence adduced before it, the tribunal has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved, and if yes, what would be proper order to make. In such a case the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all." (7) In the present case the Labour Court after consideration of the evidence and applying its mind to the merits of the case has come to the conclu­sion that the. action of the Management was with­out any jurisdiction as it was against the princi­ples of natural justice inasmuch as no opportunity was given to the employee to explain his conduct. The Labour Court has further found from the cir­cumstances that the case was one of victimisation as the opposite party No. 3 was an active member of the Union. This court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot sit as a court of appeal against the award of the Labour Court. There is thus no force in this petition and it is rejected. But in the circumstances the par­ties will bear their own costs of this petition. (8) S. K. DUTTA J. : I agree. Petition dismissed.