JUDGMENT : Barman, J. - The eight accused Respondents herein were acquitted by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Balasore of the charge of dacoity against all of them u/s 395, Indian Penal Code. 2. This case arises out of an alleged incident of dacoity on the night of September 17, 1960 (Saturday) at about 11. a.m. in the house of one Birendra Nath Parida (p.w. 11) at village Jyochhnamoyee, district Balasore, during his absence at Chandbali where he had gone the same evening. After his return from Chandbali the said Birendra Nath Parida (p.w. 11) aged the First Information Report on September 19, 1960 at 11 p.m. at the local police station (Ext. 3), twelve miles away from the place of occurrence. In the said F.I.R. the informant is said to have given information generally about the dacoity as he had heard from the inmates of the house. It is said that all the details could not be given in the said First Information Report as the informant was worried at the time because of the dacoity which took place in his house in his absence. On September 20, 1960 the investigating officer came to the village and at that time the informant P.W.11 filed a second Report (Ext. 4) where the informant gave certain other details and additional facts. In due course after investigation the eight accused Respondents were arrested, were sent up for trial and they all were acquitted by the learned trial Judge. It is against this order of acquittal that this Government Appeal has been filed. 3. The prosecution case is based mainly on the evidence of three eye-witnesses p.ws. 1, 2 and 3 (fourth eye-witness p.w. 9 turned out to be hostile); recoveries of ornaments, cloths, paddy, fishing net and mosquito curtain, gunny bags with coaltar mark 'B' from the different accused Respondents as appears from the seizure lists; the extra-Judicial confession by accused Respondent, Radhakrishna alias Radhakanta Das before p.w. 6 and 12. w. 13 implicating himself and all other accused Respondents; direct evidence of previous conspiracy to commit dacoity and lastly the motive. In defence the accused Respondents totally denied the charge against them and their case is that they have been falsely implicated in the case out of enmity. The learned trial Judge did not believe the prosecution case and acquitted all the accused Respondents giving them the benefit of doubt; 4. In defence the accused Respondents totally denied the charge against them and their case is that they have been falsely implicated in the case out of enmity. The learned trial Judge did not believe the prosecution case and acquitted all the accused Respondents giving them the benefit of doubt; 4. The main point for consideration in this appeal against acquittals whether the learned trial Judge was justified in his decision on the evidence in this case. The scope of enquiry in an appeal against acquittal was laid down by the Prior Council and reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and this Court has consistency followed the principles laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court. A division Bench of this Court in State of Orissa v. Narahari Khatei and Anr. ILR 1962 Cutt 303 following the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, held that there was no distinction as regards the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal and that from a conviction; the High Court has full power to review at large all the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed; while no doubt on such an appeal the High Court is entitled to go into the facts and arrive at its own estimate of the evidence, it is also settled law that where the case turns all oral evidence of witnesses, the estimate of such evidence by the trial court is not to be lightly set aside. The grounds fire setting aside an order of acquittal vary and depend upon the facts of each case. The grounds fire setting aside an order of acquittal vary and depend upon the facts of each case. Some of the various grounds (illustrative and not exhaustive) on which an order of acquittal can be set aside were stated to be these :if the trial court rejects eye-witnesses who speak with slight and inconsequential variations on unsubstantial grounds and on the basis of insignificant discrepancies; or where the case put forward by the prosecution by and large, represented the substantial truth and the Indian is true; or where the reasons, given by the trial Judge for not believing the main witnesses who spoke as to what happened could not be sustained and the alleged discrepancies and contradictions in their evidence were not such as to detract from truthfulness; or where the evidence of the main witnesses not believed by the trial Judge was natural and consistent and the alleged discrepancies pointed out by the trial Judge were not either contradictions at all or even if they were so trivial as not to affect in any way their veracity ;or where the accused fails to explain the circumstances appearing against him. In all such cases the appellate court can rightly find itself unable to accept, the conclusion of the trial Judge. 5. The position in law on this aspect has been further clarified by the Supreme Court in a very recent decision in Harbans Singh and Anr. v. The State of Punjab 1962 S.C.D. 198. Their Lordships reiterated their earlier view that before interfering in appeal with an order of acquittal the court, must examinee not only questions of law and fact in all their aspects but must also closely and carefully examine the reasons which impelled the lower courts to acquit the accused and should interfere only if satisfied, after such examination that the conclusion, reached by the lower court that the guilt of the person has not been proved is unreasonable. It was further made clear that in emphasising the necessity of "compelling reasons" to justify an interference with an order of acquittal the Supreme Court did not in any way try to curtail the power bestowed on appellate courts u/s 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when hearing appeals against acquittal. It was further made clear that in emphasising the necessity of "compelling reasons" to justify an interference with an order of acquittal the Supreme Court did not in any way try to curtail the power bestowed on appellate courts u/s 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when hearing appeals against acquittal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court expressed that they were anxious to impress on the appellate courts the importance of bestowing special care in the sifting of evidence in appeals, against acquittals; what be caned the golden thread running through an the recent pronouncements of their Lordships is the rule that in deciding appeals against acquittal the Court of Appeal must examine the evidence with particular care, must examine also he reasons on which the order of acquittal was based and should interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitting Judge is clearly unreasonable; once the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower Court is clearly an unreasonable one that itself is a "compelling reason" for interference ; for, it is a court's duty to commit a guilty person when the guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, no less than it is its duty to acquit the accused when such guilt is not so established. 6. The simple test now laid down by the Supreme Court is whether the view taken by the trial Judge is clearly unreasonable, thus indicating the angle from which an appeal against acquittal is to be approached. The ratio decedent of the Supreme Court decision in Harbans Singh's case 2 cited above is that the High Court after examination of the evidence with particular or special car has to decide whether or not the view of the lower court is clearly unreasonable. It is the duty of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal to approach the matter in proper manner and apply the principles correctly. 7. This leads us to the examination of the evidence in this case with particular or special care to decide whether or not the view, taken by the learned trial Judge in acquitting the accused Respondents of the charge of dacoity, is clearly unreasonable. 8. The learned trial Judge does not appear to have accepted the reliability of the first information report to the police, which is the genesis of the prosecution case. 8. The learned trial Judge does not appear to have accepted the reliability of the first information report to the police, which is the genesis of the prosecution case. The learned trial Judge appears to have drawn adverse inference from certain alleged discrepancies in the two consecutive reports to the Police namely the First Information Report (Ext. 3) lodged by p.w. 11 on September 19, 1960 immediately after his return from Chandabali and the other (Ext. 4) by him on the following day, September 20, 1960, when the investigating officer came to the village. The factual position is this: In the First Report, the name of accused Respondent No. 7 Bhusan Raha was not mentioned. and there were some names mentioned therein who were not ultimately charged. In the Second (described as supplementary). Report it contained details of the articles stolen and also certain facts which were omitted in the first report, namely, as to the use of force by the dacoits on the inmates of the house. The explanation of the informant (P.W. ll) in cross examination for the alleged discrepancies in the two reports is that he had heard from his wife (P.W. 3) that the dacoits had threatened to kill their child if the keys were not surrendered. The witness P.W. 11 did not give all these details in the First Report as he was then mentally worried; that on his return after filing the First Information Report, P.W. 11's wife (P.W. 3) and his father-in-law (P.W. 1) had enquired whether he (P.W. 11) had informed thief details given by them. P.W. 11 further said that his wife (P.W. 3) told him what thins had been stolen and then he verified and found the articles missing. then P.W. 11 lodged the second or the supplementary report stating all the details; when the investigating officer came to the village. The learned trial Judge apparently did not accept P.W. 11's explanation and appears to have disbelieved the eye-witnesses p.ws. 1, 2 and 3, on the basis of whose statements the first report c to the Police was lodged. The learned trial Judge appears to have drawn wrong inference that the second or the supplementary report was by way of subsequent embellishment of the prosecution case. 1, 2 and 3, on the basis of whose statements the first report c to the Police was lodged. The learned trial Judge appears to have drawn wrong inference that the second or the supplementary report was by way of subsequent embellishment of the prosecution case. The omission of the name of the accused Respondent No. 7 Bhusan Rana and other details in the first report is not such a material discrepancy as to disbelieve the prosecution case altogether. 9. A part from extra-judicial confession of thee accused Respondent No. 4 Radha Krishna Das implicating himself and the other accused Respondents in the dacoity, the evidence directly implicating each of the accused Respondents individually is based on the direct testimony of the eye-witesses and the various recoveries with reference to each of these accused Respondents as hereinafter discussed. 10-17. His Lordship discusses who evidence each of accused. 18. The above examination, with special and particular rare, of the direct testimony of the eye-witness, the recoveries from the several accused Respondents and other circumstances as discussed above, clearly implicate all the accused Respondents in the dacoity in the house of p.w. 11. There was no difficulty about identification of the accused dacoits. The evidence of p.w. 2 is that the dacoits did no cover their faces nor did they colour their faces. It is in the evidence of p.w. 3 that she knew the accused dacoits from before as they used to work in the house as labourers and cultivators: As regards recoveries, the prosecution case, broadly stated, is that they all were seized by the 1.0. (p.w. 15) in the presence of two witnesses p.w. 13 and p.w. 14 who proved the contents and signed. None of the accused Respondents claimed any of the seized articles as belonging to any of them. The paddy, which was recovered, was of distinctive type, namely Patni paddy. The seized gunny bags had on them distinctive coaltar mark 'B', presumably referring to Birendra p.w. 11, from hose house the gunny bags were stolen. The accused Respondents did not claim any of these articles as their own nor did they give any explanation for the recoveries. 19. In my view the learned trial Judge was wrong in not accepting the eye-witnesses, who appear to have spoken with inconsequential variations if any or at all en unsubstantial grounds and on the basis of alleged insignificant discrepancies. 19. In my view the learned trial Judge was wrong in not accepting the eye-witnesses, who appear to have spoken with inconsequential variations if any or at all en unsubstantial grounds and on the basis of alleged insignificant discrepancies. The case put forward by the prosecution in this case represents the substantial truth and the incident is true. I am further of opinion that the reasons, given by the learned trial Judge for not believing the eye-witnesses p.ws. 1, 2 and 3 who spoke as to what happened, cannot be sustained and the alleged discrepancies and contradictions in their evidence if any or at all were not such as to detract from truthfulness; further that the evidence of the eye-witnesses p.ws. 1, 2 and 3 which was not believed by the learned trial Judge, appears to be natural and consistent and the alleged discrepancies mentioned by the learned trial Judge were not either contradictions at an or even if they were so they were so trivial as not to affect in any way their veracity. That apart, the fact of various recoveries from the accused Respondents as aforesaid is a staggering incriminating circumstance against them. 20. Thus, from the direct testimony of the eye-witnesses and the incriminating un-explained recoveries from the accused Respondents, it is clear that all the accused Respondents participated in the dacoity. This, our view against all the accused Respondents, is further strengthened by the extra-judicial confession of accused Respondent No. 4 Radhakrishna Das, implicating himself and the other accused Respondents. P.W. 6 and p.w. 13, before whom the said confession was made, corroborated each other. Furthermore, there is also evidence of previous conspiracy to commit the dacoity the same night after p.w. 11 (owner of the hours) had left for Chandbali. P.W. 5 supports this aspect of the prosecution case. 21. As regards motive, the evidence is that in the morning of the date of the incident, thirteen persons including the accused Respondents had approached p.w. 11 for a loan of paddy each which p.w. 11 refused. P.W. 11 however agreed to give 10 seers to each after his return from Chandbali. The prosecution case on motive, in substance, is that these persons having been disappointed in getting the loan of paddy they asked for, all conspired to loot after p.w. 11 left for Chandbali the same night. P.W. 11 however agreed to give 10 seers to each after his return from Chandbali. The prosecution case on motive, in substance, is that these persons having been disappointed in getting the loan of paddy they asked for, all conspired to loot after p.w. 11 left for Chandbali the same night. Thus, in the evening they conspired and decided to loot as aforesaid. In support of the prosecution case regarding motive, the evidence of P.W. 8 who, however, timed out hostile and P.W. 11 is directly relevant. Ext. 1 is the list of the said 13 persons to whom the loan of 10 seers each was promised by P.W. 11 as aforesaid and the said list was prepared by p.w. 8. Although P.W. 8 had turned out house but the investigating officer P.W. 15 said that P.W. 8 had told him (I.O.) that on September 17, 1960 he (P.W. 8) was present when the thirteen men asked for the paddy loan from P.W. 11 and he (P.W. 8) had written out their names and then handed over the list (Ext. 1) to P.W. ll. 22. The defence took several points in course of hearing of this appeal but they all lose their importance and significance in the face of the positive evidence of the eye-witnesses and the recoveries. With regard to the recoveries, the defence commented that out of two search witnesses, P.W. 14 had turned out hostile arid that accordingly the recoveries could not be aid to have been established. The defence point is that P.W. 14 having turned out hostile, his evidence on seizures should be discarded altogether. With regard to the recoveries, the defence commented that out of two search witnesses, P.W. 14 had turned out hostile arid that accordingly the recoveries could not be aid to have been established. The defence point is that P.W. 14 having turned out hostile, his evidence on seizures should be discarded altogether. In my opinion this argument is wholly untenable as it overlooks the settled position in law that the evidence of a witness who is cross-examined by the party calling him is ill evidence and can be relied on by either party, the credibility of the facts deposed to being a matter for the court; by giving permission to cross-examine nothing adverse to the credit of the witnesses is decided; there is no necessity to put obstacles in the way of a party who has called an unwilling witness to the circumstances in which a witness may be cross-examined by the party caning him are not laid down in Section 154, Evidence Act which leaves the matter entirely to the discretion of the court and there is no legal objection to such permission being freely granted. In the present case P.W. 14 was an unfriendly or unwilling witness and he was freely cross-examined. P.W. 14 proved that the contents of the seizure lists were true; he admitted that he was present at the search and signed the lists. It transpires from his answers to the questions put in cross-examination that the contents of the seizure lists were true; that he signed the seizure lists. u/s 103(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure what is required is that two witnesses must be parent. There is, therefore, no substance in the defence contention that the recoveries had not been established. 23. After examination of the case in all its aspects, with special care, we find that the view taken by the learned trial Judge was clearly unreasonable. In support of our finding as to the clean unreasonableness of the view of the trial Judge, a passage from his judgment is quoted are follows: As Bhusan Rana (accused Respondent No. 7) was not named in the F.I.R. we may take it that neither Gaya Prasad (P.W. 1) nor Shailabala (P.W. 3) nor Sarat Ojha (P.W. 9) had named him, and that Bhusan was entangled during the police investigation stage. Radha Krishna Das (accused Respondent No. 4) was also not named by Shailabala (P.W. 3) or Gaya Prasad (p.w .l) or Sarat (P.W. 9). So his name (accused Respondent No. 4 Radhakrishna Das) must have been included in the F.I.R. by the informant out of suspicion. This view, taken by the learned trial Judge, is clearly unreasonable as based on mere conjectures and wrong inferences not supported by evidence adduced in this case. The learned trial Judge did not accept the explanation that p.w. 11 could not give the details in the F.I.R. as he was then mentally worried and "mad like" as P.W. 11's wife p.w. 3, while giving evidence, described her husband's state of mind at the time. The learned trial Judge was also clearly unreasonable in taking the view that: non-mentioning of the details in the original F.I.R. (Ext. 3) was fatal as that left a lot of things to be developed. 24. Thus, after examining the evidence in this case, with special and particular care, we are satisfied that the view taken by the learned trial Judge in acquitting the accused Respondents of the charge of dacoity is clearly unreasonable. In this view of the case, the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge is set aside, and all the accused Respondents are convicted of dacoity u/s 395, Indian Penal Code: As regards sentence, having regard to the circumstances of the case, all the accused Respondents are sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year each. This Government Appeal is accordingly allowed. Misra, J. 25. I agree. Final Result : Allowed