JUDGMENT : Venkatarama Aiyar, J. 1. This is an appeal by special leave against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, Jullundur, dated 16-4-1959, made in Reference No. 40 of 1958. The appellant is a public limited Company engaged in the manufacture of cement. On 8-4-1955, the appellant and its workmen entered into an agreement Ex. A-6, settling the matters in dispute between them and fixing inter alia grades of several categories of workmen and their scales of wages. The agreement provides that the settlement should be binding on both the parties for a period of two years commencing from 8-4-1955, but that the Union would have the right to move for reconsideration of the grades, if that was recommended by the Government, Wage Board. It is common ground that the Union terminated this agreement as from 8-4-1957, in accordance with Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as "the Act" and then made a demand on the management for revision of the agreement in respect of the grades of the workmen and certain allowances. On 19-5-1957, the appellant and the Union referred their disputes to the decision of two arbitrators but as they could not agree they wrote to the Government of Punjab on 30-8-1957, to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal, as an umpire. Before any action was taken on this, both the parties applied to the Punjab Government on 5-4-1958, under Section 10(2) of the Act for referring the disputes to a tribunal, and on 24-7-1958, the Government referred them to the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, Jullundur, for adjudication under Section 10(l)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal pronounced its award on 8-5-1959, and being dissatisfied with it, the appellant has preferred this appeal against the same with the leave of this Court. 2. Three contentions have been pressed before us in this appeal: (1) The Tribunal which heard the reference was not validly constituted; (2) The award insofar as it revised the grades of workmen is illegal and erroneous; (3) The award of an additional allowance of Rs. 5 per mensem to the shift workers is not justified. These contentions will now be considered in their order. 5 per mensem to the shift workers is not justified. These contentions will now be considered in their order. (1) Taking up the first contention that the Tribunal was not validly constituted, the relevant facts are that on 28-4-1953, the Government of Punjab issued a notification whereby it constituted an Industrial Tribunal under Section 7 of the Act and appointed Shri A.N. Gujral as its sole member and presiding officer under Section 7(3)(c) of the Act. Shri Gujral continued to hold this office at all material times. Parliament then enacted the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 36 of 1956, whereby it introduced several amendments in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This Act which came into force on 10-3-1957, repealed Section 7 in the principal Act, and substituted in its place Sections 7-A, 7-B and 7-C. On 19-4-1957, the Government of Punjab issued a notification under Section 7-A constituting a new Tribunal and appointed Shri A.N. Gujral as its sole member and presiding officer. It is the award made by this Tribunal that is the subject-matter of the present appeal. Section 7-A(3) omitting what is not relevant for the present discussion runs as follows: "7-A. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Tribunal unless (a) he. It is the award made by this Tribunal that is the subject-matter of the present appeal. Section 7-A(3) omitting what is not relevant for the present discussion runs as follows: "7-A. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Tribunal unless (a) he. (b) he has held the office of the Chairman or any other member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, or of any Tribunal, for a period of not less than two years." It was under this provision that Shri A.N. Gujral who had held the office of the President of the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, from 28-4-1953, was appointed as the presiding officer of the new Tribunal, It is the contention of the appellant that the appointment of Shri A.N. Gujral as President of the Tribunal on 28-4-1953, was invalid, because according to Section 7(3)(c) which is the material provision it is only a person who is "qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court" that could be appointed as a member and Shri A.N. Gujral was not qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the High Court on that date as he was more than sixty years of age, having been born on 4-6-1892 and that as the appointment of Shri A.N. Gujral as member on 28-4-1953, was invalid the period during which he functioned as the President of the Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 7 cannot count for the purpose of Section 7-A(3)(b). The question whether a person who has attained the age of sixty could validly be appointed as a member of the Tribunal under Section 7(3)(c) came up for consideration before this Court in Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. Workmen, Civil Appeal No. 188 of 1961, decided on February 8, 1962 where also the validity of the appointment of Shri A.N. Gujral under the notification dated 28-4-1953, aforesaid was in question. The present appeal was heard along with Civil Appeal No. 188 of 1961 and by our Judgment in that appeal we have held that on the construction of Section 7(3)(c) a person who had attained the age of sixty could validly be appointed as a member. The present appeal was heard along with Civil Appeal No. 188 of 1961 and by our Judgment in that appeal we have held that on the construction of Section 7(3)(c) a person who had attained the age of sixty could validly be appointed as a member. Following that decision we must hold that Shri A.N. Gujral was validly appointed to the Industrial Tribunal on 28-4-1953, and that, in consequence, he was duly qualified to be appointed as presiding officer of the Tribunal under Section 7-A(3)(b). (2) We shall now proceed to consider the contention of the appellant that the revision of the grades of workmen and their scale of wages was illegal and erroneous. The argument of the appellant is that there having been an agreement between the parties, Ex. A-6, fixing the categories of workmen and their scales of wages, the Tribunal should not have modified it without a finding that there had been a change of circumstances. Reliance was placed on the observation of this Court in Burn & Co., Calcutta v. Employees, (1956) SCR 781, 787 as supporting this contention. There a dispute between the management and the workmen with reference to the fixation of fair wages was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and the Tribunal gave its award on a consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties. That award was in operation under Section 19(3) of the Act until 12-7-1951, when it was terminated by the Union under Section 19(6). Thereafter the Union made a demand for higher wages as from 12-7-1951, and as the management declined to grant the request, there arose an industrial dispute, and, that was again referred by the Government for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal. It was found by the Tribunal on the evidence adduced by the parties that there was no change of circumstances since the last adjudication was made, and on that the question was raised whether the award of the Tribunal for the previous year was binding on the parties as res judicata. This Court held that though Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code was not as such applicable, the principles of res judicata underlying that section were of wider application and observed: "And there are good reasons why this principle should be applicable to decisions of Industrial Tribunals also. This Court held that though Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code was not as such applicable, the principles of res judicata underlying that section were of wider application and observed: "And there are good reasons why this principle should be applicable to decisions of Industrial Tribunals also. Legislation regulating the relation between Capital and Labour has two objects in view. It seeks to ensure to the workmen who have not the capacity to treat with capital on equal terms, fair returns for their labour. It also seeks to prevent disputes between employer and employees, so that production might not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the society might not suffer. Now, if we are to hold that an adjudication loses its force when it is repudiated under Section 19(6) and that the whole controversy is at large, then the result would be that far from reconciling themselves to the award and settling down to work it, either party will treat it as a mere stage in the prosecution of a prolonged struggle and far from bringing industrial peace, the awards would turn out to be but truces giving the parties breathing time before resuming hostile action with renewed vigour. On the other hand, if we are to regard them as intended to have long term operation and at the same time hold that they are liable to be modified by change in the circumstances on which they were based, both the purposes of the legislature would be served." (pp. 789-90) On the very principle of it, this decision can have application only where there is an adjudication by the Tribunal on the merits. In the present case there has been no adjudication by any Tribunal but only a settlement between the parties. That would, of course, be binding on them but only to the extent provided in the agreement itself. Here the agreement was to be in operation for two years. It provides for the revision of the terms even earlier in accordance with the decision of the Wage Board. The agreement, therefore, becomes spent on its own term, on 8-4-1957, and that is how the parties understood it as is clear from their conduct in referring the disputes including the one for revision of grades first to the decision of arbitrators and then, that failing, to the Government of Punjab, under Section 10(2) of the Act. The agreement, therefore, becomes spent on its own term, on 8-4-1957, and that is how the parties understood it as is clear from their conduct in referring the disputes including the one for revision of grades first to the decision of arbitrators and then, that failing, to the Government of Punjab, under Section 10(2) of the Act. We must accordingly hold that it was competent to the Tribunal to revise the grades for the period subsequent to the agreement even if there was no proof of change in circumstances. It is next argued that in deciding that the existing grades should be revised, the Tribunal has failed to consider one of the points raised by the appellant which was thus stated in its statement: "Though a small unit its scales are higher than those in the bigger surrounding factories." It is urged that this omission vitiates the finding of the Tribunal on this question. It is true that the Tribunal does not expressly deal with this point in its award. In view of this we have examined the record with a view to satisfy ourselves whether that has resulted in failure of justice. The Union has adduced considerable body of evidence as to the grades and scales of wages in this industry with a view to show that the existing scales required revision. Exs. A-1, A-2 and A-5 are statements of the scales of wages in the cement industry. The Secretary of the Union Shri Madanlal has also given evidence on this matter as AW 3. Besides filing the above documents he stated that the wages for some of the skilled workmen were less than what were paid in other factories. He also filed Ex. A-10 which is a comparative chart of wages prevailing in certain industries. As against this there was practically no evidence on the side of the appellant. Shri R.L. Agarwal, RW 2, who has been the Manager of the appellant's concern for the last nine months stated in his examination-in chief "our scales and grades are higher than those prevailing in other cement factories". But in cross-examination he admitted that he had got no personal knowledge about the wages prevailing in other cement concerns. Shri R.L. Agarwal, RW 2, who has been the Manager of the appellant's concern for the last nine months stated in his examination-in chief "our scales and grades are higher than those prevailing in other cement factories". But in cross-examination he admitted that he had got no personal knowledge about the wages prevailing in other cement concerns. An examination of the evidence let in by the appellant clearly shows that it was chiefly directed to showing that the Company had, during the relevant year, incurred losses and that, therefore, it would not be able to bear the burden of an increase in the wages. It seems probable that before the Tribunal the appellant did not place much reliance on the contention that the scales of wages in this factory compare favourably with those prevailing in other cement concerns and that what it seriously pressed was the contention that the Industry was not in a position to pay more wages. Having examined the evidence we are satisfied that the appellant has no real cause for complaint on this score. That this revision has not in fact resulted in any injustice could be seen from the following statement showing the position before and under the award: Existing Semi-skilled Demand Revised A. Rs. 40-2-60 Rs. 45-2-80 Merged into one grade B. Rs. 55-21/2-85 Rs. 45-3-1/2-77-1/2-4-97 Rs. 45-2-1/2-80-3-95 Skilled workmen B. Rs. 70-3-110 Rs. 70-3-110 Merged into one grade A. Rs. 80-4-125 Rs. 80-4-125 Rs. 80-5-125 Junior clerks Rs. 50-4-80 Rs. 60-5-85-7-1/2--122-10-173 Rs. 50-5-90-6-120 Senior clerks Rs. 30-4-100-5-125 Rs. 90-7-1/2--120-10-220-15-310 Rs. 90-6-120-8-160-EB-10-210. What the Tribunal has done is simply to amalgamate different categories into one and to make consequential changes. The reason for this is thus stated in the award: "If I fix the scales of semi-skilled and skilled workmen as such it will give rise to a number of industrial disputes when the management would be required to fix these categories in these classes." The Tribunal also refers to the fact that the number of unskilled workmen is not very high and that a slight increase in their wages would be justified. As regards the skilled workmen it takes into account the rates which are in vogue in other industries. In view of these facts, the revision of the grades and scales of wages of the workmen by the Tribunal must be held to be justified and just. As regards the skilled workmen it takes into account the rates which are in vogue in other industries. In view of these facts, the revision of the grades and scales of wages of the workmen by the Tribunal must be held to be justified and just. A contention was also advanced that in revising the scale of wages of Junior Clerks the Tribunal had taken into account the award made by it in the case of the Punjab Cloth Mills, Bhiwani, that the said award had not been admitted as evidence in the present case, and as it has been relied on for reaching the finding that the scale of wages of junior clerks required revision, the award is illegal, and must be set aside. The decision of this Court in Burn & Co., Ltd. v. Workmen, (1959) 1 LLJ 450 , is cited as a precedent directly supporting this contention. But that, however, is a decision on its facts, which were that an award had been given by an Industrial Tribunal fixing the wage-structure in an industry, and both the parties had agreed to accept the award. Subsequently the workmen wanted a revision of the wages, and the dispute was referred to a Tribunal for adjudication. There was no evidence that there had been any change in the circumstances since the date of the previous award. But the Tribunal revised the wage-structure on the strength of an award made in another reference, which had not been admitted as evidence in the case. It was with reference to these facts that this Court observed: "It was pointed out to us that the tribunal had referred to some award in connection with Martin Burn & Co., of the existence of which there was no evidence in the record and it was conceded on behalf of the workmen that this was so. It is patent, therefore, that so far as the workmen are concerned the award of the tribunal is based on some material which both parties concede does not exist in the record. There is no other reason given for altering the scales of pay and dearness allowance so far as the workmen are concerned." (p. 456). Thus the award was set aside on the ground that apart from the award in the Martin Burn & Co. There is no other reason given for altering the scales of pay and dearness allowance so far as the workmen are concerned." (p. 456). Thus the award was set aside on the ground that apart from the award in the Martin Burn & Co. case which was not in evidence, there was no other material in support of it. That is not the position here. The award given in the case of the Punjab Cloth Mills, Bhiwani, was not the only evidence before the Tribunal, and even if that is ruled out, there was on record other evidence supporting the demand for revision, on which the finding of the Tribunal could be sustained. Its should also be mentioned that the Tribunal has not fully adopted the scale fixed in the Punjab Cloth Mills case. It has modified it so as to suit the present case. The reference to the award in the Punjab Cloth Mills case has not resulted in any prejudice to the appellant, and we must, therefore, decline to interfere on this ground. (3) The last point urged for the appellant relates to the extra allowance of Rs. 5 per mensem directed to be paid to the shift workers. It is contended that shift working is incidental to service in this establishment and must be taken to be one of its service conditions and the workmen who had got into employment with full knowledge of it, cannot now be permitted to claim more on this account. But then there was evidence and indeed this was admitted that the clerks working in the shifts have to work for more hours than those working in the offices. Under the circumstances the grant of an extra sum of Rs. 5 per mensem for these workmen cannot be said to be unjust. 3. A contention was also raised that there was no justification for increasing the dearness allowance but this was expressly abandoned before us. 4. All the contentions raised in support of the appeal fail and it is accordingly dismissed with costs, one hearing fee.