MEHROTRA, C. J. The petitioner, the Management of the Na­tional Power Supply Corporation Ltd., carries on business of supply of electric power in Dhubri. In connection with the dismissal of one Sri Hirendra Nath Bhattacharjee, an employee of the peti­tioner at the branch office at Dhubri, an industrial dispute arose, which was referred by the State Government by its order dated the I3th February, 1959 to the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court for adjudication. The reference was numbered as Reference No. 10 of 1959. During the pendency of the aforesaid industrial dispute the opposite party No. 3 to the present petition - Goalpara Zilla Electric Supply Workers' Union, Dhubri - made an application before the Labour Court under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it was alleged that Sri Benode Behari Kar, Sri Nihar Kanta Chakraborty, Sri Nepal Chandra Ghosh and Sri Nagina Much, all workmen of the petitioner who are opposite parties Nos. 4 to 7 to this petition respectively, were dismissed during the pendency of the aforesaid reference in violation of the principles of natural justice for their trade Union activities. The petitioner rais­ed before the Labour Court several preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the peti­tion. But the Labour Court gave its award on merits and repelled the preliminary points raised by the petitioner. (2) The contention raised by the petitioner is that as the petitioner had raised by a separate ap­plication certain preliminary points before the) Labour Court, the Labour Court should have dis­posed of those preliminary issues first and there­after should have given an opportunity to the peti­tioner to substantiate their case on merits after holding that the preliminary points had no force. As the Labour Court disposed of the preliminary point and the merits of the application by one award, the petitioner was deprived of their oppor­tunity to produce evidence which would have es­tablished that the dismissal of the workmen was justified. As the Labour Court disposed of the preliminary point and the merits of the application by one award, the petitioner was deprived of their oppor­tunity to produce evidence which would have es­tablished that the dismissal of the workmen was justified. In support of the contention reliance is placed on the language of section 33-A of the In­dustrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') which reads as follows: - "Where an employer contravenes the provi­sions of section 33 during the pendency of pro­ceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner to such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on re­ceipt of such complaint that Labour Court, Tribu­nal or National Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the pro­visions of this Act and shall submit its award to-the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly." It is urged that if there has been a contraven­tion of the provisions of section 33 by the em­ployer, the employee has been given a right to apply in writing to the Labour Court for adju­dication of the dispute. The non-compliance with the provisions of section 33 is thus a condition, precedent for the exercise of the powers to ad­judicate the dispute between the parties under section 33-A. After the Labour Court has found that there has been a contravention of the provi­sions of section 33, the Labour Court acquires jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute bet­ween the workmen and the employer. It is thus-necessary for the Labour Court to decide whether there has been a contravention of section 33 or not before entering upon the adjudication of the dispute. Section 33A according to the petitioner's-contention contemplates two distinct stages. At the first stage the Labour Court has to decide whether there has been a contravention of the pro­visions of section 33 and after having come to the conclusion that there has been a contravention, it has to decide the dispute on merits. As in the present case the decision on the preliminary issue that there has been non-compliance with the pro­visions of section 33 was not given separately, they petitioner was prejudiced in their case on merits of the dispute. In my judgment there is no force in this contention. As in the present case the decision on the preliminary issue that there has been non-compliance with the pro­visions of section 33 was not given separately, they petitioner was prejudiced in their case on merits of the dispute. In my judgment there is no force in this contention. The Labour Court before giving any relief to the employee under section 33-A has to find out first that there has been a contravention of the provisions of section 33. The contraven­tion of the provisions of section 33 is the founda­tion for the exercise of the power to adjudicate upon the dispute. But the section does not con­template two distinct and separate stages in the inquiry and the Labour Court was not bound under section 33-A to decide the preliminary issue first and thereafter proceed to inquire into the merits after giving fresh opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. On the facts of the present case it does not appear from the award that the petitioner was in any way prejudiced and the peti­tioner had no opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their case. Reference is made by the counsel for the petitioner to the case of Equita­ble Coal Co., Ltd. v. Algu Singh, reported in AIR 1958 SC 761 and reference is made to the following passage at p. 763:- "In an enquiry held under S. 23, (Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950) two ques­tions fall to be considered: Is the fact of con­travention by the employer of the provisions of section 22 proved? If yes, is the order passed by the employer against the employee justified on the merits? If both these questions are answered in favour of the employee, the Appellate Tribunal would no doubt be entitled to pass an appropriate order in favour of the employee. If the first point is answered in favour of the employee, but on the second point the finding is that, on the merits, the order passed by the employer against the em­ployee is justified, then the breach of section 22 proved against the employer may ordinarily be re­garded as a technical breach and it may not, un­less there are compelling facts in favour of the employee, justify any substantial order of compen­sation in favour of the employee. It is unneces­sary to add that, if the first issue is answered against the employee, nothing further can be done under section 23." This case to my mind does not support the con­tention of the petitioner that the inquiry under section 33-A has to be made at two stages - first the Labour Court has to determine that there has been a violation of the provisions of section 33 and thereafter decide on merits after giving fresh op­portunity to the parties to adduce evidence in support of their cases. (3) On merits it is contended that section 33 was not contravened in the present case as the Union took up the case of the workmen who were not concerned in the dispute which was the sub­ject-matter of the reference. The reference related to the discharge of Sri Hirendra Nath Bhattacharjee and the other workmen cannot be said to be concerned in the dispute raised by Sri Hirendra Nath Bhattacharjee on his dismissal. Cases where the reference is with regard to matters which affect all the workers of the concern stand on a different footing and in such cases it can be said that all the workers employed in the concern are interested in the dispute and thus can be said to be concerned in the dispute within the mean­ing of section 33. But when the reference relates to employment or non-employment of an individual, workman, all other workmen cannot be said to be concerned in the dispute. The word 'con­cerned' to my mind, has a wider connotation than the actual party to the reference. In the case of M/s. New India Motors (P.) Ltd., New Delhi v. K. T. Morris reported in AIR 1960 SC 875 it was observed as follows: - "What does the expression 'workmen con­cerned in such dispute' mean? The appellant con­tends that the main dispute was in regard to the discharge of 7 apprentices employed by the ap­pellant, and it is only the said 7 apprentices who were concerned in the said dispute. The respon­dent was not concerned in the said dispute, and so the termination of his services cannot attract the provisions of section 33 (i) (a). The appellant con­tends that the main dispute was in regard to the discharge of 7 apprentices employed by the ap­pellant, and it is only the said 7 apprentices who were concerned in the said dispute. The respon­dent was not concerned in the said dispute, and so the termination of his services cannot attract the provisions of section 33 (i) (a). Prima facie the argument that 'workmen concerned in such dispute' should be limited to the workmen directly or actually concerned in such dispute appears plausible, but if we examine the scheme of the Act and the effect of its material and relevant provi­sions this limited construction of the clause in question cannot be accepted." The expression includes all workmen on whose, be­half the dispute has been raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute. (4) Section 18 (3) of the Act reads as follows: -"18 (3). A settlement arrived at in .the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on - (a) all parties to the industrial dispute: (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) Where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is" an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) Where a party referred to in clause (a) or cl. (b) is composed of workmen all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part." The dispute of an individual workman is essential­ly an individual dispute. But when it is taken up by a large number of workmen of the concern it assumes the character of an industrial dispute. But when it is taken up by a large number of workmen of the concern it assumes the character of an industrial dispute. Thus although the reference relates only to the discharge of Sri Hirendra Nath Bhattacharjee, still as it was taken up by all the workmen of the con­cern, it assumed the character of an industrial dis­pute and a reference was made to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute. Thus the workers on whose behalf the case of Hirendra Nath Bhattacharjee was taken up, are all concerned in the dispute and it cannot be said that the wor­kers who were discharged and whose case was taken up by the Union by an application under section 33-A were not concerned in the dispute which was the subject-matter of Reference No. 10 of 1959. (5) The next point taken by the petitioner is that under section 33-A the application is to be filed by the employee aggrieved by the contraven­tion of the provisions of section 33. In the present case the persons who were entitled to make an application were the opposite parties Nos. 4 to 7 and not the Goalpara Zilla Electric Supply Workers' Union, Dhubri. The Union had no right to make an application under section 33-A. The conten­tion is that it is open to the Union to take up the matter of the dismissal of the workmen and ask for a reference under section 10 of the Act. When a matter is taken up by the Union it be­comes an industrial dispute and reference can be made under section 10. But apart from the right given to the Union to collectively bargain or col­lectively bring the dispute relating to the discharge of a workman to the Labour Court for adjudica­tion, the individual workman aggrieved by the contravention of section 33 has also been given right to get the dispute decided by the Labour Court during the pendency of the reference. Sec­tion 33-A thus gives a right to an individual workman to approach the Labour Court for a de­cision 'of the dispute and the section is to be strict­ly construed. On the plain reading of section 33-A it is clear that the workman aggrieved by the con­travention of the provisions of section 33 alone is entitled to apply. Sec­tion 33-A thus gives a right to an individual workman to approach the Labour Court for a de­cision 'of the dispute and the section is to be strict­ly construed. On the plain reading of section 33-A it is clear that the workman aggrieved by the con­travention of the provisions of section 33 alone is entitled to apply. If the Union is authorised in writing by the workman aggrieved, the application by the Union will be an application by the ag­grieved workman. But the Union in its own right cannot take up the dispute regarding the dis­missal of a workman as an industrial dispute and apply under section 33-A for adjudication. There is nothing on the records of this case to show that any such authority was given to the Union to apply on behalf of the aggrieved workmen. Reference is made to the case of Belur Iron and Steel Workers' Union v. Shyam Engineer­ing Works decided by the Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta reported in 1952 Lab AC 279. In this case dealing with the provisions of section 23 of the Appellate Tribunal Act, 1950 the Tribunal held that the right to make a complaint against a dismissal in contravention of section 22 is available only to the 'aggrieved workman' and therefore a complaint by the Union was not main­tainable. The point was raised before the Labour Court and the Labour Court relying upon the case of Steel Brothers and Co., Ltd. v. Their Work­men, 1954-1 Lab LJ 314 (LATI-Cal.) has held that the petition by the Secretary of the Union on behalf of the Union was maintainable. It will appear from the award itself that the Steel Brothers' case did not lay down that the Union independently can apply under section 33-A. The Union can only apply when authorised by the employee aggrieved. In the present case the Labour Court has held that as the Management has failed to show that the employee did not give any authority to the Union to fire a petition, the petition was maintainable. When the point was raised by the Management it was within the know­ledge of the Union and it was for the Union to ad­duce evidence to show that there has been an au­thority by the aggrieved workmen to the Union to file a petition under section 33-A of the Act. When the point was raised by the Management it was within the know­ledge of the Union and it was for the Union to ad­duce evidence to show that there has been an au­thority by the aggrieved workmen to the Union to file a petition under section 33-A of the Act. The Labour Court in our opinion has committed a manifest error of law in holding that the applica­tion on behalf of the Union Secretary was main­tainable in the absence of any authority by the ag­grieved workmen. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to go further into the merits of the dispute. We accordingly allow this petition, and set aside the award. But we make no orders as to costs. (6) S. K. DUTTA, J. : I agree. Petition allowed.