Judgment :- 1. By virtue of S.119 of the States Reorganisation Act, two Court-Fees Acts, namely, the Travancore-Cochin Act II of 1125 and the Madras Act XIV of 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the old Acts) came to he current in different parts of this State of Kerala. The fees prescribed for the same matter under these two enactments differed largely; and therefore to bring about uniformity in the matter a consolidating Act, the Kerala Act X of 1960 (which will be referred to as the new Act), has been passed with the assent of the President on July 27, 1960, published in the Kerala Gazette on July 30, 1960, and brought into force on February 1, 1962 by a notification in the Gazette dated January 19, 1962. The new Act has mostly adopted the provisions of the Madras Act which prescribed a higher scale of court-fees in most matters than the Travancore-Cochin Act. 2. On February 12,1962, Shri. T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer filed a Vakalath for the respondents in S.A. No. 856 of 1961, paying court fee thereon under the repealed Travancore-Cochin Act II of 1125. The Office came to note that on fresh Vakalaths in pending cases some Advocates paid court-fee Rs. 3/- under the new Act, and some Rs. 2/- under the old Act and therefore referred the matter to the Bench as to whether Vakalaths, Miscellaneous Petitions, Copy Applications etc., filed after the commencement of the new Act in appeals from decrees or orders in suits instituted before the commencement of the Act are to be taxed court-fee under the old Acts or the new Act. Notice was ordered on the reference to the Advocate General who readily appeared in response thereto and argued the matter on behalf of the State. 3. The answer to the reference is to be sought in S.87(2) of the new Act. Under it all proceedings by way of appeal, revision or otherwise arising from suits instituted before the commencement of the new Act, whether the proceedings be instituted before or after such commencement, shall be governed by the provisions of the old Acts. The section reads: "87. Under it all proceedings by way of appeal, revision or otherwise arising from suits instituted before the commencement of the new Act, whether the proceedings be instituted before or after such commencement, shall be governed by the provisions of the old Acts. The section reads: "87. (1) The Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, in force in the Malabar District referred to in sub-section (2) of S.5 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act, 1125 and the Travancore-Cochin Suits Valuation Act, 1125, are hereby repealed. (2) All suits and proceedings instituted before the commencement of this Act and all proceedings by way of appeal, revision or otherwise arising therefrom whether instituted before or after such commencement shall, notwithstanding the repeal of the said Acts be governed by the provisions of the said Acts and the rules made thereunder." 4. The word 'proceedings' presents little difficulty. Though the word is not defined in the Act, it finds definition in the Civil Rules of Practice, both of Travancore-Cochin and of Madras alike, to include "all documents presented to or filed in Court by any party or commissioner or other officer of court, other than the documents produced as evidence" and that is the accepted connotation of the word in legal parlance. The documents like Vakalaths, Miscellaneous Petitions, Copy Applications etc., in regard to which the reference is made must therefore be held 'proceedings' within the meaning of the above section. 5. But, the question is whether they do come within the purview of the expression "otherwise arising therefrom" in the section. The learned Advocate General points out that the word 'otherwise' following an enumeration of particular objects is normally to be construed as denoting objects similar in nature to those enumerated before the word. Sutherland on Statutory Construction refers to the doctrine of noscitur a sociis thus; "In case the legislative intent is not clear the meaning of doubtful words may be determined by reference to their association with other associated words and phrases." and continues to say, "A variation of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis is that of ejusdem generis where general words follow specific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. The doctrine is an attempt to reconcile an incompatibility between specific and general words in view of other rules of construction that all words in a statute are to be given effect, if possible; that parts of a statute are to be construed together; and that the legislature is presumed not to have used superfluous words. If the general words are given their full and natural meaning, that is, the meaning they would receive in the abstract, they would include the objects designated by the specific words, making the latter superfluous. If, on the other hand, the series of specific words is given its full and natural meaning, the general words are redundant in part. The rule accomplishes the purpose of giving effect to both the particular and the general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class, and the general words as extending the provisions of the statute to everything embraced in that class, though not specifically named by the particular words," Lopez, L. J., made no-distinction between the doctrines of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, and observed in Smelting company of Australia v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1897,1 Q.B. 175, 181): "I think the proper way of construing those words is to apply to them what is known as the ejusdem generis doctrine, or, as it is sometimes expressed, the doctrine noscitur a sociis, which is that, where general words immediately follow or are closely associated with specific words, their meaning must be limited by reference to the preceding words." 6. But, these doctrines are mere guides to ascertain the legislative intent in the enactment, and cannot therefore be applied so as to make the expression in the enactment meaningless or nugatory. As observed by Rickby L.J. in the 1897,1 Q. B. case (cited supra): "The rule of construction which is called the ejusdem generis doctrine, or sometimes the doctrine 'noscitur a sociis, is one which ought to be applied with great caution; because it implies a departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning which may or may not have been the intention of the legislature." 7. Shri Krishnamoorthy Iyer submits that if the doctrine noscitur a sociis is applied, in the construction of S.87 (2) of the new Court-Fees Act (X of 1960) the expression 'otherwise arising therefrom' can have little significance at all; for, nothing: is similar in nature to an appeal or revision which are unique in themselves as proceedings designed to invoke a superior tribunal to grant redress against unjust orders of an inferior tribunal. He relies strongly on the ruling in Ganga Naicken v. Sundaram Ayyar (A.I.R.1956 Madras 597) where the ejusdem generis doctrine was kept out in the construction of S.87 (2) of the Court-fees Act, and an application for "copy of judgment and decree in a Civil Revision Petition" disposed of long before the commencement of the Act was held to be a proceeding 'otherwise arising from' the suit instituted before the Act liable to be taxed under the old Act only. It was observed therein: "The proceeding that may otherwise arise from a suit and proceeding need not therefore be in the nature of an appeal or revision, as there are several other matters which arise out of a suit and proceeding or appeal or revision instituted before the commencement of the Act." 8. Statute law, like case law, often evinces a particular respect for precedents. Via trita via tuta (the trodden path is the safe path) is a principle very often observed in both the fields. The legislature, like the Courts, is "hesitant to leave the pattern of experience for the uncharted jungle of experiment." Whenever a demand for legislative regulation arises the usual practice is to look up prior enactments in pari materia which have to their credit the prestige and authority of long acceptance rather than attempt the more difficult and dangerous task of framing an original set of rules; and that is what exactly we find in the enactment of S.87 (2) of the new Act running parallel in diction with S.87 (2) of the Madras Court-fees Act, 1955. The legislative language used in the present Act must then be of the same legislative intent as in the Madras Act. In looking up for a precedent for the enactment and adopting the Madras Act as the model, the legislature has also to be presumed to have been aware of the judicial interpretation of its provisions. The legislative language used in the present Act must then be of the same legislative intent as in the Madras Act. In looking up for a precedent for the enactment and adopting the Madras Act as the model, the legislature has also to be presumed to have been aware of the judicial interpretation of its provisions. I would therefore presume that in enacting S.87 (2) of the new Act, the legislature approved the judicial interpretation thereof made in A.I.R. 1956 Madras 597, especially since no change has been made in its diction. 9. It then follows that all proceedings like Vakalaths, Miscellaneous Petitions and Copy Applications in appeals from suits instituted before the commencement of the Act shall be governed by the old Act, the Travancore-Cochin Court-Fees Act II of 1125, or the Madras Act, XIV of 1955, as the case may be, the operation of the new Act X of 1960 being confined to proceedings arising from suits instituted on or after February 1, 1962. The reference is answered as above.