MEHROTRA, C. J.: These two appeals arise out of the same judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Lower Assam Districts, Nowgong. M/s. Dasuram Mirjamal Firm appellant in First Appeal No. 8/57 was plaintiff in the suit and Brahmadatta Bajaj appellant in First Appeal No. 23/57 along with two others was defendant in the court below. M/s. Dasuram Mirjamal firm-a registered firm at Gauhati-brought a suit on the basis of a simple mortgage dated 10th November 1946 for Rs. 75,000/- executed by defendants 1 to 3. The suit was for the recovery of Rs. 1,13,250/- inclusive of a sum of Rs.38,250/- as interest, by sale of the mortgage property. The trial court decreed the suit for Rs. 45,732/1/6 as principal, Rs. 2,500/2/6 as interest till the execution of the mortgage and Rs. 22,463/- as Interest on the principal sum of Rs. 46,732/1/6, the total decretal amount thus being Rs. 71,695/4/-.. The suit was decreed against all the defendants in so far as it related to the mortgaged property. The mortgaged property was directed to be sold first and for the balance amount a personal decree was passed against defendant No. 1 alone. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were, exempt from the personal decree. Both the parties have Tiled appeal. Plaintiff M/s. Dasuram Mirjamal Firm has filed appeal No. 8/57 for the balance amount and for personal decree against defendants 2 and 3 also. Defendant No. 1 Brahmadatta Bajaj has filed appeal No. 23/57 against the part of the decree by which the suit has been decreed in part. (2) The contention of the plaintiff appellant is have the mortgage in suit is proved to have been duly executed. In the mortgage it is set out that Rs. 46,732/1/6 was the amount due to the plaintiff from the defendants on account of the principal and interest of a parole debt and the interest on the said amount on the date of the mort­gage had come to Rs. 2,500/2/6. The balance of the 25,767/12/- was paid in cash on the date of the execution of the mortgage. Thus the defendants mortgages the property set out in the plaint for consideration. Ta» mortgaged property consists of land and a rice mill with its machineries standing on the land. 2,500/2/6. The balance of the 25,767/12/- was paid in cash on the date of the execution of the mortgage. Thus the defendants mortgages the property set out in the plaint for consideration. Ta» mortgaged property consists of land and a rice mill with its machineries standing on the land. It is sat out 'B the plaint that from time to time the defendants has borrowed money from the plaintiff and the amount was entered in the Khata kept by the plaintiff. On adjustment of accounts the sum of Rs. 45,732/l/- was acknowledged in the Khata as the amount due inclusive of the interest. The money was borrowed the meet the necessity of the mill business. As the defendants were in need of further money a cash sum of Rs. 25,767/12/- was paid to the defendants by the plaintiff on the 10th November 1946 towards the mortgage consi­deration. The suit was thus for the realisation of the mortgage debt by sale of the mortgaged property. (3) . All the defendants filed separate written statements. The main contesting- defendant was defendant No. 1. The contention of defendant No. 1 in the written statement mainly was that the mortgage bond was without consideration and that the suit as framed is not maintain , able. It is stated in the written statement that the plaintiff agreed to manage 'Sree Bajaj Rice Mill' of Lanne belonging to the defendants by investing money and t» give half share of the profit to the defendants. The plaintiff undertook to invest money for the running of the mill and with that agreement wrote out the mortgage deed, got it signed by the defendants and assured the defendants that defendants would have no liability on the basis of these deeds. This deed was taken with a view to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff in the event the defendants raised any objection when the mill started running well. It is denied by the defendant that the amount of advance made to the defendants by the, plaintiff came to Rs. 46,732/1/6 on adjustment of account and the said amount was acknowledged in the Khata. It is also denied that the defendants took Rs-. 25,767/4/- from the plaintiff in cash on the date of the execution of the mortgage. It is denied by the defendant that the amount of advance made to the defendants by the, plaintiff came to Rs. 46,732/1/6 on adjustment of account and the said amount was acknowledged in the Khata. It is also denied that the defendants took Rs-. 25,767/4/- from the plaintiff in cash on the date of the execution of the mortgage. The plaintiff after getting the deed executed, not arrange for investing money or managing Sri Bajaj Rice Mill and when the defendant informed the plaintiff that he would call a Marrowari Panchayat the matter was settled by the plaintiff and a registered partnership deed to which Dasuram Mirjamal and Defendants 1 and 3 were parties, was executed on 17th November 1947. The name of the mill was changed to 'Sree Kamakshya- " Rice Mill' on condition that the parties will share half and half of the profits and the money for running of the business will be invested by the plaintiff. The mill ran up to the 17th April 1949, but thereafter the plaintiff closed the mill without giving any share of profits to the defendants. In short therefore, the case of the defendant is that the mortgage deed was a sham transaction, no consideration passed and it was never act upon. The plaintiff had agreed to run the rice mill and when he failed to do it after getting the mortgage deed executed, a registered partnership deed was executed between the parties and the plaintiff stopped the mill after running it for a short time. The point taken by the defendant by way of addi­tional grounds of appeal is that in view of the terms of the registered partnership deed, the mortgage debt could not be realised by sale of the rice mill. In effect, the contention is that the mortgage debt was wiped off and was substituted by the partnership deed. In view of the partnership deed, the mortgage deed could not be enforced against the rice mill and further that the remedy of the plaintiff if at all, was to bring a suit for dis­solution of the partnership and for accounts. The plain­tiff could no longer bring a suit for recovery of the mortgage debt. In view of the partnership deed, the mortgage deed could not be enforced against the rice mill and further that the remedy of the plaintiff if at all, was to bring a suit for dis­solution of the partnership and for accounts. The plain­tiff could no longer bring a suit for recovery of the mortgage debt. The mortgage deed was stamped with court fee stamp and when the deed was filed the plaintiff realised that it was not properly stamped and took back the deed and the collector certified after charging the necessary penalty that the deed was properly stamped. Thereafter it was admitted into evidence. The contention of the defendant further is that the deed was not admissible in evidence as it was not properly stamped and further that it was illegally registered and could not be enforced as a mortgage. (4) The trial court held on consideration of the evidence that the execution of the mortgage has bean duly proved. The trial court further held that as the deed was certified to have been properly stamped by the Collector and was admitted into evidence, the ques­tion of admissibility could not be raised. He further held that there was no force in the contention of the defen­dant that the deed was rot registered at all and thus not valid as a mortgage. The trial court however, held that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the cash consi­deration was paid on the date of the execution of the mortgage. As regards the sum of Rs. 46,732/1/6 alleged to have been advanced as a parole debt and which is alleged to have been acknowledged by defendant No. 1 in the Khata of the plaintiff, the trial court held that the acknowledgment of the debt in the mortgage deed was sufficient to fasten the liability on the defendants and thus it was not open to the defendants to reopen the matter again. On these findings he decreed the suit for Rs. 46,732/1/6 the principal amount of the mortgage and the interest on the said amount up to the date of the decree. On these findings he decreed the suit for Rs. 46,732/1/6 the principal amount of the mortgage and the interest on the said amount up to the date of the decree. (5) The plaintiff appellant has strenuously contended that the due execution of the mortgage having been proved, there being a recital in the deed itself that the mortgage consideration was duly received by the mortga­gors, - burden lay on the defendants to prove the contrary and to establish that no consideration passed on the date of the execution of the mortgage. He has further urged that even the evidence on the record proved that the sum of Rs. 25,767/12/- was paid on the date of the execution to the defendants by the plaintiff. (6) In the mortgage deed there is a clear recital to the effect that some money was advanced by the plain­tiff to the defendants for the mill business. On the Khata account the amount due both for the principal and interest was Rs. 46,732/1/6 and at the defendants needed money for the said business a cash loan of Rs. 25,767/lZ/-was taken by the defendants from the plaintiff. For the total debt of Rs. 75.000/- the mortgage was executed. The payment of money was also admitted before the Registrar as the mortgage is a registered document. The mortgage was executed on the 10th November 1946. On the 17th November 1947 a deed of partnership was entered into between Mirjamall Agarwalla one of the partners of the plaintiff Firm and Brahmadatta Bajaj and Tilak Chand Bajaj -defendants Nos. 1 and 3 in the pre­sent suit - in which it was clearly set out that the defendants who were the second party in the partnership deed, were running the rice mill and as they had no sufficient money to run the rice business they entered into partnership with Mirjamall Agarwalla first party on terms set out in the deed of partnership. In paragraph 2 of the deed it was expressly stated that the said mill of the 2nd party is under mortgage to the 1st party for Rs. 75,000 as per deed, dated 10th November 1946. The number of the mortgage deed is 8739 of 1946. On the 16th November 1946 a deed of partition was executed between the defendants and in paragraph 4 of the said partition deed it is set out that the debt of Rs. 75,000 as per deed, dated 10th November 1946. The number of the mortgage deed is 8739 of 1946. On the 16th November 1946 a deed of partition was executed between the defendants and in paragraph 4 of the said partition deed it is set out that the debt of Rs. 75,000 under mortgage bond in favour of Messrs. Dasuram Mirjamal of Gauhati shall be paid by the first party only, the second party shall not be liable for it in any way. The first party to this partition deed was the defendants Nos. 1 and 3 to the present suit. By this arrangement between three defendants, defendants Nos. 1 and 3 alone had undertaken the liabi­lity to pay the debt of Rs. 75,000/- under the mortgage. In paragraph 11 of the partnership deed which is relied upon by the defendant in support of his contention that the mortgage debt has been wiped off by the execution of the partnership deed, there is mention of the fact that no property of this partnership business will be liable for the previous debts or liabilities of the 2nd party that is defendants Nos. 1 and 3. That there was in existence a debt is thus by impli­cation acknowledged in this partnership deed. These documents clearly show that not only the existence of the mortgage deed was admitted but it was also admitted that the consideration of the mortgage was Rs. 75.000/-and the defendant were debtors to the extent of Rs. 75,000/- under the mortgage. At no stage when those documents were executed the defendants 1 and 3 stated that the mortgage was a sham transaction or it was without consideration. None of these documents contained any statement to the effect that the cash consideration set out in the mortgage deed never passed. This being the state of affairs, it was up to the defendants to explain these admissions. (7) It was argued by the counsel for the defendant that when parties have led evidence, the question of burden of proof becomes immaterial and it is up to the plaintiff who has undertaken the responsibility of proving the passing of the consideration, to establish that fact. At any rate this court for itself can examine the evidence and come to its own conclusion whether the plaintiff has proved the passing of the consideration. At any rate this court for itself can examine the evidence and come to its own conclusion whether the plaintiff has proved the passing of the consideration. No objection can be taken to this broad proposition that when ' the parties have led evidence the question of burden of proof becomes immaterial. But when there is an admission in the document between the parties of the passing of the consideration, burden lies on the defendant to explain the j admission and the admissions can be taken into conside­ration in assessing the value of the evidence produced by the parties. The question of burden of proof also is material with a view to assess the value of the evidence produced by the parties. Apart from these admissions in the document, plaintiff has examined Mr. Mirjamal Agarwalla. He has stated that "it is not a fact that the document was executed without receiving any consideration. Some amount was due on Khata account and the balance was paid in cash". He has further stated that he did not remember the amount on each account but it has been stated in the document. In cross-examination also he stated that it is not a fact that no cash was paid on the date of execution of the mortgage bond. He has further stated that the witnesses also saw the payment by him to the defendants. (8) The plaintiff has produced two witnesses. Sri Madanlal Goenka who is an attesting witness, has slated that some amount was paid in his presence but he cannot give the amount that was actually paid. The other witness Ramakrisson Dhonuka who has proved the execution of the mortgage, has said that he did not remember it any consideration was paid in his presence. (9) It is urged by the counsel for the defendant that no reliance can be placed on the statement of these witnesses in so far as they attempt to prove the passing of the consideration. As to the statement of Mirjamai Agarwalla it is urged that he has not been able to give the exact amount of cash paid on the date of the execu­tion. If in fact he had paid any cash money on that date, he should have been in a position to state the exact amount. He has specifically denied that the document was without consideration and no cash consideration was paid. If in fact he had paid any cash money on that date, he should have been in a position to state the exact amount. He has specifically denied that the document was without consideration and no cash consideration was paid. It is difficult to remember the exact amount of cash paid. He has said in his statement that the exact amount can be known from the document itself. (10) It is next urged that Mirjamal Agarwalla has stated that his witnesses saw the passing of the considera­tion, but none of the two witnesses have given the exact amount of the cash consideration. One of the witnesses has said that he does not remember whether any money consideration passed. The other witness has said that some cash consideration was made but he was unable to give the exact amount. If the plaintiff himself was unable to give the exact amount, it cannot be expected from the witnesses after such a long time that they will be able to give the exact amount. From the statements' of these witnesses read in the light of the admission made by the defendant in the documents referred to above, it is clear that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing the payment of cash consideration on the date of the exe­cution of the mortgage. The defendant's case as I have said was that the mortgage was without consideration, it was only with a view to safeguard the future contingency that the mortgage deed was executed and it was assured at the time of the execu­tion of the mortgage that the deed will not be enforced. There is no evidence to support this contention. The court below has not accepted this contention of the defendant. The defendants never came forward with the specific case that even if it be accepted that the mortgage was a genuine document and the previous debt was set off against the; the mortgage, no cash money was paid on the date of the execution of the mortgage. Even in the additional written statement it was only stated that the mortgage debt has been wiped off in view of paragraph 11 of the partnership deed. This statement also presupposes the existence of a valid debt and the case found by the court below was not specifically set out by the defendants in their written statements. Even in the additional written statement it was only stated that the mortgage debt has been wiped off in view of paragraph 11 of the partnership deed. This statement also presupposes the existence of a valid debt and the case found by the court below was not specifically set out by the defendants in their written statements. (11) The next ground on which the court below has disbelieved the case of the plaintiff is that they failed to produce their account books. An application was filed by the defendants on the 23rd June 1953 asking for an order for the production of the Khatas of the plaintiff showing the taking of money on different occasions. The plaintiff was no doubt ordered to produce the account books. But an application was filed by the plaintiff sett­ing out the reasons for their inability to produce the account books and also setting out that defendants if they wanted, could inspect the account books in Gauhati. me defendants declined to inspect the Khatas at Gauhati ana the court on the 19th March 1956 passed the following order : "Heard the learned Advocates in respect of the Addi­tional Written Statement filed and is accepted without objection from the side of the plaintiff. Read the petition showing cause for not producing the khatas called, for and is accepted from the circumstances set forth therein. The learned Advocate for the defendants decli­ned to undertake the inspection of these khatas at Gauhati as agreed to by the plaintiffs and the case is therefore taken up. Examined the plaintiff as P. W. 3. The suit is based on a registered mortgage bond and the khatas proposed to be inspected do not appear to be mate­rial for the purpose of discharging the burden of defen­dants and prayer for production of these at this state of the proceedings in court is therefore refused. The learned advocate for the plaintiffs declines to adduce any more witness on behalf of the plaintiffs and the case for the plaintiffs is therefore closed". This order clearly shows that the reasons given By the plaintiff for non-production of the khatas have been accepted by the court to be correct and further as the .defendants declined to inspect them at Gauhati, the court did not think it advisable to order the production of these documents in court. This order clearly shows that the reasons given By the plaintiff for non-production of the khatas have been accepted by the court to be correct and further as the .defendants declined to inspect them at Gauhati, the court did not think it advisable to order the production of these documents in court. It is surprising that after having accepted the reasons given for non-production of the accounts, the court still drew a presumption against the plaintiff for non-production of those documents. It is contended by the counsel for the defendant that this order was based only on the ground that the application for production OT documents in court was filed at a late stage and it is open to this court to examine the reasons given by the plain­tiff for non-production of the documents and if this court finds that the reasons are not valid, an adverse presumption can be drawn against the plaintiff. We do not think that the ground on which the defen­dant's prayer for production of the documents was rejec­ted was only the fact that it was applied for at a late stage. The opening sentence of this order clearly shows that the reasons given by the plaintiff for non-production of the documents were accepted by the court below. Moreover the defendants had been moving from before for the production of the documents and. it cannot be said that the rejection of the prayer of the defendants was only on the ground that it was made at a late stage. What the order really means is that the prayer of the defendants that the plaintiff should produce the docu­ments was rejected on the ground that the plaintiff had given sufficient reasons for it. The plaintiff had asked that the defendants should inspect the khatas at Gauhati which the defendants declined to do. Having declined to do that, they might have asked the court for the pro­duction of the khatas in court. This prayer may have been made at a late stage and the court refused it. (12) We do not think also that in the circumstances of the present case any adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff. Moreover, the presumption is only a piece of evidence but by itself it cannot be relied to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. (12) We do not think also that in the circumstances of the present case any adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff. Moreover, the presumption is only a piece of evidence but by itself it cannot be relied to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. In view of the positive evidence on the record coupled with the admission by the defendants of the passing of the consideration, no adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff for 1 non-production of the documents. (13) The defendants also have not produced their account books. (14) Regarding the question of the deficiency in ^ stamp and the admissibility of the mortgage bond, in our opinion the court below is right in holding that after the I document has been admitted in evidence, Sec. 36 of the ! Indian Stamp Act bars calling ,in question the admissibility of the document on the ground that the instrument had not been duly stamped. The document was withdrawn with the permission of the court and was duly certified by the Collector on payment of the penalty to be duly stamped. Thereafter it was filed in court and was admitted in evidence without any objection by the defendant. That being ; so, section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act is attracted which provides that where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in section 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instru­ment has not been duly stamped. (15) It was next contended by the defendant that the document could not be registered as it was not duly stamped. The registration was illegal and as such it should be trea­ted to be a document without registration. A mortgage bond without registration is invalid and no decree could be passed on such a mortgage. Section 37 of the Indian Stamp Act provides that "The State Government may make rules providing that, where an instrument bears a stamp of sufficient amount but of improper description, it may, on payment of the ' duty with which the same is chargeable, be certified to be duly stamped, and any instrument so certified shall then be deemed to have been duly stamped as from the date of its execution". Section 37 is a complete answer to the defendant's J contention. Section 37 is a complete answer to the defendant's J contention. It is however, argued that section 37 is not attracted in the present case. The words "stamp of” sufficient amount but of improper 'description" in section 37 are not to be interpreted as including a description of stamp appropriate for purposes altogether outside the, Stamp Act but is confined to a stamp which is used for the purpose of denoting the stamp duty chargeable on an instrument but which is improper in a particular case having regard to the Act and the Rules. In our opinion this contention is not sound. In the case of 'Ma Pwa May and another v. S. R. M. M. A. Chettiar Firm' reported in AIR 1929 PC 279, it was held as follows : - "It is not correct that section 37 has no reference to any stamp except a revenue stamp pure and simple. A revenue stamp surcharged Court-fee is within the mean­ing of section 37 a stamp of improper description: So far as Court-fee stamps in their present form are concer­ned too narrow a construction upon a remedial section like section 37, Stamp Act should not be put". In this case a mortgage was executed on an ordi­nary impressed revenue stamp, but surcharged with the words: "Court-fee", stamped over it. The amount of the stamp was sufficient to satisfy the revenue require­ments. Before the defendants filed a written statement calling attention to the stamp objection, the plaintiffs mortgages had applied to the Court for return of the mortgage deed in order that they might apply to the Collector for rectification of the error. The document was forwarded to the Collector under section 38 (2) of the Stamp Act who on payment of further duty and a penalty certified it. to be duly stamped. It was then received in evidence. It was held that its admission could not tie called in question in view of section 36 and further that section 87 of stamp Act was also attracted. In our opinion the decision of their lordships of the Privy Council is not only entitled to great weight but we are ourselves in complete agreement with the decision. (16) By the additional ground the defendant has raised the point that by virtue of clause 11 of the used of partnership the mortgage debt is no longer enforceable. In our opinion the decision of their lordships of the Privy Council is not only entitled to great weight but we are ourselves in complete agreement with the decision. (16) By the additional ground the defendant has raised the point that by virtue of clause 11 of the used of partnership the mortgage debt is no longer enforceable. Clause 11 of the partnership deed Ext. A is as follows : "That no property of this partnership business will be liable for the previous debts or liabilities of the 2nd party". There are two-fold contentions raised on behalf of the defendant. Firstly it is urged that under this deed the mill and the land are partnership property and thus under clause 11 it cannot be made liable for the debt of the defendant. Paragraph 11 protects only the property be­longing to the partnership business. It cannot be said that the mill and the land on which the mill is situate is the property of the partnership business. The partnership was entered into between Mirjamall Agarwalla and Erahmadatta Bajaj and Tilak Chand Bajaj who are defendants Nos. 1 and 3 respectively to the suit, for running the rice business and the land on which the mill was situate was not the property of the partnership business. If the mill and the land were made under this deed the partnership business property, there was no necessity to mention specifically in paragraph 2 that the mill of the 2nd party (defendants 1 and 3) is under mortgage to the 1st party (Mirjamall Agarwalla) and further there was no necessity to mention specifically in paragraph 4 that the second party will not get any rent for the mill. IT the mill had become a partnership business property, there was no question of the second party getting any rent for it and thus there was no question of foregoing their right for rent. But reading the partnership deed as a whole it is clear that the partnership was in respect of the rice business and not the mill and the land on which it was situate. It cannot therefore, be said that the mort­gaged property could not be made liable for the mortgage debt. But reading the partnership deed as a whole it is clear that the partnership was in respect of the rice business and not the mill and the land on which it was situate. It cannot therefore, be said that the mort­gaged property could not be made liable for the mortgage debt. (17) it was next contended that the mortgage was replaced by the partnership deed and thus the remedy of the plaintiff was to file a suit for dissolution of the partnership and for accounts and not for recovery of the mortgage money. There is no substance in this conten­tion either. As I have already pointed out, the partnership deed related to the rice business and it cannot be said that the deed substituted the mortgage deed and the mortgaged property was made the partnership assets. The partnership deed also does not show that the money which was borrowed for running the rice business prior to the partnership and which was a consideration for the mort­gage was regarded as the assets or liability of the partnership. 'Nor can it be said that the money which was borrowed prior to the partnership for running the rice mill was advanced by the plaintiff for running the partnership business. As I have already pointed out, the case of the defendants throughout was that the mortgage deed was a sham transaction and was never to be acted upon, it was never alleged that the mortgage was substituted by the partnership deed and that the money advanced in the mortgage was meant for being utilised for running the partnership business. (18) It was lastly contended that under the Assam Money Lenders Act the mortgagee is not entitled to get as interest more than the principal amount and as the sum of Rs. 46,732/1/6 comprised of both principal and interest, no decree could be passed for the interest amount at more than the principal amount advanced by the plaintiff. In the concluding portion of paragraph 4 of the written statement of defendant No. 1 it was stated that in the loan in the khatas as stated by the plaintiff in his plaint, was included only interest for a very long time, the entire aforesaid acknowledgments and statements in the deed are fit to be reopened as the said transactions as between the parties thereto are substantially unfair. No specific plea appears to have been taken for re­opening of the transactions nor any provision of the Assam Money Lenders Act has been pointed out which gives power to the court to reopen the whole transaction and unless the transaction can be reopened, and this court goes into the details of the amount of Rs. 46,732/1/6 which was acknowledged as the amount due as a part of the consideration of the mortgage , it is difficult to hold that the plaintiff charged interest at more than the principal amount and violated the provisions of the Assam Money Lenders Act. If the point had been specifically taken, the court below would have gone into that question and had also determined that the court had or had not the power to reopen the whole transaction. In the absence of any specific plea on that behalf this court in appeal will not go into that question. (19) We also do not find any reason as to why the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 could be exempted from personal decree. They were the executants of the mortgage. Any partition between the defendants inter se by which this debt was allotted to defendants Nos. 1 and 3 alone and defendant No. 2 was specifically exempted from the liability of the debt cannot be binding on the mortgagee. If the defendant No. 2 has to pay the amount, it may be that he may be entitled to recover it from the other defendants under the terms of the partition deed. But the defen­dant No. 2 being an executant of the mortgage and there being no specific provision in the deed itself that the personal decree will be confined to defendant No. 1, there was no reason why the plaintiff could not get a personal decree against defendants Nos. 2 and 3. (20) In the result therefore, First Appeal No. 8/57 is allowed and First Appeal No. 23/57 is dismissed. The suit is decreed in its entirety. At the first instance the entire amount claimed by the plaintiff is realisable by the sale of the mortgaged property. In the event of any deficiency the plaintiff will be entitled to get a per­sonal decree against all the defendants. Plaintiff is en­titled to his costs throughout. (21) S. K. DUTTA, J.: I agree. , Order accordingly.