The appellants, the Union of India and the Union Territory of Tripura who were the defendants in Title Suit No. 49 of 1958 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge have filed this appeal against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge by which he gave a decree to the respondent one Shri Kula Chandra Sinha who was a S.D.O. in the employment of the second appellant (1) declaring that the order passed by the Chief Commissioner of Tripura on 19-1-1956 'dismissing the respondent from service and the order passed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, of the Union of India, the first appellant on 17-8-1957 'removing the respondent' from Service in place of the dismissal order by the Chief Commissioner were unconstitutional, illegal and inoperative, (2) declaring the respondent to be in service in the rank of the S.D.O., (3) decreeing a sum of Rs. 13,115.74 to be recoverable from the appellants and (4) decreeing that the respondent will be entitled to get a decree for the recovery of future salary and allowances till the date of his reinstatement. (2) The respondent Shri Kula Chandra Sinha was the S.D.O. at Sonamura in March, 1954. As S.D.O. he was engaged in the procurement of food 'grains for the Tripura Administration and this was going on for sometime. On 3-3-1954, a radiogram message Ext. A-l was sent by the Director of Procurement Shri H. S. Dev Barma (who was examin­ed in the suit as D. W. 1) to the respondent to stop further procurement of food grains forthwith. But still, in the week-end report of procurement sent by radiogram to the Director of Procurement, about 10,000 maunds of food grains were shown as procured in the preceding week. On 14-3-1954, the Director of Procurement went to Sonamura and told the respondent that the figure of pro­curement of 10,000 maunds in the last week had roused suspicion and he requested the respondent to look into the matter. On 15-3-1954 two bills Ext. D for 1,600 maunds of rice of a value of Rs. 24.800/- supplied by the procuring agent Hydar Ali Sirdar on 2-3-1954 and 3-3-1954 and Ext. H for 1,800 maunds of the value of Rs. 21,900/- in favour of the procuring agent Abdul Rahaman for supply of rice on 28-2-1954 and 2-3-1954 were presented to the respondent for orders regarding payment. 24.800/- supplied by the procuring agent Hydar Ali Sirdar on 2-3-1954 and 3-3-1954 and Ext. H for 1,800 maunds of the value of Rs. 21,900/- in favour of the procuring agent Abdul Rahaman for supply of rice on 28-2-1954 and 2-3-1954 were presented to the respondent for orders regarding payment. The said bills were supported by the certificates of the Food Inspector showing that the rice had been supplied and stored in the godown and they were also signed by the Divisional Accountant stating that they were check­ed and may be passed for payment. Accordingly, the respondent passed the bills. Thereafter, on 22-3-1954 and 23-3-1954 D. W. 1, the Director of Procurement went to Buxanagar without the know­ledge of the respondent and carried out a check of the godowns where food grains were stored and took statements from certain persons including the procuring agents Hydar Ali Sirdar and Abdul Rahaman and then submitted a report against the respondent which the respondent was not aware of. This report is not before us. Thereupon the then District Magistrate Shri R. Ghosh directed the respondent to appear before him with the bills Exts. D and H and the respon­dent was asked to submit a report which he did on 29-3-1954. That report is Ext. J dated 29-3-1954 in which the respondent stated that the bills were checked by the Divisional Accountant, Sonamura and they were supported by certificates of purchase issued by Sri Amal Roy Choudhury, Food Inspec­tor. Buxanagar and hence they were passed by him. A second report Ext. 1 was also made by the res­pondent on 30-3-1954 relating to the said bills in which he denied that the bills Ext. H for Rs. 27.900/-was drawn up with his knowledge, that no purchase of rice had been made for the said amount and that he had caused the Divisional Accountant to prepare the bill and further that he had no know­ledge of any misappropriation or cheating in res­pect of the said bill. (3) After these reports were taken from the respondent, the District Magistrate appears to have submitted a report to the Chief Commissioner on 9-4-1954. This report is also not before us, but it was clearly against the respondent, as seen from what followed. On 13-4-1954, the Chief Commis­sioner passed the order Ext. (3) After these reports were taken from the respondent, the District Magistrate appears to have submitted a report to the Chief Commissioner on 9-4-1954. This report is also not before us, but it was clearly against the respondent, as seen from what followed. On 13-4-1954, the Chief Commis­sioner passed the order Ext. 3 placing the respon­dent under suspension and appointing the Collector and District Magistrate to conduct a departmental enquiry into the allegations against the respondent and to submit a report. As Ext. 3 is an important document to decide the question at issue in this case, it is better that I give it in extenso. "GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA HOME DEPARTMENT CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION No. 26/C Dated, Agartala, the 13th April, 1954. ORDER WHEREAS it has been reported to me that Shri K. C. Sinha, S.D.O., Sonamura is involved in a serious conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Gov­ernment of a huge amount and that due to his participation thereof the Government has actually suffered a great loss. WHEREAS he has shown culpable and gross negligence in the discharge of his duties as S.D.O. by passing bills of large amounts in spite of timely warning that there was some foul play and without verifying or feeling satisfied that the payments were being made for genuine purchase. WHEREAS Shri Sinha has shown his com­plicity in the matter of cheating the Govt. by taking special interest in getting the bills prepared and paid on the same day in spite of timely warning. WHEREAS I am satisfied from the report of the Dist. Magistrate that a prima facie case regard­ing his complicity and connection with the above conspiracy has been made out I hereby order that Shri K. C. Sinha should be placed under suspen­sion from service. He should hand over charge of his duties to the S.T.O., Sonamura immediately. During the period of suspension Shri Sinha will draw 50% of his salary and proportionate allow­ances as subsistence allowance. The Collector and District Magistrate is hereby appointed to conduct departmental enquiry into the allegations against Shri K. C. Sinha and submit his report to me as early as possible. Sd/- V. Nanjappa. Chief Commissioner. Tripura. GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE No. 656/DM/SC/54 Dated, Agartala the 19th April, 1954. Copy of the order is forwarded to Shri K. C. Sinha, S.D.O., Sonamura for information and guidance. Sd/- V. Nanjappa. Chief Commissioner. Tripura. GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE No. 656/DM/SC/54 Dated, Agartala the 19th April, 1954. Copy of the order is forwarded to Shri K. C. Sinha, S.D.O., Sonamura for information and guidance. To 12-5-54 or submission of the explana­tion. Sd/- District Magistrate and Collector Tripura. 19-4-54." (4) When the respondent received this order, he applied to the District Magistrate for supplying him with copies of all the reports and papers on the basis of which the proceedings were drawn up against him. But the District Magistrate by his reply dated 5-5-1954 wanted that the papers requir­ed should be specified. Thereupon the respondent sent the petition Ext. 1 dated 8-5-1954 in which he requested that certified copies of (1) the report of the District Magistrate to the Chief Commissioner on which the proceeding was drawn up against him, (2) the statements of witnesses and (3) all relevant papers which directly or indirectly formed the basis of the proceedings should be given to him. But no reply was sent to Ext. 1 and none of the papers were supplied. (5) Here, I may refer to Ext. 3 again. In para 1 of Ext. 3, the Chief Commissioner has men­tioned simply that it was reported to him that the respondent was involved in a serious conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Government of a huge amount and that due to the participation of the respondent, the Government had actually suffered a great loss. What this report was and whose re­port it was have not been mentioned. Nor were the details of the conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Government mentioned. Nor was it shown in what way, the respondent had participated in the conspiracy- Again no details of the losses suffered by the Government were mentioned in Ext. 3. The respondent was entitled to know these details and to know the documents and the statements of per­sons relied on for making this allegation against him. With regard to the second paragraph in Ext. 3, again it simply mentioned that the respondent had shown culpable and gross negligence in the dis­charge of his duties as S.D.O. by passing a huge amount in spite of timely warning that there was some foul play and without verifying or feeling satisfied that the payments were being made for genuine purchase. 3, again it simply mentioned that the respondent had shown culpable and gross negligence in the dis­charge of his duties as S.D.O. by passing a huge amount in spite of timely warning that there was some foul play and without verifying or feeling satisfied that the payments were being made for genuine purchase. Hence, again, it will be noticed that the details of the bills in respect of which the culpable and gross negligence were said to have been shown have not been mentioned. Nor is it stated as to who gave the timely warning of foul play and when. Again, which were the payments made by the res­pondent in respect of which the charge of culpable and gross negligence was made against him was also not referred to. The third paragraph of Ext. 3 refers to the respondent's complicity in the matter of cheating the Government by taking special in­terest in getting the bills prepared and paid on the same day in spite of timely warning. Hence, again, what was the special interest which the respondent took and what were the bills which he caused to be prepared and for which he ordered payment on the same day and what was the timely warning and who gave the timely warning and what was the basis on which the charge of complicity of the respondent in cheating the Government were not mentioned. Thus, the first three paragraphs in Ext. 3 are couched in vague and general terms and cannot be said to form the subject-matter of specific charges framed against the respondent and the respondent was, therefore, justified in calling for the documents and statements on which the charges were based. He ought to have been supplied with them. (6) The respondent, thereafter submitted his written statement Ext. 2 on 12-5-1954 as ordered. In the written statement he pointed out that the three charges mentioned in paragraphs 1-3 of the order Ext. He ought to have been supplied with them. (6) The respondent, thereafter submitted his written statement Ext. 2 on 12-5-1954 as ordered. In the written statement he pointed out that the three charges mentioned in paragraphs 1-3 of the order Ext. 3 were vague and indefinite, that the pro­visions of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules have not been followed in framing the said charges, that he had in the course of the service passed innumerable number of bills, that the dates and numbers of the bills passed by him in respect of which the charges were framed have not been mentioned, that the allegations in support of the charges as required under the Rules have not been given to him, that the names and statements of witnesses forming the basis of the charges were also not given to him, that the con­spiracy to cheat the Government was an offence under the Indian Penal Code for which there should } be a criminal prosecution and not a departmental inquiry, that even the report of the District Magis­trate on which the Chief Commissioner had framed the charges was not given to him and that he has thereby been very much prejudiced in meeting the charges. (7) What one would expect when this was pointed out by the respondent was that the defects - and they were serious defects, because clearly the charges were quite indefinite and were not in accordance with Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and the respondent cannot be expected to defend himself against vague charges - would be rectified and specific charges would be framed against him and he will be given the records and documents which he had called for so that he may meet the charges. But nothing was done in that direction. Mr. M. Ramunny who had succeeded Mr. Ghosh as District Magistrate proceeded to hold the inquiry. In the inquiry, the respondent's request to be allow­ed to be represented by a lawyer was turned down. Mr. Ramunny appears to have examined 7 wit­nesses in the presence of the respondent as seen from his report Ext. 4 dated 11-2-1955. One of the witnesses examined in the inquiry was Hari Sankar Dev Barma, the Director of Food and Pro­curement Department who had held a prior inquiry into the matter and who had then examined 7 wit­nesses. Mr. Ramunny appears to have examined 7 wit­nesses in the presence of the respondent as seen from his report Ext. 4 dated 11-2-1955. One of the witnesses examined in the inquiry was Hari Sankar Dev Barma, the Director of Food and Pro­curement Department who had held a prior inquiry into the matter and who had then examined 7 wit­nesses. This earlier inquiry was without the knowledge of the respondent. This H. S. Dev Barma appears to have sent a report after holding the inquiry. The respondent had called for the statements of the witnesses made in the said inquiry and also for the report of the said Dev Barma. But none of these were supplied to him and still the report Ext. 4 shows that the facts of the case mentioned therein were all taken from the previous inquiry held by this H. S. Dev Barma of which the respondent had no knowledge at all and Ext. 4 deals with the statements made by the 7 witnesses in the inquiry held by this H. S. Dev Barma. The following extract from the said report Ext. 4 will clarify what I have stated above. "Shri H. S. Dev Barma forwarded along with his above report the statements of the following persons, namely: (1) Altab Ali. (2) Abdul Mazid. (3) Prafulla Deb Choudhuri. (4) Amal Roy Choudhury. (5) Abdul Rahaman (his two statements). (6) Tapendranath Roy. (7) Hyder Ali Sardar. I have examined carefully the above state­ments. Altab Ali, Abdul Mazid, Prafulla Deb Choudhuri and Amal Roy Choudhury have not dis­closed anything implicating Shri Sinha. Hyder Ali in his statement says that Abdul Rahaman told him that Shri Sinha was paid Rs. 500/- through Amal Roy Choudhury. He further says that Shri Sinha visited the storing Agent Altab Ali's House during his stay in Boxanagar area from 9th to 13th March, 1954 but did not verify the stock of foodgrains in his godown and he saw Abdul Rahaman taking the purse from the house of C. O. Prafulla Deb Choudhury while leaving Sonamura for Boxanagar on the 18th March, 1954. Abdul Rahaman states that he paid Inspector Amal Roy Choudhury Rs. 5,200/- from out of the amount of Rs. 27,900/-. He admits in his statements that he did not pur­chase any quantity of foodgrains when the bill for Rs. 27.900/- was passed and payment made. Sub­sequently he purchased rice worth Rs. Abdul Rahaman states that he paid Inspector Amal Roy Choudhury Rs. 5,200/- from out of the amount of Rs. 27,900/-. He admits in his statements that he did not pur­chase any quantity of foodgrains when the bill for Rs. 27.900/- was passed and payment made. Sub­sequently he purchased rice worth Rs. 1,500/- only and returned Rs. 18,200/- (Rupees eighteen thous­and and two hundred) to Shri H. S. Dev Barma. Tapendranath Roy says that he drew the attention of Shri Sinha to the unusually large amounts of the two bills when placing the same before him (Shri Sinha) and it was at the instance of Shri Sinha that he prepared these two bills- of Boxanagar on 15th March, 1954." (8) It will be seen from the above that one witness examined by H. S. Dev Barma was Abdul Rahaman, the procuring agent in whose favour the bill Ext. H for Rs. 27,900/- was passed by the respondent. Two statements had also been recorded from this Abdul Rahaman and Mr. Ramunny relied on the evidence of this Abdul Rahaman in the earlier enquiry as well as on the statements taken from Abdul Rahaman. Neither the deposition of Abdul Rahaman before Shri H. S. Dev Barma nor the statements taken from this Abdul Rahaman were made available to the respondent in the course of the inquiry and still they were relied on by Mr. Ramunny. This Abdul Rahaman was not even examined at the regular inquiry held by Mr. Ramunny. Again, reference is made in Ext. 4 to a statement made by the respondent on 30-3-1954 namely, Ext. I in which it was stated that there was an admission by the respondent that warning was given to him by Shri H. S- Dev Barma. If this was being relied on as an admission, the respondent should have been given a copy of the statement and given an opportunity to explain. But no copy of this statement was made avail­able to the respondent. Further after the whole inquiry was over, three letters written by one Gopal Chakraborty, a Food Inspector to another Food Inspector Amal Roy Choudhury on 27-2-54, 28-2-54 and 3-3-54 were admitted in evidence and on the strength of the said three letters Mr. But no copy of this statement was made avail­able to the respondent. Further after the whole inquiry was over, three letters written by one Gopal Chakraborty, a Food Inspector to another Food Inspector Amal Roy Choudhury on 27-2-54, 28-2-54 and 3-3-54 were admitted in evidence and on the strength of the said three letters Mr. Ramunny stated in his order that the said letters revealed that the respondent had been handsomely paid by the said Inspectors for the shady transac­tions and that he did not see any reason to dis­believe the contents of the letters. But the person who wrote the letters and the person who received the said letters were not examined in the inquiry and no opportunity was given to the respondent to cross-examine them in respect of the said letters. It was stated in Ext. 4 that the said Inspectors as well as Abdul Rahaman were being prosecuted in the Magistrate's Court and hence, it was not possi­ble to examine them in connection with the depart­mental inquiry. Is that a proper reason to take the said evidence into consideration against the respondent without examining the said persons in the enquiry? (9) After taking into consideration the evidence referred to above, Mr. Ramunny in his report Ext. 4 stated that he was fully convinced that the respondent had conspired with Amal Roy Choudhury and Gopal Chakraborty, the Food Inspectors and Abdul Rahaman and Altab Ali to cheat and defraud the Government of a huge amount includ­ing the sum of Rs. 27,900/- and that the respon­dent should no longer be retained in service. The last sentence in the penultimate paragraph of Ext. 4 is very important for our purpose. It stated that the case may, however, be finalized after fram­ing charges afresh. It is clear from this one sentence that Mr. Ramunny himself did not treat the inquiry held by him as an inquiry under Rule 55 of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, but only as a kind of preliminary inquiry to see if there-was any truth in the three charges mentioned in the order of the Chief Commissioner Ext. 3. Mr. Ramunny seems to have come to the conclu­sion that in the matter of the passing of the bill Ext. 3. Mr. Ramunny seems to have come to the conclu­sion that in the matter of the passing of the bill Ext. H the respondent had conspired with the four other persons, all of whom were being prosecuted in a criminal Court in respect of that very matter. Thus Mr. Ramunny was of opinion that specific charges in respect of the passing of the said bill Ext. 4 should be framed against the respondent and a regular inquiry held against him. (10) But when the report Ext. 4 reached the Chief Commissioner he did not evidently consider it necessary that any such inquiry should be held against the respondent as suggested by Mr. Ramunny. Instead he took the three charges in paragraphs 1-3 of Ext. 3 as proved and he passed the order Ext. 5 in September, 1955 stating that the charges have been substantiated and the res­pondent's complicity in connection with the con­spiracy has been fully made out and that it was proposed to dismiss the respondent from service and he was called upon to state why he should no; be dismissed from service. A copy of the report of Mr. Ramunny was also sent to the respondent. Respondent made his representation Ext. 8 on 13-10-55. After this on 19-1-1956 the order Ext 6 was passed stating that the respondent's representation was duly considered and that he was dismissed with effect from that date. (11) The respondent filed an appeal against the order of dismissal to the Government of India and the Government of India appears to have consulted the Union Public Service Commission in the matter and in accordance with the opinion of the Public Service Commission, they allowed the appeal of the respondent in part and modified the punish­ment of dismissal into one of removal from service and the respondent was informed accordingly by Ext. 7-A dated 17-8-1957 along with which the report of the Public Service Commission Ext. 7-B dated 19-7-1957 was also enclosed. In the report of the Commission, they held that the respondent was afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself against the charges brought against him. Then they proceeded to consider the three charges in Ext. 3 and they held that charge 1 namely, that the respondent was involved in the conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Government was not proved. In the report of the Commission, they held that the respondent was afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself against the charges brought against him. Then they proceeded to consider the three charges in Ext. 3 and they held that charge 1 namely, that the respondent was involved in the conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Government was not proved. With regard to charge 2 namely, culpable and gross negligence in the discharge of his duty by passing bills of large amounts in spite of timely warning that there was some foul play and with­out verifying or feeling satisfied that the payments were being made for genuine purchases, the Com­mission came to the conclusion that the Director of Procurement had forewarned the respondent and that he should not have passed the bills for pay­ment until he verified the stock of food grains and that this failure on his part and his passing the bills are circumstances which indicate culpable and gross negligence on his part. With regard to charge 3 namely, that the respondent had shown his complicity in the matter of cheating the Gov­ernment by taking special interest in getting the bills prepared and paid on the same day in spite of timely warning, the Commission stated that this charge was really a part of charge 2. I am unable to understand this observation of the Commission at all, because the charge of com­plicity in cheating can never be part of culpable and gross negligence but only a part of charge 1 which stated that the respondent was involved in a serious conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Gov­ernment. Thus when the Commission was acquitt­ing the respondent of charge 1 they cannot seek to bring charge 3 which was really part of charge 1 into charge 2 which was only culpable and gross negligence in having passed the bills without checking the stock. Any way we are not concern­ed with the merits of the case and we need not dwell on that part of the Commission's report where they find charges 2 and 3 proved against the respondent. We are concerned in this case with the question and with the finding of the Com­mission as to whether the respondent was afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself against the charges brought against him. We are concerned in this case with the question and with the finding of the Com­mission as to whether the respondent was afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself against the charges brought against him. (12) After getting this order of the Government of India, the respondent issued notice under S. 80, C. P. C. against the Government and he brought the present suit. The learned Subordinate Judge in decreeing the suit has gone into the question whether on the evidence let in the inquiry the charges were proved against the respondent. I must hold that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in going into that question. In a suit of this kind, the Court cannot sit in judgment over the domestic tribunals and state that on the evidence adduced in the departmental proceedings, the charges were not brought home and that the findings of the domestic tribunal were wrong. I find that in the course of the evidence of the respondent as P. W. 1 and of Shri H. S. Dev Banna as D. W. 1 a lot of unnecessary matter has been brought in to show whether or not in the departmental inquiry, the charges were, in fact, proved against the respon­dent. Such evidence should not have been allowed by the lower Court. The lower Court has dealt in detail with the question whether timely warning was given to the respondent by Shri H. S. Dev Barma and he has dealt with the evidence of Shri H. S. Dev Barma as D. W. 1 and the lower Court has held that sufficient reliance cannot be placed on the statement of Shri H. S. Dev Barma and it has even held that the respondent must be said to have passed the two bills Exts. D and H in the ordinary course of business. The lower Court was certainly wrong in going into such questions as it was not within the jurisdic­tion of the Courts to decide whether the charges brought against the respondent were true charges or even whether on the evidence adduced in the departmental inquiry, the said charges were proved against him. As I said earlier, Courts are con­cerned in such suits only with the question whe­ther reasonable opportunity was given to the res­pondent in the inquiry to meet the charges brought against him and if principles of natural justice were observed in the inquiry. As I said earlier, Courts are con­cerned in such suits only with the question whe­ther reasonable opportunity was given to the res­pondent in the inquiry to meet the charges brought against him and if principles of natural justice were observed in the inquiry. We can address ourselves only to such questions in such a suit. All the observations in judgment of the lower Court which deal with the merits of the charges and with the proof of the charges in the inquiry have to be ignored. The whole case has to be decided on the question whether the observation of the Public-Service Commission in Ext. 7-B that from a careful perusal of the records the Commission considered that the respondent was afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself against the charges brought against him was correct or not. If it is found that reasonable opportunity has not been 1 given, then the removal of the respondent from service has to be set aside. We shall address ourselves to that question immediately. (13) The learned Subordinate Judge has held that no reasonable opportunity was given to the respondent to defend himself in the inquiry. The reasons given by him are (1) that the charges framed against the respondent were vague and indefinite, (2) that the respondent in spite of his request was not given the documents which he called for, (3) that the inquiring officer relied in the inquiry as seen from his report Ext. 4 on the report submitted by Shri H. S. Dev Barma, D. W. 1 in the preliminary inquiry held by him in the absence of the respondent and that a copy of this report was not made available to the Respondent. (4) that again in the report Ext. 4 the evidence given by the 7 witnesses in that preliminary in­quiry held by Shri H. S. Dev Barma were referred to, though all those 7 witnesses were not examined in the subsequent inquiry, (5) that the statements taken from the said 7 witnesses in the preliminary inquiry were not made available to the respondent even though they were relied on the Ext. 4 and (6) that though a report of the District Magistrate Shri R. Ghosh dated 9-4-1954 recommending action being taken against the respondent sent to the Chief Commissioner was referred to in Ext. 4 and (6) that though a report of the District Magistrate Shri R. Ghosh dated 9-4-1954 recommending action being taken against the respondent sent to the Chief Commissioner was referred to in Ext. 4, a copy of that report though called for by the res­pondent was not made available to him in the inquiry, and (7) that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a lawyer at the enquiry. From these facts, he came to the conclusion that no rea­sonable opportunity was given to the respondent to defend himself against the charges. (14) I have referred to the three charges men­tioned in paragraphs 1-3 of Ext. 3, the order of the Chief Commissioner directing the inquiry. Though the District Magistrate Mr. Ramunny had mainly found him guilty of the first charge namely, of serious conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Government and causing great loss to the Government, the Public Service Commission in their order Ext. 7-B did not find that this charge was proved and the final order of removal of the res­pondent was not based on the said charge, but on charges 2 and 3 which they found proved. We need not therefore take much time with regard to the first charge. But since the inquiry in respect of all the charges was a common inquiry and relat­ed to the same matters, if it is found that reason­able opportunity was not given to the respondent in respect of charges 2 and 3 the same lacuna will apply as far as charge 1 is concerned. But we shall mainly direct ourselves to charges 2 and 3 in this appeal. (15) But before I proceed to deal with the charges, let us be clear as to what is meant by reasonable opportunity. The term reasonable opportunity to be given to a delinquent Govern­ment servant to defend himself as provided in Arti­cle 311(2) of the Constitution is based on the princi­ples of natural justice. (15) But before I proceed to deal with the charges, let us be clear as to what is meant by reasonable opportunity. The term reasonable opportunity to be given to a delinquent Govern­ment servant to defend himself as provided in Arti­cle 311(2) of the Constitution is based on the princi­ples of natural justice. The well-known decision of the Supreme Court Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 has laid down what this reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision contained in Article 311(2) is, in the following terms: "The reasonable opportunity envisaged to the Government servant by the provision contained in Art. 311(2) includes (a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after apply­ing his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punish­ments and communicates the same to the govern­ment servant. Thus, the protection provided by rules, like R. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Con­trol and Appeal) Rules, is bodily lifted out of the rules and together with an additional opportunity embodied in S. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, so as to give a statutory protection to the government servants and is now incorporated in Art- 311(2) so as to convert the protection into a constitutional safeguard." (16) I may also refer to another decision of the Supreme Court "Union of India v. T. R. Varma", AIR 1957 SC 882 in which the following principles are laid down: "The Evidence Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural jus­tice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so then decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court of law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of-the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-exa­mining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explain­ing them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the pro­cedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed." (17) In the recent decision of the Supreme Court State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva, AIR 1961 SC 1623 , the above observations in AIR 1957 SC 882 were quoted with approval and the following observations were made: "It cannot be denied that when an order of dismissal passed against a public servant is chal­lenged by him by a petition filed in the High Court under Art. 226 it is for the High Court to consider "whether the constitutional requirements of Arti­cle 311(2) have been satisfied or not. In such a case it would be idle to contend that the infirmities on which the public officer relies flow from the exercise of discretion vested in the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer may have acted bona fide but that does not mean that the discretionary orders passed by him are final and conclusive. Whenever it is urged before the High Court that as a result of such orders the public officer has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity it would be open to the High Court to examine the matter and decide whether the requirements of Art. 311(2) have been satisfied or not. In such matters it is difficult and inexpedient to lay down any general rules; whe­ther or not the officer in question has had a reason­able opportunity must always depend on the facts in each case. In such matters it is difficult and inexpedient to lay down any general rules; whe­ther or not the officer in question has had a reason­able opportunity must always depend on the facts in each case. The only general statement that can-be safely made in this connection is that the depart­mental enquiries should observe rules of natural justice and that if they are fairly and properly con­ducted the decisions reached by the enquiry officers on the merits are not open to be challenged on the ground that the procedure followed was not exact­ly in accordance with that which is observed in Courts of Law. As Venkatarama Aiyar, J. has ob­served in 1958 SCR 499 at p. 507 : (S) AIR 1957 SC 882 at p. 885, "stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all rele­vant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them." It is hardly necessary to em­phasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would mean that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice." (18) Now we have to see in the light of the above three decisions of the highest Court of the land whether the respondent was given a reason­able opportunity to defend himself. The first thing necessary in a departmental inquiry is that the grounds on which it is proposed to take action against an officer shall be reduced to the form of definite charge or charges and communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders in the case. This is provided in Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, Which apply to the present case. This is also laid down by the Supreme Court in Khem Chand's case, AIR 1958 SC 300 by stating that an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence must be given to the Government servant and that this can be done only if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based. (19) Applying this test to our present case, if we go through Ext. 3 which contains the three charges, it will be seen that the charges are extre­mely vague and indefinite. We are not concerned at present with charge 1, as I said. But still even that charge has to be said to be very vague as only "a serious conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Government of a huge amount" is mentioned therein. As to who are the conspirators besides the respondent, as to what the conspirators did namely, specific instances to defraud the Govern­ment and as to the actual loss suffered by the Gov­ernment, there is no mention in the charge and no allegations in support of the charge were given. I need not dwell more about charge 1. Coming to charge 2, it refers to culpable and gross negligence by passing bills of large amounts in spite of timely warning that there was foul play and without verifying or feeling satisfied that the payments were being made for genuine purchases. No men­tion was made as to the particular bill or bills in respect of which the respondent was negligent, 'or as to who gave the timely warning and when it was given and in respect of which purchases they were given. How is the respondent to defend himself against the charge of gross and culpable negligence, unless he is told in respect of which bill or bills he was negligent, particularly when as pointed by the (respondent in his written statement Ext. 2, he had passed innumerable number of bills? (20) The respondent by Ext. 1 requested that the relevant papers which directly or indirectly formed the basis of the proceedings should be given to him. But they were not supplied to him. 2, he had passed innumerable number of bills? (20) The respondent by Ext. 1 requested that the relevant papers which directly or indirectly formed the basis of the proceedings should be given to him. But they were not supplied to him. The bills in respect of which the proceedings were being taken and the statements of witnesses exa­mined in the preliminary inquiry by Shri H. S. Dev Barma in respect of the said bills who were likely to be examined in the next inquiry should have been given to him. In that case, it could have been said that though the charges were vague and indefinite, the documents and statements given to the respondent showed him the details. As it is, the respondent was in the dark on these matters until the enquiry was concluded by Mr. Ramunny. It is not as if the inquiring officer did not know in respect of which particular bills the proceedings were being taken against the respondent. The said bills are marked in this case as Exts D and H. The said bills were not even produced in the inquiry, though they were made use of in the inquiry. I am mentioning this to show that the respondent was not informed in respect of which bills charge 2 was framed against him, even though the Chief Commissioner who framed the charges must have known from the reports of the Director of Procurement and the Dis­trict Magistrate in respect of which bills charge 2 was being framed. In the same way charge 3 also refers to the complicity of the respondent in the matter of cheating by taking special interest in getting the bills prepared and paid on the same day in spite of timely warning. One cannot under-'stand why the details of the bills and the date on which he was alleged to have passed the bills by taking special interest and the details of the timely warning and as to who gave the warning should not have been given in the charge. One fails to understand how the respondent was expected to meet those charges, unless he was given the details which, in fact, he called for by Ext. 1. Even in the subsequent written statement Ext. One fails to understand how the respondent was expected to meet those charges, unless he was given the details which, in fact, he called for by Ext. 1. Even in the subsequent written statement Ext. 2 which he filed on 12-5-1954 he had stated that the details of the bills were not mentioned and that as he had passed innumerable bills in his service, if the bills are not mentioned in particular he was not in a position to meet the charges and he had said that he had been seriously prejudiced in submitting his representation. In spite of this written statement none of the details were given to him. (21) In this connection, I may refer to the two decisions "Tribhuwannath Pandey v. Govern­ment of the Union of India", AIR 1953 Nag 138 and "Bhugiram Hazarika v. Supdt. of Police, Sibsagar, AIR 1954 Assam 18. In the Nagpur decision to which the present C. J. of the Sup­reme Court was a party as the C. J. of Nagpur, he has stated that it cannot be said that a Govern­ment servant was given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him if he was not told in the clearest terms and with full particularity what his alleged faults were. The Assam case has relied on the said Nagpur decision and held that it is imperative on the State to frame specific charges with full particularity, intimate those charges to the Govern­ment servant concerned, give him an adequate opportunity to answer those charges and after con­sidering his answers to take its decision. Applying the above principles, it has to be held that the charges framed against the respondent were totally defective and did not give him a proper opportunity to meet the said charges in view of their vagueness and indefiniteness. (22) Even though the learned Advocate appear­ing for the appellants himself had to admit that the charges were vague and indefinite, it was strenuously urged by him that the respondent was already aware even before the charges were framed which were the bills in respect of which the charges were being framed and in that connection the two reports given by the respondent namely, Exts. I and J and dated 29-3-54 and 30-3-54 which dealt with the two bills Exts. D and H were brought to my notice. I and J and dated 29-3-54 and 30-3-54 which dealt with the two bills Exts. D and H were brought to my notice. I find that the Public Service Commission have also stated in paragraph 3 of their report Ext. 7-B that even before the charges were framed against him, the respondent was fully aware of the facts and circumstances of the case as would be clear from the two reports Exts. I and J. A similar argument was raised before Shri Sinha, C. J. in AIR 1953 Nag 138 and his Lordship stated in para­graph 10 of the decision: "The learned Additional Government Pleader says that the petitioner well knew what the charges against him were because during his period of pro­bation several adverse remarks regarding his work were made, that those remarks were communicated to him and that he could well understand what were his defects. In our opinion, that is not correct. As we have already said it should not be left to the Government servant concerned to find out or imagine what the charges levelled against him are, I but on the other hand, it is imperative on the ' State to frame specific charges with full particularity." (23) I am in entire agreement with the said observations. What I am still unable to under­stand is why in spite of the respondent's calling for the particulars by Exts. 1 and 2, the enquiring officer still did not specify the particulars of the bills or give the respondent the copies of the bills and the two reports Exts. I and J on which evi­dently the enquiring officer was relying. It has to be mentioned here that Exts. I and J were not produced at the enquiry and the respondent was not asked to explain them even though both the inquiring officers as well as the Public Service Com­mission were relying on Exts. I and J in order to find the respondent guilty. What transpired prior to the starting of the departmental inquiry we are not concerned with. It is in the departmental in­quiry that specific charges giving details of the matters which were proposed to be taken into consideration against the respondent must be fram­ed. It is idle to contend that the delinquent offi­cer knew the details of the charges against him even before the enquiry started. It is in the departmental in­quiry that specific charges giving details of the matters which were proposed to be taken into consideration against the respondent must be fram­ed. It is idle to contend that the delinquent offi­cer knew the details of the charges against him even before the enquiry started. The absurdity of that argument will be patent if it is pushed to the logical extreme. It will mean that if an ex­planation had been asked from an officer before it was decided to hold an enquiry against him, then no charges need be framed against him, on the plea that he knew already, of the charges. This is against all canons of justice. The learned Sub­ordinate Judge's finding that the charges were vague and indefinite has to be accepted. If the charges were vague and indefinite, then it is a negation of reasonable opportunity and hence a violation of the principles of natural justice and the entire in­quiry has to be held to be vitiated on that one ground. (24) The next point dealt with by the Sub­ordinate Judge is that the respondent was not given the documents, statements taken at the pre­liminary inquiry and the reports of Shri H. S. Dev Barma and of the District Magistrate which he had called for. I have included these as items 2-6 in paragraph 13 above and they may be considered together. When the charges themselves were vague and indefinite and when the respondent in order to know the specific charges against him called for the particular documents on which the charges were based it is most unfair not to give those docu­ments to him. It would even look as if the enquiry officer wanted to conduct the enquiry without the respondent knowing of the specific charges and allegations against him. All that I can say is that it is a total negation of fair play and of the principles of natural justice. One fails to know how the respondent was expect­ed to defend himself when he did not know the specific charges against him and the documents and statements on which the charges were based. It is no use saying that the respondent's reports Exts. I and J would show that he knew of the specific charges. Even these reports were not made available to him. It is no use saying that the respondent's reports Exts. I and J would show that he knew of the specific charges. Even these reports were not made available to him. In the said reports, he had given explanation to show that he was not negligent but that he had passed the bills in question after certi­ficates were issued by the Procurement Inspectors stating that the rice had been stored in the godown and after the Accountant had made a note that the bills may be passed for payment. Evidently the said explanation does not appear to have been accepted by the District Magistrate when he sub­mitted a report to the Chief Commissioner to pro­ceed against the respondent departmentally. I find that this report of the District Magistrate has been referred to both in the report Ext. 4 of the District Magistrate after the inquiry and also in Ext. 7-B, the report of the Public Service Commission. Thus it is clear that the inquiring officer, the punishing authority as well as the Public Service Commission had access to this report of the Dis­trict Magistrate as well as to the documents referred to in the said report and that they have used the said report for the purpose of adjudging the res­pondent guilty of the charges. The only person who did not have access to it was the person who should have been given access to it namely, the respondent and he had called for the report. Still it was not made available to him. What we are concerned with in a case of this kind is not whether the inquiring officer, the punish­ing authority and the Public Service Commission had material before them to find the respondent guilty, but whether before finding him guilty they gave reasonable opportunity to the respondent to defend himself with respect to the materials which the inquiring officer and the punishing authority had before them. It has to be said that by with­holding this report of a he District Magistrate in spite of it being called for by the respondent in Exts. 1 and 2 the principles of natural justice have been utterly violated. (25) Again, with regard to the report of Shri H. S. Dev Barma, we find that it has been relied on in Ext. 1 and 2 the principles of natural justice have been utterly violated. (25) Again, with regard to the report of Shri H. S. Dev Barma, we find that it has been relied on in Ext. 4 by the inquiring officer and the evi­dence of the 7 witnesses examined by Shri H. S. Dev Barma before submitting the said report was also relied on by the inquiring officer and evidently by the punishing authority in adjudging the respon­dent guilty. That report also should have been made available and the statements taken from the said witnesses, or at least from those who were examined in the subsequent inquiry should have been given to the respondent in order to enable him to cross-examine those witnesses effectively. A reading of the deposition of Shri H. S. Dev Barma given in the inquiry which is marked as Ext. 12 would show that he has referred to a state­ment in writing given to him by Abdul Rahaman, one of the procuring agents who was examined in the preliminary inquiry. I am sure that this state­ment was available to the inquiring officer and the punishing authority. But this statement was not given to the respondent though it was referred to in the evidence at the inquiry. Again, this Abdul Rahaman was examined in the preliminary inquiry by Shri H. S. Dev Barma and he was not examined in the second inquiry, because, according to the inquiring officer, criminal proceedings were pending against him. Thus with­out examining Abdul Rahaman the statement re­corded from him as well as the evidence in the preliminary inquiry were made use of against the respondent in order to find him guilty. This is totally opposed to natural justice. Shri H. S. Dev Barma also referred in his evidence to the report which he sent to the District Magistrate and the Chief Commissioner. That report was also taken into consideration by the inquiring officer without allowing the respondent access to it and to have his say on that. He also referred to the bills Exts. D and H. But these bills were not produced at the time of the inquiry. (26) As I stated earlier, the inquiring officer Mr. That report was also taken into consideration by the inquiring officer without allowing the respondent access to it and to have his say on that. He also referred to the bills Exts. D and H. But these bills were not produced at the time of the inquiry. (26) As I stated earlier, the inquiring officer Mr. Ramunny did not treat this as the inquiry con­templated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution or under Rule 55 of the C.C.S. (C.C.A.) rules, but only as a fact-finding preliminary inquiry, so that on the basis of the said fact-finding inquiry, regular charges may be framed against the respondent and a fresh inquiry held. This is clear from the penulti­mate paragraph of his report Ext. 4 in which he had stated that the case may, however, be finalized after framing charges afresh. It will be seen from Ext. 4 that the two bills Exts. D and H without being produced were taken into consideration, but that ultimately only the bill Ext. H was found incriminating against the respondent. Thus as a matter of fact only in respect of this bill Ext. H, the case was found proved against the respondent. Still it will be seen from the order Ext. 6 of the Chief Commissioner issuing the notice to the res­pondent to show cause why he should not be dis­missed from service, he has stated that respondent had shown culpable and gross negligence by passing bills of large amounts as well as complicity in the matter of cheating by taking special interest in gett­ing the bills prepared. Thus it is clear that the punishing authority has not bestowed his mind at all on the report of the inquiry namely, Ext. 4 or understood that only in respect of one bill namely, Ext. H was the case found proved by the inquiry officer and not in res­pect of unspecified number of bills as mentioned in Ext. 6. Even the Public Service Commission in finding charges 2 and 3 proved against the respon­dent forgot the fact that the charges as they stood in respect of an unspecified number of bills had not been proved and the Public Service Commis­sion also has taken into account only the bill Ext. H passed in favour of Abdul Rahaman. (27) With reference to charge 2 of culpable and gross negligence what was held by the inquiring officer in Ext. H passed in favour of Abdul Rahaman. (27) With reference to charge 2 of culpable and gross negligence what was held by the inquiring officer in Ext. 4 and by the Public Service Com­mission in Ext. 7-B was that the negligence con­sisted in passing the bills without physical verification of the stock. No other negligence has been referred to. If that was so, why was it not men­tioned in the charge itself that the negligence con­sisted in passing the bills without physical verifica­tion of the stock? If that had been specifically mentioned in the charge, the respondent would have had a chance to explain it. But without giving that chance, the inquiring officer relied on the evidence of Shri H. S. Dev Barma to hold that there was no physical verification of the stock. It was stated that timely warning was given by Shri H. S. Dev Barma. But even the evidence of Shri H. S. Dev Barma was that he did not ask the respondent to verify the stock before passing the bill but only asked him to be careful about passing bills of that week. When passing the bill, the respondent had before him the certificate of the Procurement Ins­pector and the storing agent that the rice had been stored in the godown and the Accountant also had stated that the bill had been checked and may be passed for payment. The respondent had also given the same explanation in his reports Exts. I and J. If the said reports were not being accepted and he was being found guilty of negligence in not personally verifying the stock before passing the bill, this matter should have been specifically men­tioned in the charge and an opportunity given to the respondent. Without doing so, any finding of negligence for failure to personally verify the stock cannot be said to be a finding arrived at after giving reasonable opportunity to the respondent to defend himself. The respondent had not physical­ly verified the stock even in passing the bill Ext. D. Hence the charge of negligence could have been brought against him for non-verification of the stock in respect of Ext. D also. But Ext. D does not appear to have been taken into consideration either by the inquiry officer or by the Public Service Com­mission. The respondent had not physical­ly verified the stock even in passing the bill Ext. D. Hence the charge of negligence could have been brought against him for non-verification of the stock in respect of Ext. D also. But Ext. D does not appear to have been taken into consideration either by the inquiry officer or by the Public Service Com­mission. The fact of the matter is that because this H. S. Dev Barma later conducted a verification of the stock and found some shortage and because Abdul Rahaman, the procuring agent gave a state­ment to him that he had taken the money under the bill Ext. H. in advance without supplying the stock, the respondent was found guilty of negligence. But this statement of Abdul Rahaman cannot be taken into account against the respondent and the respondent's negligence in respect of Ext. H can­not be found proved simply because there was a shortage of stock. The negligence if it was there was there whether the stock was found short or not. As far as the respondent was concerned, he is to pay the money under the bills if certified by the storing agent as well as by the procurement Inspec­tors that the stock has been weighed and stored in the godown. I can understand that if timely warn­ing had been given to the respondent that he should not pass the bills without physical verification of stock and if hp had still passed it without physical verification, he may be found guilty of willful dis­obedience of orders but not of neglect of duty in any case. (28) Coming now to charge 3, there was no separate finding in Ext. 4 of the respondent's com­plicity in the matter of cheating. But the inquiring officer found charge 1 of conspiracy to cheat the Government proved and hence, the complicity of the respondent also was treated as proved. But the Public Service Commission in Ext. 7-B found charge 1 of conspiracy not proved. Curiously enough they treated charge 3, namely, the respon­dent's complicity as part of charge 2 namely of negligence. One fails to understand by what pro­cess of reasoning the Public Service Commission could have done so. Negligence and complicity in cheating are poles apart and by finding the charge of negligence proved, the Public Service Commis­sion cannot say that charge 3 also was proved. One fails to understand by what pro­cess of reasoning the Public Service Commission could have done so. Negligence and complicity in cheating are poles apart and by finding the charge of negligence proved, the Public Service Commis­sion cannot say that charge 3 also was proved. Strictly speaking what I have stated above relates to the merits of the case. But the conclusion of the Public Service Commission was only that charge 2 was proved and they treated charge 3 as proved by saying that it was part of charge 2. When that is done after the Public Service Commission toad found charge 1 not proved and thus there was no evidence of respondent's complicity in cheating, this Court has to find that it is an error apparent in the face of the record and that in finding the respondent guilty of complicity in cheating, the Public Service Commission have acted without any evidence before it, apart from the question of the respondent not being given any reasonable oppor­tunity to meet the charges. (29) For the above mentioned reasons, this Court has to accept the Subordinate Judge's finding that the order of removal from service of the respondent was vitiated because it was based on an inquiry in which no reasonable opportunity was given to the respondent to defend himself and in which the principles of natural justice have been totally violated. (30) For the appellants, my attention was drawn to various decisions, all of which I have perused with great care. But none of those decisions hold that an inquiry of the type which has been held in the present case could be held to be in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The decision Sharmanand v. Superintendent, Gun Carriage Factory, Jabalpur, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 178 only holds that the demand of the reports of officers who have made preliminary inquiries if they are not considered in the later departmental inquiry itself and thus cannot be used by the delinquent for any purpose may be refused and that no grievance can be made out of the fact that such reports were not supplied. But in our pre­sent case, the reports in the preliminary inquiries both by Shri H. S. Dev Barma and by the District Magistrate were referred to in the subsequent in­quiry and have been taken into account in the re­port Ext. 4. But in our pre­sent case, the reports in the preliminary inquiries both by Shri H. S. Dev Barma and by the District Magistrate were referred to in the subsequent in­quiry and have been taken into account in the re­port Ext. 4. Hence, this decision does not help the appellants. The decision Dr. Tribhuwan Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat 116 is again a case where the report of the Anti-Corruption Department in a confidential inquiry held before framing charge was not referred to by the inquiry commissioner. In such a case there will be no violation of the principles of natural justice, if the said report is not made available. (31) The decision "Krishnaswamy v. State of Kerala, AIR 1960 Ker 224 holds that it is not the failure to adhere strictly to Rules relating to enqui­ries into misconduct that confers the right on a civil servant to complain against the punishment and so long as Art. 311 is not violated, it is not competent for the High Court to interfere with the right of the President of the Union or the Gov­ernor of the State as the case may be, to punish a civil servant, even though the enquiry may not be strictly in accordance with the Rules. Nobody need quarrel with the statement. It is not the non-adherence to Rules but the denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself that will require interference by Courts. To the same effect is the ruling Jagannath Singh v. Assistant Excise Commissioner, AIR 1959 All 771 which held that the dismissal or removal of a civil servant in violation of the rules would not by itself entitle him to come to the High Court, but would leave him to appeal to the administrative authorities and that it is only a breach of Arti­cle 311 that furnishes a cause to come to the High Court or to approach a civil Court for redress. (32) Another decision relied on by the appel­lants was The State of Bombay (now the Gujarat State) v. Raojibhai Motibhai Patel, AIR 1961 Guj 130 . That case does not help the appellants at all. (32) Another decision relied on by the appel­lants was The State of Bombay (now the Gujarat State) v. Raojibhai Motibhai Patel, AIR 1961 Guj 130 . That case does not help the appellants at all. In that case a statement of a witness re­corded in the preliminary inquiry was made use of in the final inquiry without the said witness being examined and it was said that it was done for the purpose of corroborating the evidence given by another witness at the regular inquiry. It was held by Gujarat High Court that this vitiated the inquiry and that a delinquent against whom a disciplinary action was taken are against whom evidence is recorded should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who have given evidence against him. Thus in our pre­sent case, the statements of 5 witnesses given at the preliminary inquiry were made use of by the inquiring officer in his report Ext. 4, even though they were not examined at the second inquiry. Thus this decision really supports the respondent's case. (33) A decision of the Kerala High Court "N. Vasudevan Nair v. Government of Kerala", AIR 1962 Ker 43 was strongly relied on for the appellants. No doubt certain observations made in that decision would go to show that a regular inquiry was not necessary in disciplinary actions of administrative tribunals. But a perusal of the said decision shows that in that particular case, when the Government servant concerned was served with a copy of the charges framed against him, he sub­mitted a written statement stating that there have been some clerical mistakes and that he might be pardoned for his mistakes. He did not mention that he wanted any oral inquiry or even a personal hearing. Then the inquiring officer issued a notice to him intimating that witnesses had given evidence against him on the charges and that the said evi­dence proved the falsification of accounts and mis­appropriation of Government money by the delin­quent and he was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service and later was dismissed from service. It was contended before the Kerala High Court that the evidence given in the inquiry held in the absence of the delinquent should not have been made use of against him and that it was against the principles of natural justice. It was contended before the Kerala High Court that the evidence given in the inquiry held in the absence of the delinquent should not have been made use of against him and that it was against the principles of natural justice. In dealing with that question the Kerala High Court remarked that the dictum that finding a person guilty on the basis of evidence recorded behind his back is a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice cannot be accepted in its application to disciplinary in­quiries against public servants and that the require­ments of natural justice to be observed in a depart­mental inquiry are that the person proceeded against should know the nature of the accusation made, that he is given an opportunity to state his case and that the tribunals should act in good faith. Of course, in a case where the delinquent did not ask for an oral inquiry and simply prayed that he may be pardoned for his mistakes, a regular inquiry by examining witnesses in the presence of the Government servant concerned may not be necessary. But it is too late in the day to say that principles of natural justice do not require that in a departmental inquiry the witnesses to prove the charges against a government servant, who does not admit the charges, can be examined in the absence of the government servant concern­ed. The decisions of the Supreme Court which I have dealt with in this case have laid down the law in the matter in no uncertain terms and the High Courts have got to follow the law so laid down. (34) There was one further complaint made by the respondent namely, that he was not allowed to engage a lawyer in the inquiry and that this was against the principles of natural justice. This argument also appears to have been accepted by the Subordinate Judge. But I am not prepared to agree with him. The normal rule in departmental proceedings is that the delinquent cannot claim as a matter of right that he should be allowed to be represented by a lawyer. In cases of exceptional difficulty where there are large number of charges and voluminous records which a person cannot sift properly, the help of a lawyer has to be allowed. The normal rule in departmental proceedings is that the delinquent cannot claim as a matter of right that he should be allowed to be represented by a lawyer. In cases of exceptional difficulty where there are large number of charges and voluminous records which a person cannot sift properly, the help of a lawyer has to be allowed. But it cannot be said that the denial to be represent­ed by a lawyer will amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice. (35) For the above reasons, I agree with the Subordinate Judge that the respondent was entitled to the declaration prayed for by him namely, that the order of the Chief Commissioner dismissing the respondent and the order of the Ministry of Home Affairs removing the respondent from ser­vice are unconstitutional, illegal and inoperative. (36) The learned Subordinate Judge has further given the respondent a decree for arrears of salary to the tune of Rs. 13,115.75 nP. The right of a Government servant to sue for arrears of his salary on reinstatement has been laid down by the Sup­reme Court in The State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, AIR 1954 SC 245 . Hence, there can be no doubt that the respondent is entitled to the arrears of, salary and that the decree for arrears of salary \vas rightly given by the Subordinate Judge when1 he set aside the removal of the respondent from service. The learned Subordinate Judge has fur­ther given a decree for the recovery of the future pay and allowances till the date of reinstatement of the respondent. I do not think that such a decree for future pay and allowance until the date of reinstatement can be given to the respondent. When once it is declared by Court that the order of dismissal or removal of the plaintiff from ser­vice was unconstitutional, the plaintiff re­mains reinstated in service from the date 'of the order of dismissal or removal and the Government is bound to respect the order of Court and pay the salary from, the date of reinstatement. But, the Court cannot give a decree for future salary and allowances. But, the Court cannot give a decree for future salary and allowances. We know of the provision under Order XX, Rule 12, C. P. C. where in a decree for possession of immoveable property and mesne profits, a decree may be given for the arrears of rent or mesne profits which have accrued due during the period prior to the institution of the suit and directing an inquiry as to future mesne profits or rent from the date of institution of the suit until delivery of possession or the expiration of 3 years from the date of a decree. But such a provision will not apply in the case of a suit for a declaration that the dismissal of a Government servant is void and for salary from the Government. A Government servant can claim at best only the arrears of salary which have accrued due at the time of the suit and cannot claim future salary. Originally according to the decision of the Privy Council High Commis­sioner for India v. I. M. Lall, AIR 1948 PC 121, even the right of a Government to sue for arrears for salary was denied. But that view was sub­sequently overruled in the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 245 . But even that decision does not say that there can be a suit claiming future salary until reinstatement. That part of the decree of the Subordinate Judge granting a decree for the recovery of future pay and allowances till the date of reinstatement has therefore to be set aside. (37) In the result, therefore, the decree of the Subordinate Judge is confirmed so far as the declara­tion that the orders of dismissal and removal of the respondent are unconstitutional, illegal and in­operative and so far as the decree for arrears of salary amounting to Rs. 13,115.74 nP. is concerned. But the decree passed for the recovery of future pay and allowances that may be due to respondent till the date of his reinstatement is set aside. As the» respondent has succeeded in the main, the appellants will pay the costs of appeal to the respondent. Order accordingly.