Ahmed Hassan v. Deputy Commissioner of Manipur — 1962 DIGILAW 74 (GAU)

ORDER :- This is an application for the issue of a writ to quash the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur dated 29th March, 1960, dismissing the petitioner from service and the order dated 28-3-1961 passed by the Chief Commissioner, Manipur, in appeal reducing the penalty of dismissal to one of the removal of the petitioner from service. 2. The petitioner has stated as follows in his petition : He was appointed as a Revenue Collection Mohorer (clerk) on 8th February, 1945, by the then State Government on a scale of pay of Rs. 20 - 45/-. After the integration of Manipur with the Union of India on 15-10-1949, he continued in service under Article VIII of the Manipur Merger Agreement as zilladar (Civil Service) Class III) and no definite order of appointment was made by the Chief Commissioner as far as the petitioner was concerned. Since 1951 he has been serving as Revenue Peshkar to the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur. The Chief Commissioner was the appointing authority of Class III Civil Servants of Manipur, during the first few years after the integration of Manipur State. In the year 1959, departmental proceedings were started against the petitioner and three charges were framed against him on 13-4-1959, viz., (1) that he had acquired properties worth Rs. 15,000/- and odd between February, 1945 and February, 1958, which was disproportionate to the known sources of his income, (2) that he submitted an assessment of income on 2-11-1957, which was found to be false and (3) that he had willfully acted in contravention of Rule 9 (2) of the Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1935 and Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, in purchasing 36 and ½ bighas of landed property worth Rs. 7,300/- in the name of himself and his son and his wife without the prior sanction of the local Government or Head of the Office. He was given time till 15-4-1959 to submit his written statement to the charges and this was extended on his application up to 25-4-1959 while according to Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, he was entitled to 3 clear weeks. Thus, he was not given reasonable opportunity for his defence. He was given time till 15-4-1959 to submit his written statement to the charges and this was extended on his application up to 25-4-1959 while according to Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, he was entitled to 3 clear weeks. Thus, he was not given reasonable opportunity for his defence. The petitioner applied for permission to take copies of certain documents which would be necessary for his defence and he was informed on 5-5-1959 that the documents may be inspected in the presence of the E. A. C. As the time for filing his written statement was not extended, he had thus to submit his written statement even before he could take copies of the documents he relied on. Thereafter the Additional District Magistrate, Manipur, was appointed as the Inquiring Officer without any notice to the petitioner and he was asked to appear before the Additional District Magistrate on 9-5-1959, and the enquiry was held on several dates in June, 1959. No person was nominated to present the case in support of the charges and the Additional District Magistrate himself conducted the case. Seven witnesses were examined in the enquiry in support of the charges. But in spite of repeated requests of the petitioner the S. P. (Special Police Establishment) Shillong on whose report the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was set in motion was not examined. The petitioner cited five D. Ws. of whom four alone were examined and the 5th witness Hazi Amanullah who was present before the Inquiring Officer was not examined without giving any reason in writing and thus the petitioner was denied opportunity to cross-examine the most important witness in support of the charges and of examining the most important D. W. On the report dated 22-9-1959 of the Additional District Magistrate, the Deputy Commissioner issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 8-12-1959, giving him only six days time for submitting representation against the proposed punishment of dismissal. After he made his representation, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order dated 29-3-1960, dismissing the petitioner from service. Against the said order he preferred an appeal to the Chief Commissioner. The Chief Commissioner passed an order on 28-3-1961 reducing the penalty of dismissal to one of removal from service on the ground that no specific instance of corruption was directly proved against the petitioner. 3. Against the said order he preferred an appeal to the Chief Commissioner. The Chief Commissioner passed an order on 28-3-1961 reducing the penalty of dismissal to one of removal from service on the ground that no specific instance of corruption was directly proved against the petitioner. 3. The petitioners first contention now is that as he was appointed by the Manipur State Government as Mohorer and as he continued in service as Zilladar in the integrated Part "C" State of Manipur when the Chief Commissioner was the appointing authority of class III servants, the order of dismissal passed by the Deputy Commissioner, a Subordinate Officer to the Manipur State Government and to the Chief Commissioner was in violation of the mandatory provision of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution and as such it was illegal and void. Secondly, he contends that even if the Deputy Commissioner was the proper disciplinary authority, the petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity to defend himself as he was given only 11 days time to file his written statement in defence and it was not made possible for the petitioner to inspect the required documents and take copies of the same and as the S. P. (Special Police Establishment) Shillong was not examined in support of the charges and as the D. W. Hazi Amanullah was also not examined. 4. For the respondents it was admitted that the petitioner was appointed by the Manipur State Government on 8-2-1945 as Mohorer. They also admitted that after the integration of the State of Manipur with the Indian Union on 15-10-1949, the petitioner continued in service without any formal order of re-employment and that this was through inadvertence. Thus the petitioner was admitted to be a permanent servant of the Manipur Administration after integration, without any formal order of appointment. They also state that from 11-1-1951, the petitioner was working as Revenue Peshkar to the Deputy Commissioner with the benefit of the revised pay scale being given to him retrospectively from 1-4-1950 in accordance with the general order of the Government of India conveyed to the Manipur Administration by the letter Annexure-A dated 28-2-1953. They also state that from 11-1-1951, the petitioner was working as Revenue Peshkar to the Deputy Commissioner with the benefit of the revised pay scale being given to him retrospectively from 1-4-1950 in accordance with the general order of the Government of India conveyed to the Manipur Administration by the letter Annexure-A dated 28-2-1953. But their contention is that according to Rules framed by the Chief Commissioner on 25-9-1951, marked as Annexure-B, Class III Civil servants under the Administration were and are appointed by the appropriate authority given in the schedule to the said Rules and that it will be seen that the Deputy Commissioner was and is the Appointing Authority of the petitioner and hence the Deputy Commissioner was the disciplinary authority who could dismiss the petitioner and hence Article 311 (1) has not been violated. They also say that reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself in the enquiry and that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this writ. 5. I shall take up the question as to who is the authority who appointed the petitioner in service. This is an important question because tinder Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, no Civil servant can be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The first appointment of the petitioner on 8-2-1945 was made by the Government of the then State of Manipur, under the then Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur. Rule No. 8 of the said Rules provided that His Highness the Maharajah was to appoint all officials drawing a pay of more than Rs. 15/- per month and that other officials were to be appointed by the Member in charge of the particular Department. Thus, the authority which appointed the petitioner originally on 8-2-1945 was His Highness the Maharajah. Before the integration of Manipur with the Indian Union, there was the treaty between the Maharajah and the Government of India on 21-9-1949, known as the Manipur Merger Agreement, Under Article VIII of the said agreement, the Government of India guaranteed either the continuance in service of the permanent members of the Public Services of Manipur or the payment of reasonable compensation. The actual merger took place on 15-10-1949. On that date, the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949 came into force. The actual merger took place on 15-10-1949. On that date, the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949 came into force. Under Section 4 of the said Order, the Chief Commissioner was to appoint all Judges, Magistrates and other Officers as may be necessary for the Administration of Manipur and all Judges, Magistrates and other Officers, who immediately before the commencement of the order were exercising lawful functions in Manipur, were to continue to exercise their respective functions until other provisions were made by the Chief Commissioner. It was on the strength of this order that the petitioner continued in service until other arrangements were made by the Chief Commissioner. Section 5 of the said order provided that all laws in force in Manipur or any part thereof immediately before the commencement of the order were to continue in force until repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority, provided that all powers exercisable under the said laws by His Highness the Maharajah or the Government of the State shall be exercisable by the Chief Commissioner. Thus, the Chief Commissioner stepped into the shoes of the Maharajah. The Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur, to which I referred a little while ago, were Rules issued by the Maharajah who had then the authority to make all laws for the then State of Manipur. Thus, by Section 5 of the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949, the said Rules which had the force of law as having been issued by the Maharajah continued in force until repealed or amended by competent authority. Thus, from 15-10-1949, under Rule 8 of the said Rules read with Section 4 of the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949, all appointments of officials and particularly those drawing a pay of more than Rs. 15/- a month had to be made by the Chief Commissioner who under Section 5 of the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949 took the place of the Maharajah. 6. Thus, after 15-10-1949, the petitioner continued in service by virtue of Section 4 of the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949 until other provisions were made by the Chief Commissioner. The conditions of service of the petitioner and other civil servants must also be deemed to be the same as existing at the time of the integration as the said conditions of service had the force of law until altered or amended by competent authority. The conditions of service of the petitioner and other civil servants must also be deemed to be the same as existing at the time of the integration as the said conditions of service had the force of law until altered or amended by competent authority. Thereafter on 23-1-1950, the States Merger (Chief Commissioners Provinces) Order, 1950 was promulgated, constituting Manipur into a Chief Commissioners province and keeping alive the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949 by Section 4 thereof until repealed, modified or amended by the Dominion Legislature or other competent authority. Then on 26-1-1950, the Constitution of India came into force and by Article 372 thereof, the Laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution were to continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by competent authority. Thus, the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949 continued even after 26-1-1950. Section 4 of the said Order, as I said, permitted the Chief Commissioner to make other provisions regarding the appointment and continuance in service of the Civil servants of the old State of Manipur prior to the merger. 7. Then on 25-9-1951, the Chief Commissioner issued the order Annexure-B regarding the appointment, discipline etc., of class III and IV servants in the Manipur Administration. Under this order, the authority to appoint class III and IV servants in the Revenue Service and to impose penalties including removal and dismissal from such service was vested in the Deputy Commissioner. But the Deputy Commissioner, on the strength of Annexure-B did not pass any order appointing the petitioner in his office and the petitioner continued as before by virtue of Section 4 of the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949. Evidently, the reason was that the Central Government had not decided even by then about the re-organisation of the Revenue Department of Manipur or fixed the strength of the staff or prescribed the scales of pay of the various posts. This was done later by Annexure-A dated 28-2-1953 by which the number of post of various categories and their scales of pay in the Revenue Department were fixed. We find from this that there were to be 33 Zilladars on the pay scale of Rs. 40-2-50(EB)-3-8-(EB)-4-100/-. The petitioner was working as a Zilladar at that time. This was done later by Annexure-A dated 28-2-1953 by which the number of post of various categories and their scales of pay in the Revenue Department were fixed. We find from this that there were to be 33 Zilladars on the pay scale of Rs. 40-2-50(EB)-3-8-(EB)-4-100/-. The petitioner was working as a Zilladar at that time. What should have been done after the issue of Annexure-A was that appointment orders should have been issued by proper authority in respect of such of the servants of the old Manipur State, whom it was decided to retain in service after proper screening. Paragraph 2 of Annx. A provided that the revised scale of pay was to be given with retrospective effect from 1-4-1950 to such personnel taken over from the former State as may ultimately be retained in service after proper screening. In the counter statement of the respondents, it is stated that after the issue of Annexure-A there was re-organisation of services in the Revenue Department and after screening some of the former employees both in permanent and temporary employ were retained, while some others were discharged and fresh appointment orders were issued by appropriate Appointing Authorities in accordance with the Rules framed by the Government. But it was admitted that in the case of the petitioner even though he was retained in service, no fresh appointment order was issued through inadvertence, even though he was given the benefit of the revised scale of pay with retrospective effect from 1-4-1950, thereby meaning that the petitioner was retained in service with effect from 15-10-1949 with the revised scale of pay from 1-4-1950. The petitioner continued in service thereafter until 1959 and such service was admitted to be permanent service. He was dismissed from service on 29-3-1960 by the Deputy Commissioner after the departmental enquiry referred to above. 8. The question then arises as to who was the authority which appointed the petitioner in service with effect from 15-10-1949. On this question will depend whether the Deputy Commissioner had the authority to dismiss him from service. It is clear that the petitioner cannot have continued in service on the strength of his original appointment by the Maharajah on 8-2-1945, as all contracts of service prior to the merger stood automatically terminated from the date of the merger. On this question will depend whether the Deputy Commissioner had the authority to dismiss him from service. It is clear that the petitioner cannot have continued in service on the strength of his original appointment by the Maharajah on 8-2-1945, as all contracts of service prior to the merger stood automatically terminated from the date of the merger. This has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajvi Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1958 SC 228 . It is also clear that without an appointment in the new set up from 15-10-1949, the petitioner cannot have permanently continued in service. It is again clear that on 15-10-1949, the date of the merger, only the Chief Commissioner had the authority to appoint class III servants, to which class the petitioner belonged. The question whether the petitioner will be retained in service was left undecided until the issue of the letter Annexure-A by the Government of India, by which the re-organisation of the Revenue Department was finalised and the pay scales and the number of posts fixed. Thus, the appointment of the petitioner could have taken place only after the date of Annexure-A, namely, 28-2-1953. What was pointed out for the respondents was that at the time when Annexure-A was issued, the order of the Chief Commissioner Annexure-B had already been made on 25-9-1951 and by Annexure-B, the authority to appoint class III servants was given to the Deputy Commissioner and hence the Deputy Commissioner must be deemed to have been the authority which appointed the petitioner, even though no regular appointment order was issued in the case of the petitioner through inadvertence. But an order like Annexure-B cannot have retrospective effect and in fact, it is not seen from Annexure-B that it has been given retrospective effect. Thus, the Deputy Commissioner became the appointing authority of class III only from 25-9-1951, the date of Annexure-B and he can make appointments only prospectively from that date and not with retrospective effect from an earlier date. 9. I would have accepted that the Deputy Commissioner appointed the petitioner, if an appointment order was, in fact, issued by him in the case of the petitioner on or after 25-9-1951. 9. I would have accepted that the Deputy Commissioner appointed the petitioner, if an appointment order was, in fact, issued by him in the case of the petitioner on or after 25-9-1951. The petitioner has been admittedly given the benefit of the revised scale of pay with effect from 1-4-1950 which meant that he has been accepted to be in service in any case from 1-4-1950. On 1-4-1950, the Deputy Commissioner did not have the authority to appoint the petitioner. Again, it is admitted that the petitioner has been continuing in service from 15-10-1949. On 15-10-1949, the Chief Commissioner and not the Deputy Commissioner was the authority who could have appointed the petitioner. When there is no order of appointment as far as the petitioner is concerned and when it is realised that the petitioner cannot have continued as a permanent member of the service from 15-10-1949 without a regular appointment, what we have got to see is as to who the authority was who could have appointed the petitioner on 15-10-1949, because it is admitted that from 15-10-1949 he has continued as a permanent member of the service as class III servant. As the only authority who could have appointed the petitioner on 15-10-1949 was the Chief Commissioner, we have to take it that it was the Chief Commissioner himself who appointed him, though there was no actual order of appointment in his case. It is clear that the Deputy Commissioner could not have appointed him after 25-9-1951, the date of Annexure-B with retrospective effect from 15-10-1949. This would show that under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, the Deputy Commissioner who was subordinate to the Chief Commissioner had no power to order the dismissal or removal of the petitioner from service. The order of dismissal by the Deputy Commissioner has, therefore, to be held as void under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. 10. In this connection, I may refer to the decision Ramchandra Gopalrao v. D. I. G., Police, AIR 1957 Madh-Pra 126. It is almost a similar case. The civil servant concerned in that case was appointed by the Ruler of Ratlam State on 31-12-1945. 10. In this connection, I may refer to the decision Ramchandra Gopalrao v. D. I. G., Police, AIR 1957 Madh-Pra 126. It is almost a similar case. The civil servant concerned in that case was appointed by the Ruler of Ratlam State on 31-12-1945. After the Ratlam State merged in the State of Madhya Bharat, he continued as the member of the Madhya Bharat Police Force by virtue of Ordinance No. 30 of 1948, issued by the Raj Pramukh of Madhya Bharat and his name was included in the list of Sub-Inspectors prepared by the Inspector General of Police of Madhya Bharat. Subsequently, an enquiry was held against him and he was dismissed from service by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. The question was whether the said dismissal by the D. I. G. of Police violated Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. At the time of the order of dismissal, the D. I. G. of Police had the power of appointment of Sub-Inspectors just as at the time of dismissal in our present case the Deputy Commissioner was the appointing authority for the petitioner. The Madhya Pradesh High Court discussed the question on the basis that there was no order of appointment of the Government servant concerned in that case after the merger of Ratlam State into Madhya Bharat, just as in our present case also there was no order of appointment after the merger of Manipur into the Indian Union and observed : "If for the applicability of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution to the civil servants appointed in one State and continued in service, without any fresh appointment, in a newly created State consisting of the State where they were originally appointed, a fiction has to be evolved, then having regard to the above-mentioned decisions, the rational fiction would be one of determining the subordination of the dismissing or removing authority in relation to that authority in the new State which is equivalent to the authority which appointed the civil servant concerned in the old State, and not that of determining the authority who would have appointed the civil servant in the new State". The said decision was before Rajvi Amar Singhs case, AIR 1958 SC 228 was decided by the Supreme Court, and hence dealt with the question as if the civil servants service in the pre-merged State automatically continued after the merger, and hence the Madhya Pradesh High Court stated that in determining the subordination of the dismissing or removing authority we have to find out the authority in the new State which is equivalent to the authority which appointed the Civil servant concerned in the old State and that we need not determine the authority who would have appointed the civil servant in the new State. But that cannot be accepted now as good law. The service of a Civil Servant in the new State has no relation to his service in the old State and is only governed by the new contract of service entered into by him in the new State. Thus, where he continues in service in the new State without a regular order of appointment, we have got to determine as to who was the authority who would or could have appointed the civil servant in the new State. Thus, it is not the authority in the new State which is equivalent to the authority which appointed the civil servant concerned in the old State, nor the subordination of the dismissing or removing authority in relation to the said appointing authority which has to be determined. What has to be determined is the authority which appointed the civil servant in the new State and whether the authority which dismissed or removed him was or was not subordinate to the said authority. If there was no regular order of appointment in the new State what we have to see is who was the authority who would or could have appointed him in the new State at the time of the merger. 11. In the said decision, certain observations made in the decision Sobhagmal v. State, AIR 1954 Raj 207 were dissented from. The said decision of the Rajasthan High Court related to a case where a person was appointed as Inspector in the Custom and Excise Department by the Government of Jaipur. 11. In the said decision, certain observations made in the decision Sobhagmal v. State, AIR 1954 Raj 207 were dissented from. The said decision of the Rajasthan High Court related to a case where a person was appointed as Inspector in the Custom and Excise Department by the Government of Jaipur. After the merger of Jaipur along with certain other former States in the present State of Rajasthan, the person was suspended from service by the Assistant Commissioner, Custom and Excise and eventually there was an enquiry into certain charges against him and the Commissioner, Custom and Excise, removed the person from service. There was no appointment of the petitioner in the integrated State of Rajasthan and he was suspended even before the integration was completed. The Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court stated that in such a peculiar case it seemed to him that the proper way to look at it was to see who would have appointed the applicant in the State of Rajasthan if he had been brought into the new integrated set up. It is this finding of the Rajasthan High Court, which was dissented from in the Madhya Pradesh decision. Having due regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajvi Amar Singhs case, AIR 1958 SC 228 , we now find that in the Rajasthan case there was no appointment of the public servant in the new State of Rajasthan and hence the public servant concerned was not entitled to the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution and it was not therefore necessary to decide as to who would have appointed the public servant in the State of Rajasthan if he had been brought into the integrated set up. But the principle enunciated in that decision in a case where there was no regular order of appointment In the new State and a public servant was absorbed in the new State as in our present case seemed to me to be the correct principle and not the one laid down in AIR 1957 Madh Pra 126. 12. But the principle enunciated in that decision in a case where there was no regular order of appointment In the new State and a public servant was absorbed in the new State as in our present case seemed to me to be the correct principle and not the one laid down in AIR 1957 Madh Pra 126. 12. As I stated already, the petitioner was absorbed in the new State of Manipur with effect from 15-10-1949, even though no formal order of appointment was made and he was given the benefit of the revised scale of pay and he was allowed to continue in service until 1959 when he was dismissed from service by the order of the Deputy Commissioner. What we have to see therefore is as to who was the authority who could or would have issued the order of appointment of the petitioner to absorb him into service with effect from 15-10-1949. I have pointed out that only the Chief Commissioner had the authority to appoint the petitioner on that date. The Deputy Commissioner got the authority of appointment only by Annexure-B dated 25-9-1951 and he cannot have appointed the petitioner with effect from 15-10-1949. Hence, we have to take it that the authority who appointed the petitioner though no formal order of appointment was issued was the Chief Commissioner. Hence, the order of the Deputy Commissioner, who is sub-ordinate to the Chief Commissioner dismissing the petitioner from service is clearly against the mandatory provision of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution and the said order has to be treated as void. On that one ground alone this writ application has to be allowed. 13. In the view which I have taken on this question, the further questions regarding the reasonable opportunity not being given to the petitioner to meet the charges framed against him do not arise. On that one ground alone this writ application has to be allowed. 13. In the view which I have taken on this question, the further questions regarding the reasonable opportunity not being given to the petitioner to meet the charges framed against him do not arise. I need only mention in passing that the so-called defects in the enquiry which have been pointed out, namely, that the petitioner was not given 3 weeks time as required under Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, that he was denied the opportunity of using certain documents in the preparation of his written statement, that the S.P. (Special Police Establishment) Shillong was not examined as a Prosecution Witness and that one Hazi Amanullah whom the petitioner cited as a D.W. was also not examined as a witness did not appear to me to have much substance in them. The petitioner was allowed 11 days time to file his written statement and not 3 weeks as provided under Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. But it is not every non-observance of the rules that can be raised in writ proceedings. It is only if the non-observance of a Rule prejudiced the petitioner in his defence that it can be said that the principles of natural justice were not observed. The petitioner has not pointed out in what way he was prejudiced in his defence by that. Again, admittedly, the petitioner was allowed to inspect the documents and to take copies of the same. The petitioners complaint is that he could not do so before he filed the written statement. But the written statement did not complete the enquiry. There was a regular enquiry by the examination of witnesses subsequently and it is not stated by the petitioner that he was denied any documents called for by him in the course of the enquiry which followed. Hence, the mere fact that time was not given to the petitioner to inspect the documents and to take copies thereof before he filed his written statement is not a ground for holding the enquiry to be vitiated. Again, it was not necessary for the prosecution to examine the S.P. (Special Police Establishment) Shillong in the enquiry. The report of the S.P. has not been relied on in the enquiry. Again, it was not necessary for the prosecution to examine the S.P. (Special Police Establishment) Shillong in the enquiry. The report of the S.P. has not been relied on in the enquiry. The petitioner cannot dictate as to who should be examined in such departmental enquiry by the prosecution. Nor do I find from the records of the departmental enquiry proceedings that the petitioner prayed for permission to cross-examine the said S.P. Again, the non-examination of Hazi Amanullah cannot by itself be treated as against the principles of natural justice. I find from the order sheet of the Inquiring Officer that the petitioner did not ask for the examination of Hazi Amanullah, but only examined 4 witnesses for the defence. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner insisted on the examination of Hazi Amanullah and that the Inquiring Officer refused such permission. No doubt, now the petitioner claims that Hazi Amanullah was an important witness for him. But he has not stated in what way he was important and how his non-examination has prejudiced his defence. I can only say that the fact of non-examination of Hazi Amanullah whose examination the petitioner did not insist on at the time of the enquiry is now made use of in this writ and I cannot say that such non-examination vitiated the enquiry. Thus, I am not able to see anything in the enquiry itself which was against the principles of natural justice. Nor am I able to see any prejudice caused to the petitioner. 14. As the order of dismissal was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, who had no authority to do so and as the Chief Commissioner converted the said void order into an order of removal only in appeal, I have to hold that the orders of both the Deputy Commissioner and of the Chief Commissioner are void. A writ of certiorari will therefore issue quashing the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 29-3-1960 dismissing the petitioner from service and also the order of the Chief Commissioner dated 28-3-1961 reducing the penalty of dismissal to one of removal. Under the circumstances of the case, I direct both parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.