P. N. BHAGWATI, J. ( 1 ) THESE two Revision Applications arise out of a petition filed by one Dahyabhai Dhanjibhai Shah to adjudicate Champaklal Chhotalal Sutaria Kusumchand Ramniklal and Navalchand Ramniklal ( hereinafter referred to as Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 ) as insolvents. The petition was filed on 10th October 1949. It was preceded by a notice dated 3rd October 1949 to which no reply was sent by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. Dahyabhai Dhanjibhai Shah ( who will hereinafter be referred to as the petitioning creditor ) alleged in the petition seven acts of insolvency. The first act of insolvency was that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had executed on 11th July 1949 a transfer of their joint family property bearing Survey No. 378 for Rs. 24 999 with intent to defeat or delay their creditors and to give preference to one of the creditors. The second act of insolvency alleged was that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had effected an equitable mortgage of their property in Bombay to secure a sum of Rs. 70 0 This allegation obviously did not constitute an act of insolvency and it was therefore rightly not pressed by the creditors as an act of insolvency. The third act of insolvency which the petitioning creditor alleged in the petition was that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had transferred by sale their immovable property bearing Survey No 792 for Rs. 21 999 to one Narottamdas Durlabhdas on 6th September 1949 It is important to note that no allegation was made that this transfer was effected by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 with intent to defeat or delay their creditors or to give preference to any creditor. Then followed the fourth act of insolvency which according to the petitioning creditor was constituted by the allegation that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had suspended payment of their debts and were not paying their debts as they became due. Three other acts of insolvency were set out thereafter but they are not material for the purpose of the present Revision Applications barring the act of insolvency based on the allegation that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had removed and disposed of their valuables with a view to secreting the same and preventing their creditors from being able to proceed against the same in satisfaction of their claims against Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. 1 to 3 had removed and disposed of their valuables with a view to secreting the same and preventing their creditors from being able to proceed against the same in satisfaction of their claims against Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. The petition was opposed by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 who contended inter alia that no act of insolvency was committed by any of them and that they were therefore not liable to be adjudicated insolvents. Now though the petition was filed as early as 10th October 1949 it was for reasons which can hardly be justified not disposed of until 23rd July 1958. It ran a long drawn out course much to the detriment of Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 and ultimately ended in a victory for Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. On 23rd July 1958 it was dismissed on the ground that no act of insolvency could be said to have been committed by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. It maybe mentioned at this stage that pursuant to a rule enacted by the High Court with the previous sanction of the State Government under section 79 of the Provincial Insolvency Act notices were issued to the transferees of the two properties bearing Survey Nos. 378 and 792 in respect of which the allegation was made in regard to the property bearing Survey No. 378 that it was transferred by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. As I have pointed out above no allegation was made in the petition that this latter transfer was effected by opponents Nos. 1 to 3 with intent to defeat or delay their creditors or to give preference to one of the creditors and no notice need therefore have been issued to the transferee under that transfer but in fact I find that a notice was so issued. The interesting part of the story however is that these notices were not issued immediately on the filing of the petition but were issued sometime after the hearing of the petition had commenced and some evidence had already been taken. The petitioning creditor and Amarchand Vajechand a supporting creditor who was joined as a party to the petition as a result of a proceeding adopted by him were both examined as witnesses in support of the petition before notices were issued to the transferees. The petitioning creditor and Amarchand Vajechand a supporting creditor who was joined as a party to the petition as a result of a proceeding adopted by him were both examined as witnesses in support of the petition before notices were issued to the transferees. After the transferees appeared pursuant to the notices issued to them the transferees filed their respective written statements and an opportunity was given to the transferees to cross-examine the petitioning creditor. No such opportunity was however given to transferees to cross-examine Amarchand Vajechand to whom I shall refer as the supporting creditor. After the evidence in support of the petition was concluded evidence was led on behalf of Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 and thereafter the transferees examined themselves as witnesses. It was on this record that the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that no act of insolvency was proved and he accordingly dismissed the petition. ( 2 ) BEING aggrieved by the order of dismissal passed by the learned trial Judge the petitioning creditor filed Appeal No. 56 of 1958 in the District Court Surat. The supporting creditor also filed Appeal No. 57 of 1958 against the same order. The transferees were not made parties to these appeals but notices were issued to them and in pursuance of the notices the transferees appeared and contested the appeals. A preliminary objection was urged against the appeals and it was that the appeals were barred by the law of limitation. The objection on the ground of limitation was two-fold. The first objection was that the appeals were not filed against Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 within the time prescribed by the law of limitation and the second objection was that the transferees were necessary parties to the appeals and since the notices were issued to the transferees and the transferees appeared in the appeals long after the period of limitation for the filing of the appeals had expired the appeals were barred by the law of limitation. So far as the first objection was concerned it appears that at the hearing of the appeals Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 realising the futility of the objection conceded that Appeal No. 57 of 1958 was within time. So far as the first objection was concerned it appears that at the hearing of the appeals Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 realising the futility of the objection conceded that Appeal No. 57 of 1958 was within time. Though the contention was pressed that Appeal No. 56 of 1958 was not within time the learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeals came to the conclusion that the contention was without substance and he accordingly rejected the contention. The certified copy of the judgment was applied for by the petitioning creditor on 4th August 1958 and the certified copy was ready for delivery on 5th November 1958. The appeal was filed on 5 December 1958. Now the certified copy of the judgment applied for by the supporting creditor was ready for delivery on 21st November 1958 and the petitioning creditor stated that he was therefore under the bona fide belief that the certified copy of the judgment applied for by him was also ready for delivery on the same day namely 21 November 1958 and hence both the appeals were presented on 5th December 1958. The learned Assistant Judge therefore in any event condoned the delay if there was any in the filing of the appeal of the petitioning creditor and treated the appeal of the petitioning creditor as within time. The learned Assistant Judge on the merit of the appeals came to the conclusion that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had given notice to the petitioning creditor and the supporting creditor suspending payment of their debts and has therefore committed the act of insolvency specified in sec. 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The learned Assistant Judge also came to the conclusion that the transfers of the properties bearing Survey No. 378 and 792 were effected by Opponent Nos. 1 to 3 with intent to defeat or delay their creditors and that these transfers constituted an act of insolvency within the meaning of sec 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The learned Assistant Judge also found that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had fraudulently made over the movables belonging to them to the names of the female members of their family. This circumstance was however relied on by the learned Assistant Judge not as an independent act of insolvency but as a circumstance indicative of the intention of Opponents Nos. The learned Assistant Judge also found that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had fraudulently made over the movables belonging to them to the names of the female members of their family. This circumstance was however relied on by the learned Assistant Judge not as an independent act of insolvency but as a circumstance indicative of the intention of Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 to defeat and delay their creditors. The learned Assistant Judge on this view of the matter passed an order adjudicating Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 as insolvents. This order was passed by the learned Assistant Judge in both the appeals. Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 thereupon preferred two Revision Applications in this Court challenging the order made by the learned Assistant Judge. ( 3 ) MR. A. M. Joshi learned advocate appearing on behalf of Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 contended before me that the appeals before the learned Assistant Judge were barred by the law of limitation and that they should not therefore have been entertained by him. Mr. A. M. Joshi reiterated the same arguments which were urged before the learned Assistant Judge. But for the same reasons which found acceptance with the learned Assistant Judge I hold that the appeals were within time and that even if Appeal No. 56 of 1958 was not within time the learned Assistant Judge exercised his discretion rightly in condoning the delay if any in filling that appeal. The learned Assistant Judge was therefore right in proceeding to hear and dispose of the appeals on merits. ( 4 ) THE next contention of Mr. A. M. Joshi was that the learned Assistant Judge was in error in holding that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had committed the act of insolvency specified in sec. 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Mr. A. M. Joshi disputed the finding of the learned Assistant Judge that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had given notice to the petitioning creditor and the supporting creditor suspending payment of their debts. According to Mr. A. M. Joshi there was not a tittle of evidence to support this finding of the learned Assistant Judge and this finding was therefore unreasonable and perverse and I could interfere with the same in revision. Now before I examine the validity of this contention of Mr. According to Mr. A. M. Joshi there was not a tittle of evidence to support this finding of the learned Assistant Judge and this finding was therefore unreasonable and perverse and I could interfere with the same in revision. Now before I examine the validity of this contention of Mr. A. M. Joshi I must state at once that the act of insolvency specified in sec. 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act was not alleged by the petitioning creditor in his petition and that no inquiry could therefore be held into the question whether such act of insolvency was committed by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. The only allegation made by the petitioning creditor in the petition was that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had suspended payment of their debts and were not paying their debts as they became due. This was alleged as an act of insolvency. But it is apparent that this allegation even ifestablished could not constitute an act of insolvency so as to render Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 liable to be adjudicated as insolvents. The petitioning creditor did not allege in the petition that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 gave within three months of the filing of the petition notice to any of their creditors that they had suspended payment of their debts. It is elementary that mere suspension of payment of debts does not constitute an act of insolvency. It is necessary in order to constitute an act of insolvency that the debtor should give notice to any of his creditors that he has g suspended payment of his debts. Notice by the debtor to any of his creditors is a necessary constituent of an act of insolvency under this head. That not having been alleged the petition did not disclose any cause of action in respect of this particular act of insolvency and in the absence of such cause of action no inquiry could be held whether Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had committed this particular act of insolvency. It must be remembered that a petition to adjudicate a debtor as an insolvent is a very serious matter. 1 to 3 had committed this particular act of insolvency. It must be remembered that a petition to adjudicate a debtor as an insolvent is a very serious matter. The adjudication of the debtor as an insolvent affects his status and involves considerable disgrace and legal disabilities to the debtor; therefore it is all the more necessary that the act of insolvency alleged against him should be clearly and precisely described in the petition. The act of insolvency must be set out in the petition in all its particularity and if any essential ingredient is found wanting on the facts alleged in the petition in my opinion the petition must fail in so far as that ground is concerned. It must also be remembered that an act of insolvency in order to found a petition must have been committed within three months of the filing of the petition. If a petition is filed more than three months after the commission of the act of insolvency it would fail since the act of insolvency would not be available to the petitioning creditor after the expiration of three months from its commission. It would therefore follow that if a particular act of insolvency is not mentioned in the petition the petition cannot even be amended except on strong and exceptional grounds so as to found it upon the particular act of insolvency if more than three months have already elapsed from the date of commission of such act of insolvency. I need not however consider whether any amendment could have been granted in the present case so as to perfect the cause of action under sec. 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act since no application for amendment of the petition. was made at any time before the disposal of the petition by the learned trial Judge or the disposal of the appeals by the learned Assistant Judge The only argument advanced in support of the adjudication order under sec. 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act was that since as a result of the evidence given by the petitioning creditor and the supporting creditor Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 were aware that what was alleged against them was that they had given notices to their creditors suspending payment of their debts no prejudice was caused to Opponents Nos. 1. to 3 if the Court reached the finding that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 were aware that what was alleged against them was that they had given notices to their creditors suspending payment of their debts no prejudice was caused to Opponents Nos. 1. to 3 if the Court reached the finding that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had committed the act of insolvency specified in sec. 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act even though that particular act of insolvency was not set out in the petition. This argument is however in my opinion fallacious for it is now well-settled that a creditors petition must allege the specific act of insolvency on which it is founded and the facts which constitute the act: it is not sufficient to make vague allegations in the petition of acts which are not acts of insolvency and then endeavour by means of evidence to prove that as a matter of fact an act of insolvency has been committed. Such an attempt was characterized as futile in a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vassanji v. Mulji (A. I. R. 1926 Bombay 405 Moreover I do not see how if an amendment could not be permitted after the expiration of a period of three months from the date of commission of the act of insolvency mere leading of evidence in regard to the act of insolvency after the expiration of such period of three months could entitle the petitioning creditor to make out a case for adjudication based on such act of insolvency. I am therefore of the opinion that in the absence of a proper plea alleging facts sufficient to constitute the act of insolvency set out in section 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act it was not open to the Court to adjudicate Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 as insolvents on the ground that they had committed an act of insolvency specified in that section. But apart from this objection based on want of proper pleading I find that there is no evidence at all to support the finding that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 gave notices to the petitioning creditor and the supporting creditor that they had suspended payment of their debts. All that the petitioning creditor stated in his examination-in-chief in this connection was that he demanded the dues several times but Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 gave notices to the petitioning creditor and the supporting creditor that they had suspended payment of their debts. All that the petitioning creditor stated in his examination-in-chief in this connection was that he demanded the dues several times but Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 stated that they were unable to pay the dues and that their business was slack. I find it extremely difficult to construe this statement alleged to have been made by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 as amounting to notice that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 had suspended payment of their debts. But the matter becomes clear if one turns to the cross-examination of the petitioning creditor by the transferees. Cross-examined on this point the petitioning creditor stated that he had gone to Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 about ten days before the filing of the petition i. e. on or about 1st October 1949 in order to ask them to liquidate his dues and at that time Opponents Nos. 1 and 2 stated that they would call all the creditors and settle their dues within about ten days. Now assuming this statement of the petitioning creditor is accepted in its entirety even so it does not carry the case against Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 any further. In this statement the petitioning creditor makes it clear that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 did not state that they had suspended payment of their debts but that on the contrary they stated that they would call all the creditors and settle their dues within about ten days. It is therefore plain that the evidence of the petitioning creditor does not establish any notice by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 to the petitioning creditor that they had suspended payment of their debts. Turning to the evidence of the supporting creditor it is no doubt true that the supporting creditor stated that Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 said to him in July 1949 that they had closed their business as they were steeped in debts and were unable to pay the same. But he does not say as to whether this statement was made by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 said to him in July 1949 that they had closed their business as they were steeped in debts and were unable to pay the same. But he does not say as to whether this statement was made by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 to him prior to 10th July 1949 or subsequent to that date: for if this statement was made prior to 10th July 1949 the notice of suspension of debts would not be within three months of the filing of the petition which was presented on 10th October 1949 and the act of insolvency constituted by this statement would not be available in support of the petition. I may also mention that to my mind it is extremely improbable that such a statement as this was made by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 to the supporting creditor in July 1949. There is no evidence to show that in July 1949 Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 were in embarrassed circumstances or that they had closed their business. As a matter of fact according to Opponent No. 3 who gave evidence on oath the business was stopped in October 1949 after the receipt of the notice dated 3rd October 1949. It is also surprising that if the supporting creditor was informed by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 in July 1949 that they had closed their business as they were steeped in debts and were unable to pay the same the supporting creditor should not have taken immediate action for the purpose of protecting his interest. I am therefore of the opinion that the evidence of the supporting creditor also does not help to establish that notice of suspension of debts was given by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 within three months prior to the filing of the petition. Apart from the evidence of the petitioning creditor and the supporting creditor Mr. I. C. Bhatt could not draw my attention to any evidence which could even remotely support the finding of the learned Assistant Judge that notice of suspension of debts was given by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3 to the petitioning creditor and the supporting creditor. This finding of the learned Assistant Judge cannot therefore stand and it must be held that no act of insolvency specified in section 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act was committed by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. 1 to 3 to the petitioning creditor and the supporting creditor. This finding of the learned Assistant Judge cannot therefore stand and it must be held that no act of insolvency specified in section 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act was committed by Opponents Nos. 1 to 3. ( 5 ) [ The rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] application allowed. .