Judgment 1. These two appeals are presented on behalf of two sets of defendants against the order of the second Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur, dated the 3rd January, 1958, setting aside the award of the arbitrator dated the 3rd August, 1953 with regard to partition of certain properties and dismissing the suit on the ground that it has become infructuous because of the vesting of the milkiat properties by a notification issued under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act after the award had been made. 2. It appears that there was a registered deed of agreement between the parties dated the 4th April, 1953, appointing Shri Shivasati Prasad, a lawyer practising at Muzaffarpur, as an arbitrator for partitioning the joint family properties. The arbitrator made the award on 3rd August, 1953, and it was registered on the next day. It appears from the award that the arbitrator partitioned all the moveables, cash, rehan bonds, hand-notes and immoveables including the kast, bakasht, zirat, gairmazura lands and the proprietary interests of the joint family. On the 9th of November, 1953, the arbitrator filed the award in Court and made a prayer for passing a decree in terms of the award. Objection was filed by defendants second party on the 24th July, 1954 praying that the award should be set aside on the ground that there was misconduct on the part of the arbitrator who had shown partiality and bias in making division of the properties. On the 1st of January, 1956, the notification under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act was issued vesting the milkiat interest mentioned in the award of the arbitrator in the State of Bihar. When the case was taken up for hearing before the lower Court, a preliminary issue was raised on behalf of defendants second party that the award had become infructuous on account of the notification under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and on this ground alone the award should be set aside. This preliminary issue has been decided by the lower court in favour of the defendants second party and it has been held that the award has become infructuous on account of the statutory notification under the Bihar Land Reforms Act and the suit should be dismissed. This preliminary issue has been decided by the lower court in favour of the defendants second party and it has been held that the award has become infructuous on account of the statutory notification under the Bihar Land Reforms Act and the suit should be dismissed. The lower court has not gone into the question with regard to the merit of the objection raised by defendants second party that the award should be set aside on account of misconduct of the arbitrator. 3. On behalf of the appellants submission was made by learned Counsel that the lower court has committed an error of law in holding that the award has become infructuous because of the statutory notification under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act which had the effect of vesting the intermediary interest in the State of Bihar. It was submitted by learned Counsel on behalf of the appellants that the award has not become invalid under Sec.30(c) of the Arbitration Act and the lower court was not warranted in setting aside the award and dismissing the suit. It was argued that the proper course for the lower court was to act under Sec.16 of the Arbitration Act and to remit the award back to the arbitrator for reconsideration in view of the changed situation brought about by the notification of the State Government under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act by which the title of the milkiat property vested in the State Government. In our opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants is well-founded and must be accepted as correct. The legal position with regard to the impact of Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act on a case of this description has been the subject-matter of elaborate consideration in a Full Bench decision of the Court in Sukhdeo Das V/s. Kashi Prasad, 1958 BLJR 559 : ( AIR 1958 Pat 630 ). The effect of that decision is that in a suit of this description the subject-matter is not wholly destroyed as a result of the vesting in the Stare under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The effect of that decision is that in a suit of this description the subject-matter is not wholly destroyed as a result of the vesting in the Stare under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. It was held in that Full Bench case that on a true construction of Sec. 6 the word intermediary in that section would include the entire body of intermediaries and khas possession under that section does not mean physical possession but includes also constructive possession of the intermediary. In view of the principle laid down by the Full Bench in this case, it is manifest that the suit for partition in this case has not become infructuous because the subject matter of the partition has partially vested in the State of Bihar or gone out of the possession of the parties in the suit. It, therefore, follows that the lower court was erroneous in law in holding that the suit has become infructuous because of the vesting of the milkiat properties in the State of Bihar under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. In our opinion, the proper course for the lower court would be to refer the matter back to the arbitrator under Sec.16 of the Arbitration Act for making a fresh partition of the properties which are left to the members of the joint family after the vesting of the milkiat interest in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act and then to proceed to give an award in accordance with law within a time to be fixed by the lower court. 4. On behalf of the respondents, reference was made to the decision of this Court in Deep Narain Singh V/s. Mt. Dhaneshwari, AIR 1960 Pat 201 and it was submitted that though the court is not entitled to set aside the award on the grounds mentioned in Sec.30 of the Arbitration Act, the court has still inherent, power to ignore the award and refuse to pass a decree under Sec.17 of the Act in case it is found that the award is a nullity either because of the vagueness of the arbitration agreement, or for any other reason, or it upon the face of it the award is prima facie illegal and not fit to be maintained. In a situation of this kind, it is undoubtedly open to the Court to set aside the award suo motu apart from any application which a party can make under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act. We have already said that the award of the arbitrator in this case is not a nullity merely because of the vesting of the milkiat interest of the members of the joint family under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act in the State Government. The principle laid down by this Court in AIR 1960 Pat 201 has, therefore, no application to the present case. We, therefore, reject the argument of learned Counsel for the respondents on this point. 5. For these reasons we hold that this appeal should be allowed, the order of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge dated the 3rd January, 1958, should be set aside and the case should so back to the lower court for deciding in the first place the objection of the defendants second party that the award is fit to be set aside because of misconduct on the part of the arbitrator and there was bias and partiality shown by him in making division of the properties. After the case goes back on remand to the lower Court, it should hear the partial on the merit of the objections raised by the defendants second party according to Sec.33 of the Arbitration Act and then decide whether the objections of the defendants second party are well-founded and whether the award should be set aside on the ground of misconduct under Sec.30 of the Arbitration Act. If the tower court finds that the award is not fit to be set aside for the reasons given by the defendants second party, it should make an order remitting the award to the arbitrator for reconsidering the matter in the light of the situation brought about by the vesting of the milkiat interest in the State Government under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The lower Court should fix a time within which the arbitrator should submit his decision after reconsideration of the matter. 6. We, therefore, allow the appeals to the extent indicated above and remand the case to the lower Court for decision to accordance with the directions we have given. There will be no order as to costs of these appeals.