V. B. RAJU, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are tenants in respect of Prabhat Talkies at Nadiad belonging to the opponents filed this civil revision petition aggrieved by the order of Assistant Judge at Nadiad confirming in appeal a decree for possession passed against them by the Joint Civil Judge Junior Dn. Nadiad in a suit filed by the opponents for possession of the theatre in question on the ground that the possession was required by plaintiff No. 1 for his personal and bona fide requirement and for establishing his son in business. The trial Court held it proved that plain- tiff No. 1 required the premises in question reasonably and bona fide for occupation by himself and that greater hardship would not be caused by passing a decree for eviction than by refusing to pass it and thereupon decreed the plaintiffs suit for possession. In appeal the learned Assistant Judge confirmed these two findings and also the decree passed by the learned trial Judge. ( 2 ) IN revision four points were urged. Firstly relying on the English case of selwyn v. Hamill 1948 All England Law Reports 70 it is urged that when the Court was not satisfied that the premises were required reasonably and bona fide for use by plaintiff No. 1 and his son the Revision Court should set aside the decree in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The observations at page 72 of this English case are as follows :-IN cases under the Rents Acts it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that all the requirements of the Acts have been fulfilled before an order for possession is made. If they have not been satisfied the Court has no jurisdiction to make the order. ( 3 ) THIS proposition is no doubt correct because if the Act requires certain requirements to be satisfied and if the trial Court does not give a finding that those requirements are satisfied then the order passed by the trial Court would be without jurisdiction. But that is not the case in the instant case. There are findings by both the courts below on both the essential requirements of the case. This contention is therefore rejected. But that is not the case in the instant case. There are findings by both the courts below on both the essential requirements of the case. This contention is therefore rejected. ( 4 ) THE next contention is that it was obligatory upon the court to consider the evidence as to whether reasonable accommodation was available to the landlord or the tenant and that the courts below not having considered this aspect of the case they have committed a material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction. For this proposition the learned counsel for the petitioners relies on Hardial Singh and others v. Malayan Theatres Ltd. 1953 Appeal Cases 632 in this English Case it is held as follows:-WHILE all the circumstances must be taken into account unless the independent requirement of suitable alternative accommodation is complied with the Court is not entitled to make an order for possession however much it is persuaded that it is reasonable to do so. ( 5 ) BUT this decision turns upon the peculiar wording of the Singapore Control of Rent Ordinance No. 25 of 1947 which was being construed section 14 (1) whereof reads as follows :- (1) No order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any premises comprised in a tenancy shall be made or given except in the following cases. . . (m) in any other case where the court considers it reasonable that such an order or judgment be made or given and is satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation is available for the tenant or will be available for him when the order or judgment takes effect. Under the Singapore law as provided in clausa (m) of sec. 14 (1) of the ordinance above referred to in any other case referred to in that clause no order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any premises comprised in a tenancy should be made except where the court considers it reasonable and is satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation was available for the tenant or will be available for him when the order or judgment takes effect. According to this clause therefore the fundamental requirements for passing a decree under this clause are that the court should consider the order for eviction to be reasonable and the court should be further satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation was available for the tenant Under this clause two requirements must be satisfied before the Court can pass an order for eviction. But under sec. 13 of Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act there is only one requirement namely that the premises must be reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held. It is clear from clause (m) of sec. 14 of the Singapore Ordinance that unless the Court is satisfied on both these points there can be no order for eviction. But the Indian Law is different because under section 13 (1) (g) of the Act the landlord is entitled to recover possession if the Court is satisfied that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person by whose benefit the premises are held. Under clause (g) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act it is not necessary for the court to consider the question of alternative accommodation but the court is obliged to pass a decree for eviction if the conditions of sec. 13 (1) (g) are satisfied. No doubt there is a proviso in sub-section (2) of sec. 13 which reads as follows :- no decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (g) of sub-section (1) if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. ( 6 ) WHERE the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. ( 7 ) HAVING provided that a decree for eviction shall be passed if the conditions of sec. ( 7 ) HAVING provided that a decree for eviction shall be passed if the conditions of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act are satisfied sub-section (2) of sec. 13 lays down a proviso that no decree for eviction shall be passed under sec. 13 (1) (g) if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. This sub- sec. is a proviso to sub-sec. (1) (g) and provides that no decree for eviction shall be passed unless the requirements of sub-section (2) are satisfied. In other words although the landlord is entitled to possession if the requirements of section 13 (1) (g) of the Act are satisfied no decree for possession should be passed if the Court is satisfied on certain points as stated in sec. 13 (2) of the Act. The ingredients set out in sub-sec. (2) of section 13 of the Act are therefore not essential requirements before a decree for possession can be passed under section 13 (1) (g) of the Act but these ingredients are a sort of a proviso laying down that although a decree for eviction shall be passed if the requirements of section 13 (1) (g) are satisfied it should not be passed under certain circumstances. The principle laid down by the Privy Council in 1953 Appeal Cases 632 having regard to the Singapore Rent Ordinance does not apply in view of the language of the Indian statute. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the principle laid down in 1953 A. C. 632 should be followed is therefore rejected. ( 8 ) THE last point urged is that the first appellate court thought that the conduct of the parties in 1947 when the original tenancy agreement was renewed was irrelevant. Having observed that it was irrelevant to consider the conduct of the parties in 1947 when the lease was renewed the learned appellate Judge in fact considered the conduct of the parties. Even if he had made a mistake in holding that the conduct of the parties in 1947 was irrelevant that would be only a mistake on the question of the relevancy of certain evidence. Even if he had made a mistake in holding that the conduct of the parties in 1947 was irrelevant that would be only a mistake on the question of the relevancy of certain evidence. I am not prepared to say that it is a mistake because the suit was filed in 1957 and it would not be reasonable to hold that the conduct of the parties in 1947 was irrelevant on the question of bona fide requirement of the plaintiffs in 1957. This contention is therefore rejected. ( 9 ) NO other point is urged. The revision application is therefore dismissed with costs. Revision application dismissed. .