ORDER 1. This order will also govern Civil Revision No. 582 of 1961. 2. These two revision petitions arise out of two separate suits filed by Tapeswari Devi for the recovery of electricity charges from her two tenants In each suit the plaintiff alleged that the defendant concerned had agreed to pay an extra amount of Rs.10 per month over and above the monthly rent of Rs.60 for the electricity consumed by him in the tenement, and that the defendant Sinha had failed to pay the electricity charges for the period from the 1st April 1959 to 6th May 1961 and the other defendant had also not paid the charges for the period from 1st April 1959 to 1st August 1961. The plea of each of the defendants was that the monthly rent of Rs.60 in respect of the premises included charges for electricity consumption. The two suits were consolidated by the lower Court. In the course of the trial of the suits, it was stated on behalf of the plaintiff that if the defendant concerned would take a special oath on 'Gangajali' and state that the monthly rent of Rs. 60 included electricity charges, the plaintiff would abide by that oath and the suit should be dismissed accordingly. Each of the defendants took oath and testified that the monthly lent of Rs. 60 was Inclusive of electricity charges. Thereupon the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Jabalpur, dismissed both the suits. Hence these revision petitions by the plaintiff. 3. It was argued by Shri Pande, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff Tapeshwari Devi, that under section 9 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, the offer to be bound by a special oath or affirmation must come from the party himself and not from a counselor witness of the party, and that in the present cases the initiative came not from the plaintiff herself but from her husband Bhagwat Prasad while giving evidence as a witness on her behalf. Learned counsel said that the learned trial Judge was under an erroneous impression that Bhagwat Prasad himself was the plaintiff. 4. Both these petitions are devoid of any substance and must be dismissed. The record clearly shows that the offer under section 9 of the Act was made on behalf of the plaintiff by her counsel and not by Bhagwat Prasad. 4. Both these petitions are devoid of any substance and must be dismissed. The record clearly shows that the offer under section 9 of the Act was made on behalf of the plaintiff by her counsel and not by Bhagwat Prasad. It is true that in the order recorded by the lower Court on 23rd October 1961 it bas been stated that the "Plaintiff examined himself." As the plaintiff's husband Bhagwat Prasad and not the plaintiff herself was examined, the statement is no doubt erroneous. But from that statement it does not follow that throughout the order dated 23rd October 1961 the trial Judge used the word 'plaintiff' for Bhagwat Prasad and not for Tapeshwari Devi, and consequently the statement in the order that "the plaintiff offered special oath" meant that Bhagwat Prasad had offered the oath. The plaintiff Tapeswari Devi' was appearing through her counsel Shri Awasthy, and the expressions in the order dated 23rd October 1961, namely, "Plaintiff with Shri Awasthy" and "Plaintiff offered special oath" only mean that the plaintiff's appearance was through her counsel and it was he who made the offer of special oath on behalf of the plaintiff. So also the note recorded by the trial Judge when Bhagwat Prasad was being examined as plaintiff's witness that "At this stage the plaintiff" offered special oath in the following words....." plainly means that the offer of special oath was on behalf of the plaintiff and through her counsel. It may be that the suggestion to offer special oath was put by Bhagwat Prasad to the plaintiff's counsel who then acting as the duly authorised agent of his client put the offer before the Court. But from this it does not follow that the offer of special oath was made before the Court by Bhagwat Prasad and not by the plaintiff's counsel Shri Pande, learned counsel for the applicant, did not appear in the lower Court and was not in a position to say as to who actually placed the offer before the Court. That being so, and in the absence of anything on record to indicate positively that the special oath was offered by Bhagwat Prasad and no one else, there can be no ground for inferring from the solitary erroneous statement in the order dated the 23rd October 1961 that the "plaintiff examined himself", that the special oath v. as offered by Bhagwat Prasad. From the record it is clear that the oath was offered on behalf of the plaintiff by her counsel. 5. The contention that under section 9 of the Act it is only the party who can make the offer of being bound by a special oath and not his counsel is unsubstantial. Section 9 of the Act is as follows:- "If any party to any judicial proceeding offers to be bound by any such oath or solemn affirmation as is mentioned in section 8, if such oath or affirmation is made by the other party to or by any witness in such proceeding, the Court may, if it thinks fit, ask such party or witness, or cause him to be asked, whether or not he will make the oath or affirmation: Provided that no party or witness shall be compelled to attend personally in Court solely for the purpose of answering such question." Here, we are concerned with the question whether a party's counsel can make an offer on the party's behalf of being bound by a special oath, and not with the question whether an oath taken by a counsel can be regarded as an oath of the party for the purposes of sections 8 and 9 of (be Act. So far as the making of an offer to be bound by a special oath is concerned, there is nothing in the wording of section 9 which leads to the conclusion that the offer must be by the party himself in person. An act of the agent is in law an act of the party. If a counsel is duly empowered by a party to enter into a compromise, then it stands to reason to hold that he can make an offer on behalf of the party to abide by a special oath. If a counsel makes such an offer which is accepted by the other party, then under section 9 a binding agreement would come into existence. In the present case, the plaintiff's counsel had authority to compromise the suit. Under that authority he could dearly make an offer under section 9 of the Act. If a counsel makes such an offer which is accepted by the other party, then under section 9 a binding agreement would come into existence. In the present case, the plaintiff's counsel had authority to compromise the suit. Under that authority he could dearly make an offer under section 9 of the Act. There is ample authority for the view that the counsel of a party is competent to make an offer under section 9 and that it is not necessary that the offer to be bound by a special oath or solemn affirmation must come from the party himself and not through his counsel: See Narain Singh Vs. Har Bux Singh AIR 1953 All. 312 ; Mathura Prasad Vs. Sita Ram, AIR 1940 Oudh.314; Hata Vs Small AIR 1932 Lah. 414 and Wasi-ul Zaman Vs. Mt. Faiza, AIR 1916 All. 165. Some of these cases even hold that for the purposes of section 9 it is not necessary that the counsel should be specially authorized to make an offer or to compromise the case generally and that it is enough if he has been duly authorized to conduct the case generally on behalf of his client. In Sadashiv Vs. Maruli, ILR 14 Bom 455, there is no doubt an observation that no person but the party himself can make such an offer as is contemplated by section 9. This observation was made on the considerations that the merits of a case are better known to a party than to anyone else and the adoption of the procedure laid down in section 9 is "an appeal to the conscience of the party to whom the offer is made." These are, in my opinion, considerations which apply more appropriately to a person who takes the oath than to a person who makes the offer. In the Bombay case it was recognised that if a party specially authorises his pleader to make an offer to be bound by a particular oath, he might be estopped from retracing the step he had taken if his other were acted upon. Moreover, the decision in that case actually turned on the construction of the power of attorney held by the agent of the defendant and it was found that the power did not give to the agent the authority to make an offer of being bound by a particular oath. 6. Moreover, the decision in that case actually turned on the construction of the power of attorney held by the agent of the defendant and it was found that the power did not give to the agent the authority to make an offer of being bound by a particular oath. 6. For all these reasons, I am of the' opinion that in the present case the special oath was validly offered by the plaintiff's counsel on her behalf. On the taking of that oath by the two defendants, the suits were rightly dismissed by the Court below. The result is that both there applications are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.