JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an appeal from the judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Berhampur dismissing the Plaintiff's suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 5440/- with interest and costs from the Defendant. The Defendant executed a promissory note in favour of the Plaintiff on 29-9-1953 (Ext. A) and received Rs. 1000/- in cash and Rs. 3000/- by cheque promising to pay back the money with interest on demand. The Defendant, while admitting the execution of the promissory note and the receipt of money stated that he did not execute it in his personal capacity but as the Managing Director of a firm known as the Sugar Distillery and Timber Mills Limited. Hence he urged that the firm alone was liable for the repayment of the loan. This plea was negatived by the lower court who held on a construction of letters Exts. 1, 2 and 3 that the Defendant was personally liable to pay the money. But he dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that on the date on which the loan was advanced the Plaintiff was not a registered money-lender and that consequently Section 8 of the Orissa One-lenders Act operated as a complete bar to the recovery of the loan. This is the sole point for consideration in this appeal. 2. It is admitted that on the date of the loan, namely 29-9-1953, the Plaintiff's father Raghunath Sahu was alive and that he was the kartha of the joint family consisting of himself and his son the Plaintiff. Raghunath Sahu died only three days later, on 2-10-1953 and thereafter the Plaintiff became the kartha of the joint family. The Plaintiff also stated on oath that the money for the loan advanced came from the joint family property. The Plaintiff's father was a registered money-lender holding Registration Certificate No. 30 dated 8-4-1951 the maximum capital being Rs. 15000/-. It is also admitted that after Raghunath Sahu's death, his son (Plaintiff) took a Certificate of Registration on 2-1-1954 for a maximum capital of Rs. 15000/. 3. Thus the admitted position is that on the date of advance of the loan, namely 29-9-1953 the Plaintiff' was himself not a registered money-lender. Mr. Sinha for the Respondent therefore contended that Section 80 of the Orissa Money-lenders Act must operate as a complete bar to the filing of the present stilt. 15000/. 3. Thus the admitted position is that on the date of advance of the loan, namely 29-9-1953 the Plaintiff' was himself not a registered money-lender. Mr. Sinha for the Respondent therefore contended that Section 80 of the Orissa Money-lenders Act must operate as a complete bar to the filing of the present stilt. It is true that that section says that a money-lender shall not be entitled to institute a suit for recovery of a loan advanced by him...unless he is a registered under the Act at the time when such loan is advanced. If the expression 'money-lender' is construed in the present case as referring only to the Plaintiff in his personal capacity it is obvious that this section must operate as a complete bar. But Mr. Rao for the Appellant contended that the expression 'money-lender' in Section 8 includes only a person in whose name the loan was advanced but also a Hindu. Undivided family if in fact the loan was advanced by the family. He relied very much on the definition of the expression 'money-lender' in Section 2(j) of the Act which expressly says that the expression includes not only a person who advances a loan but also a Hindu Undivided Family. Mr. Rao therefore contended that on the facts as proved by he Plaintiff and not challenged by the Defendant it must be held that the loan was really advanced by the joint family consisting of the Plaintiff's father and himself, though the promissory note was taken in the name of an undivided coparcener who was not kartha at that time. He also urged that the Registration Certificate in the name of the Plaintiff's father must be construed to be the certificate of the Hindu joint family though he might not have expressly said so in his application for registration. Hence, according to Mr. Rao the loan having been advanced by the Hindu joint family and he registration certificate having been obtained in the name of the kartha of the family, Section 8 will not operate as a bar on the facts proved in this case. 4. I am inclined to accept Mr. Rao's contention. Hence, according to Mr. Rao the loan having been advanced by the Hindu joint family and he registration certificate having been obtained in the name of the kartha of the family, Section 8 will not operate as a bar on the facts proved in this case. 4. I am inclined to accept Mr. Rao's contention. The peculiar position of a Hindu joint family was well known to the Legislature and hence while defining the expression 'money-lender' in Section 2(j) the legislature took special care to include a Hindu undivided family within the scope of the definition, even though one individual alone might have advanced a loan. Hence in Section 8 of the Act we must, as a matter of construction, substitute the words "Hindu Undivided Family" wherever the word "money-lender" occurs and make consequential grammatically arterations, to the other expressions used in that section. If such a substitution is made Section 8 of the Act would for the purpose of this case read as follows: A Hindu undivided family shall not be entitled to institute a suit for the recovery of a loan advanced by the family...unless the family was registered under this Act at the time when such loan was advanced. Under the general Hindu law a Hindu Undivided family ordinarily acts through its kartha, even though some portions of the property may be in the name of other undivided co-parceners. Hence if the Registration Certificate is in the name of the kartha of a Hindu undivided family it would ordinarily be construed to be a certificate of the family unless there is some rebutting evidence to show that the certificate was taken by the kartha in his personal capacity can not as Manager of he undivided family. Here there is no such evidence. It is true that the Plaintiff's father Raghunath Sahu did not while obtaining the certificate in 1951, expressly say that he was taking it as the kartha of the family. But in an undivided family consisting of a Hindu father and his son, such an express recital in the application form is not ordinarily made and the presumption would be very strong indeed that the father acted as the kartha of the undivided family. But in an undivided family consisting of a Hindu father and his son, such an express recital in the application form is not ordinarily made and the presumption would be very strong indeed that the father acted as the kartha of the undivided family. I must therefore hold that the registration certificate obtained in the year 1951, though standing in the name of the Plaintiff's father, was really the registration certificate on behalf of the Hindu undivided family acting through its kartha. 5. The next question is: whether the loan was advanced by the joint family or by the Plaintiff in his separate capacity. It is true that even an undivided coparcener especially in a trading family might have separate business transactions of his own as distinct from the transactions of the family. But here there is absolutely no evidence to that effect. On the other hand the Plaintiff stated on oath that the money for the loan was advanced out of joint family funds and this statement has remained practically unrebutted. Thus when it is proved that the money for the loan was advanced from family funds even though the promissory note was taken in the name of the undivided coparcener ad there is absolutely no evidence to show that coparcener had separate transactions of his own, the reasonable inference must be that the loan was the loan of the joint family. In this view it must be held that the requirements of Section 8 of the Orissa Money-lenders Act have been fully complied with and there is no bar to the Plaintiff's instituting the suit notwithstanding the fact that he became the kartha of the family only three days after the date of advancement of the loan. 6. I may now deal with some of the decisions relied on by Mr. Sinha for the Respondents. In Meghraj Tibrawala Vs. Panchu Sahu Teli and Others, it was held that a person who advanced a loan on a handnote will not be permitted to say that the money came out of some-body else's funds and that with regard to negotiable instruments of this type no question of benami tranfiaction would arise. In that case the person in whose name the hand note was taken, took the plea that the money was actually advanced by his wife out of her own funds and that he was only a benamidar. In that case the person in whose name the hand note was taken, took the plea that the money was actually advanced by his wife out of her own funds and that he was only a benamidar. This contention was rejected. But in the present case the Plaintiff did not claim to be a benamidar for the Hindu undivided family but was only depending on the ordinary presumption under the Hindu law that where a joint family is proved to have existed, with adequate funds, and where evidence is also led to show that the funds of the family were utilised for advancing the suit loan, the mere fact that the hand note was taken in the name of one of the undivided coparceners will not suffice to show that the loan was not a joint family loan. In my opinion the aforesaid Patna decision has absolutely no application here bearing in mind the well known principles of Hindu law on the subject. 7. Mr Sinha then relied on Mst. Sahdeya Kuar and Others Vs. Rash Behari Singh, which at first bears a superficial resemblance to the instant case. There the hand note was taken in the name of the Plaintiff, one Rashbehari Singh at a time when he was a member of a joint family of which the kartha was one Mungeshwar Singh. The Plaintiff did not state anywhere at any time that the loan was really advanced out of joint family funds of which Mungeshwar Singh was the kartha. On the contrary the learned Judge on a review of the facts held that the loan was advanced by the Plaintiff himself. In this state of the evidence he over-ruled the argument that the loan was in fact advanced by Mungeshwar Singh as the kartha of the family and that though the Plaintiff had not registered himself as a money-lender, Mungeshwar Singh the Kartha was a registered money-lender and that his registration could save the suit from being barred u/s 4 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act (corresponding to Section 8 of the Orissa Money-lenders Act). The learned Judge went further and said that on the pleadings the Plaintiff should not be permitted to lead evidence to show that the loan was actually advanced n behalf of the joint family. The learned Judge went further and said that on the pleadings the Plaintiff should not be permitted to lead evidence to show that the loan was actually advanced n behalf of the joint family. The aforesaid facts in the Patna case are clearly distinguishable, from those in the instant case of in the present case also the Plaintiff had come forward with a clear case that the loan was his separate transaction with which the joint family had no connection whatsoever, he would not have been permitted to lead evidence contrary to the pleadings or to say that the loan was really a loan of the joint family. But a fair construction of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint would show that the Plaintiff from the beginning has been asserting that the loan was really the joint family loan though taken in his name. I may quote the aforesaid paragraphs: 5. The Plaintiff's father and the Plaintiff were members of a Joint Hindu family and the Plaintiff's father was the manager of the said family during his lifetime. He was a registered money-lender. (i) The date and number of his registration certificate are 8-4-1951 number 30 . (ii) The maximum capital in respect of which he held the certificate was Rs. 15000/-. 6. The Plaintiff was continuing the said family business in his name after the death of his father and hence the suit promissory note was taken in the name of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also got himself registered as a money-lender. (i) The date and number of his registration certificate are 2-1-1951 No. is 1 of 1954. (ii) The maximum capital in respect of which he holds the certificate is Rs. 15000/-. Mr. Sinha relied very much on the following sentence in paragraph 6 of the plaint, namely: The Plaintiff was continuing the said family business in his name after the death of his father and hence the suit promissory note was taken in the name of the Plaintiff. He urged that here there was a clear admission that the Plaintiff took over the joint family business only after tile death of his father on 2-10-1953 which necessarily involves an implied admission that prior to that date they business carried on by the Plaintiff was only in his personal capacity. I do not think that such a construction follows from the aforesaid sentence. I do not think that such a construction follows from the aforesaid sentence. The aforesaid sentence is doubtless some what contradictory. The use of the word "hence" is practically meaningless because the suit promissory note was taken three days prior to the death of this father when the Plaintiff was not the kartha of the family. Apparently there was some confusion in the mind of the Plaintiff when the aforesaid words were used in paragraph 6 of the plaint. But his main intention is clear namely that the loan was a joint family loan and that after the death of his father he became the kartha of the family and was bringing the suit in that capacity. This was perhaps the reason why when the Plaintiff led evidence to show that the money was advanced out of joint family funds the Defendant also did not object nor did the latter care to cross examine him in respect of this matter. In my opinion the decision of the Patna High Court in Mst. Sahdeya Kuar and Others Vs. Rash Behari Singh, is also not applicable. 8. Mr. Sinha then relied on a later decision of the same High Court of the same year reported in Jugal Prasad Misser Vs. Bhadai Das and Others, where their Lordships held that though the expression "money-lender" a defined in the interpretation clause in the Bihar Act would include an assignee or a successor-in interest of the person who advanced the loan, nevertheless in construing that expression in Section 4 of that Act the assignee or successor-in-interest of the original money-lender cannot be held to be a money-lender for the purpose of that section because such a construction would be repugnant to the subject or context. The learned Judges rightly emphasised that the words "at the time when the loan was advanced" occurring in Section 4 of the Bihar Act (which corresponds to Section 8 of the Orissa Act) definitely indicated that the money-lender contemplated in that Section must be the very person who advanced the loan and the expression could not possibly include an assignee or successor in interest who came into existence sometime after the loan was advanced. It is the that in applying the definition in the interpretation clause in the succeeding sections of any statute, if it is found that there is any repugnancy to the object or context, a wider inclusive definition may not be applicable, But this decision is of to help in the present case because there is no repugnancy to the subject or context of Section 8 which would make the definition of the expression 'money-lender' inapplicable to a Hindu undivided family. An assignee or successor-in-interest may come into existence after the loan is advanced. But where the loan is advanced by a member of a Hindu undivided family that family is in existence at the time when the loan is advanced. Hence there seems no reason why the inclusive definition of the expression "money-lender" given in Clause 2(j) of the Orissa Money-lenders Act should not be applied while construing Section 8, for the limited purpose of including a Hindu undivided family also within the scope of that definition. 9. For these reasons I am satisfied that Section 8 of the Orissa Money-lenders Act does not operate as a bar on the facts proved and admitted in this case. As all other points have been decided in favour of the Plaintiff, it must be held that his claim must be decreed. 10. The appeal is allowed the judgment and decree of the lower court are set aside and the Plaintiff's claim for Rs. 5440/- is decreed with costs. He will also be entitled to future interest at 6 percent per annum, from the date of institution of the suit till the date of complete repayment. Das, J. 11. I agree. Final Result : Allowed