Judgment K.Sahai, J. 1. The petitioner has been convicted under Sections 406 and 471 of the Penal Code, and has been sentenced for each offence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500.00 or, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months. The substantive sentences of imprisonment have been ordered to run concurrently. 2. Petitioner Dani Singh holds a fair-price shop at Kuserhi Centre. He was supplied on behalf of the Government with 84 maunds of wheat on payment of its price and sales tax. The prosecution case is that there is an ad hoc committee for Kuserhi Centre, and that the petitioner was instructed to sell the wheat to residents of villages Kuserhi, Mahmada, Dumri and Bhadrathi on slips issued by members of that committee. The petitioner did not carry out the instructions, and sold wheat to whomsoever be liked perhaps charging black market prices. Under the orders of the Block Development Officer (P. W. 2), the Circle Inspector (P. W. 6) went to village Kuserhi, and took possession of the stock register and the sale register from the petitioner. He found that there was no stock of wheat left with the petitioner. 3. On the facts mentioned above, charges for offences under Sections 406, 465, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code were framed against the petitioner. Subsequently, a charge for an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act was also framed against him. The trying Magistrate convicted him for all the offences with which he was charged; but the Additional Sessions Judge of Monghyr, who heard the appeal, set aside the petitioner s convictions under Sections 465 and 468 of the Penal Code as well as his conviction under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. He maintained the petitioners convictions and sentences only under the two sections which I have mentioned. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the offences for which the petitioner has been convicted have not been established against him. In so far as the offence under Sec. 406 is concerned, he has urged that the petitioner paid the price as well as the sales tax of the wheat which was supplied to him, and hence property in the entire 84 maunds of wheat passed to him. In my judgment, this argument is correct. In so far as the offence under Sec. 406 is concerned, he has urged that the petitioner paid the price as well as the sales tax of the wheat which was supplied to him, and hence property in the entire 84 maunds of wheat passed to him. In my judgment, this argument is correct. It may be that, under the conditions of his licence, the petitioner may have had to dispose of the wheat, which was sold to him, in a particular manner; but a breach of any of those conditions could only make him liable under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. He has, however, been acquitted of the charge under that section, 5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed in his judgment that the transaction of supply of wheat to the petitioner was not really a transaction of sale, that the wheat still remained the property of the Government, though he deposited money which was equivalent to the price of the wheat calculated at a certain rate, before it was issued to him, and that the wheat must be held to have been entrusted to the petitioner on behalf of the Government. I am unable to find any support for this line of reasoning. The Circle Inspector (P. W. 6) has stated that the price of wheat and sales tax charged for 84 maunds of wheat as per store order was Rs. 1,194,97, and that the wheat price at that time was at the rate of Rs. 14/- per maund. He has further said that the petitioner deposited the money in the office, and thereafter wheat was issued to him. He has nowhere said that the amount was merely the equivalent of the value of the wheat and was not paid as the price of the wheat. When a person pays the price of a commodity to the owner of that commodity or his representative, who delivers the commodity in consideration of the price, the transaction is clearly one of sale. In my opinion, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner purchased the wheat on payment of its proper price, and the property in the wheat passed to him on such purchase. It cannot, therefore, be held that the wheat was entrusted to the petitioner on behalf of the Government. In my opinion, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner purchased the wheat on payment of its proper price, and the property in the wheat passed to him on such purchase. It cannot, therefore, be held that the wheat was entrusted to the petitioner on behalf of the Government. This view receives support from the decision in Satyendra Nath V/s. Emperor, ILR (1947) 1 Cal 97, though the facts of that case are somewhat dissimilar. 6. I may further mention that the prosecution case relating to the manner of sale of wheat by the petitioner to the residents of the four villages suffers from great confusion. It is alleged that the petitioner was instructed to supply wheat to particular individuals on the basis of slips issued by members of the ad hoc committee; but there is no evidence at all to show that any such instruction was actually given to the petitioner. The Block Development Officer (P. W. 2) has been questioned in this connection, and he has stated that he is unable to say if the petitioner had been asked to distribute grains through the ad hoc committee. P. W. 25 has said that the petitioner had received Government grains at least twice or thrice before he received the 84 maunds of wheat in question. On this basis, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has assumed that the petitioner must have known the method of supply or sale of wheat to the people of the four villages. This assumption is obviously incorrect because the evidence on the record shows that the ad hoc committee was not functioning at all, and no member was issuing any slip. Reference may be made in this connection to the evidence of P. W.s 3, 9, 15 and 22, which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has considered in paragraph 10 of his judgment. After a consideration of their evidence, he has observed that it might be that the committee was not working properly but it was the duty of the petitioner to approach the members of the Committee and to ask them to issue slips. It seems to me that it was no business of the petitioner to ask the members of the ad hoc committee to do their duties. It is obvious that the committee was not functioning at all. It seems to me that it was no business of the petitioner to ask the members of the ad hoc committee to do their duties. It is obvious that the committee was not functioning at all. That being so, the petitioner must have been selling grains even previously to different persons without production of slips issued by a member of the committee. This is the only conclusion which I can reach, in view of the fact that there is no evidence that he was given any instruction to sell grains on the basis of slips issued by the members of the committee and in view of the facts that the committee was not functioning. 7. For the reasons which I have given above, it is clear that the offence of criminal breach of trust under Sec. 406 of the Penal Code has not been made out against the petitioner. 8. The next question is whether the offence under Sec. 471 of the Penal Code has been proved. Several persons appear to have put their signatures or thumb impressions in the sale register, which purports to have been maintained by the petitioner, in token of having received different amounts of grains. Some of those persons, viz., P. Ws. 4, 5 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 17, 18 19, 21 and 24 have denied having purchased wheat from the petitioner and having put their signatures or thumb impressions on the sale register. It appears that specimen signatures and thumb impressions of many of these witnesses were taken by the police for comparison; but the only evidence of comparison which has been adduced is that the alleged thumb impression of P. W. 24 against item No. 47 in the sale register does not tally with his specimen thumb impression. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that even if the alleged thumb impression on the sale register is held to be forged, there is. no evidence to show that the petitioner knew, or had reason to believe, that it was a forged thumb impression. The Circle Inspector (P. W. 6) has stated that he does not know who has written the sale register. He has stated that the petitioners signature is to be found on every page of the sale register; but this is incorrect. I do not find his > signature on most of the pages of the sale register. The Circle Inspector (P. W. 6) has stated that he does not know who has written the sale register. He has stated that the petitioners signature is to be found on every page of the sale register; but this is incorrect. I do not find his > signature on most of the pages of the sale register. It is to be found only on a few pages. In any case, he has not signed the page which contains item No. 47. It may be that the man who wrote the sale register took the thumb impression of a wrong man in place of that of Beni Dharhi (P.; W. 24); but it is impossible to hold that the peti-. tioner knew, or had reason to believe, that the thumb impression was forged. 9. It is difficult to accept the evidence of the other witnesses who have said that they did not purchase wheat from the petitioner, and did not put their signatures or thumb impressions upon the sale register, because I do not see why the petitioner would have obtained forged signatures and thumb impressions. As no slips were being issued for sale of wheat by him to different persons and as he was selling the wheat to any one he liked, it seems to me that he could easily have taken genuine thumb impressions and signatures of persons to whom he supplied wheat, on his sale register. Particularly it is important to note that no evidence of comparison of their specimen signatures or thumb impressions with their alleged signatures and thumb impressions on the sale register is forthcoming. In these circumstances, I am unable to hold that any thumb impression or signature on the sale register is forged. The petitioners conviction under Sec. 471 of the Penal Code for user of a forged document cannot therefore, be maintained. 10. In the result, I allow the application, set aside the convictions and sentences recorded against the petitioner, and acquit him.