Judgment :- 1. Pending a suit to set aside a compromise decree in part and the execution proceedings therein to that extent, the judgment-debtor - plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the decree-holders - defendants from executing that portion of the decree. The application was allowed by both the lower courts and the 1st defendant seeks to vacate it in revision. 2. The only question for adjudication is whether the order of temporary injunction granted by the lower courts can be sustained. S.94 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the court may, if it is so prescribed, grant a temporary injunction. 0.39 R.1 and 2 prescribe when temporary injunctions may be granted. R.1 lays down that where in any suit it is proved that any property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold or delivered in execution of a decree, or that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors, the court may grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, "or make such other order for staying or preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or dispossession of the property as the court thinks fit, until the suit is disposed of or until further orders. R.2 provides that in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after the judgment, apply to the court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right, and the court may by order grant such injunction. These are the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding temporary injunctions. S.94 makes it clear beyond doubt that a temporary injunction may be issued, if it is so prescribed; which means, if it is prescribed by the Rules. These are the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding temporary injunctions. S.94 makes it clear beyond doubt that a temporary injunction may be issued, if it is so prescribed; which means, if it is prescribed by the Rules. That means that the powers of the court to issue temporary injunctions must be found within the four corners of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely within R.1 and 2 of 0.39. 3. In T.C. Kunhukuttan Nair v. Sibakumaran (1958 KLT. 385) a Division Bench of this Court took the aforesaid view and observed that whatever might be the inherent powers of the Chartered High Courts in such cases, so far as the other courts were concerned, the inherent power under S.151 of the Code to make such orders as might be necessary to meet the ends of justice could not be invoked to grant temporary injunction in oases, where the conditions laid down in R.1 and 2 of 0.39 did not obtain. This view of pur High Court is amply supported by decisions of other High Courts, for example, see Murugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu, Mudali (AIR. 1938 M. 190), Kuppammal v. Seetharama Aiyer (AIR. 1948 M. 528), K. Nagabhushana Reddy v. K.V. Srinivasa Reddy (AIR. 1951 M. 279), Subramanian v. Seetarama Aiyar (AIR. 1949 M. 104), Hemant Kumar v. Ayodhya Prasad (AIR. 1957 M. B. 95), Ram Sharup v. Ram Prasad (AIR. 1953 M. B. 154) and Abdul Hamid Khan v. Tridip Kumar Chanda (AIR. 1953 Assam 104). 4. The learned advocate of the respondent invites my attention to a decision of this Court by Vaidialingam, J., in Itten v. Subramonia Iyer (1958 KLT. 327). There also the learned judge observed that it could not be said that a party executing a decree lawfully obtained, which had become final and which was not challenged in any way, was causing any property to be sold or delivered wrongfully in execution of the decree. 327). There also the learned judge observed that it could not be said that a party executing a decree lawfully obtained, which had become final and which was not challenged in any way, was causing any property to be sold or delivered wrongfully in execution of the decree. In that decision there is an observation to the effect that "there is no dispute that the decree itself is not being challenged in the present proceedings and what the plaintiff claims is some special rights in the properties before he can be dispossessed." Basing on this observation the learned counsel of the respondent argues that in a case, where the decree sought to be executed is itself being challenged in the suit pending which temporary injunction is sought, the position is different. I do not think that this contention is justified. If the several decisions of the various High Courts herein before referred to are looked into, it would appear that in almost all of them the decree sought to be executed were themselves being impugned in the suits. Therefore, this contention has no basis whatsoever. The observation of Vaidialingam, J. brought to my notice is only a casual observation, which has no such conclusive bearing on the decision of my learned brother. 5. In the case before me the decree sought to be avoided is a compromise decree and the decree is still in force; and merely because a suit is filed to set it aside, it cannot be said that by the execution of the decree injury of any kind would be caused to the judgment-debtor-plaintiff. Until the decree is set aside the execution of the decree is only a lawful proceeding, which the decree-holder is entitled to prosecute; and therefore, by such execution no injury could be presumed to result. 6. The result is the order of the lower courts has to be set aside. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order of temporary injunction is sot aside. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout. Allowed.